LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Gl  FT    OF 


, L 

Class 


OUTLINES  OF 

SYSTEMATIC   THEOLOGY 


OUTLINES 


SYSTEMATIC    THEOLOGY 


DESIGNED    FOR    THE    USE    OF 
THEOLOGICAL    STUDENTS 


BY 


AUGUSTUS    HOPKINS    STRONG,  D.  D.,  LL.  D. 

PRESIDENT    AND    PROFESSOR    OF    BIBLICAL    THBOLOGY    IN    THB 
ROCHESTER    THEOLOGICAL    SEMINARY 


PHILADELPHIA 

AMEKICAN  BAPTIST  PUBLICATION  SOCIETY 
BOSTON  CHICAGO  ATLANTA 

NEW  YOBK       ST.  Louis         DALLAS 


COPYRIGHT, 

BY    AUGUSTUS    HOPKINS    STRONG, 
1908. 


Cfctfeto  2>eo  daltoatorf* 


180121 


THE  EYE  SEES  ONLY  THAT  WHICH  IT  BRINGS  WITH  IT  THE  POWER 

Cicero. 


THOU  MINE  EYES,  THAT  I  MAY  BEHOLD   WONDROUS  THINGS 

OUT  OF  THT  LAW."  —  Psalm  119  :  18. 

"  FOR  WITH  THEE  IS  THE  FOUNTAIN  OF  LIFE  :   IN  THY  LIGHT  SHALL 

WE  SEE  LIGHT."  —  Psalm  36  :  9. 

"  FOR  WE  KNOW  IN  PART,  AND  WE  PROPHESY  IN  PART  ;  BUT  WHEN 
THAT  WHICH  IS  PERFECT  IS  COME,  THAT  WHICH  IS  IN  PART 
SHALL  BE  DONE  AWAY."—  1  Cor.  13  :  9,  10. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 

The  present  work  contains  the  substance  of  my  "Systematic 
Theology."  It  omits  all  bibliographical  and  illustrative  material, 
and  confines  itself  to  bare  statements  of  doctrine.  Those  readers 
who  desire  further  explanation  of  the  various  points  under  discus- 
sion will  find  their  needs  supplied  in  the  larger  work,  a  description 
of  which  immediately  follows  this  Introductory  Note.  It  is 
thought  that  the  present  volume  may  have  its  special  value  as  a 
text-book  and  basis  for  class-recitation,  supplemented,  as  such 
recitation  may  be,  by  the  oral  expositions  of  the  teacher.  As  this 
volume,  however,  contains  all  the  large  print  of  the  larger  work,  it 
constitutes  in  itself  a  complete  whole,  and  presents  the  author's 
views  in  all  essential  particulars. 

ROCHESTER  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY, 

ROCHESTER,  N.  Y.,  MAY  1,  1908. 


vii 


PEEFAOE 

TO  THE  AUTHOR'S  "SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY"  IN  THREE  VOLUMES. 


The  present  work  is  a  revision  and  enlargement  of  my 
"Systematic  Theology,"  first  published  in  1886.  Of  the  original 
work  there  haye  been  printed  seven  editions,  each  edition  embody- 
ing successive  corrections  and  supposed  improvements.  During 
the  twenty  years  which  have  intervened  since  its  first  publication 
I  have  accumulated  much  new  material,  which  I  now  offer  to  the 
reader.  My  philosophical  and  critical  point  of  view  meantime  has 
also  somewhat  changed.  While  I  still  hold  to  the  old  doctrines,  I 
interpret  them  differently  and  expound  them  more  clearly,  because 
I  seem  to  myself  to  have  reached  a  fundamental  truth  which 
throws  new  light  upon  them  all.  This  truth  I  have  tried  to  set 
forth  in  my  book  entitled  "  Christ  in  Creation,"  and  to  that  book 
I  refer  the  reader  for  further  information. 

That  Christ  is  the  one  and  only  Eevealer  of  God,  in  nature,  in 
humanity,  in  history,  in  science,  in  Scripture,  is  in  my  judgment 
the  key  to  theology.  This  view  implies  a  monistic  and  idealistic 
conception  of  the  world,  together  with  an  evolutionary  idea  as  to 
its  origin  and  progress.  But  it  is  the  very  antidote  to  pantheism, 
in  that  it  recognizes  evolution  as  only  the  method  of  the  tran- 
scendent and  personal  Christ,  who  fills  all  in  all,  and  who  makes  the 
universe  teleological  and  moral  from  its  centre  to  its  circumference 
and  from  its  beginning  until  now. 

Neither  evolution  nor  the  higher  criticism  has  any  terrors  to  one 
who  regards  them  as  parts  of  Christ's  creating  and  educating  pro- 
cess. The  Christ  in  whom  are  hid  all  the  treasures  of  wisdom  and 

ix 


X  PKEFACE. 

knowledge  himself  furnishes  all  the  needed  safeguards  and  limita- 
tions. It  is  only  because  Christ  has  been  forgotten  that  nature  and 
law  have  been  personified,  that  history  has  been  regarded  as  unpur- 
posed  development,  that  Judaism  has  been  referred  to  a  merely 
human  origin,  that  Paul  has  been  thought  to  have  switched  the 
church  off  from  its  proper  track  even  before  it  had  gotten  fairly 
started  on  its  course,  that  superstition  and  illusion  have  come  to 
seem  the  only  foundation  for  the  sacrifices  of  the  martyrs  and  the 
triumphs  of  modern  missions.  I  believe  in  no  such  irrational  and 
atheistic  evolution  as  this.  I  believe  rather  in  him  in  whom  all 
things  consist,  who  is  with  his  people  even  to  the  end  of  the  world, 
and  who  has  promised  to  lead  them  into  all  the  truth. 

Philosophy  and  science  are  good  servants  of  Christ,  but  they  are 
poor  guides  when  they  rule  out  the  Son  of  God.  As  I  reach  my 
seventieth  year  and  write  these  words  on  my  birthday,  I  am  thank- 
ful for  that  personal  experience  of  union  with  Christ  which  has 
enabled  me  to  see  in  science  and  philosophy  the  teaching  of  my 
Lord.  But  this  same  personal  experience  has  made  me  even  more 
alive  to  Christ's  teaching  in  Scripture,  has  made  me  recognize  in 
Paul  and  John  a  truth  profounder  than  that  disclosed  by  any 
secular  writers,  truth  with  regard  to  sin  and  atonement  for  sin, 
that  satisfies  the  deepest  wants  of  my  nature  and  that  is  self- 
evidencing  and  divine. 

I  am  distressed  by  some  common  theological  tendencies  of  onr 
time,  because  I  believe  them  to  be  false  to  both  science  and 
religion.  How  men  who  have  ever  felt  themselves  to  be  lost  sin- 
ners and  who  have  once  received  pardon  from  their  crucified  Lord 
and  Savior  can  thereafter  seek  to  pare  down  his  attributes,  deny 
his  deity  and  atonement,  tear  from  his  brow  the  crown  of  miracle 
and  sovereignty,  relegate  him  to  the  place  of  a  merely  moral  teacher 
who  influences  us  only  as  does  Socrates  by  words  spoken  across  a 
stretch  of  ages,  passes  my  comprehension.  Here  is  my  test  of 


PREFACE.  XI 

orthodoxy  :  Do  we  pray  to  Jesus  ?  Do  we  call  upon  the  name  of 
Christ,  as  did  Stephen  and  all  the  early  church  ?  Is  he  our  living 
Lord,  omnipresent,  omniscient,  omnipotent  ?  Is  he  divine  only 
in  the  sense  in  which  we  are  divine,  or  is  he  the  only-begotten  Son, 
God  manifest  in  the  flesh,  in  whom  is  all  the  fulness  of  the 
Godhead  bodily  ?  What  think  ye  of  the  Christ  ?  is  still  the  critical 
question,  and  none  are  entitled  to  the  name  of  Christian  who,  in  the 
face  of  the  evidence  he  has  furnished  us,  cannot  answer  the  ques- 
tion aright. 

Under  the  influence  of  Ritschl  and  his  Kantian  relativism,  many 
of  our  teachers  and  preachers  have  swung  off  into  a  practical  denial 
of  Christ's  deity  and  of  his  atonement.  We  seem  upon  the  verge 
of  a  second  Unitarian  defection,  that  will  break  up  churches  and 
compel  secessions,  in  a  worse  manner  than  did  that  of  Channing 
and  Ware  a  century  ago.  American  Christianity  recovered  from 
that  disaster  only  by  vigorously  asserting  the  authority  of  Christ 
and  the  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures.  We  need  a  new  vision  of 
the  Savior  like  that  which  Paul  saw  on  the  way  to  Damascus  and 
John  saw  on  the  isle  of  Patmos,  to  convince  us  that  Jesus  is  lifted 
above  space  and  time,  that  his  existence  antedated  creation,  that  he 
conducted  the  march  of  Hebrew  history,  that  he  was  born  of  a 
Virgin,  suffered  on  the  Cross,  rose  from  the  dead,  and  now  lives 
f  orevermore,  the  Lord  of  the  universe,  the  only  God  with  whom  we 
have  to  do,  our  Savior  here  and  our  Judge  hereafter.  Without  a 
revival  of  this  faith  our  churches  will  become  secularized,  mission 
enterprise  will  die  out,  and  the  candlestick  will  be  removed  out  of 
its  place  as  it  was  with  the  seven  churches  of  Asia,  and  as  it  has 
been  with  the  apostate  churches  of  New  England. 

I  print  this  revised  and  enlarged  edition  of  my  "  Systematic 
Theology,"  in  the  hope  that  its  publication  may  do  something  to 
stem  this  fast  advancing  tide,  and  to  confirm  the  faith  of  God's 
elect.  I  make  no  doubt  that  the  vast  majority  of  Christians  still 


Xli  PREFACE. 

hold  the  faith  that  was  once  for  all  delivered  to  the  saints,  and  that 
they  will  sooner  or  later  separate  themselves  from  those  who  deny 
the  Lord  who  bought  them.  When  the  enemy  comes  in  like  a 
flood,  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  will  raise  up  a  standard  against  him. 
I  would  do  my  part  in  raising  up  such  a  standard.  I  would  lead 
others  to  avow  anew,  as  I  do  now,  in  spite  of  the  supercilious 
assumptions  of  modern  infidelity,  my  firm  belief,  only  confirmed 
by  the  experience  and  reflection  of  a  half  century,  in  the  old 
doctrines  of  holiness  as  the  fundamental  attribute  of  God,  of  an 
original  transgression  and  sin  of  the  whole  human  race,  in  a  divine 
preparation  in  Hebrew  history  for  man's  redemption,  in  the  deity, 
preexistence,  virgin  birth,  vicarious  atonement  and  bodily  resur- 
rection of  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord,  and  in  his  future  coming  to  judge 
the  quick  and  the  dead.  I  believe  that  these  are  truths  of  science 
as  well  as  truths  of  revelation  ;  that  the  supernatural  will  yet  be 
seen  to  be  most  truly  natural ;  and  that  not  the  open  minded  theo- 
logian but  the  narrow  minded  scientist  will  be  obliged  to  hide  his 
head  at  Christ's  coming. 

The  present  volume,  in  its  treatment  of  Ethical  Monism,  Inspir- 
ation, the  Attributes  of  God,  and  the  Trinity,  contains  an  antidote 
to  most  of  the  false  doctrine  which  now  threatens  the  safety  of  the 
church.  I  desire  especially  to  call  attention  to  the  section  on 
Perfection,  and  the  Attributes  therein  involved,  because  I  believe 
that  the  recent  merging  of  Holiness  in  Love,  and  the  practical 
denial  that  Eighteousness  is  fundamental  in  God's  nature,  are 
responsible  for  the  utilitarian  views  of  law  and  the  superficial  views 
of  sin  which  now  prevail  in  some  systems  of  theology.  There  can 
be  no  proper  doctrine  of  the  atonement  and  no  proper  doctrine  of 
retribution,  so  long  as  Holiness  is  refused  its  preeminence.  Love 
must  have  a  norm  or  standard,  and  this  norm  or  standard  can  be 
found  only  in  Holiness.  The  old  conviction  of  sin  and  the  sense  of 
guilt  that  drove  the  convicted  sinner  to  the  Cross  are  inseparable 


PREFACE. 

from  a  firm  belief  in  the  self-affirming  attribute  of  God  as  logically 
prior  to  and  as  conditioning  the  self-communicating  attribute.  The 
theology  of  our  day  needs  a  new  view  of  the  Righteous  One.  Such 
a  view  will  make  it  plain  that  God  must  be  reconciled  before  man 
can  be  saved,  and  that  the  human  conscience  can  be  pacified  only 
upon  condition  that  propitiation  is  made  to  the  divine  Righteous- 
ness. In  this  volume  I  propound  what  I  regard  as  the  true  Doc- 
trine of  God,  because  upon  it  will  be  based  all  that  follows  in  the 
volumes  on  the  Doctrine  of  Man,  and  the  Doctrine  of  Salvation. 

The  universal  presence  of  Christ,  the  Light  that  lighteth  every 
man,  in  heathen  as  well  as  in  Christian  lands,  to  direct  or  overrule 
all  movements  of  the  human  mind,  gives  me  confidence  that  the 
recent  attacks  upon  the  Christian  faith  will  fail  of  their  purpose. 
It  becomes  evident  at  last  that  not  only  the  outworks  are  assaulted, 
but  the  very  citadel  itself.  We  are  asked  to  give  up  all  belief  in 
special  revelation.  Jesus  Christ,  it  is  said,  has  come  in  the  flesh 
precisely  as  each  one  of  us  has  come,  and  he  was  before  Abraham 
only  in  the  same  sense  that  we  were.  Christian  experience  knows 
how  to  characterize  such  doctrine  so  soon  as  it  is  clearly  stated. 
And  the  new  theology  will  be  of  use  in  enabling  even  ordinary 
believers  to  recognize  soul-destroying  heresy  even  under  the  mask 
of  professed  orthodoxy. 

I  make  no  apology  for  the  homiletical  element  in  my  book.  To 
be  either  true  or  useful,  theology  must  be  a  passion.  Pectus  est 
quod  theologum  facit,  and  no  disdainful  cries  of  "Pectoral 
Theology  ! "  shall  prevent  me  from  maintaining  that  the  eyes  of  the 
heart  must  be  enlightened  in  order  to  perceive  the  truth  of  God, 
and  that  to  know  the  truth  it  is  needful  to  do  the  truth.  Theology 
is  a  science  which  can  be  successfully  cultivated  only  in  connection 
with  its  practical  application.  I  would  therefore,  in  every  discus- 
sion of  its  principles,  point  out  its  relations  to  Christian  experience, 
and  its  power  to  awaken  Christian  emotions  and  lead  to  Christian 


XIV  PREFACE. 

decisions.  Abstract  theology  is  not  really  scientific.  Only  that 
theology  is  scientific  which  brings  the  student  to  the  feet  of  Christ. 
I  would  hasten  the  day  when  in  the  name  of  Jesus  every  knee  shall 
bow.  I  believe  that,  if  any  man  serve  Christ,  him  the  Father  will 
honor,  and  that  to  serve  Christ  means  to  honor  him  as  I  honor  the 
Father.  I  would  not  pride  myself  that  I  believe  so  little,  but 
rather  that  I  believe  so  much.  Faith  is  God's  measure  of  a  man. 
Why  should  I  doubt  that  God  spoke  to  the  fathers  through  the 
prophets  ?  Why  should  I  think  it  incredible  that  God  should  raise 
the  dead  ?  The  things  that  are  impossible  with  men  are  possible 
with  God.  When  the  Son  of  man  comes,  shall  he  find  faith  on  the 
earth  ?  Let  him  at  least  find  faith  in  us  who  profess  to  be  his 
followers.  In  the  conviction  that  the  present  darkness  is  but 
temporary  and  that  it  will  be  banished  by  a  glorious  sunrising,  I 
give  this  new  edition  of  my  "Theology"  to  the  public  with  the 
prayer  that  whatever  of  good  seed  is  in  it  may  bring  forth  fruit, 
and  that  whatever  plant  the  heavenly  Father  has  not  planted  may 
be  rooted  up. 
ROCHESTER  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY, 

ROCHESTER,  N.  Y.,  AUGUST  3,  1906. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

INTRODUCTORY  NOTE, vii 

PREFACE, xi-xiv 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS, xv-xxviii 

PAET  I.— PROLEGOMENA, 1-17 

CHAPTER  I.—  IDEA  OF  THEOLOGY, 1-8 

I.—  Definition  of  Theology, 1 

II.—  Aim  of  Theology, 1 

III. — Possibility  of  Theology  —  grounded  in, 1-5 

1.  The  existence  of  a  God, 1-2 

2.  Man's  capacity  for  the  knowledge  of  God, 2-3 

3.  God's  revelation  of  himself  to  man, 3-5 

IV. —  Necessity  of  Theology, 5-6 

V.—  Relation  of  Theology  to  Religion, 7-8 

CHAPTER  H—  MATERIAL  OF  THEOLOGY, 9-12 

I.— Sources  of  Theology, 9-11 

1.  Scripture  and  Nature, 9-10 

2.  Scripture  and  Rationalism, 10 

3.  Scripture  and  Mysticism, 10-11 

4.  Scripture  and  Romanism, 11 

II. — Limitations  of  Theology, 11-12 

HI. —  Relations  of  Material  to  Progress  in  Theology, 12 

CHAPTER  HE. —  METHOD  OF  THEOLOGY, 13-17 

I.— Requisites  to  the  Study  of  Theology, 13 

II. — Divisions  of  Theology, 13-14 

III.—  History  of  Systematic  Theology, 14-15 

IV. —  Order  of  Treatment, 15-16 

V.—  Text-books  in  Theology, •  — ^ 16~17 

PART  II.— THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD, 18-32 

CHAPTER  I.—  ORIGIN  OF  OUR  IDEA  OF  GOD'S  EXISTENCE,  .......  18-23 

I.— First  Truths  in  General, 18-19 

H.— The  Existence  of  God  a  First  Truth, 19-20 

1.  Its  universality, 19 

2.  Its  necessity, 19-20 

3.  Its  logical  independence  and  priority, 20 

III. —  Other  supposed  Sources  of  the  Idea, 21-22 

IV.—  Contents  of  this  Intuition, 22-23 

xv 


XVI  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  II.—  CORROBORATIVE  EVIDENCES  OP  GOD'S  EXISTENCE,  24-28 

I. — The  Cosmological  Argument, 24-25 

H.— The  Teleogical  Argument, 25-26 

III. — The  Anthropological  Argument, 26-27 

IV.—  The  Ontological  Argument, 27-28 

CHAPTER  III.—  ERRONEOUS  EXPLANATIONS,  AND  CONCLUSION,  . . .  29-32 

I. — Materialism, 29-30 

II. — Materialism  Idealism, 30 

III.—  Idealistic  Pantheism, 30-31 

IV. —  Ethical  Monism, 31-32 

PABTHI.—  THE   SCRIPTURES   A  REVELATION   FROM 

GOD, 33-66 

CHAPTER  I.—  PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS, 34-42 

I. —  Reasons  a  priori  for  expecting  a  Revelation  from  God, . .  33-34 

II. — Marks  of  the  Revelation  man  may  expect, 34-35 

III. —  Miracles  as  attesting  a  Divine  Revelation, 35-39 

1.  Definition  of  Miracle, 35-36 

2.  Possibility  of  Miracles, 36 

3.  Probability  of  Miracles, 36-37 

4.  Amount  of  Testimony  necessary  to  prove  a  Miracle, 37-38 

5.  Evidential  Force  of  Miracles, 38 

6.  Counterfeit  Miracles, 39 

IV. —  Prophecy  as  attesting  a  Divine  Revelation, 39-41 

V.  —  Principles  of  Historical  Evidence  applicable  to  the  Proof 

of  a  Divine  Revelation, 41-42 

1.  As  to  Documentary  Evidence, 41 

2.  As  to  Testimony  in  General, 41-42 

CHAPTER  IL —  POSITIVE  PROOFS  THAT  THE  SCRIPTURES  ARE  A 

DIVINE  REVELATION, 43-55 

I, —  Genuineness  of  the  Christian  Documents, 43-49 

1.  Genuineness  of  the  Books  of  the  New  Testament, 43-48 

1st.  The  Myth-theory  of  Strauss, 45-46 

2d.  The  Tendency-theory  of  Baur, 46-47 

3d.  The  Romance-theory  of  Renan, 47 

4th.  The  Development-theory  of  Harnack, 47-43 

2.  Genuineness  of  the  Books  of  the  Old  Testament, 48-49 

II. — Credibility  of  the  "Writers  of  the  Scriptures, 49-50 

III. —  Supernatural  Character  of  the  Scripture  Teaching, 50-52 

1.  Scripture  Teaching  in  General, 50-51 

2.  Moral  System  of  the  New  Testament, 51 

3.  The  Person  and  Character  of  Christ, 51-52 

4.  The  Testimony  of  Christ  to  Himself, 52 

IV. —  Historical  Results  of    the    Propagation    of    Scripture, 

Doctrine, 53-54 

CHAPTER  HI. —  INSPIRATION  OP  THE  SCRIPTURES, 55-56 

L —  Definition  of  Inspiration, 55 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XV11 

H.—  Proof  of  Inspiration, 55-56 

III.—  Theories  of  Inspiration, 56-58 

1.  The  Intuition-theory, 56-57 

2.  The  Illumination-theory, 57 

3.  The  Dictation-theory, 57-58 

4.  The  Dynamical-theory, 58 

IV. —  The  Union  of  the  Divine    and    Human  Elements  in 

Inspiration, 58-61 

V. —  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Inspiration, 61-66 

1.  Errors  in  Matters  of  Science, 61-62 

2.  Errors  in  Matters  of  History,   62 

3.  Errors  in  Morality, 63 

4.  Errors  of  Seasoning, 63 

5.  Errors  in  Quoting  or  Interpreting  the  Old  Testament, . . .  63-64 

6.  Errors  in  Prophecy, 64 

7.  Certain  Books  unworthy  of  a  Place  in  Inspired  Scripture,  64 

8.  Portions  of  the  Scripture  Books  written  by  others  than 

the  Persons  to  whom  they  are  ascribed, 64-64 

9.  Sceptical  or  Fictitious  Narratives, 65 

10.  Acknowledgment  of  the    Non-inspiration    of  Scripture 

Teachers  and  their  Writings, 65-66 

PABTIV.— THE   NATUKE,  DECEEES,  AND  WOBKS  OF 

GOD, 67-123 

CHAPTER  I. —  THE  ATTRIBUTES  OP  GOD, 67-81 

I. — Definition  of  the  term  Attributes, 67 

II. —  Belation  of  the  Divine  Attributes  to  the  Divine  Essence, .  67-68 

HI.— Methods  of  Determining  the  Divine  Attributes, 68-69 

IV.—  Classification  of  the  Attributes 69-70 

V. — Absolute  or  Immanent  Attributes, 70-75 

First  Division.  —  Spirituality,   and    Attributes  therein 

involved, 70-71 

1.  Life, 71 

2.  Personality, •     71 

Second  Division. — Infinity,    and    Attributes    therein 

involved, 72  73 

1.  Self-existence, 72 

2.  Immutability, 72-73 

3.  Unity, 73 

Third  Division. — Perfection,   and   Attributes  therein 

involved, 73-75 

1.  Truth, 73-74 

2.  Love, 74-75 

3.  Holiness, 75 

VI.  —  Belative  or  Transitive  Attributes, 76-79 

First  Division. — Attributes  having   relation  to  Time 

and  Space, 76 

1.  Eternity, 76 


XY111  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

2.  Immensity, 76 

Second  Division. — Attributes  having  relation  to  Cre- 
ation,   76-78 

1.  Omnipresence, 76-77 

2.  Omniscience, 77 

3.  Omnipotence, 77-78 

Third  Division. — Attributes  having  relation  to  Moral 

Beings, 78-79 

1.     Veracity  and  Faithfulness,  or  Transitive  Truth,  78 

2. — Mercy  and  Goodness,  or  Transitive  Love, 78 

3.     Justice    and     Bighteousness,     or     Transitive 

Holiness, 78-79 

YH.—  Bank  and  Belations  of  the  several  Attributes, 79-81 

1.  Holiness  the  Fundamental  Attribute  in  God, 79-80 

2.  The  Holiness  of  God  the  Ground  of  Moral  Obligation,. . .  80-81 

CHAPTER  n.— DOOTBINE  OF  THE  TRINITY, 82-94 

L — In  Scripture  there  are  Three  who  are  recognized  as  God,.  82-86 

1.  Proofs  from  New  Testament, 82-85 

A.  The  Father  is  recognized  as  God, 82 

B.  Jesus  Christ  is  recognized  as  God, 82-85 

C.  The  Holy  Spirit  is  recognized  as  God, 85 

2.  Intimations  of  the  Old  Testament, 85-86 

A.  Passages  which  seem  to  teach  Plurality  of  some 

Bort  in  the  Godhead, 85  86 

B.  Passages  relating  to  the  Angel  of  Jehovah, 86 

C.  Descriptions  of  the  Divine  Wisdom  and  Work,. . .  86 

D.  Descriptions  of  the  Messiah, 86 

IE. —  These  Three  are  so  described  in  Scripture,  that  we  are 

compelled  to  conceive  them  as  distinct  Persons, 87-88 

1.  The  Father  and  the  Son  are  Persons  distinct  from 

each  other, 87 

2.  The  Father  and  the  Son  are  Persons  distinct  from 

the  Spirit, 

3.  The  Holy  Spirit  is  a  Person, 87-88 

III. —  This  Tripersonality  of  the  Divine  Nature  is  not  merely 

economic  and  temporal,  but  is  immanent  and  eternal,. .  88-89 

1.  Scripture  Proof  that  these  distinctions  of  Per- 

sonality are  eternal, 88 

2.  Errors  refuted  by  the  Scripture  Passages, 88-89 

A.  The  SabeUian, 88 

B.  The  Arian, 88  89 

IV. —  While  there  are  three  Persons,  there  is  but  one  Essence, .  89 

V.— These  three  Persons  are  Equal, 89-92 

1.  These  Titles  belong  to  the  Persons, 89-90 

2.  Qualified  Sense  of  these  Titles, 90-91 

3.  Generation  and  Procession  consistent  with  Equality,  91-92 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xix 

VL — The  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  inscrutable,  yet  not  self- 
contradictory,  but  the  Key  to  all  other  Doctrines, .  92-94 

1.  The  Mode  of  this  Triune  Existence  is  inscrutable, . .  92-93 

2.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  is  not  self -contradictory,  93 

3.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  has  important  relations 

to  other  Doctrines, 93-94 

CHAPTER  HE. —  THE  DECREES  OP  GOD, 95-100 

I. — Definition  of  Decrees, 95 

n.— Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Decrees, 96-97 

1.  From  Scripture, 96 

2.  From  Reason, 96-67 

A.  From  the  Divine  Foreknowledge, 96-97 

B.  From  the  Divine  Wisdom, 97 

C.  From  the  Divine  Immutability, 97 

D.  From  the  Divine  Benevolence, 97 

HL —  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Decrees, 97-100 

1.  That  they  are  inconsistent  with  the  Free  Agency  of 

Man, 97-99 

2.  That  they  take  away  all  Motive  for  Human  Exertion,  90-100 

3.  That  they  make  God  the  Author  of  Sin, 

IV.—  Concluding  Remarks, 100 

1.  Practical  Uses  of  the  Doctrine  of  Decrees, 100 

2.  True  Method  of  Preaching  the  Doctrine, 100 

CHAUTER  IV. —  THE  WORKS  OP  GOD,  OR  THE  EXECUTION  OF  THE 

DECREES, 101-123 

SECTION  I. —  CREATION, 101-109 

I.—  Definition  of  Creation, 101 

IL— Proof  of  the  Doctrine, 101-103 

1.  Direct  Scripture  Statements, 102-103 

2.  Indirect  Evidence  from  Scripture, 103 

ILL—  Theories  which  oppose  Creation, 103-106 

1.  Dualism, 103-104 

2.  Emanation, 104 

3.  Creation  from  Eternity, 104-105 

4.  Spontaneous  Generation, 105-106 

IV.—  The  Mosaic  Account  of  Creation, 106 

1.  Its  Twofold  Nature, 106 

2.  Its  Proper  Interpretation, 106 

V.— God's  End  in  Creation, 106-107 

1.  The  Testimony  of  Scripture, 106-107 

2.  The  Testimony  of  Eeason, 107-108 

VL—  Relation  of  the  Doctrine  of  Creation  to  other  Doctrines, .  108-109 

1.  To  the  Holiness  and  Benevolence  of  God, 108 

2.  To  the  Wisdom  and  Free  Will  of  God, 108 

3.  To  Christ  as  the  Revealer  of  God, 108 

4.  To  Providence  and  Redemption, 109 

5.  To  the  Observance  of  the  Sabbath, 109 


XX  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS 

SECTION  II.—  PRESERVATION, -. 109-112 

I. — Definition  of  Preservation, 109-110 

II. —  Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Preservation, 110 

1.  From  Scripture, 110 

2.  From  Beason, 110 

HE. — Theories  which  virtually  deny  the  Doctrine  of  Preserva- 
tion,    110-111 

1.  Deism, ...    110-111 

2.  Continuous  Creation, Ill 

IV. —  Bemarks  upon  the  Divine  Concurrence, 111-112 

SECTION  III. —  PROVIDENCE, 112-118 

I. —  Definition  of  Providence, 112 

H.—  Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Providence, 112-113 

1.  Scriptural  Proof, 112-113 

2.  Bational  Proof, 113 

III. —  Theories  opposing  the  Doctrine  of  Providence, 114-115 

1.  Fatalism, 114 

2.  Casualism, 114 

3.  Theory  of  a  merely  General  Providence, 114-115 

IV. — Relations  of  the  Doctrine  of  Providence, 115-118 

1.  To  Miracles  and  Works  of  Grace, ...   , 115-116 

2.  To  Prayer  and  its  Answer, 116-117 

3.  To  Christian  Activity, 117-118 

4.  To  the  Evil  Acts  of  Free  Agents, 118 

SECTION  IV. —  GOOD  AND  ENIL  ANGELS, 118-123 

I. — Scripture  Statements  and  Intimations, 119-121 

1.  As  to  the  Nature  and  Attributes  of  Angels, 119 

2.  As  to  their  Number  and  Organization, 119 

3.  As  to  their  Moral  Character, 119-120 

4.  As  to  their  Employments, 120-121 

A.  The  Employments  of  Good  Angels, 120 

B.  The  Employments  of  Evil  Angels, 120-121 

II. —  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Angels, 121-122 

1.  To  the  Doctrine  of  Angels  in  General, 121-122 

2.  To  the  Doctrine  of  Evil  Angels  in  General, 122 

III. —  Practical  Uses  of  the  Doctrine  of  Angels, 123 

1.  Uses  of  the  Doctrine  of  Good  Augels, 123 

2.  Uses  of  the  Doctrine  of  Evil  Angels, 123 

PABT  V.— ANTHBOPOLOGY,  OB  THE  DOCTBINE  OF  MAN,  124-178 

CHAPTER  I. — PRELIMINARY, 124-134 

I.—  Man  a  Creation  of  God  and  a  Child  of  God, 124-125 

II.—  Unity  of  the  Bace, 125-127 

1.  Argument  from  History, 125 

2.  Argument  from  Language, 126 

3.  Argument  from  Psychology, 126 

4.  Argument  from  Physiology, 126-127 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS  XXI 

in.—  Essential  Elements  of  Human  Nature, 127-128 

1.  The  Dichotomous  Theory 127 

2.  The  Trichotomous  Theory, 127-128 

IV.—  Origin  of  the  Soul, 128-130 

1.  The  Theory  of  Preexistence, 128-129 

2.  The  Creatian  Theory, 129-130 

3.  The  Traducian  Theory, 130 

V.—  The  Moral  Nature  of  Man, 131-134 

1.  Conscience, 131-132 

2.  Will, 132-134 

CHAPTEB  IL —  THE  ORIGINAL  STATE  OF  MAN, 135-140 

I.— Essentials  of  Man's  Original  State, 135-137 

1.  Natural  Likeness  to  God,  or  Personality, 135 

2.  Moral  Likeness  to  God,  or  Holiness, 135-137 

A.  The  Image  of  God  as  including  only  Person- 

ality,            136 

B.  The  Image  of    God   as  consisting  simply  in 

Man's  Natural  Capacity  for  Beligion, 136-137 

IL— Incidents  of  Man's  Original  State, 137-138 

1.  Results  of  Man's  Possession  of  the  Divine  Image, . . ,  137-138 

2.  Concomitants  of  Man's  Possession  of  the  Divine 

Image, 138 

1st.  The  Theory  of  an  Original  Condition  of 

Savagery, 138-139 

2d.  The  Theory  of  Comte  as  to  the  Stages  of 

Human  Progress, 139-140 

CHAPTER  HE.—  SIN,  OB  MAN'S  STATE  OF  APOSTASY, 141-178 

SECTION  I. —  THE  LAW  OF  GOD, 141-145 

I.— Lawin  General, 141-142 

II.—  The  Law  of  God  in  Particular, 142-144 

1.  Elemental  Law, 142-144 

2.  Positive  Enactment, , 144 

HL—  Relation  of  the  Law  to  the  Grace  of  God, 144-145 

SECTION  II. — NATURE  OF  SIN, 145-151 

I.— Definition  of  Sin, 145-148 

1.  Proof, 146-148 

2.  Inferences, 148 

IL— The  Essential  Principle  of  Sin, 148-151 

1.  Sin  as  Sensuousness, 149 

2.  Sin  as  Finiteness, 149-150 

3.  Sin  as  Selfishness, 150-151 

SECTION  ILL —  UNIVERSALITY  OF  SIN, 152-153 

I. — Every  human  being  who  has  arrived  at  Moral  Conscious- 
ness has  committed  acts,  or  cherished  dispositions,  con- 
trary to  the  Divine  Law, 152 

II. — Every  member  of  the  human  race,  without  exception, 


XX11  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

possesses  a  Corrupted  Nature,   which,  is  a  source  of 

actual  sin,  and  is  itself  sin, 153 

SECTION  IV. —  ORIGIN  OP  SIN  IN  THE  PERSONAL  ACT  OF  ADAM,  . .  154-156 
I. — The  Scriptural  Account  in  Genesis, 154-155 

1.  Its  General  Character  not  Mythical  or  Allegorical, 

but  Historical, 154 

2.  The  Course  of  the  Temptation,  and  the  resulting 

Fall, 154-155 

II. —  Difficulties  connected  with  the  Fall,  considered  as  the 

personal  Act  of  Adam, 155-156 

1.  How  could  a  holy  being  Fall  ? 155 

2.  How  could  God  justly  permit  Satanic  Temptation  ?.  155 

3.  How  could  a  Penalty  so  great  be  justly  connected 

with  Disobedience  to  so  slight  a  Command  ? 155-156 

III. —  Consequences  of  the  Fall  —  so  far  as  respects  Adam 156-157 

1.  Death, 156 

A.  Physical  Death,  or  the  Separation  of  the  Soul 

from  the  Body, 156 

B.  Spiritual  Death,  or  the  Separation  of  the  Soul 

from  God, 156 

2.  Positive  and  formal  Exclusion  from  God's  Presence,  15&-157 
SECTION  V. —  IMPUTATION  OF  ADAM'S  SIN  TO  HIS  POSTERITY, 157-169 

Scripture  Teaching  as  to  Eace-sin  and  Bace-responsi- 

bility, 157-158 

I. —  Theories  of  Imputation, 158-166 

1.  The  Pelagian  Theory,  or  Theory  of  Man's  Natural 

Innocence, 158-159 

2.  The  Arminian  Theory,   or    Theory  of  voluntarily 

appropriated  Depravity, 159-161 

3.  The  New-School  Theory,   or  Theory  of  Condem- 

nable  Yitiosity, 161-162 

4.  The  Federal  Theory,  or  Theory  of  Condemnation 

by  Covenant, 162-164 

6.  Theory  of  Mediate  Imputation,  or  Theory  of  Con- 
demnation for  Depravity, 164-165 

6.  Augustinian  Theory,  or  Theory  of  Adam's  Natural 

Headship, 165-166 

II. — Objections  to  the  Augustinian  Theory  of  Imputation, 167-169 

SECTION  YI.  —  CONSEQUENCES  OF  SIN  TO  ADAM'S  POSTERITY,  ....  169-177 
I.— Depravity, 170-172 

1.  Depravity  Partial  or  Total? 170 

2.  Ability  or  Inability  ? 170-172 

EL— Guilt, 172-174 

1.  Nature  of  Guilt, 172-173 

2.  Degrees  of  Guilt, 172-174 

ITL— Penalty, 174-177 

1.  Idea  of  Penalty, 174-175 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

2.  Actual  Penalty  of  Sin, 175-177 

SECTION  VH— THE  SALVATION  OF  INFANTS, 177-178 

PABT  VI.— SOTEBIOLOGY,  OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SAL- 
VATION THROUGH  THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST 

AND  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT, 179-233 

CHAPTEB  I. —  CHRISTOLOGY,  OB  THE  REDEMPTION  WROUGHT  BY 

CHRIST, 179-206 

SECTION  I.— HISTORICAL  PREPARATION  FOR  REDEMPTION, 179-180 

I. —  Negative  Preparation,  in  the  History  of  the  Heathen 

World, 179 

II. — Positive  Preparation,  in  the  History  of  Israel, 179-180 

SECTION  IL— THE  PERSON  OF  CHBIST, 180-188 

I. —  Historical  Survey  of  Views   respecting  the  Person  of 

Christ, 180-181 

1.  The  Ebionites 180 

2.  The  Docetse, 180 

3.  The  Arians, 180 

4.  The  Apollinarians, 180-181 

5.  The  Nestorians, 181 

6.  The  Eutychians, 181 

7.  The  Orthodox  Doctrine, 181 

II.—  The  two  Natures  of  Christ,— their  Reality  and  Integrity,  181-183 

1.  The  Humanity  of  Christ, 181-182 

A.  Its  Reality, 181-182 

B.  Its  Integrity, 182 

2.  The  Deity  of  Christ, 182-183 

HI.—  The  Union  of  the  two  Natures  in  one  Person, 183-188 

1.  Proof  of  this  Union, 183-184 

2.  Modern  Misrepresentations  of  this  Union, 184-186 

A.  The  Theory  of    Gess  and  Beecher,  that  the 

Humanity  of  Christ  is  a  Contracted  and 
Metamorphosed  Deity, 184^185 

B.  The  Theory  of  Dorner  and  Bothe,  that  the 

Union  between  the  Divine  and  the  Human 
Natures  is  not  completed  by  the  Incarnating 
Act, 185-186 

3.  The  Beal  Nature  of  this  Union, 186-188 

SECTION  ILL —  THE  Two  STATES  OF  CHRIST, 188-191 

I.— The  State  of  Humiliation, 188-190 

1.  The  Nature  of  Christ's  Humiliation, 188-190 

A.  The    Theory   of   Thomasius,    Delitzsch,    and 

Crosby,  that  the  Humiliation  consisted  in  the 
Surrender  of  the  Belative  Attributes, 188-189 

B.  The  Theory  that    the  Humiliation  consisted 

in  the  Surrender  of  the  Independent  Exercise 

of  the  Divine  Attributes 189-190 


XXIV  TABLE  OR  CONTENTS 

2.  The  Stages  of  Christ's  Humiliation, 190 

II.—  The  State  of  Exaltation, 190-191 

1.  The  Nature  of  Christ's  Exaltation, 190 

2.  The  Stages  of  Christ's  Exaltation, 190-191 

SECTION  IV. —  THE  OFFICERS  OF  CHKIST, 191-206 

I.—  The  Prophetic  Office  of  Christ, 191-192 

1.  The  Nature  of  Christ's  Prophetic  Work, 191 

2.  The  Stages  of  Christ's  Prophetic  Work, 191-192 

H.— The  Priestly  Office  of  Christ, 192-206 

1.  Christ's  Sacrificial  Work,  or  the  Doctrine  of  the 

Atonement, 192-205 

General  Statement  of  the  Doctrine 192-193 

A.  Scriptural  Methods  of  Representing  the  Atone- 

ment,            193 

B.  The  Institution  of  Sacrifice,  especially  as  found 

in  the  Mosaic  System, 194-195 

C.  Theories  of  the  Atonement, 195-203 

1st.  The  Socinian,  or  Example  Theory  of  the 

Atonement, 195-196 

2d.  The     Bushnellian,     or     Moral-Influence 

Theory  of  the  Atonement, 196-197 

3d.  The  Grotian,   or    Governmental  Theory 

of  the  Atonement, 197-198 

4th.  The   Irvingian    Theory,  or    Theory  of 

gradually  extirpated  Depravity, 198-199 

5th.  The  Anselmic,   or    Commercial   Theory 

of  the  Atonement, 199-200 

6th.  The  Ethical  Theory  of  the  Atonement, . .  200-203 

First,  The  Atonement  as  related  to  Holi- 
ness in  God, 200-201 

Secondly,  The  Atonement  as  related  to 

Humanity  in  Christ, 201-203 

D.  Objections  to  the  Ethical  Theory  of  the  Atone- 

ment,      203-205 

E.  The  Extent  of  the  Atonement, 205 

2.  Christ's  Intercessory  Work, 205  206 

HI.— The  Kingly  Office  of  Christ, 206 

CHAPTER  n. — THE  RECONCILIATION  OF  MAN  TO  GOD,  OR  THE 
APPLICATION    OF    REDEMPTION    THROUGH    THE 

WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT, 207-233 

SECTION  I. —  THE  APPLICATION  OF  CHRIST'S  REDEMPTION,  IN 

ITS  PREPARATION, 207-211 

I.— Election, 208-210 

1.  Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Election, 208-209 

2.  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Election, 209-210 

H— Calling, 210-211 

A.  Is  God's  General  Call  Sincere  ?. .  .  210-211 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS  XXV 

B.  Is  God's  Special  Call  Irresistible  ? 211 

SECTION  II. —  THE  APPLICATION  OP  CHRIST'S  REDEMPTION,  IN 

ITS  ACTUAL  BEGINNING, 211-229 

I.—  Union  with  Christ, 211-214 

1.  Scripture  Eepresentations  of  this  Union, 212 

2.  Nature  of  this  Union, 212-213 

3.  Consequences  of  this  Union, 213-214 

H.—  Regeneration, 214-219 

1.  Scripture  Representations, 214 

2.  Necessity  of  Regeneration, 215 

3.  The  Efficient  Cause  of  Regeneration, 215-216 

4.  The  Instrumentality  used  in  Regeneration, 216-217 

5.  The  Nature  of  the  Change  wrought  in  Regeneration,  218-219 
HI. — Conversion, 219-224 

1.  Repentance, 220-221 

Elements  of  Repentance, 220-221 

Explanations  of  the  Scripture  Representations, . . .          221 

2.  Faith, 221-224 

Elements  of  Faith, 221-222 

Explanations  of  the  Scripture  Representations, 222-224 

IV.— Justification, 224-229 

1.  Definition  of  Justification, 224 

2.  Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Justification, 224-225 

3.  Elements  of  Justification, 225-226 

4.  Relation  of  Justification  to  God's  Law  and  Holiness,  226-227 

5.  Relation  of  Justification  to  Union  with  Christ  and 

the  Work  of  the  Spirit, 227-228 

6.  Relation  of  Justification  to  Faith, 228 

7.  Advice  to  Inquirers  demanded  by  a  Scriptural  View 

of  Justification, 229 

SECTION  HI.— THE  APPLICATION  OP  CHRIST'S  REDEMPTION,  IN 

ITS  CONTINUATION, 229-233 

I.—  Sanctification, 229-232 

1.  Definition  of  Sanctification, 229 

2.  Explanations  and  Scripture  Proof, 229-230 

3.  Erroneous  Views  refuted  by  the  Scripture  Passages,  230-232 

A.  The  Antinomian, 230 

B.  The  Perfectionist, 231-232 

II. —  Perseverance, 232-233 

1.  Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Perseverance, 232 

2.  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Perseverance, 232-233 

PART  Vn.— ECCLESIOLOGY,   OR   THE   DOCTRINE  OF 

THE  CHURCH, 234-257 

CHAPTER  I. — THE  CONSTITUTION  OP  THE  CHURCH,  OR  CHURCH 

POLITY, 234-243 

I.—  Definition  of  the  Church, 234-235 


XXVI  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

1.  The  Church,  like  the  Family  and  the  State,  is  an 

Institution  of  Divine  Appointment, 235 

2.  The  Church,  unlike  the  Family  and  the  State,  is  a 

Voluntary  Society, 235 

II.—  Organization  of  the  Church, 235-238 

1.  The  Fact  of  Organization, , 235-236 

2.  The  Nature  of  this  Organization, 236-237 

3.  The  Genesis  of  this  Organization, 237-238 

HI.—  Government  of  the  Church, 238-242 

1.  Nature  of  this  Government  in  General, 238-240 

A.  Proof  that  the  Government  of  the  Church  is 

Democratic  or  Congregational, . .    238-239 

B.  Erroneous  Views  as  to  Church  Government, 

refuted  by  the  Scripture  Passages, 239-240 

(a)  The    World-church    Theory,    or    the 

Komanist  View, 239 

(6)  The  National-church  Theory,  or  the 
Theory  of  Provincial  or  National 
Churches, 239-240 

2.  Officers  of  the  Church, 240-242 

A.  The  Number  of  Offices  in  the  Church  is  two,...          240 

B.  The  Duties  belonging  to  these  Offices, 240-241 

0.  Ordination  of  Officers, 241-242 

( a )  What  is  Ordination? 241 

( 6  )  Who  are  to  Ordain  ? 241-242 

3.  Discipline  of  the  Church, 242 

A.  Kinds  of  Discipline, 242 

B.  Eelation  of  the  Pastor  to  Discipline, 242 

IV. —  Belation  of  Local  Churches  to  one  another, 242-243 

1.  The  General  Nature   of   this  Eelation  is  that  of 

Fellowship  between  Equals, 242 

2.  This  Fellowship  involves  the  Duty  of  Special  Con- 

sultation   with  regard    to    Matters  affecting  the 
common  Interest, 243 

3.  This  Fellowship  may  be  broken  by  manifest  Depart- 

ures from  the  Faith  or  Practice  of  the  Scriptures 

on  the  part  of  any  Church, 243 

CHAPTER  II.—  THE  ORDINANCES  OF  THE  CHURCH, 244-257 

I.—  Baptism, 244-251 

1.  Baptism  an  Ordinance  of  Christ, 244-245 

2.  The  Mode  of  Baptism, 245-246 

A.  The  Command  to  Baptize  is  a  Command  to 

Immerse, 245 

B.  No  Church  has  the  Eight  to  Modify  or  Dispense 

with  this  Command  of  Christ, 246 

3.  The  Symbolism  of  Baptism, 246-247 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

A.  Expansion  of  the  Statement  as  to  the  Symbolism 

of  Baptism, 246 

B.  Inferences  from  the  Passages  referred  to, 247 

4.  The  Subjects  of  Baptism, 247-251 

A.  Proof  that  only  Persons  giving  Evidence  of 

being  [Regenerated  are    proper  Subjects  of 
Baptism, 247-248 

B.  Inferences  from  the  Fact  that  only  Persons  giv- 

ing Evidence  of  being  Regenerate  are  proper 

Subjects  of  Baptism, 248-249 

O.  Infant  Baptism, 249-251 

(  a  )  Infant  Baptism  without  Warrant  in  the 

Scripture, 249-250 

(  6  )  Infant  Baptism  expressly  Contradicted 

by  Scripture, 250 

(c)  Its  Origin  in  Sacramental  Conceptions 

of  Christianity, 250 

( d )  The  Eeasoning  by  which  it  is  supported 

Unscriptural,  Unsound,  and  Dangerous 

in  its  Tendency, 250-251 

( e )  The  Lack  of  Agreement  among  Pedo- 

baptists, 251 

(/)  The  Evil  Effects  of  Infant  Baptism, 251 

H.— The  Lord's  Supper, 251-257 

1.  The  Lord's  Supper    am    Ordinance  instituted  by 

Christ, 251-252 

2.  The  Mode  of  Administering  the  Lord's  Supper, 252 

3.  The  Symbolism  of  the  Lord's  Supper, 252-253 

A.  Expansion  of  the  Statement  as  to  the  Symbolism 

of  the  Lord's  Supper, 252 

B.  Inferences  from  this  Statement, 253 

4.  Erroneous  Views  of  the  Lord's  Supper, 253-254 

A.  The  Romanist  View, 253-254 

B.  The.Lutheran  and  High  Church  View, 254 

5.  Prerequisites  to  Participation  in  the  Lord's  Supper,  254-257 

A.  There  are  Prerequisites, 254 

B.  Laid  down  by  Christ  and  his  Apostles, 254-255 

0.  The  Prerequisites  are  Four, 255-257 

First, — Regeneration, 255 

Secondly,—  Baptism, 255-256 

Thirdly,—  Church  Membership, 256 

Fourthly,— An  Orderly  Walk, 256 

D.  The  Local  Church  is  the  Judge  whether  these 

Prerequisites  are  fulfilled, 256-257 

E.  Special  Objections  to  Open  Communion, 257 

PART  VIII.— ESCHATOLOGY,  OR   THE  DOCTRINE  OF 

FINAL  THINGS, 258-274 


XXY111  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

I.—  Physical  Death, 258-260 

That  this  is  not  Annihilation,  argued  : 

1.  Upon  Rational  Grounds, 258-259 

2.  Upon  Scriptural  Grounds, 259-260 

II.— The  Intermediate  State, 260-262 

1.  Of  the  Righteous, 260-261 

2.  Of  the  Wicked, 261-262 

Refutation  of  the  two  Errors  : 

(a)  That  the  Soul  sleeps,    between  Death 

and  the  Resurrection, 261 

(  b )  That  the  Suffering  of  the  Intermediate 

State  is  Purgatorial, 261 

Concluding  Remark, 262 

III.— The  Second  Coming  of  Christ, 262-264 

1.  The  Nature  of  Christ's  Coming, 262 

2.  The  Time  of  Christ's  Coming, 262-263 

3.  The  Precursors  of  Christ's  Coming, 263 

4.  Relation     of    Christ's     Second    Coming    to    the 

Millennium, 263-264 

IV. —  The  Resurrection, 264-266 

1.  The  Exegetical  Objection, 265 

2.  The  Scientific  Objection, 265-266 

V.—  The  Last  Judgment, 266-268 

1.  The  Nature  of  the  Final  Judgment, 267 

2.  The  Object  of  the  Final  Judgment, 267 

3.  The  Judge  in  the  Final  Judgment, 268 

4.  The  Subjects  of  the  Final  Judgment, 268 

5.  The  Grounds  of  the  Final  Judgment, 268 

VI.— The  Final  States  of  the  Righteous  and  of  the  Wicked, ....  268-274 

1.  Of  the  Righteous, 268-269 

A.  Is  Heaven  a  Place  as  weU  as  a  State  ? 269 

B.  Is  this  Earth  to  be  the  Heaven  of  the  Saints  ? . .          269 

2.  Of  the  Wicked, 269-274 

A.  Future  Punishment  is  not  Annihilation, 270 

B.  Punishment  after  Death  excludes  new  Proba- 

tion and  ultimate  Restoration, 270-271 

C.  This  future  Punishment  is  Everlasting, 271-272 

D.  Everlasting   Punishment   is   not    inconsistent 

with  God's  Justice, 272-273 

E.  Everlasting    Punishment   is   not    inconsistent 

with  God's  Benevolence, 273-274 

F.  Preaching  of  Everlasting  Punishment  is  not  a 

hindrance  to  the  success  of  the  Gospel, 274 


fu*> 


A.V 

THE 

UNIVERSITY! 


- 


OUTLINES  OF 

SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

PAET  I. 

PROLEGOMENA. 
CHAPTER  I. 

IDEA   OF  THEOLOGY. 

I.  DEFINITION. — Theology  is  the  science  of  God  and  of  the  relations 
between  God  and  the  universe. 

II.  AIM. — The  aim  of  theology  is  the  ascertainment  of  the  facts  respect- 
ing God  and  the  relations  between  God  and  the  universe,  and  the  exhibi- 
tion of  these  facts  in  their  rational  unity,  as  connected  parts  of  a  formulated 
and  organic  system  of  truth. 

III.  POSSIBILITY.  —The  possibility  of  theology  has  a  threefold  grounds 
1.     In  the  existence  of  a  God  who  has  relations  to  the  universe  ;   2.  In  the 
capacity  of  the  human  mind  for  knowing  God  and  certain  of  these  relations  ; 
and  3.     In  the  provision  of  means  by  which  God  is  brought  into  actual  con- 
tact with  the  mind,  or  in  other  words,  in  the  provision  of  a  revelation. 

1.  In  the  existence  of  a  God  who  has  relations  to  the  universe. — It  has 
been  objected,  indeed,  that  since  God  and  these  relations  are  objects 
apprehended  only  by  faith,  they  are  not  proper  objects  of  knowledge  or 
subjects  for  science.  We  reply  : 

A.  Faith  is  knowledge,  and  a  higher  sort  of  knowledge. — Physical  sci- 
ence also  rests  upon  faith — faith  in  our  own  existence,  in  the  existence  of  a 
world  objective  and  external  to  us,  and  in  the  existence  of  other  persons 
than  ourselves;  faith  in  our  primitive  convictions,   such  as  space,  time, 
cause,  substance,  design,  right ;  faith  in  the  trustworthiness  of  our  faculties 
and  in  the  testimony  of  our  fellow  men.  But  physical  science  is  not  thereby 
invalidated,  because  this  faith,  though  unlike  sense-perception  or  logical 
demonstration,  is  yet  a  cognitive  act  of  the  reason,  and  may  be  denned 
as  certitude  with  respect  to  matters  in  which  verification  is  unattainable. 

B.  Faith  is  a  knowledge  conditioned  by  holy  affection. — The  faith  which 
apprehends  God's  being  and  working  is  not  opinion  or  imagination.     It  is 
certitude  with  regard  to  spiritual  realities,  upon  the  testimony  of  our 
rational  nature  and  upon  the  testimony  of  God.  Its  only  peculiarity  as  a  cog- 
nitive act  of  the  reason  is  that  it  is  conditioned  by  holy  affection.     As  the 

1 


2  POSSIBILITY  OP  THEOLOGY. 

science  of  aesthetics  is  a  product  of  reason  as  including  a  power  of  recog- 
nizing beauty  practically  inseparable  from  a  love  for  beauty,  and  as  the 
science  of  ethics  is  a  product  of  reason  as  including  a  power  of  recognizing 
the  morally  right  practically  inseparable  from  a  love  for  the  morally  right,  so 
the  science  of  theology  is  a  product  of  reason,  but  of  reason  as  including 
a  power  of  recognizing  God  which  is  practically  inseparable  from  a  love  for 
God. 

C.  Faith,  therefore,  can  furnish,  and  only  faith  can  furnish,  fit  and 
sufficient  material  for  a  scientific  theology. — As  an  operation  of  man's 
higher  rational  nature,  though  distinct  from  ocular  vision  or  from  reason- 
ing, faith  is  not  only  a  kind,  but  the  highest  kind,  of  knowing.  It  gives 
us  understanding  of  realities  which  to  sense  alone  are  inaccessible,  namely, 
God's  existence,  and  some  at  least  of  the  relations  between  God  and  his 
creation. 

2.  In  the  capacity  of  the  human  mind  for  knowing  God  and  certain 
of  these  relations. — But  it  has  urged  that  such  knowledge  is  impossible 
for  the  following  reasons  : 

A.  Because  we  can  know  only  phenomena.    We  reply  :    (a)    We  know 
mental  as  well  as  physical  phenomena.       (6)      In  knowing  phenomena, 
whether  mental  or  physical,  we  know  substance  as  underlying  the  phe- 
nomena, as  manifested  through  them,  and  as  constituting  their  ground  of 
unity,     (c)     Our  minds  bring  to  the  observation  of  phenomena  not  only 
this  knowledge  of  substance,  but  also  knowledge  of  time,  space,  cause,  and 
right,  realities  which  are  in  no  sense  phenomenal.     Since  these  objects  of 
knowledge  are  not  phenomenal,  the  fact  that  God  is  not  phenomenal  can- 
not prevent  us  from  knowing  him. 

B.  Because  we  can  know  only  that  which  bears  analogy  to  our  own 
nature  or  experience.     We  reply:  (a)  It  is  not  essential  to  knowledge 
that  there  be  similarity  of  nature  between  the  knower  and  the  known. 
We  know  by  difference  as  well  as  by  likeness.     (6)  Our  past  experience, 
though  greatly  facilitating  new  acquisitions,  is  not  the  measure  of  our  pos- 
sible knowledge.     Else  the  first  act  of  knowledge  would  be  inexplicable, 
and  all  revelation  of  higher  characters  to  lower  would  be  precluded,  as  well 
as  all  progress  to  knowledge  which  surpasses  our  present  attainments, 
(c)  Even  if  knowledge  depended  upon  similarity  of  nature  and  experience, 
we  might  still  know  God,  since  we  are  made  in  God's  image,  and  there 
are  important  analogies  between  the  divine  nature  and  our  own. 

C.  Because  we  know  only  that  of  which  we  can  conceive,  in  the  sense 
of  forming  an  adequate  mental  image.     We  reply :     (a)    It  is  true  that 
we  know  only  that  of  which  we  can  conceive,  if  by  the  term  "conceive" 
we  mean  our  distinguishing  in  thought  the  object  known  from  all  other 
objects.     But,  (6)     The  objection  confounds  conception  with  that  which  is 
merely  its  occasional  accompaniment  and  help,  namely,  the  picturing  of 
the  object  by  the  imagination.     In  this  sense,  conceivability  is  not  a  final 
test  of  truth,     (c)  That  the  formation  of  a  mental  image  is  not  essential 
to  conception  or  knowledge,  is  plain  when  we  remember  that,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  we  both  conceive  and  know  many  things  of  which  we  cannot  form 


POSSIBILITY   OF  THEOLOGY.  3 

a  mental  image  of  any  sort  that  in  the  least  corresponds  to  the  reality  ;  for 
example,  force,  cause,  law,  space,  our  own  minds.  So  we  may  know  God, 
though  we  cannot  form  an  adequate  mental  image  of  him. 

D.  Because  we  can  know  truly  only  that  which  we  know  in  whole  and 
not  in  part.     We  reply  :     (a)     The  objection  confounds  partial  knowledge 
with  the  knowledge  of  a  part.      We  know  the  mind  in  part,  but  we  do 
not  know  a  part  of  the  mind.     (6)    If  the  objection  were  valid,  no  real 
knowledge  of  anything  would  be  possible,  since  we  know  no  single  thing 
in  all  its  relations.     We  conclude  that,  although  God  is  a  being  not  com- 
posed of  parts,  we  may  yet  have  a  partial  knowledge  of  him,  and  this 
knowledge,  though  not  exhaustive,  may  yet  be  real,  and  adequate  to  the 
purposes  of  science. 

E.  Because  all  predicates  of  God  are  negative,  and  therefore  furnish 
no  real  knowledge.     We  answer  :    (a)     Predicates  derived  from  our  con- 
sciousness, such  as  spirit,  love,  and  holiness,  are  positive.     (6)    The  terms 
"infinite"  and  "absolute,"  moreover,  express  not  merely  a  negative  but  a 
positive  idea — the  idea,  in  the  former  case,  of  the  absence  of  all  limit,  the 
idea  that  the  object  thus  described  goes  on  and  on  forever  ;  the  idea,  in 
the  latter  case,  of  entire  self-sufficiency.     Since  predicates  of  God,  there- 
fore, are  not  merely  negative,  the  argument  mentioned  above  furnishes  no 
valid  reason  why  we  may  not  know  him. 

F.  Because  to  know  is  to  limit  or  define.     Hence  the  Absolute  as 
unlimited,  and  the  Infinite  as  undefined,  cannot  be  known.     We  answer : 
(a)  God  is  absolute,  not  as  existing  in  no  relation,  but  as  existing  in  no 
necessary  relation;  and  (6)  God  is  infinite,  not  as  excluding  all  coexistence 
of  the  finite  with  himself,  but  as  being  the  ground  of  the  finite,  and  so 
unfettered  by  it.     (c)  God  is  actually  limited  by  the  unchangeablenessof  his 
own  attributes  and  personal  distinctions,  as  well  as  by  his  self-chosen 
relations  to  the  universe  he  has  created  and  to  humanity  in  the  person  of 
Christ.     God  is  therefore  limited  and  defined  in  such  a  sense  as  to  render 
knowledge  of  him  possible. 

G.  Because  all  knowledge  is  relative  to  the  knowing  agent;  that  is, 
what  we  know,  we  know,  not  as  it  is  objectively,  but  only  as  it  is  related 
to  our  own  senses  and  faculties.     In  reply :  (a)  We  grant  that  we  can 
know  only  that  which  has  relation  to  our  faculties.     But  this  is  simply  to 
say  that  we  know  only  that  which  we  come  into  mental  contact  with,  that 
is,  we  know  only  what  we  know.     But,  (6)  We  deny  that  what  we  come 
into  mental  contact  with  is  known  by  us  as  other  than  it  is.     So  far  as  it  is 
known  at  all,  it  is  known  as  it  is.     In  other  words,  the  laws  of  our  knowing 
are  not  merely  arbitrary  and  regulative,  but  correspond  to  the  nature  of 
things.     We  conclude  that,   in   theology,   we  are  equally  warranted  in 
assuming  that  the  laws  of  our  thought  are  laws  of  God's  thought,  and  that 
the  results  of  normally  conducted  thinking  with  regard  to  God  correspond 
to  the  objective  reality. 

3.  In  God's  actual  revelation  of  himself  and  certain  of  these  rela- 
tions.— As  we  do  not  in  this  place  attempt  a  positive  proof  of  God's  exist- 
ence or  of  man's  capacity  for  the  knowledge  of  God,  so  we  do  not  now 


4  PROLEGOMENA. 

attempt  to  prove  that  God  has  brought  himself  into  contact  with  man's 
mind  by  revelation.  We  shall  consider  the  grounds  of  this  belief  here- 
after. Our  aim  at  present  is  simply  to  show  that,  granting  the  fact  of 
revelation,  a  scientific  theology  is  possible.  This  has  been  denied  upon 
the  following  grounds : 

A.  That  revelation,   as  a  making  known,  is  necessarily  internal  and 
subjective — either  a  mode  of  intelligence,  or  a  quickening  of  man's  cog- 
nitive powers — and  hence  can  furnish  no  objective  facts  such  as  constitute 
the  proper  material  for  science. 

In  reply  to  this  objection,  urged  mainly  by  idealists  in  philosophy, 

(a)  We  grant  that  revelation,  to  be  effective,  must  be  the  means  of 
inducing  a  new  mode  of  intelligence,  or  in  other  words,  must  be  under- 
stood. We  grant  that  this  understanding  of  divine  things  is  impossible 
without  a  quickening  of  man's  cognitive  powers.  We  grant,  moreover, 
that  revelation,  when  originally  imparted,  was  often  internal  and 
subjective. 

(6)  But  we  deny  that  external  revelation  is  therefore  useless  or  impos- 
sible. Even  if  religious  ideas  sprang  wholly  from  within,  an  external  rev- 
elation might  stir  up  the  dormant  powers  of  the  mind.  Religious  ideas, 
however,  do  not  spring  wholly  from  within.  External  revelation  can 
impart  them.  Man  can  reveal  himself  to  man  by  external  communica- 
tions, and,  if  God  has  equal  power  with  man,  God  can  reveal  himself  to 
man  in  like  manner. 

(c)  Hence  God's  revelation  may  be,  and,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  it  is, 
in  great  part,  an  external  revelation  in  works  and  words.  The  universe  is 
a  revelation  of  God ;  God's  works  in  nature  precede  God's  words  in  history. 
We  claim,  moreover,  that,  in  many  cases  where  .truth  was  originally  com- 
municated internally,  the  same  Spirit  who  communicated  it  has  brought 
about  an  external  record  of  it,  so  that  the  internal  revelation  might  be 
handed  down  to  others  than  those  who  first  received  it. 

(tf)  With  this  external  record  we  shall  also  see  that  there  is  given 
under  proper  conditions  a  special  influence  of  God's  Spirit,  so  to  quicken 
our  cognitive  powers  that  the  external  record  reproduces  in  our  minds  the 
ideas  with  which  the  minds  of  the  writers  were  at  first  divinely  filled. 

(e)  Internal  revelations  thus  recorded,  and  external  revelations  thus 
interpreted,  both  furnish  objective  facts  which  may  serve  as  proper  jnater- 
ial  for  science.  Although  revelation  in  its  widest  sense  may  include,  and 
as  constituting  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  theology  does  include,  both 
insight  and  illumination,  it  may  also  be  used  to  denote  simply  a  pro- 
vision of  the  external  means  of  knowledge,  and  theology  has  to  do  with 
inward  revelations  only  as  they  are  expressed  in,  or  as  they  agree  with, 
this  objective  standard. 

B.  That  many  of  the  truths  thus  revealed  are  too  indefinite  to  consti- 
tute the  material  for  science,  because  they  belong  to  the  region  of  the  feel- 
ings, because  they  are  beyond  our  full  understanding,  or  because  they  are 
destitute  of  orderly  arrangement.     We  reply  : 


RELATION   TO   RELIGION".  5 

(a)  Theology  has  to  do  with  subjective  feelings  only  as  they  can  be 
defined,  and  shown  to  be  effects  of  objective  truth  upon  the  mind.  They 
are  not  more  obscure  than  are  the  facts  of  morals  or  of  psychology,  and  the 
same  objection  which  would  exclude  such  feelings  from  theology  would 
make  these  latter  sciences  impossible. 

(6)  Those  facts  of  revelation  which  are  beyond  our  full  understanding  may, 
like  the  nebular  hypothesis  in  astronomy,  the  atomic  theory  in  chemistry, 
or  the  doctrine  of  evolution  in  biology,  furnish  a  principle  of  union  between 
great  classes  of  other  facts  otherwise  irreconcilable.  We  may  define  our 
concepts  of  God,  and  even  of  the  Trinity,  at  least  sufficiently  to  distinguish 
them  from  all  other  concepts ;  and  whatever  difficulty  may  encumber  the 
putting  of  them  into  language  only  shows  the  importance  of  attempting  it 
and  the  value  of  even  an  approximate  success. 

(c)  Even  though  there  were  no  orderly  arrangement  of  these  facts,  either 
in  nature  or  in  Scripture,  an  accurate  systematizing  of  them  by  the  human 
mind  would  not  therefore  be  proved  impossible,  unless  a  principle  were 
assumed  which  would  show  all  physical  science  to  be  equally  impossible. 
Astronomy  and  geology  are  constructed  by  putting  together  multitudinous 
facts  which  at  first  sight  seem  to  have  no  order.  So  with  theology.  And 
yet,  although  revelation  does  not  present  to  us  a  dogmatic  system  ready- 
made,  a  dogmatic  system  is  not  only  implicitly  contained  therein,  but  parts 
of  the  system  are  wrought  out  in  the  epistles  of  the  New  Testament,  as  for 
example  in  Bom.  5  : 12-19 ;  1  Cor.  15  :  3,  4 ;  8  :  6 ;  1  Tim.  3  :  16  ;  Heb.  6 : 
1,  2. 

IY.  NECESSITY. — The  necessity  of  theology  has  its  grounds 
(a)  In  the  organizing  instinct  of  the  human  'mind.  This  organizing 
principle  is  a  part  of  our  constitution.  The  mind  cannot  endure  confusion 
or  apparent  contradiction  in  known  facts.  The  tendency  to  harmonize 
and  unify  its  knowledge  appears  as  soon  as  the  mind  becomes  reflective  ; 
just  in  proportion  to  its  endowments  and  culture  does  the  impulse  to  sys- 
tematize and  formulate  increase.  This  is  true  of  all  departments  of  human 
inquiry,  but  it  is  peculiarly  true  of  our  knowledge  of  God.  Since  the  truth 
with  regard  to  God  is  the  most  important  of  all,  theology  meets  the  deepest 
want  of  man's  rational  nature.  Theology  is  a  rational  necessity.  If  all 
existing  theological  systems  were  destroyed  to-day,  new  systems  would  rise 
to-morrow.  So  inevitable  is  the  operation  of  this  law,  that  those  who  most 
decry  theology  show  nevertheless  that  they  have  made  a  theology  for  them- 
selves, and  often  one  sufficiently 'meagre  and  blundering.  Hostility  to 
theology,  where  it  does  not  originate  in  mistaken  fears  for  the  corruption 
of  God's  truth  or  in  a  naturally  illogical  structure  of  mind,  often  proceeds 
from  a  license  of  speculation  which  cannot  brook  the  restraints  of  a  com- 
plete Scriptural  system. 

(6)  In  the  relation  of  systematic  truth  to  the  development  of  charac- 
ter. Truth  thoroughly  digested  is  essential  to  the  growth  of  Christian 
character  in  the  individual  and  in  the  church.  All  knowledge  of  God  has 
its  influence  upon  character,  but  most  of  all  the  knowledge  of  spiritual 
facts  in  their  relations.  Theology  cannot,  as  has  sometimes  been  objected, 


6  PROLEGOMENA. 

deaden  the  religious  affections,  since  it  only  draws  out  from  their  sources 
and  puts  into  rational  connection  with  each  other  the  truths  which  are 
best  adapted  to  nourish  the  religious  affections.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
strongest  Christians  are  those  who  have  the  firmest  grasp  upon  the  great 
doctrines  of  Christianity  ;  the  heroic  ages  of  the  church  are  those  which 
have  witnessed  most  consistently  to  them  ;  the  piety  that  can  be  injured  by 
the  systematic  exhibition  of  them  must  be  weak,  or  mystical,  or  mistaken. 

(c)  In  the  importance  to  the  preacher  of  definite  and  just  views  of 
Christian  doctrine.      His  chief    intellectual  qualification  must  be  the 
power  clearly  and  comprehensively  to  conceive,  and  accurately  and  power- 
fully to  express,  the  truth.     He  can  be  the  agent  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  con- 
verting and  sanctifying  men,  only  as  he  can  wield  "the  sword  of  the 
Spirit,  which  is  the  word  of  God"  (  Eph.  6  :  17),  or,  in  other  language, 
only  as  he  can  impress  truth  upon  the  minds  and  consciences  of  his 
hearers.     Nothing  more  certainly  nullifies  his  efforts  than  confusion  and 
inconsistency  in  his  statements  of  doctrine.     His  object  is  to  replace 
obscure  and  erroneous  conceptions  among  his  hearers  by  those  which  are 
correct  and  vivid.     He  cannot  do  this  without  knowing  the  facts  with 
regard  to  God  in  their  relations  —  knowing  them,  in  short,  as  parts  of  a 
system.     With  this  truth  he  is  put  in  trust.     To  mutilate  it  or  misrepresent 
it,  is  not  only  sin  against  the  Eevealer  of  it,— it  may  prove  the  ruin  of 
men's  souls.      The  best  safeguard  against  such  mutilation  or  misrepresen- 
tation, is  the  diligent  study  of  the  several  doctrines  of  the  faith  in  their 
relations  to  one  another,  and  especially  to  the  central  theme  of  theology, 
the  person  and  work  of  Jesus  Christ. 

(d)  In  the  intimate  connection  between  correct  doctrine  and  the 
safety  and  aggressive  power  of  the  church.     The  safety  and  progress  of 
the  church  is  dependent  upon  her  "holding  the  pattern  of  sound  words" 
(2  Tim.  1  :  13),  and  serving  as  "  pillar  and  ground  of  the  truth  "  (1  Tim.  3: 
15).     Defective  understanding  of  the  truth  results  sooner  or  later  in 
defects  of  organization,  of  operation,  and  of  life.     Thorough  comprehen- 
sion of  Christian  truth  as  an  organized  system  furnishes,  on  the  other  hand, 
not  only  an  invaluable  defense  against  heresy  and  immorality,  but  also  an 
indispensable  stimulus  and  instrument  in  aggressive  labor  for  the  world's 
conversion. 

(e)  In  the  direct  and  indirect  injunctions  of  Scripture.     The  Scrip- 
ture urges  upon  us  the  thorough  and  comprehensive  study  of  the  truth 
(John  5:39,   marg.,  —  "Search  the  Scriptures"),   the  comparing  and 
harmonizing  of  its  different  parts  (1  Cor.   2:  13 — "comparing   spiritual 
things  with  spiritual"),  the  gathering  of  all  about  the  great  central  fact  of 
revelation  (Col.  1 :  27— "which  is  Christ  in  you,  the  hope  of  glory  "),  the 
preaching  of  it  in  its  wholeness  as  well  as  in  its  due  proportions  (2  Tim.  4  : 
2—  "Preach  the  word").     The  minister  of  the  Gospel  is  called  "a  scribe 
who  hath  been  made  a  disciple  to  the  kingdom  of  heaven  "  (Mat.  13  :  52) ; 
the  "pastors  "of  the  churches  are  at  the  same  time  to  be  "teachers" 
(Eph.  4  : 11);  the  bishop  must  be  "apt  to  teach"  (1  Tim.  3  :  2),  "  handling 
aright  the  word  of  truth  "  (  2  Tim.  2  :  15  ),   "holding  to  the  faithful  word 
which  is  according  to  the  teaching,  that  he  may  be  -able  both  to  exhort  in 
the  sound  doctrine  and  to  convict  the  gainsay ers  "  (Tit.  1:9). 


NECESSITY    OF  THEOLOGY.  7 

V.  RELATION  TO  RELIGION.— Theology  and  religion  are  related  to  each 
other  as  effects,  in  different  spheres,  of  the  same  cause.  As  theology  is  an 
effect  produced  in  the  sphere  of  systematic  thought  by  the  facts  respecting 
God  and  the  universe,  so  religion  is  an  effect  which  these  same  facts  pro- 
duce in  the  sphere  of  individual  and  collective  life.  With  regard  to  the 
term  '  religion',  notice  : 

1.  Derivation. 

(a)  The  derivation  from  religare,  'to  bind  back'  (man  to  God),  is 
negatived  by  the  authority  of  Cicero  and  of  the  best  modern  etymologists; 
by  the  difficulty,  on  this  hypothesis,  of  explaining  such  forms  as  religio, 
religens;  and  by  the  necessity,  in  that  case,  of  presupposing  a  fuller 
knowledge  of  sin  and  redemption  than  was  common  to  the  ancient  world. 

(6)  The  more  correct  derivation  is  from  relegere,  "  to  go  over  again," 
"carefully  to  ponder."  Its  original  meaning  is  therefore  ''reverent 
observance  "  (of  duties  due  to  the  gods). 

2.  False  Conceptions. 

(a)  Beligion  is  not,  as  Hegel  declared,  a  kind  of  knowing ;  for  it 
would  then  be  only  an  incomplete  form  of  philosophy,  and  the  measure  of 
knowledge  in  each  case  would  be  the  measure  of  piety. 

(6)  Religion  is  not,  as  Schleiermacher  held,  the  mere  feeling  of  depend- 
ence ;  for  such  feeling  of  dependence  is  not  religious,  unless  exercised 
toward  God  and  accompanied  by  moral  effort. 

(c)  Religion  is  not,  as  Kant  maintained,  morality  or  moral  action  ;  for 
morality  is  conformity  to  an  abstract  law  of  right,  while  religion  is  essen- 
tially a  relation  to  a  person,  from  whom  the  soul  receives  blessing  and  to 
whom  it  surrenders  itself  in  love  and  obedience. 

3.  Essential  Idea. 

Religion  in  its  essential  idea  is  a  life  in  God,  a  life  lived  in  recognition  of 
God,  in  communion  with  God,  and  under  control  of  the  indwelling  Spirit  of 
God.  Since  it  is  a  life,  it  cannot  be  described  as  consisting  solely  in  the 
exercise  of  any  one  of  the  powers  of  intellect,  affection,  or  will.  As  physical 
life  involves  the  unity  and  cooperation  of  all  the  organs  of  the  body,  so 
religion,  or  spiritual  life,  involves  the  united  working  of  all  the  powers  of 
the  soul.  To  feeling,  however,  we  must  assign  the  logical  priority,  since 
holy  affection  toward  God,  imparted  in  regeneration,  is  the  condition  of 
truly  knowing  God  and  of  truly  serving  him. 

4     Inferences. 

From  this  definition  of  religion  it  follows  : 

(a)  That  in  strictness  there  is  but  one  religion.  Man  is  a  religious  being, 
indeed,  as  having  the  capacity  for  this  divine  life.  He  is  actually  religious, 
whoever,  only  when  he  enters  into  this  living  relation  to  God.  False 
religions  are  the  caricatures  which  men  given  to  sin,  or  the  imaginations 
which  men  groping  after  light,  form  of  this  lif e  of  the  soul  in  God. 

(6)  That  the  content  of  religion  is  greater  than  that  of  theology.  The 
facts  of  religion  come  within  the  range  of  theology  only  so  far  as  they  can 
be  definitely  conceived,  accurately  expressed  in  language,  and  brought 
into  rational  relation  to  each  other. 


8  PROLEGOMENA. 

(c)  That  religion  is  to  be  distinguished  from  formal  worship,  which  is 
simply  the  outward  expression  of  religion.  As  such  expression,  worship  is 
"formal  communion  between  God  and  his  people."  In  it  God  speaks  to 
man,  and  man  to  God.  It  therefore  properly  includes  the  reading  of 
Scripture  and  preaching  on  the  side  of  God,  and  prayer  and  song  on  the 
side  of  the  people. 


CHAPTEK  II. 

MATERIAL   OF   THEOLOGY. 

I.  SOURCES  OP  THEOLOGY.— God  himself,  in  the  last  analysis,  must  be  the 
only  source  of  knowledge  with  regard  to  his  own  being  and  relations. 
Theology  is  therefore  a  summary  and  explanation  of  the  content  of  God's 
self -revelations.  These  are,  first,  the  revelation  of  God  in  nature ;  secondly 
and  supremely,  the  revelation  of  God  in  the  Scriptures. 

1.  Scripture  and  Nature.  By  nature  we  here  mean  not  only  physical 
facts,  or  facts  with  regard  to  the  substances,  properties,  forces,  and  laws 
of  the  material  world,  but  also  spiritual  facts,  or  facts  with  regard  to  the 
intellectual  and  moral  constitution  of  man,  and  the  orderly  arrangement  of 
human  society  and  history. 

(a)  Natural  theology.  —  The  universe  is  a  source  of  theology.  The 
Scriptures  assert  that  God  has  revealed  himself  in  nature.  There  is  not 
only  an  outward  witness  to  his  existence  and  character  in  the  constitution 
and  government  of  the  universe  (Ps.  19  ;  Acts  14  :17;  Rom.  1:20),  but  an 
inward  witness  to  his  existence  and  character  in  the  heart  of  every  man 
(Bom.  1 :17,  18,  19,  20,  32;  2  :15).  The  systematic  exhibition  of  these 
facts,  whether  derived  from  observation,  history  or  science,  constitutes 
natural  theology. 

(  6 )  Natural  theology  supplemented.  —  The  Christian  revelation  is  the 
chief  source  of  theology.  The  Scriptures  plainly  declare  that  the  revela- 
tion of  God  in  nature  does  not  supply  all  the  knowledge  which  a  sinner 
needs  (  Acts  17  : 23  ;  Eph.  3:9).  This  revelation  is  therefore  supplemented 
by  another,  in  which  divine  attributes  and  merciful  provisions  only  dimly 
shadowed  forth  in  nature  are  made  known  to  men.  This  latter  revela- 
tion consists  of  a  series  of  supernatural  events  and  communications,  the 
record  of  which  is  presented  in  the  Scriptures. 

(  c)  The  Scriptures  the  final  standard  of  appeal.  — Science  and  Scripture 
throw  light  upon  each  other.  The  same  divine  Spirit  who  gave  both  reve- 
lations is  still  present,  enabling  the  believer  to  interpret  the  one  by  the 
other  and  thus  progressively  to  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth. 
Because  of  our  finiteness  and  sin,  the  total  record  in  Scripture  of  God's  past 
communications  is  a  more  trustworthy  source  of  theology  than  are  our 
conclusions  from  nature  or  our  private  impressions  of  the  teaching  of  the 
Spirit.  Theology  therefore  looks  to  the  Scripture  itself  as  its  chief  source 
of  material  and  its  final  standard  of  appeal. 

(d)  The  theology  of  Scripture  not  unnatural. — Though  we  speak  of 
the  systematized  truths  of  nature  as  constituting  natural  theology,  we  are 
not  to  infer  that  Scriptural  theology  is  unnatural.  Since  the  Scriptures 

9 


10  PROLEGOMENA. 

have  the  same  author  as  nature,  the  same  principles  are  illustrated  in  the 
one  as  in  the  other.  All  the  doctrines  of  the  Bible  have  their  reason  in 
that  same  nature  of  God  which  constitutes  the  basis  of  all  material  things. 
Christianity  is  a  supplementary  dispensation,  not  as  contradicting,  or  cor- 
recting errors  in,  natural  theology,  but  as  more  perfectly  revealing  the 
truth.  Christianity  is  indeed  the  ground-plan  upon  which  the  whole 
creation  is  built — the  original  and  eternal  truth  of  which  natural  theology 
is  but  a  partial  expression.  Hence  the  theology  of  nature  and  the  theol- 
ogy of  Scripture  are  mutually  dependent.  Natural  theology  not  only  pre- 
pares the  way  for,  but  it  receives  stimulus  and  aid  from,  Scriptural 
theology.  Natural  theology  may  now  be  a  source  of  truth,  which,  before 
the  Scriptures  came,  it  could  not  furnish. 

2.  Scripture  and  nationalism.     Although  the  Scriptures  make  known 
much  that  is  beyond  the  power  of  man's  unaided  reason  to  discover  or 
fully  to  comprehend,  their  teachings,  when  taken  together,  in  no  way  con- 
tradict a  reason  conditioned  in  its  activity  by  a  holy  affection  and  enlight- 
ened by  the  Spirit  of  God.     To  reason  in  the  large  sense,  as  including  the 
mind's  power  of  cognizing  God  and  moral  relations — not  in  the  narrow 
sense  of  mere  reasoning,  or  the  exercise  of  the  purely  logical  faculty — the 
Scriptures  continually  appeal. 

A.  The  proper  office  of  reason,  in  this  large  sense,  is  :  (a)  To  furnish 
us  with  those  primary  ideas  of  space,  time,  cause,  substance,  design,  right, 
and  God,  which  are  the  conditions  of  all  subsequent  knowledge.     (6)     To 
judge  with  regard  to  man's  need  of  a  special  and  supernatural  revelation, 
(c)     To  examine  the  credentials  of  communications  professing  to  be,  or  of 
documents  professing  to  record,  such  a  revelation,     (d)    To  estimate  and 
reduce  to  system  the  facts  of  revelation,  when  these  have  been  found  pro- 
perly attested,     (e)    To  deduce  from  these  facts  their  natural  and  logical 
conclusions.     Thus  reason  itself  prepares  the  way  for  a  revelation  above 
reason,  and  warrants  an  implicit  trust  in  such  revelation  when  once  given. 

B.  nationalism,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  reason  to  be  the  ultimate 
source  of  all  religious  truth,  while  Scripture  is  authoritative  only  so  far  as  its 
revelations  agree  with  previous  conclusions  of  reason,  or  can  be  rationally 
demonstrated.     Every  form  of  rationalism,  therefore,  commits  at  least  one 
of  the  following  errors  :    (a)    That  of  confounding  reason  with  mere  rea- 
soning, or  the  exercise  of  the  logical  intelligence.     (6)    That  of  ignoring 
the  necessity  of  a  holy  aftection  as  the  condition  of  all  right  reason  in 
religious  things,    (c)   That  of  denying  our  dependence  in  our  present  state 
of  sin  upon  God's  past  revelations  of  himself,  (d)    That  of  regarding  the 
unaided  reason,   even  its  normal  and  unbiased  state,  as  capable  of  dis- 
covering, comprehending,  and  demonstrating  all  religious  truth. 

3.  Scripture  and  Mysticism.     As  rationalism  recognizes  too  little  as 
coming  from  God,  so  mysticism  recognizes  too  much. 

A.  True  mysticism. — We  have  seen  that  there  is  an  illumination  of  the 
minds  of  all  believers  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  Spirit,  however,  makes  no 
new  revelation  of  truth,  but  uses  for  his  instrument  the  truth  already 
revealed  by  Christ  in  nature  and  in  the  Scriptures.  The  illuminating 


LIMITATIONS      OF  THEOLOGY.  11 

work  of  the  Spirit  is  therefore  an  opening  of  men's  minds  to  understand 
Christ's  previous  revelations.  As  one  initiated  into  the  mysteries  of  Chris- 
tianity, every  true  believer  may  be  called  a  mystic.  True  mysticism  is 
that  higher  knowledge  and  fellowship  which  the  Holy  Spirit  gives  through 
the  use  of  nature  and  Scripture  as  subordinate  and  principal  means. 

B.  False  mysticism.  — Mysticism,  however,  as  the  term  is  commonly 
used,  errs  in  holding  to  the  attainment  of  religious  knowledge  by  direct 
communication  from  God,  and  by  passive  absorption  of  the  human  activi- 
ties into  the  divine.  It  either  partially  or  wholly  loses  sight  of  (a)  the  out- 
ward organs  of  revelation,  nature  and  the  Scriptures ;  (6)  the  activity  of 
the  human  powers  in  the  reception  of  all  religious  knowledge ;  (c)  the 
personality  of  man,  and,  by  consequence,  the  personality  of  God. 

4.  Scripture  and  JZomanism.  While  the  history  of  doctrine,  as  show- 
ing the  progressive  apprehension  and  unfolding  by  the  church  of  the  truth 
contained  in  nature  and  Scripture,  is  a  subordinate  source  of  theology, 
Protestantism  recognizes  the  Bible  as  under  Christ  the  primary  and  final 
authority. 

Komanism,  on  the  other  hand,  commits  the  two-fold  error  (a)  Of  making 
the  church,  and  not  the  Scriptures,  the  immediate  and  sufficient  source  of 
religious  knowledge ;  and  (6)  Of  making  the  relation  of  the  individual  to 
Christ  depend  upon  his  relation  to  the  church,  instead  of  making  his  rela- 
tion to  the  church  depend  upon,  follow,  and  express  his  relation  to  Christ. 

II.  LIMITATIONS  OF  THEOLOGY.  —  Although  theology  derives  its  mate- 
rial from  God's  two-fold  revelation,  it  does  not  profess  to  give  an  exhaus- 
tive knowledge  of  God  and  of  the  relations  between  God  and  the  universe. 
After  showing  what  material  we  have,  we  must  show  what  material  we  have 
not.  We  have  indicated  the  sources  of  theology  ;  we  now  examine  its  limi- 
tations. Theology  has  its  limitations  : 

(a)  In  the  finiteness  of  the  human  understanding.  This  gives  rise 
to  a  class  of  necessary  mysteries,  or  mysteries  connected  with  the  infinity 
and  incomprehensibleness  of  the  divine  nature  (Job  11  :  7  ;  Bom.  11  :  33). 

(6)  In  the  imperfect  state  of  science,  both  natural  and  metaphysical. 
This  gives  rise  to  a  class  of  accidental  mysteries,  or  mysteries  which 
consist  in  the  apparently  irreconcilable  nature  of  truths,  which,  taken 
separately,  are  perfectly  comprehensible. 

(c)  In  the  inadequacy  of  language.     Since  language  is  the  medium 
through  which  truth  is  expressed  and  formulated,  the  invention  of  a  pro- 
per terminology  in  theology,  as  in  every  othei?  science,  is  a  condition  and 
criterion  of  its  progress.     The  Scriptures  recognize  a  peculiar  difficulty  in 
putting  spiritual  truths  into  earthly  language  (  1  Cor.  2  :  13  ;  2  Cor.  3:6; 
12  :  4  ). 

(d)  In    the  incompleteness  of  our    knowledge  of  the    Scriptures. 
Since  it  is  not  the  mere  letter  of  the  Scriptures  that  constitutes  the  truth, 
the  progress  of  theology  is  dependent  upon  hermeneutics,  or  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  word  of  God. 


12  PROLEGOMENA. 

(e)  In  the  silence  of  written  revelation.  For  our  discipline  and  pro- 
bation, much  is  probably  hidden  from  us,  which  we  might  even  with  our 
present  powers  comprehend. 

(/)  In  the  lack  of  spiritual  discernment  caused  by  sin.  Since  holy 
affection  is  a  condition  of  religious  knowledge,  all  moral  imperfection  in 
the  individual  Christian  and  in  the  church  serves  as  a  hindrance  to  the 
working  out  of  a  complete  theology. 

III.     BEI^ATIONS  OF  MATERIAL  TO  PROGRESS  IN  THEOLOGY. 

(a)  A  perfect  system  of  theology  is  impossible.  We  do  not  expect  to 
construct  such  a  system.  All  science  but  reflects  the  present  attainment 
of  the  human  mind.  No  science  is  complete  or  finished.  However  it 
may  be  with  the  sciences  of  nature  and  of  man,  the  science  of  God  will 
never  amount  to  an  exhaustive  knowledge.  We  must  not  expect  to  dem- 
onstrate all  Scripture  doctrines  upon  rational  grounds,  or  even  in  every 
case  to  see  the  principle  of  connection  between  them.  Where  we  cannot 
do  this,  we  must,  as  in  every  other  science,  set  the  revealed  facts  in  their 
places  and  wait  for  further  light,  instead  of  ignoring  or  rejecting  any  of 
them  because  we  cannot  understand  them  or  their  relation  to  other  parts 
of  our  system. 

(6)  Theology  is  nevertheless  progressive.  It  is  progressive  in  the 
sense  that  our  subjective  understanding  of  the  facts  with  regard  to  God, 
and  our  consequent  expositions  of  these  facts,  may  and  do  become  more 
perfect.  But  theology  is  not  progressive  in  the  sense  that  its  objective 
facts  change,  either  in  their  number  or  their  nature.  With  Martineau  we 
may  say  :  "Beligion  has  been  reproached  with  not  being  progressive  ;  it 
makes  amends  by  being  imperishable."  Though  our  knowledge  may  be 
imperfect,  it  will  have  great  value  still.  Our  success  in  constructing  a 
theology  will  depend  upon  the  proportion  which  clearly  expressed  facts  of 
Scripture  bear  to  mere  inferences,  and  upon  the  degree  in  which  they  all 
cohere  about  Christ,  the  central  person  and  theme. 


CHAPTER    III. 

METHOD   OF   THEOLOGY. 

I.  REQUISITES  TO  THE  STUDY. —  The  requisites  to  the  successful  study 
of  theology  have  already  in  part  been  indicated  in  speaking  of  its  limita- 
tions. In  spite  of  some  repetition,  however,  we  mention  the  following  : 

(a)  A  disciplined  mind.  Only  such  a  mind  can  patiently  collect  the 
facts,  hold  in  its  grasp  many  facts  at  once,  educe  by  continuous  reflection 
their  connecting  principles,  suspend  final  judgment  until  its  conclusions 
are  verified  by  Scripture  and  experience. 

(6)  An  intuitional  as  distinguished  from  a  merely  logical  habit  oj 
mind, —  or,  trust  in  the  mind's  primitive  convictions,  as  well  as  in  its 
processes  of  reasoning.  The  theologian  must  have  insight  as  well  as  under- 
standing. He  must  accustom  himself  to  ponder  spiritual  facts  as  well  as 
those  which  are  sensible  and  material ;  to  see  things  in  their  inner  relations 
as  well  as  in  their  outward  forms ;  to  cherish  confidence  in  the  reality  and 
the  unity  of  truth. 

(c)  An  acquaintance  with  physical,   mental,   and  moral  science. 
The  method  of  conceiving  and  expressing  Scripture  truth  is  so  affected  by 
our  elementary  notions  of  these  sciences,  and  the  weapons  with  which 
theology  is  attacked  and  defended  are  so  commonly  drawn  from  them  as 
arsenals,  that  the  student  cannot  afford  to  be  ignorant  of  them. 

(d)  A  knowledge  of  the  original  languages  of  the  Bible.    This  is 
necessary  to  enable  us  not  only  to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  funda- 
mental terms  of  Scripture,  such  as  holiness,  sin,  propitiation,  justification, 
but  also  to  interpret  statements  of  doctrine  by  their  connections  with  the 
context. 

(e)  A  holy  affection  toward  God.     Only  the  renewed  heart  can  pro- 
perly feel  its  need  of  divine  revelation,  or  understand  that  revelation  when 
given. 

(/)  The  enlightening  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  As  only  the 
Spirit  fathoms  the  things  of  God,  so  only  he  can  illuminate  our  minds  to 
apprehend  them. 

n.  DIVISIONS  OF  THEOLOGY. — Theology  is  commonly  divided  into  Bibli- 
cal, Historical,  Systematic,  and  Practical. 

1.  Biblical  Theology  aims  to  arrange  and  classify  the  facts  of  revelation, 
confining  itself  to  the  Scriptures  for  its  material,  and  treating  of  doctrine 
only  so  far  as  it  was  developed  at  the  close  of  the  apostolic  age. 

13 


14  PROLEGOMENA. 

2.  Historical  Theology  traces  the  development  of  the  Biblical  doctrines 
from  the  time  of  the  apostles  to  the  present  day,  and  gives  account  of  the 
results  of  this  development  in  the  life  of  the  church. 

3.  Systematic  Theology  takes  the  material  furnished  by  Biblical  and 
by  Historical  Theology,  and  with  this  material  seeks  to  build  up  into  an 
organic  and  consistent  whole  all  our  knowledge  of  God  and  of  the  relations 
between  God  and  the  universe,   whether  this  knowledge  be  originally 
derived  from  nature  or  from  the  Scriptures. 

4.  Practical  Theology  is  the  system  of  truth  considered  as  a  means  of 
renewing  and  sanctifying  men,  or,  in  other  words,  theology  in  its  publica- 
^tion  and  enforcement. 

III.    HISTOET  OF  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

1.  In  the  Eastern  Church,  Systematic  Theology  may  be  said  to  have 
had  its  beginning  and  end  in  John  of  Damascus  (700-760). 

2.  In  the    Western  Church,   we  may  (with  Hagenbach)  distinguish 
three  periods  : 

(a)  The    period  of    Scholasticism,  —  introduced    by  Peter    Lombard 
(1100-1160),  and  reaching  its  culmination  in  Thomas  Aquinas  (1221-1274) 
and  Duns  Scotus  (1265-1308). 

( b )  The  period  of  Symbolism,  —  represented  by  the  Lutheran  theol- 
ogy of  Philip  Melanchthon  (1497-1560),  and  the  Beformed  theology  of 
John  Calvin  (1509-1564) ;  the  former  connecting  itself  with  the  Analytic 
theology  of  Calixtus  (1585-1656),  and  the  latter  with  the  Federal  theology 
of  Cocceius  (1603-1669). 

(c)  The  period  of  Criticism  and  Speculation,  —  in  its  three  divisions  : 
the  Rationalistic,  represented  by  Semler  (1725-1791) ;  the  Transitional,  by 
Schleiermacher  (1768-1834) ;  the  Evangelical,  by  Nitzsch,  Miiller,  Tholuck 
and  Dorner. 

3.  Among  theologians  of  views  diverse  from  the  prevailing  Protes- 
tant faith,  may  be  mentioned  : 

(a)  Bellarmine  (1542-1621),  the  Boman  Catholic. 

(b)  Arminius  (1560-1609),  the  opponent  of  predestination. 

(c)  Laelius  Socinus  (1525-1562),    and  Faustus  Socinus    (1539-1604), 
the  leaders  of  the  modern  Unitarian  movement. 

4.  British  Theology,  represented  by : 

(a]  The  Baptists,  John  Bunyan  (1628-1688),  John  Gill  (1697-1771), 
and  Andrew  Fuller  (1754-1815). 

(6)  The  Puritans,  John  Owen  (1616-1683),  Bichard  Baxter  (1615-1691), 
John  Howe  (1530-1705),  and  Thomas  Bidgeley  (1666-1734). 

(c)  The  Scotch  Presbyterians,  Thomas  Boston  (1676-1732),  John  Dick 
(1764-1833),  and  Thomas  Chalmers  (1780-1847). 

(d)  The  Methodists,  John  Wesley  (1703-1791),   and  Bichard  Watson 
(1781-1833). 


ORDER  OF  TREATMENT   Itf   SYSTEMATIC   THEOLOGY.  15 

(e)  The  Quakers,  George  Fox  (1624-1691),  and  Kobert  Barclay  (1648- 
1690). 

(/)  The  English  Churchmen,  Richard  Hooker  (1553-1600),  Gilbert 
Burnet  (1643-1715),  and  John  Pearson  (1613-1686). 

5.     American  theology,  running  in  two  lines: 

(a)  The  Beformed  system  of  Jonathan  Edwards  (1703-1758),  modified 
successively  by  Joseph  Bellamy  (1719-1790),  Samuel  Hopkins  (1721-1803), 
Timothy  Dwight  (1752-1817),  Nathanael  Emmons  (1745-1840),  Leonard 
Woods  (1774-1854),  Charles  G.  Finney  (1792-1875),  Nathaniel  W.  Taylor 
(1786-1858),    and    Horace  Bushnell    (1802-1876).      Calvinism,    as   thus 
modified,  is  often  called  the  New  England,  or  New  School,  theology. 

(b)  The  older  Calvinism,  represented  by  Charles  Hodge  the  father  (1797- 
1878)  and  A.  A.  Hodge  the  son  (1823-1886),  together  with  Henry  B. 
Smith  ( 1815-1877),  Robert  J.  Breckinridge  ( 1800-1871 ),  Samuel  J.  Baird, 
and  William  G.  T.  Shedd  (1820-1894).    All  these,  although  with  minor 
differences,  hold  to  views  of  human  depravity  and  divine  grace  more  nearly 
conformed  to  the  doctrine  of  Augustine  and  Calvin,  and  are  for  this  reason 
distinguished  from  the  New  England  theologians  and  their  followers  by 
the  popular  title  of  Old  School. 

IV.    ORDER  OF  TREATMENT  IN  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

1.  Various  methods  of  arranging  the  topics  of  a  theological  system. 

(a)  The  Analytical  method  of  Calixtus  begins  with  the  assumed  end  of 
all  things,  blessedness,  and  thence  passes  to  the  means  by  which  it  is 
secured.  (6)  The  Trinitarian  method  of  Leydecker  and  Martensen  regards 
Christian  doctrine  as  a  manifestation  successively  of  the  Father,  Son  and 
Holy  Spirit,  (c)  The  Federal  method  of  Cocceius,  Witsius,  and  Boston 
treats  theology  under  the  two  covenants,  (d)  The  Anthropological  method 
of  Chalmers  and  Rothe ;  the  former  beginning  with  the  Disease  of  Man 
and  passing  to  the  Remedy  ;  the  latter  dividing  his  Dogmatik  into  the 
Consciousness  of  Sin  and  the  Consciousness  of  Redemption,  (e)  The 
Christological  method  of  Hase,  Thomasius  and  Andrew  Fuller  treats  of 
God,  man,  and  sin,  as  presuppositions  of  the  person  and  work  of  Christ. 
Mention  may  also  be  made  of  (/)  The  Historical  method,  followed  by 
Ursinus,  and  adopted  in  Jonathan  Edwards's  History  of  Redemption ;  and 
(g)  The  Allegorical  method  of  Dannhauer,  in  which  man  is  described  as  a 
wanderer,  life  as  a  road,  the  Holy  Spirit  as  a  light,  the  church  as  a  candle- 
stick, God  as  the  end,  and  heaven  as  the  home  ;  so  Bunyan's  Holy  War, 
and  Howe's  Living  Temple. 

2.  The  /Synthetic  Method,  which  we  adopt  in  this  compendium,  is  both 
the  most  common  and  the  most  logical  method  of  arranging  the  topics 
of  theology.     This  method  proceeds  from  causes  to  effects,  or,  in  the 
language  of  Hagenbach  (  Hist.  Doctrine,  2  : 152 ),  "  starts  from  the  highest 
principle,  God,  and  proceeds  to  man,  Christ,  redemption,  and  finally  to 
the  end  of  all  things.  "    In  such  a  treatment  of  theology  we  may  best 
arrange  our  topics  in  the  following  order : 


16  PROLEGOMENA. 

1st.  The  existence  of  God. 

2d.  The  Scriptures  a  revelation  from  God. 

3d.  The  nature,  decrees  and  works  of  God. 

4th.  Man,  in  his  original  likeness  to  God  and  subsequent  apostasy. 

5th.  Redemption,  through  the  work  of  Christ  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

6th.  The  nature  and  laws  of  the  Christian  church. 

7th.  The  end  of  the  present  system  of  things. 

V.     TEXT-BOOKS  IN  THEOLOGY,  valuable  for  reference  :- 

1.  Confessions :  Schaff,  Creeds  of  Christendom. 

2.  Compendiums  :  H.  B.  Smith,  System  of  Christian  Theology  ;  A.  A. 
Hodge,  Outlines  of  Theology ;  E.    H.  Johnson,   Outline  of  Systematic 
Theology  ;  Hovey,  Manual  of  Theology  and  Ethics ;  W.  N.  Clarke,  Outline 
of  Christian  Theology  ;  Hase,  Hutterus  Redivivus ;  Luthardt,  Compendium 
der  Dogmatik ;  Kurtz,  Eeligionslehre. 

3.  Extended  Treatises  :  Dorner,  System  of  Christian  Doctrine  ;  Shedd, 
Dogmatic  Theology ;    Calvin,   Institutes ;     Charles    Hodge,    Systematic 
Theology  ;  Van  Oosterzee,  Christian  Dogmatics ;  Baird,  Elohim  Eevealed  ; 
Luthardt,  Fundamental,  Saving,  and  Moral  Truths ;  Phillippi,  Glaubens- 
lehre  ;  Thomasius,  Christi  Person  und  Werk. 

4.  Collected  Works  :  Jonathan  Edwards ;  Andrew  Fuller. 

5.  Histories  of  Doctrine  :    Harnack  ;  Hagenbach  ;   Shedd ;   Fisher  ; 
Sheldon  ;  Orr,  Progress  of  Dogma. 

6.  Monographs :  Julius  Miiller,  Doctrine  of  Sin  ;   Shedd,  Discourses 
and    Essays ;    Liddon,    Our  Lord's  Divinity ;    Dorner,   History  of  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Person  of  Christ ;    Dale,    Atonement ;    Strong,   Christ 
in  Creation  ;  Upton,  Hibbert  Lectures. 

7.  Theism :    Martineau,    Study  of  Religion ;    Harris,    Philosophical 
Basis  of  Theism  ;  Strong,  Philosophy  and  Religion  ;  Bruce,  Apologetics  ; 
Drummond,  Ascent  of  Man ;  Griffith-Jones,  Ascent  through  Christ. 

8.  Christian  Evidences:   Butler,  Analogy  of  Natural  and  Revealed 
Religion ;  Fisher,  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief ;  Row,  Bampton 
JJectures  for  1877 ;  Peabody,  Evidences  of  Christianity  ;  Mair,   Christian 
Evidences  ;  Fairbairn,  Philosophy  of  the  Christian  Religion  ;  Matheson, 
Spiritual  Development  of  St.  Paul. 

9.  Intellectual  Philosophy  :  Stout,  Handbook  of  Psychology  ;  Bowne, 
Metaphysics ;  Porter,  Human  Intellect ;  Hill,  Elements  of  Psychology  ; 
Dewey,  Psychology. 

10.  Moral  Philosophy:  Robinson,  Principles  and  Practice  of  Morality  ; 
Smyth,  Christian  Ethics  ;  Porter,  Elements  of  Moral  Science  ;  Calderwood, 
Moral  Philosophy ;    Alexander,   Moral  Science ;   Robins,  Ethics  of  the 
Christian  Life. 

11.  General  /Science  :  Todd,  Astronomy  ;  Wentworth  and  Hill,  Physics ; 
Remsen,    Chemistry ;     Brigham,    Geology ;    Parker,    Biology ;    Martin, 
Physiology ;   Ward,  Fairbanks,   or  West,  Sociology ;    Walker,   Political 
Economy. 


TEXT-BOOKS   Itf  THEOLOGY.  17 

12.  Theological  Encyclopedias  :  Schaff-Herzog  (  English )  ;  McClin- 
tock  and  Strong  ;  Herzog  (Second  German  Edition). 

13.  Bible  Dictionaries :  Hastings  ;  Davis  5  Cheyne  ;  Smith  (edited  by 
Hackett). 

14.  Commentaries:  Meyer,  on  the  New  Testament;  Philippi,  Lange, 
Shedd,  Sanday,  on  the  Epistle  to  the  Komans  ;  Godet,  on  John's  Gospel ; 
Lightfoot,  on  Philippians  and  Oolossians  ;  Expositor's  Bible,  on  the  Olcl 
Testament  books. 

15.  Bibles:    American  Kevision  (standard  edition);  Bevised  Greek- 
English  New  Testament  ( published  by  Harper  &  Brothers )  ;  Annotated 
Paragraph  iflble  (published  by  the  London  Religious  Tract  Society) 
Stier  and  TL-dle,  Polyglotten-Bibel. 


PAET    II. 

THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 
CHAPTER    I. 

ORIGIN  OF  OUE   IDEA   OF   GOD'S   EXISTENCE. 

God  is  the  infinite  and  perfect  Spirit  in  whom  all  things  have  their  source, 
support,  and  end. 

The  existence  of  God  is  a  first  truth  ;  in  other  words,  the  knowledge 
of  God's  existence  is  a  rational  intuition.  Logically,  it  precedes  and  con- 
ditions all  observation  and  reasoning.  Chronologically,  only  reflection 
upon  the  phenomena  of  nature  and  of  mind  occasions  its  rise  in  con- 
sciousness. 

I.      FlBST  TRUTHS  IN  GENERAL. 

1.  Their  nature. 

A.  Negatively. — A  first  truth  is  not  (a)  Truth  written  prior  to  conscious- 
ness upon  the  substance  of  the  soul — for  such  passive  knowledge  implies  a 
materialistic  view  of  the  soul;    (6)  Actual  knowledge  of  which  the  soul 
finds  itself  in  possession  at  birth  —  for  it  cannot  be  proved  that  the  soul 
has  such  knowledge  ;   (c)  An  idea,  undeveloped  at  birth,  but  which  has 
the  power  of  self-development  apart  from  observation  and  experience  —  for 
this  is  contrary  to  all  we  know  of  the  laws  of  mental  growth. 

B.  Positively. — A  first  trath  is  a  knowledge  which,  though  developed 
upon  occasion  of  observation  and  reflection,  is  not  derived  from  observa- 
tion and  reflection, — a  knowledge  on  the  contrary  which  has  such  logical 
priority  that  it  must  be  assumed  or  supposed,  in  order  to  make  any  obser- 
vation or  reflection  possible.     Such  truths  are  not,  therefore,  recognized 
first  in  order  of  time  ;  some  of  them  are  assented  to  somewhat  late  in  the 
mind's  growth  ;  by  the  great  majority  of  men  they  are  never  consciously 
formulated  at  all.      Yet  they  constitute  the  necessary  assumptions  upon 
which  all  other  knowledge  rests,  and  the  mind  has  not  only  the  inborn 
capacity  to  evolve  them  so  soon  as  the  proper  occasions  are  presented,  but 
the  recognition  of  them  is  inevitable  so  soon  as  the  mind  begins  to  give 
account  to  itself  of  its  own  knowledge. 

2.  Their  criteria.     The  criteria  by  which  first  truths  are  to  be  tested 
are  three  : 

18 


THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   A   FIRST  TRUTH.  19 

A.  Their  universality.     By  this  we  mean,  not  that  all  men  assent  to 
them  or  understand  them  when  propounded  in  scientific  form,  but  that  all 
men  manifest  a  practical  belief  in  them  by  their  language,  actions,  and 
expectations. 

B.  Their  necessity.     By  this  we  mean,  not  that  it  is  impossible  to  deny 
these  truths,  but  that  the  mind  is  compelled  by  its  very  constitution  to 
recognize  them  upon  the  occurrence  of  the  proper  conditions,   and  to 
employ  them  in  its  arguments  to  prove  their  non-existence. 

C.  Their  logical  independence  and  priority.      By  this  we  mean  that 
these  truths  can  be  resolved  into  no  others,  and  proved  by  no  others  ;  that 
they  are  presupposed  in  the  acquisition  of  all  other  knowledge,  and  can 
therefore  be  derived  from  no  other  source  than  an  original  cognitive  power 
of  the  mind. 

II.     THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  A  FIRST  TRUTH. 

1.  That  the  knowledge  of  God's  existence  answers  the  first  criterion 
of  universality,  is  evident  from  the  following  considerations : 

A.  It  is  an  acknowledged  fact  that  the  vast  majority  of  men  have  actu- 
ally recognized  the  existence  of  a  spiritual  being  or  beings,  upon  whom 
they  conceived  themselves  to  be  dependent. 

B.  Those  races  and  nations  which  have  at  first  seemed  destitute  of  such 
knowledge  have  uniformly,  upon  further  investigation,  been  found  to  pos- 
sess it,  so  that  no  tribe  of  men  with  which  we  have  thorough  acquaintance 
can  be  said  to  be  without  an  object  of  worship.     We  may  presume  that 
further  knowledge  will  show  this  to  be  true  of  all. 

C.  This  conclusion  is  corroborated  by  the  fact  that  those  individuals,  in 
heathen  or  in  Christian  lands,  who  profess  themselves  to  be  without  any 
knowledge  of  a  spiritual  power  or  powers  above  them,  do  yet  indirectly 
manifest  the  existence  of  such  an  idea  in  their  minds  and  its  positive  influ- 
ence over  them. 

D.  This  agreement  among  individuals  and  nations  so  widely  separated 
in  time  and  place  can  be  most  satisfactorily  explained  by  supposing  that  it 
has  its  ground,  not  in  accidental  circumstances,  but  in  the  nature  of  man  as 
man.     The  diverse  and  imperfectly  developed  ideas  of  the  supreme  Being 
which  prevail  among  men  are  best  accounted  for  as  misinterpretations  and 
perversions  of  an  intuitive  conviction  common  to  all. 

2.  That  the  knowledge  of  God's  existence  answers  the  second  criterion 
of  necessity,  will  be  seen  by  considering : 

A.  That  men,  under  circumstances  fitted  to  call  forth  this  knowledge, 
cannot  avoid  recognizing  the  existence  of  God.  In  contemplating  finite 
existence,  there  is  inevitably  suggested  the  idea  of  an  infinite  Being  as  its 
correlative.  Upon  occasion  of  the  mind's  perceiving  its  own  finiteness, 
dependence,  responsibility,  it  immediately  and  necessarily  perceives  the 
existence  of  an  infinite  and  unconditioned  Being  upon  whom  it  is  depend- 
ent and  to  whom  it  is  responsible. 


20  THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD. 

B.  That  men,  in  virtue  of  their  humanity,  have  a  capacity  for  religion. 
This  recognized  capacity  for  religion  is  proof  that  the  idea  of  God  is  a  neces- 
sary one.     If  the  mind  upon  proper  occasion  did  not  evolve  this  idea,  there 
would  be  nothing  in  man  to  which  religion  could  appeal. 

C.  That  he  who  denies  God's  existence  must  tacitly  assume  that  existence 
in  his  very  argument,  by  employing  logical  processes  whose  validity  rests 
upon  the  fact  of  God's  existence.     The  full  proof  of  this  belongs  under  the 
next  head. 

3.  That  the  knowledge  of  God's  existence  answers  the  third  criterion 
of  logical  independence  and  priority ',  may  be  shown  as  follows  : 

A.  It  is  presupposed  in  all  other  knowledge  as  its  logical  condition  and 
foundation.     The  validity  of  the  simplest  mental  acts,  such  as  sense-percep- 
tion, self -consciousness,  and  memory,  depends  upon  the  assumption  that  a 
God  exists  who  has  so  constituted  our  minds  that  they  give  us  knowledge 
of  things  as  they  are. 

B.  The  more  complex  processes  of  the  mind,  such  as  induction  and  de- 
duction, can  be  relied  on  only  by  presupposing  a  thinking  Deity  who  has 
made  the  various  parts  of  the  universe  and  the  various  aspects  of  truth  to 
correspond  to  each  other  and  to  the  investigating  faculties  of  man. 

C.  Our  primitive  belief  in  final  cause,  or,  in  other  words,  our  convic- 
tion that  all  things  have  their  ends,  that  design  pervades  the  universe, 
involves  a  belief  in  God's  existence.     In  assuming  that  there  is  a  universe, 
that  the  universe  is  a  rational  whole,  a  system  of  thought-relations,  we 
assume  the  existence  of    an  absolute  Thinker,   of   whose  thought  the 
universe  is  an  expression. 

D.  Our  primitive  belief  in  moral  obligation,  or,  in  other  words,  our 
conviction  that  right  has  universal  authority,  involves  the  belief  in  God's 
existence.     In  assuming  that  the  universe  is  a  moral  whole,  we  assume  the 
existence  of  an  absolute  Will,  of  whose  righteousness  the  universe  is  an 
expression. 

To  repeat  these  four  points  in  another  form — the  intuition  of  an  Abso- 
lute Reason  is  (a)  the  necessary  presupposition  of  all  other  knowledge,  so 
that  we  cannot  know  anything  else  to  exist  except  by  assuming  first  of  all 
that  God  exists ;  (6)  the  necessary  basis  of  all  logical  thought,  so  that  we 
cannot  put  confidence  in  any  one  of  our  reasoning  processes  except  by 
taking  for  granted  that  a  thinking  Deity  has  constructed  our  minds  with 
reference  to  the  universe  and  to  truth ;  (c)  the  necessary  implication  of  our 
primitive  belief  in  design,  so  that  we  can  assume  all  things  to  exist  for  a 
purpose,  only  by  making  the  prior  assumption  that  a  purposing  God  exists 
—  can  regard  the  universe  as  a  thought,  only  by  postulating  the  existence 
of  an  absolute  Thinker  ;  and  (d)  the  necessary  foundation  of  our  convic- 
tion of  moral  obligation,  so  that  we  can  believe  in  the  universal  authority 
of  right,  only  by  assuming  that  there  exists  a  God  of  righteousness  who 
reveals  his  will  both  in  the  individual  conscience  and  in  the  moral  universe 
at  large.  We  cannot  prove  that  God  is ;  but  we  can  show  that,  in  order  to 
the  existence  of  any  knowledge,  thought,  reason,  conscience,  in  man, 
man  must  assume  that  God  is. 


OTHER   SUPPOSED   SOURCES.  21 

III.     OTHER  SUPPOSED  SOURCES  OF  OUR  IDEA  OF  GOD'S  EXISTENCE. 

Our  proof  that  the  idea  of  God's  existence  is  a  rational  intuition  will  not 
be  complete,  until  we  show  that  attempts  to  account  in  other  ways  for  the 
origin  of  the  idea  are  insufficient,  and  require  as  their  presupposition  the 
very  intuition  which  they  would  supplant  or  reduce  to  a  secondary  place. 
We  claim  that  it  cannot  be  derived  from  any  other  source  than  an  original 
cognitive  power  of  the  mind. 

1.  Not  from  external  revelation, — whether  communicated  (a)  through 
the  Scriptures,  or  (&)  through  tradition  ;  for,  unless  man  had  from  another 
source  a  previous  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  God  from  whom  such  a 
revelation  might  come,  the  revelation  itself  could  have  no  authority  for 
him. 

2.  Not  from  experience,  —  whether  this  mean  (a)  the  sense-perception 
and  reflection  of  the  individual  (Locke),  (6)  the  accumulated  results  of  the 
sensations  and  associations  of  past  generations  of  the  race  (Herbert  Spen- 
cer), or  (c)  the  actual  contact  of  our  sensitive  nature  with  God,  the  super- 
sensible reality,  through  the  religious  feeling  (Newman  Smyth). 

The  first  form  of  this  theory  is  inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  the  idea 
of  God  is  not  the  idea  of  a  sensible  or  material  object,  nor  a  combination 
of  such  ideas.  Since  the  spiritual  and  infinite  are  direct  opposites  of  the 
material  and  finite,  no  experience  of  the  latter  can  account  for  our  idea  of 
the  former. 

The  second  form  of  the  theory  is  open  to  the  objection  that  the  very  first 
experience  of  the  first  man,  equally  with  man's  latest  experience,  presup- 
poses this  intuition,  as  well  as  the  other  intuitions,  and  therefore  cannot  be 
the  cause  of  it.  Moreover,  even  though  this  theory  of  its  origin  were  cor- 
rect, it  would  still  be  impossible  to  think  of  the  object  of  the  intuition  as 
not  existing,  and  the  intuition  would  still  represent  to  us  the  highest  meas- 
ure of  certitude  at  present  attainable  by  man.  If  the  evolution  of  ideas  is 
toward  truth  instead  of  falsehood,  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  act  upon  the 
hypothesis  that  our  primitive  belief  is  veracious. 

The  third  form  of  the  theory  seems  to  make  God  a  sensuous  object,  to 
reverse  the  proper  order  of  knowing  and  feeling,  to  ignore  the  fact  that  in 
all  feeling  there  is  at  least  some  knowledge  of  an  object,  and  to  forget  that 
the  validity  of  this  very  feeling  can  be  maintained  only  by  previously 
assuming  the  existence  of  a  rational  Deity. 

3.  Not  from  reasoning,  —  because 

(a)  The  actual  rise  of  this  knowledge  in  the  great  majority  of  minds  is 
not  the  result  of  any  conscious  process  of  reasoning.  On  the  other  hand, 
upon  occurrence  of  the  proper  conditions,  it  flashes  upon  the  soul  with  the 
quickness  and  force  of  an  immediate  revelation. 

( 6 )  The  strength  of  men's  faith  in  God's  existence  is  not  proportioned  to 
the  strength  of  the  reasoning  faculty.  On  the  other  hand,  men  of  greatest 
logical  power  are  often  inveterate  sceptics,  while  men  of  unwavering  faith 
are  found  among  those  who  cannot  even  understand  the  arguments  for 
God's  existence. 


22  THE   EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 

(c)  There  is  more  in  this  knowledge  than  reasoning  could  ever  have 
furnished.     Men  do  not  limit  their  belief  in  God  to  the  just  conclusions  of 
argument.     The  arguments  for  the  divine  existence,  valuable  as  they  are  for 
purposes  to  be  shown  hereafter,  are  not  sufficient  by  themselves  to  warrant 
our  conviction  that  there  exists  an  infinite  and  absolute  Being.     It  will 
appear  upon  examination  that  the  a  priori  argument  is  capable  of  proving 
only  an  abstract  and  ideal  proposition,  but  can  never  conduct  us  to  the 
existence  of  a  real  Being.     It  will  appear  that  the  a  posteriori  arguments, 
from  merely  finite  existence,  can  never  demonstrate  the  existence  of  the 
infinite.     In  the  words  of  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton  (Discussions,  23 )  —  "A  dem- 
onstration of  the  absolute  from  the  relative  is  logically  absurd,  as  in  such 
a  syllogism  we  must  collect  in  the  conclusion  what  is  not  distributed  in 
the  premises"  —  in  short,  from  finite  premises  we  cannot  draw  an  infinite 
conclusion. 

( d)  Neither  do  men  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  God's  existence  by  infer- 
ence; for  inference  is  condensed  syllogism,  and,  as  a  form  of  reasoning,  is 
equally  open  to  the  objection  just  mentioned.     We  have  seen,  moreover, 
that  all  logical  processes  are  based  upon  the  assumption  of  God's  existence. 
Evidently  that  which  is  presupposed  in  all  reasoning  cannot  itself  be  proved 
by  reasoning. 

IV.    CONTENTS  OP  THIS  INTUITION. 

1.  In  this  fundamental  knowledge  that  God  is,  it  is  necessarily  implied 
that  to  some  extent  men  know  intuitively  what  God  is,  namely,  ( a )  a 
Reason  in  which  their  mental  processes  are  grounded  ;  (  b  )  a  Power  above 
them  upon  which  they  are  dependent ;  ( c )  a  Perfection  which  imposes  law 
upon  their  moral  natures  ;  (  d  )  a  Personality  which  they  may  recognize  in 
prayer  and  worship. 

In  maintaining  that  we  have  a  rational  intuition  of  God,  we  by  no  means 
imply  that  a  presentative  intuition  of  God  is  impossible.  Such  a  presenta- 
tive  intuition  was  perhaps  characteristic  of  unfallen  man ;  it  does  belong 
at  times  to  the  Christian  ;  it  will  be  the  blessing  of  heaven  (  Mat.  5:8  — 
"the  pure  in  heart.  .  .  shall  see  God";  Rev.  22  : 4  —  "they  shall  see  his 
face  " ).  Men's  experiences  of  face-to-face  apprehension  of  God,  in  danger 
and  guilt,  give  some  reason  to  believe  that  a  presentative  knowledge  of 
God  is  the  normal  condition  of  humanity.  But,  as  this  presentative  intui- 
tion of  God  is  not  in  our  present  state  universal,  we  here  claim  only  that  all 
men  have  a  rational  intuition  of  God. 

It  is  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  loss  of  love  to  God  has  greatly 
obscured  even  this  rational  intuition,  so  that  the  revelation  of  nature  and 
the  Scriptures  is  needed  to  awaken,  confirm  and  enlarge  it,  and  the  special 
work  of  the  Spirit  of  Christ  to  make  it  the  knowledge  of  friendship  and 
communion.  Thus  from  knowing  about  God,  we  come  to  know  God  ( John 
17  :  3 —  "This  is  life  eternal,  that  they  should  know  thee  "  ;  2  Tim.  1  : 12 
—  "I  know  him  whom  I  have  believed " ). 

2.  The  Scriptures,  therefore,  do  not  attempt  to  prove  the  existence  of 
God,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  both  assume  and  declare  that  the  knowledge 


CONTENTS  OF  THIS  INTUITION.  23 

that  God  is,  is  universal  (  Bom.  1  : 19-21,  28,  32  ;  2  : 15).  God  has  inlaid 
the  evidence  of  this  fundamental  truth  in  the  very  nature  of  man,  so  that 
nowhere  is  he  without  a  witness.  The  preacher  may  confidently  follow  the 
example  of  Scripture  by  assuming  it.  But  he  must  also  explicitly  declare 
it,  as  the  Scripture  does.  "For  the  invisible  things  of  him  since  the 
creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen"  (/catfopara* — spiritually  viewed) ;  the 
organ  given  for  this  purpose  is  the  vovr  (voov/ueva) ;  but  then  —  and  this 
forms  the  transition  to  our  next  division  of  the  subject  —  they  are  "  per- 
ceived through  the  things  that  are  made"  (roiq  -rroifaaow,  Bom.  1  :20). 


CHAPTER  II. 

CORROBORATIVE  EVIDENCES  OF  GOD'S  EXISTENCE. 

Although  the  knowledge  of  God's  existence  is  intuitive,  it  may  be  expli- 
cated and  confirmed  by  arguments  drawn  from  the  actual  universe  and 
from  the  abstract  ideas  of  the  human  mind. 

Remark  1.  These  arguments  are  probable,  not  demonstrative.  For  this 
reason  they  supplement  each  other,  and  constitute  a  series  of  evidences 
which  is  cumulative  in  its  nature.  Though,  taken  singly,  none  of  them  can 
be  considered  absolutely  decisive,  they  together  furnish  a  corroboration 
of  our  primitive  conviction  of  God's  existence,  which  is  of  great  practical 
value,  and  is  in  itself  sufficient  to  bind  the  moral  action  of  men. 

Remark  2.  A  consideration  of  these  arguments  may  also  serve  to  expli- 
cate the  contents  of  an  intuition  which  has  remaided  obscure  and  only  half 
conscious  for  lack  of  reflection.  The  arguments,  indeed,  are  the  efforts  of 
the  mind  that  already  has  a  conviction  of  God's  existence  to  give  to  itself  a 
formal  account  of  its  belief.  An  exact  estimate  of  their  logical  value  and 
of  their  relation  to  the  intuition  which  they  seek  to  express  in  syllogistic 
form,  is  essential  to  any  proper  refutation  of  the  prevalent  atheistic  and 
pantheistic  reasoning. 

Remark  3.  The  arguments  for  the  divine  existence  may  be  reduced  to 
four,  namely :  I.  The  Cosmological ;  II.  The  Teleological ;  III.  The 
Anthropological ;  and  IV.  The  Ontological.  We  shall  examine  these  in 
order,  seeking  first  to  determine  the  precise  conclusions  to  which  they 
respectively  lead,  and  then  to  ascertain  in  what  manner  the  four  may  be 
combined. 

I.  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT,  OB  ARGUMENT  PROM  CHANGE  IN 
NATURE. 

This  is  not  properly  an  argument  from  effect  to  cause ;  for  the  proposi- 
tion that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause  is  simply  identical,  and  means  only 
that  every  caused  event  must  have  a  cause.  It  is  rather  an  argument  from 
begun  existence  to  a  sufficient  cause  of  that  beginning,  and  may  be  accu- 
rately stated  as  follows : 

Everything  begun,  whether  substance  or  phenomenon,  owes  its  existence 
to  some  producing  cause.  The  universe,  at  least  so  far  as  its  present  form 
is  concerned,  is  a  thing  begun,  and  owes  its  existence  to  a  cause  which  is 
equal  to  its  production.  This  cause  must  be  indefinitely  great. 

1.     The  defects  of  the  Cosmological  Argument. 

A.  It  is  impossible  to  show  that  the  universe,  so  far  as  its  substance  is 
concerned,  has  had  a  beginning.  The  law  of  causality  declares,  not  that 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  25 

everything  has  a  cause  —  for  then  God  himself  must  have  a  cause  —  but 
rather  that  everything  begun  has  a  cause,  or  in  other  words,  that  every 
event  or  change  has  a  cause. 

B.  Granting  that  the  universe,  so  far  as  its  phenomena  are  concerned, 
has  had  a  cause,  it  is  impossible  to  show  that  any  other  cause  is  required 
than  a  cause  within  itself,  such  as  the  pantheist  supposes. 

C.  Granting  that  the  universe  must  have  had  a  cause  outside  of  itself,  it 
is  impossible  to  show  that  this  cause  has  not  itself  been  caused,  i.  e.,  consists 
of  an  infinite  series  of  dependent  causes.     The  principle  of  causality  does 
not  require  that  everything  begun  should  be  traced  back  to  an  uncaused 
cause  ;  it  demands  that  we  should  assign  a  cause,  but  not  that  we  should 
assign  a  first  cause. 

D.  Granting  that  the  cause  of  the  universe  has  not  itself  been  caused, 
it  is  impossible  to  show  that  this  cause  is  not  finite,  like  the  universe 
itself.     The  causal  principle  requires  a  cause  no  greater  than  just  sufficient 
to  account  for  the  effect. 

2.  The  value  of  the  Cosmological  Argument,  then,  is  simply  this, —  it 
proves  the  existence  of  some  cause  of  the  universe  indefinitely  great. 
When  we  go  beyond  this  and  ask  whether  this  cause  is  a  cause  of  being, 
or  merely  a  cause  of  change,  to  the  universe  ;  whether  it  is  a  cause  apart 
from  the  universe,  or  one  with  it ;  whether  it  is  an  eternal  cause,  or  a  cause 
dependent  upon  some  other  cause ;  whether  it  is  intelligent  or  unintelli- 
gent, infinite  or  finite,  one  or  many,  —  this  argument  cannot  assure  us. 

II.  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT,  OB  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER  AND 
USEFUL  COLLOCATION  IN  NATURE. 

This  is  not  properly  an  argument  from  design  to  a  designer ;  for  that 
design  implies  a  designer  is  simply  an  identical  proposition.  It  may  be 
more  correctly  stated  as  follows  :  Order  and  useful  collocation  pervading  a 
system  respectively  imply  intelligence  and  purpose  as  the  cause  of  that  order 
and  collocation.  Since  order  and  useful  collocation  pervade  the  universe, 
there  must  exist  an  intelligence  adequate  to  the  production  of  this  order, 
and  a  will  adequate  to  direct  this  collocation  to  useful  ends. 

1.     Further  explanations. 

A.  The  major  premise  expresses  a  primitive  conviction.     It  is  not 
invalidated  by  the  objections  :  (  a  )  that  order  and  useful  collocation  may 
exist  without  being  purposed  —  for  we  are  compelled  by  our  very  mental 
constitution  to  deny  this  in  all  cases  where  the  order  and  collocation 
pervade  a  system  :  ( 6  )  that  order  and  useful  collocation  may  result  from  the 
mere  operation  of  physical  forces  and  laws — for  these  very  forces  and  laws 
imply,  instead  of  excluding,  an  originating  and  superintending  intelligence 
and  will. 

B.  The  minor  premise  expresses  a  working-principle  of  all  science, 
namely,  that  all  things  have  their  uses,  that  order  pervades  the  universe,  and 
that  the  methods  of  nature  are  rational  methods.    Evidences  of  this  appear 
in  the  correlation  of  the  chemical  elements  to  each  other  ;  in  the  fitness  of 


26  THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD. 

the  inanimate  world  to  be  the  basis  and  support  of  life  ;  in  the  typical  forms 
and  unity  of  plan  apparent  in  the  organic  creation ;  in  the  existence  and 
cooperation  of  natural  laws  ;  in  cosmical  order  and  compensations. 

This  minor  premise  is  not  invalidated  by  the  objections  :  (a)  That  we 
frequently  misunderstand  the  end  actually  subserved  by  natural  events  and 
objects  ;  for  the  principle  is,  not  that  we  necessarily  know  the  actual  end, 
but  that  we  necessarily  believe  that  there  is  some  end,  in  every  case  of 
systematic  order  and  collocation.  (6)  That  the  order  of  the  universe  is 
manifestly  imperfect ;  for  this,  if  granted,  would  argue,  not  absence  of 
contrivance,  but  some  special  reason  for  imperfection,  either  in  the  limita- 
tions of  the  contriving  intelligence  itself,  or  in  the  nature  of  the  end  sought 
(as,  for  example,  correspondence  with  the  moral  state  and  probation  of 
sinners). 

2.  Defects  of  the  Teleological  Argument.      These  attach  not  to  the 
premises  but  to  the  conclusion  sought  to  be  drawn  therefrom. 

A.  The  argument  cannot  prove  a  personal  God.      The  order  and  useful 
collocations  of  the  universe  may  be  only  the  changing  phenomena  of  an 
impersonal  intelligence  and  will,  such  as  pantheism  supposes.    The  finality 
may  be  only  immanent  finality. 

B.  Even  if  this  argument  could  prove  personality  in  the  intelligence 
and  will  that  originated  the  order  of  the  universe,  it  could  not  prove  either 
the  unity,  the  eternity,  or  the  infinity  of  God  ;  not  the  unity — for  the  use- 
ful collocations  of  the  universe  might  be  the  result  of  oneness  of  counsel, 
instead  of  oneness  of  essence,  in  the  contriving  intelligence  ;  not  the  eter- 
nity— for  a  created  demiurge  might  conceivably  have  designed  the  universe  ; 
not  the  infinity  —  since  all  marks  of  order  and  collocation  within  our  obser- 
vation are  simply  finite. 

3.  The  value  of  the  Teleological  Argument  is  simply  this,  — it  proves 
from  certain  useful  collocations  and  instances  of  order  which  have  clearly 
had  a  beginning,  or  in  other  words,  from  the  present  harmony  of  the  uni- 
verse, that  there  exists  an  intelligence  and  will  adequate  to  its  contrivance. 
But  whether  this  intelligence  and  will  is  personal  or  impersonal,  creator  or 
only  fashioner,  one  or  many,  finite  or  infinite,  eternal  or  owing  its  being  to 
another,  necessary  or  free,  this  argument  cannot  assure  us. 

In  it,  however,  we  take  a  step  forward.  The  causative  power  which  we 
have  proved  by  the  Cosmological  Argument  has  now  become  an  intelligent 
and  voluntary  power. 

HI.  THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT,  OR  ARGUMENT  FROM  MAN'S 
MENTAL  AND  MORAL  NATURE. 

This  is  an  argument  from  the  mental  and  moral  condition  of  man  to 
the  existence  of  an  Author,  Lawgiver,  and  End.  It  is  sometimes  called 
the  Moral  Argument. 

The  argument  is  a  complex  one,  and  may  be  divided  into  three  parts. 

1.  Man's  intellectual  and  moral  nature  must  have  had  for  its  author  an 
intellectual  and  moral  Being.  The  elements  of  the  proof  are  as  follows :  — 


THE   ONTOLOGICAL   ARGUMENT.  27 

(a)  Man,  as  an  intellectual  and  moral  being,  has  had  a  beginning  upon 
the  planet,  (b)  Material  and  unconscious  forces  do  not  afford  a  sufficient 
cause  for  man's  reason,  conscience,  and  free  will,  (c)  Man,  as  an  effect, 
can  be  referred  only  to  a  cause  possessing  self -consciousness  and  a  moral 
nature,  in  other  words,  personality. 

2.  Man's  moral  nature  proves  the  existence  of  a  holy  Lawgiver  and 
Judge.     The  elements  of  the  proof  are: — (a)  Conscience  recognizes  the 
existence  of  a  moral  law  which  has  supreme  authority.     ( b )  Known  viola- 
tions of  this  moral  law  are  followed  by  feelings  of  ill-desert  and  fears  of 
judgment,     (c)  This  moral  law,  since  it  is  not  self-imposed,  and  these 
threats  of  judgment,  since  they  are  not  self -executing,  respectively  argue 
the  existence  of  a  holy  will  that  has  imposed  the  law,  and  of  a  punitive 
power  that  will  execute  the  threats  of  the  moral  nature. 

3.  Man's  emotional  and  voluntary  nature  proves  the  existence  of  a 
Being  who  can  furnish  in  himself  a  satisfying  object  of  human  affection 
and  an  end  which  will  call  forth  man's  highest  activities  and  ensure  his 
highest  progress. 

Only  a  Being  of  power,  wisdom,  holiness,  and  goodness,  and  all  these 
indefinitely  greater  than  any  that  we  know  upon  the  earth,  can  meet  this 
demand  of  the  human  soul.  Such  a  Being  must  exist.  Otherwise  man's 
greatest  need  would  be  unsupplied,  and  belief  in  a  lie  be  more  productive 
of  virtue  than  belief  in  the  truth. 

A.  The  defects  of  the  Anthropological  Argument  are  :  (a)  It  cannot 
prove  a  creator  of  the  material  universe.     (  6 )  It  cannot  prove  the  infinity 
of  God,  since  man  from  whom  we  argue  is  finite.     (  c )  It  cannot  prove  the 
mercy  of  God.     But, 

B.  The  value  of  the  Argument  is,  that  it  assures  us  of  the  existence  of 
a  personal  Being,  who  rules  us  in  righteousness,  and  who  is  the  proper 
object  of  supreme  affection  and  service.     But  whether  this  Being  is  the 
original  creator  of  all  things,  or  merely  the  author  of  our  own  existence, 
whether  he  is  infinite  or  finite,  whether  he  is  a  Being  of  simple  righteous- 
ness or  also  of  mercy,  this  argument  cannot  assure  us. 

Among  the  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God,  however,  we  assign  to 
this  the  chief  place,  since  it  adds  to  the  ideas  of  causative  power  (which 
we  derived  from  the  Cosmological  Argument)  and  of  contriving  intelli- 
gence (which  we  derived  from  the  Teleological  Argument),  the  far  wider 
ideas  of  personality  and  righteous  lordship. 

IV.  THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT,  OB  ARGUMENT  FROM  OUR  ABSTRACT 
AND  NECESSARY  IDEAS. 

This  argument  infers  the  existence  of  God  from  the  abstract  and  neces- 
sary ideas  of  the  human  mind.  It  has  three  forms  : 

1.  That  of  Samuel  Clarke.  Space  and  time  are  attributes  of  substance 
or  being.  But  space  and  time  are  respectively  infinite  and  eternal.  There 
must  therefore  be  an  infinite  and  eternal  substance  or  Being  to  whom  these 
attributes  belong. 


28  THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD. 

Gillespie  states  the  argument  somewhat  differently.  Space  and  time  are 
modes  of  existence.  But  space  and  time  are  respectively  infinite  and  eter- 
nal. There  must  therefore  be  an  infinite  and  eternal  Being  who  subsists 
in  these  modes.  But  we  reply  : 

Space  and  time  are  neither  attributes  of  substance  nor  modes  of  exist- 
ence. The  argument,  if  valid,  would  prove  that  God  is  not  mind  but  matter, 
for  that  could  not  be  mind,  but  only  matter,  of  which  space  and  time  were 
either  attributes  or  modes. 

2.  That  of  Descartes.     We  have  the  idea  of  an  infinite  and  perfect 
Being.      This  idea  cannot  be  derived  from  imperfect  and  finite  things. 
There  must  therefore  be  an  infinite  and  perfect  Being  who  is  its  cause. 

But  we  reply  that  this  argument  confounds  the  idea  of  the  infinite  with 
an  infinite  idea.  Man's  idea  of  the  infinite  is  not  infinite  but  finite,  and 
from  a  finite  effect  we  cannot  argue  an  infinite  cause. 

3.  That  of  Anselm.     We  have  the  idea  of  an  absolutely  perfect  Being. 
But  existence  is  an  attribute  of  perfection.     An  absolutely  perfect  Being 
must  therefore  exist. 

But  we  reply  that  this  argument  confounds  ideal  existence  with  real 
existence.  Our  ideas  are  not  the  measure  of  external  reality. 

Although  this  last  must  be  considered  the  most  perfect  form  of  the  Onto- 
logical  Argument,  it  is  evident  that  it  conducts  us  only  to  an  ideal  con- 
clusion, not  to  real  existence.  In  common  with  the  two  preceding  forms 
of  the  argument,  moreover,  it  tacitly  assumes,  as  already  existing  in  the 
human  mind,  that  very  knowledge  of  God's  existence  which  it  would  derive 
from  logical  demonstration.  It  has  value,  therefore,  simply  as  showing 
what  God  must  be,  if  he  exists  at  all. 

But  the  existence  of  a  Being  indefinitely  great,  a  personal  Cause,  Con- 
triver and  Lawgiver,  has  been  proved  by  the  preceding  arguments  ;  for  the 
law  of  parsimony  requires  us  to  apply  the  conclusions  of  the  first  three 
arguments  to  one  Being,  and  not  to  many.  To  this  one  Being  we  may 
now  ascribe  the  infinity  and  perfection,  the  idea  of  which  lies  at  the  basis 
of  the  Ontological  Argument  —  ascribe  them,  not  because  they  are  demon- 
strably  his,  but  because  our  mental  constitution  will  not  allow  us  to  think 
otherwise.  Thus  clothing  him  with  all  perfections  which  the  human  mind 
can  conceive,  and  these  in  illimitable  fullness,  we  have  one  whom  we  may 
justly  call  God. 

As  a  logical  process  this  is  indeed  defective,  since  all  logic  as  well  as  all 
observation  depends  for  its  validity  upon  the  presupposed  existence  of 
God,  and  since  this  particular  process,  even  granting  the  validity  of  logic 
in  general,  does  not  warrant  the  conclusion  that  God  exists,  except  upon  a 
second  assumption  that  our  abstract  ideas  of  infinity  and  perfection  are  to 
be  applied  to  the  Being  to  whom  argument  has  actually  conducted  us. 

But  although  both  ends  of  the  logical  bridge  are  confessedly  wanting,  the 
process  may  serve  and  does  serve  a  more  useful  purpose  than  that  of  mere 
demonstration,  namely,  that  of  awakening,  explicating,  and  confirming  a 
conviction  which,  though  the  most  fundamental  of  all,  may  yet  have  been 
partially  slumbering  for  lack  of  thought. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ERRONEOUS  EXPLANATIONS,  AND   CONCLUSION. 

Any  correct  explanation  of  the  universe  must  postulate  an  intuitive 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  external  world,  of  self,  and  of  God. 
The  desire  for  scientific  unity,  however,  has  occasioned  attempts  to  reduce 
these  three  factors  to  one,  and  according  as  one  or  another  of  the  three  has 
been  regarded  as  the  all-inclusive  principle,  the  result  has  been  Materialism, 
Materialistic  Idealism,  or  Idealistic  Pantheism.  This  scientific  impulse  is 
better  satisfied  by  a  system  which  we  may  designate  as  Ethical  Monism. 

I.     MATERIALISM. 

Materialism  is  that  method  of  thought  which  gives  priority  to  matter, 
rather  than  to  mind,  in  its  explanations  of  the  universe.  Upon  this  view, 
material  atoms  constitute  the  ultimate  and  fundamental  reality  of  which 
all  things,  rational  and  irrational,  are  but  combinations  and  phenomena. 
Force  is  regarded  as  a  universal  and  inseparable  property  of  matter. 

The  element  of  truth  in  materialism  is  the  reality  of  the  external  world. 
Its  error  is  in  regarding  the  external  world  as  having  original  and  inde- 
pendent existence,  and  in  regarding  mind  as  its  product. 

In  addition  to  the  general  error  indicated  above,  we  object  to  this  system 
as  follows : 

1.  In  knowing  matter,  the  mind  necessarily  judges  itself  to  be  different 
in  kind,  and  higher  in  rank,  than  the  matter  which  it  knows. 

2.  Since  the  mind's  attributes  of  (a)  continuous  identity,  (6)  self-activity, 
(c)  unrelatedness  to  space,  are  different  in  kind  and  higher  in  rank  than  the 
attributes  of  matter,  it  is  rational  to  conclude  that  mind  is  itself  different  in 
kind  from  matter  and  higher  in  rank  then  matter. 

3.  Mind  rather  than  matter  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  the  original 
and  independent  entity,  unless  it  can  be  scientifically  demonstrated  that 
mind  is  material  in  its  origin  and  nature.     But  all  attempts  to  explain  the 
psychical  from  the  physical,  or  the  organic  from  the  inorganic,  are  acknowl- 
edged failures.    The  most  that  can  be  claimed  is,  that  psychical  are  always 
accompanied  by  physical  changes,  and  that  the  inorganic  is  the  basis  and 
support  of  the  organic.     Although  the  precise  connection  between  the  mind 
and  the  body  is  unknown,  the  fact  that  the  continuity  of  physical  changes 
is  unbroken  in  times  of  psychical  activity  renders  it  certain  that  mind  is  not 
transformed  physical  force.     If  the  facts  of  sensation  indicate  the  depen- 
dence of  mind  upon  body,  the  facts  of  volition  equally  indicate  the  depen- 
dence of  body  upon  mind. 

29 


30  THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD. 

4.  The  materialistic  theory,  denying  as  it  does  the  priority  of  spirit, 
can  furnish  no  sufficient  cause  for  the  highest  features  of  the  existing 
universe,  namely,  its  personal  intelligences,  its  intuitive  ideas,  its  free-will, 
its  moral  progress,  its  beliefs  in  God  and  immortality. 

II.  MATERIALISTIC  IDEALISM. 

Idealism  proper  is  that  method  of  thought  which  regards  all  knowledge 
as  conversant  only  with  affections  of  the  percipient  mind. 

Its  element  of  truth  is  the  fact  that  these  affections  of  the  percipient 
mind  are  the  conditions  of  our  knowledge.  Its  error  is  in  denying  that 
through  these  and  in  these  we  know  that  which  exists  independently  of  our 
consciousness. 

The  idealism  of  the  present  day  is  mainly  a  materialistic  idealism.  It 
defines  matter  and  mind  alike  in  terms  of  sensation,  and  regards  both  as 
opposite  sides  or  successive  manifestations  of  one  underlying  and  unknow- 
able force. 

To  this  view  we  make  the  following  objections : 

1.  Its  dennition  of  matter  as  a  ''permanent  possibility  of  sensation  " 
contradicts  our  intuitive  judgment  that,  in  knowing  the  phenomena  of 
matter,  we  have  direct  knowledge  of  substance  as  underlying  phenomena, 
as  distinct   from   our   sensations,    and  as  external   to  the  mind   which 
experiences  these  sensations. 

2.  Its  dennition   of  mind  as  a  "series  of  feelings  aware  of  itself" 
contradicts  our  intuitive  judgment  that,  in  knowing  the  phenomena  of 
mind,  we  have  direct  knowledge  of  a  spiritual  substance  of  which  these 
phenomena  are  manifestations,  which  retains  its  identity  independently  of 
our  consciousness,  and  which,  in  its  knowing,  instead  of  being  the  passive 
recipient  of  impressions  from  without,  always  acts  from  within  by  a  power 
of  its  own. 

3.  In  so  far  as  this  theory  regards  mind  as  the  obverse  side  of  matter, 
or  as  a  later  and  higher  development  from  matter,  the  mere  reference  of 
both  mind  and  matter  to  an  underlying  force  does  not  save  the  theory  from 
any  of  the  difficulties  of  pure  materialism  already  mentioned  ;  since  in 
this  case,  equally  with  that,  force  is  regarded  as  purely  physical,  and  the 
priority  of  spirit  is  denied. 

4.  In  so  far  as  this  theory  holds  the  underlying  force  of  which  matter 
and  mind  are  manifestations  to  be  in  any  sense  intelligent  or  voluntary,  it 
renders  necessary  the  assumption  that  there  is  an  intelligent  and  voluntary 
Being  who  exerts  this  force.     Sensations  and  ideas,  moreover,  are  expli- 
cable only  as  manifestations  of  Mind. 

III.  IDEALISTIC  PANTHEISM. 

Pantheism  is  that  method  of  thought  which  conceives  of  the  universe  as 
the  development  of  one  intelligent  and  voluntary,  yet  impersonal,  sub- 
stance, which  reaches  consciousness  only  in  man.  It  therefore  identifies 
God,  not  with  each  individual  object  in  the  universe,  but  with  the  totality 
of  things.  The  current  Pantheism  of  our  day  is  idealistic. 


ETHICAL   MONISM.  31 

The  elements  of  truth  in  Pantheism  are  the  intelligence  and  voluntari- 
ness  of  God,  and  his  immanence  in  the  universe  ;  its  error  lies  in  denying 
God's  personality  and  transcendence. 

We  object  to  this  system  as  follows 

1.  Its  idea  of  God  is  self-contradictory,  since  it  makes  him  infinite,  yet 
consisting  only  of  the  finite  ;  absolute,  yet  existing  in  necessary  relation  to 
the  universe ;  supreme,  yet  shut  up  to  a  process  of  self-evolution  and 
dependent  for  self-consciousness  on  man ;  without  self-determination,  yet 
the  cause  of  all  that  is. 

2.  Its  assumed  unity  of  substance  is  not  only  without  proof,  but  it  directly 
contradicts  our  intuitive  judgments.     These  testify  that  we  are  not  parts  and 
particles  of  God,  but  distinct  personal  subsistences. 

3.  It  assigns  no  sufficient  cause  for  that  fact  of  the  universe  which  is 
highest  in  rank,  and  therefore  most  needs  explanation,  namely,  the  exist- 
ence of  personal  intelligences.  A  substance  which  is  itself  unconscious,  and 
under  the  law  of  necessity,  cannot  produce  beings  who  are  self-conscious 
and  free. 

4.  It  therefore  contradicts  the  affirmations  of  our  moral  and  religious 
natures  by  denying  man's  freedom  and  responsibility ;  by  making  God  to 
include  in  himself  all  evil  as  well  as  all  good ;  and  by  precluding  all  prayer, 
worship,  and  hope  of  immortality. 

5.  Our  intuitive  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a  God  of  absolute  per- 
fection compels  us  to  conceive  of  God  as  possessed  of  every  highest  quality 
and  attribute  of  men,  and  therefore,  especially,  of  that  which  constitutes 
the  chief  dignity  of  the  human  spirit,  its  personality. 

6.  Its  objection  to  the  divine  personality,  that  over  against  the  Infinite 
there  can  be  in  eternity  past  no  non-ego  to  call  forth  self-consciousness,  is 
refuted  by  considering  that  even  man's  cognition  of  the  non-ego  logically 
presupposes  knowledge  of  the  ego,  from  which  the  non-ego  is  distinguished  ; 
that,  in  an  absolute  mind,  self -consciousness  cannot  be  conditioned,  as  in 
the  case  of  finite  mind,  upon  contact  with  a  not-self ;  and  that,  if  the  dis- 
tinguishing of  self  from  a  not-self  were  an  essential  condition  of  divine 
self -consciousness,  the  eternal  personal  distinctions  in  the  divine  nature  or 
the  eternal  states  of  the  divine  mind  might  furnish  such  a  condition. 

IV.     ETHICAL  MONISM. 

Ethical  Monism  is  that  method  of  thought  which  holds  to  a  single  sub- 
stance, ground,  or  principle  of  being,  namely,  God,  but  which  also  holds 
to  the  ethical  facts  of  God's  transcendence  as  well  as  his  immanence,  and 
of  God's  personality  as  distinct  from,  and  as  guaranteeing,  the  personality 
of  man. 

1.  While  Ethical  Monism  embraces  the  one  element  of  truth  contained 
in  Pantheism — the  truth  that  God  is  in  all  things  and  that  all  things  are  in 
God  —  it  regards  this  scientific  unity  as  entirely  consistent  with  the  facts  of 
ethics — man's  freedom,  responsibility,  sin,  and  guilt;  in  other  words, 
Metaphysical  Monism,  or  the  doctrine  of  one  substance,  ground,  or  prin- 


32  THE   EXISTENCE  OF   GOD. 

ciple  of  being,  is  qualified  by  Psychological  Dualism,  or  the  doctrine  that 
the  soul  is  personally  distinct  from  matter  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  God 
on  the  other. 

2.  In  contrast  then  with  the  two  errors  of  Pantheism — the  denial  of 
God's  transcendence  and  the  denial  of  God's  personality  —  Ethical  Monism 
holds  that  the  universe,  instead  of  being  one  with  God  and  conterminous 
with  God,  is  but  a  finite,  partial  and  progressive  manifestation  of  the  divine 
Life  :    Matter  being  God's  self -limitation  under  the  law  of  Necessity ; 
Humanity  being  God's  self -limitation  under  the  law  of  Freedom  ;  Incarna- 
tion and  Atonement  being  God's  self-limitations  under  the  law  of  Grace. 

3.  The  immanence  of  God,  as  the  one  substance,  ground  and  principle 
of  being,  does  not  destroy,  but  rather  guarantees,  the  individuality  and 
rights  of  each  portion  of  the  universe,  so  that  there  is  variety  of  rank  and 
endowment.     In  the  case  of  moral  beings,  worth  is  determined  by  the 
degree  of  their  voluntary  recognition  and  appropriation  of  the  divine. 
While  God  is  all,  he  is  also  in  all ;  so  making  the  universe  a  graded  and  pro- 
gressive manifestation  of  himself,  both  in  his  love  for  righteousness  and 
his  opposition  to  moral  evil. 

4.  Since  Christ  is  the  Logos  of  God,  the  immanent  God,  God  revealed 
in  Nature,  in  Humanity,  in  Redemption,  Ethical  Monism  recognizes  the 
universe  as  created,  upheld,  and  governed  by  the  same  Being  who  in  the 
course  of  history  was  manifest  in  human  form  and  who  made  atonement 
for  human  sin  by  his  death  on  Calvary.     The  secret  of  the  universe  and 
the  key  to  its  mysteries  are  to  be  found  in  the  Cross. 


PART  III. 

THE  SCBIPTUKES  A  EEVELATION  FROM  GOD. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PRELIMINARY   CONSIDERATIONS. 

I.     REASONS  A  PRIORI  FOR  EXPECTING  A  REVELATION  FROM  GOD. 

1.  Needs  of  man's  nature.    Man's  intellectual  and  moral  nature  requires, 
in  order  to  preserve  it  from  constant  deterioration,  and  to  ensure  its  moral 
growth  and  progress,  an  authoritative  and  helpful  revelation  of  religious 
truth,  of  a  higher  and  completer  sort  than  any  to  which,  in  its  present  state 
of  sin,  it  can  attain  by  the  use  of  its  unaided  powers.     The  proof  of  this 
proposition  is  partly  psychological,  and  partly  historical. 

A.  Psychological  proof. — (a)  Neither  reason  nor  intuition  throws  light 
upon  certain  questions  whose  solution  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us ;  for 
example,  Trinity,  atonement,  pardon,  method  of  worship,  personal  existence 
after  death.     ( 6  )  Even  the  truth  to  which  we  arrive  by  our  natural  powers 
needs  divine  confirmation  and  authority  when  it  addresses  minds  and  wills 
perverted  by  sin.     (  c )  To  break  this  power  of  sin,  and  to  furnish  encourage- 
ment to  moral  effort,  we  need  a  special  revelation  of  the  merciful  and  help- 
ful aspect  of  the  divine  nature. 

B.  Historical  proof.  —  (a)  The  knowledge  of  moral  and  religious  truth 
possessed  by  nations  and  ages  in  which  special  revelation  is  unknown  is 
grossly  and  increasingly  imperfect.     (6)  Man's  actual  condition  in  ante- 
Christian  times,  and  in  modern  heathen  lands,  is  that  of  extreme  moral 
depravity,     (c)  With  this  depravity  is  found  a  general  conviction  of  help- 
lessness, and  on  the  part  of  some  nobler  natures,  a  longing  after,  and  hope 
of,  aid  from  above. 

2.  Presumption  of  supply.     What  we  know  of  God,  by  nature,  affords 
ground  for  hope  that  these  wants  of  our  intellectual  and  moral  being  will  be 
met  by  a  corresponding  supply,  in  the  shape  of  a  special  divine  revelation. 
We  argue  this : 

(a)  From  our  necessary  conviction  of  God's  wisdom.  Having  made 
man  a  spiritual  being,  for  spiritual  ends,  it  may  be  hoped  that  he  will  furnish 
the  means  needed  to  secure  these  ends.  (  6 )  From  the  actual,  though  incom- 
plete, revelation  already  given  in  nature.  Since  God  has  actually  under- 
taken to  make  himself  known  to  men,  we  may  hope  that  he  will  finish  the 
3  33 


34  THE   SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION"   FROM   GOD. 

work  he  has  begun.  ( c  )  From  the  general  connection  of  want  and  supply. 
The  higher  our  needs,  the  more  intricate  and  ingenious  are,  in  general,  the 
contrivances  for  meeting  them.  We  may  therefore  hope  that  the  highest 
want  will  be  all  the  more  surely  met.  (d)  From  analogies  of  nature  and 
history.  Signs  of  reparative  goodness  in  nature  and  of  forbearance  in  provi- 
dential dealings  lead  us  to  hope  that,  while  justice  is  executed,  God  may 
still  make  known  some  way  of  restoration  for  sinners. 

We  conclude  this  section  upon  the  reasons  a  priori  for  expecting  a 
revelation  from  God  with  the  acknowledgment  that  the  facts  warrant  that 
degree  of  expectation  which  we  call  hope,  rather  than  that  larger  degree 
of  expectation  which  we  call  assurance ;  and  this,  for  the  reason  that,  while 
conscience  gives  proof  that  God  is  a  God  of  holiness,  we  have  not,  from  the 
light  of  nature,  equal  evidence  that  God  is  a  God  of  love.  Eeason  teaches 
man  that,  as  a  sinner,  he  merits  condemnation ;  but  he  cannot,  from  reason 
alone,  know  that  God  will  have  mercy  upon  him  and  provide  salvation. 
His  doubts  can  be  removed  only  by  God's  own  voice,  assuring  him  of 
"redemption  .  .  .  the  forgiveness  of  ...  trespasses"  (Eph.  1:7)  and 
revealing  to  him  the  way  in  which  that  forgiveness  has  been  rendered  possible. 

EC.    MAKES  OF  THE  BEVEIIATION  MAN  MAY  EXPECT. 

1.  As  to  Us  substance.     We  may  expect  this  later  revelation  not  to  con- 
tradict, but  to  confirm  and  enlarge,  the  knowledge  of  God  which  we  derive 
from  nature,  while  it  remedies  the  defects  of  natural  religion  and  throws 
light  upon  its  problems. 

2.  As  to  its  method.     We  may  expect  it  to  follow  God's  methods  of 
procedure  in  other  communications  of  truth. 

(a)  That  of  continuous  historical  development, — that  it  will  be  given 
in  germ  to  early  ages,  and  will  be  more  fully  unfolded  as  the  race  is  pre- 
pared to  receive  it. 

( b )  That  of  original  delivery  to  a  single  nation,  and  to  single  persons 
in  that  nation,  that  it  may  through  them  be  communicated  to  mankind. 

(  c )  That  of  preservation  in  written  and  accessible  documents,  handed 
down  from  those  to  whom  the  revelation  is  first  communicated. 

3.  As  to  its  attestation.    We  may  expect  that  this  revelation  will  be 
accompanied  by  evidence  that  its  author  is  the  same  being  whom  we  have 
previously  recognized  as  God  of  nature.     This  evidence  must  constitute  (a) 
a  manifestation  of  God  himself ;  (6)  in  the  outward  as  well  as  the  inward 
world  ;  ( c )  such  as  only  God's  power  or  knowledge  can  make  ;  and  ( d  )  such 
as  cannot  be  counterfeited  by  the  evil,  or  mistaken  by  the  candid,  soul. 
In  short,  we  may  expect  God  to  attest  by  miracles  and  by  prophecy,  the 
divine  mission  and  authority  of  those  to  whom  he  communicates  a  revelation. 
Some  such  outward  sign  would  seem  to  be  necessary,  not  only  to  assure 
the  original  recipient  that  the  supposed  revelation  is  not  a  vagary  of  his 
own  imagination,  but  also  to  render  the  revelation  received  by  a  single 
individual  authoritative  to  all  (compare  Judges  6  :  17,   36-40  —  Gideon 
asks  a  sign,  for  himself ;  1  K.  18 :  36-38 — Elijah  asks  a  sign,  for  others). 


MIRACLES,    AS  ATTESTING   REVELATION.  35 

But  in  order  that  our  positive  proof  of  a  divine  revelation  may  not  be 
embarrassed  by  the  suspicion  that  the  miraculous  and  prophetic  elements 
in  the  Scripture  history  create  a  presumption  against  its  credibility,  it  will 
be  desirable  to  take  up  at  this  point  the  general  subject  of  miracles  and 
prophecy. 

III.    MIRACLES,  AS  ATTESTING  A  DIVINE  BEVELATION. 
1.     Definition  of  Miracle. 

A.  Preliminary  Definition.  —  A  miracle  is  an  event  palpable  to  the 
senses,  produced  for  a  religious  purpose  by  the  immediate  agency  of  God  ; 
an  event  therefore  which,  though  not  contravening  any  law  of  nature,  the 
laws  of  nature,  if  fully  known,  would  not  without  this  agency  of  God  be 
competent  to  explain. 

This  definition  corrects  several  erroneous  conceptions  of  the  miracle :  — 

( a )  A  miracle  is  not  a  suspension  or  violation  of  natural  law ;   since 
natural  law  is  in  operation  at  the  time  of  the  miracle  just  as  much  as  before. 

(b)  A  miracle  is  not  a  sudden  product  of  natural  agencies  — a  product 
merely  foreseen,  by  him  who  appears  to  work  it ;  it  is  the  effect  of  a  will 
outside  of  nature.     ( c  )  A  miracle  is  not  an  event  without  a  cause  ;  since 
it  has  for  its  cause  a  direct  volition  of  God.     (d*)  A  miracle  is  not  an 
irrational  or  capricious  act  of  God ;  but  an  act  of  wisdom,  performed  in 
accordance  with  the  immutable  laws  of  his  being,  so  that  in  the  same  cir- 
cumstances the  same  course  would  be  again  pursued.     (  e  )  A  miracle  is  not 
contrary  to  experience ;  since  it  is  not  contrary  to  experience  for  a  new 
cause  to  be  followed  by  a  new  effect.     (/)  A  miracle  is  not  a  matter  of 
internal  experience,  like  regeneration  or  illumination  ;  but  is  an  event  pal- 
pable to  the  senses,  which  may  serve  as  an  objective  proof  to  all  that  the 
worker  of  it  is  divinely  commissioned  as  a  religious  teacher. 

B.  Alternative  and  Preferable  Definition.  —  A  miracle  is  an  event  in 
nature,  so  extraordinary  in  itself  and  so  coinciding  with  the  prophecy  or 
command  of  a  religious  teacher  or  leader,  as  fully  to  warrant  the  con- 
viction, on  the  part  of  those  who  witness  it,  that  God  has  wrought  it  with 
the  design  of  certifying  that  this  teacher  or  leader  has  been  commissioned 
by  him. 

This  definition  has  certain  marked  advantages  as  compared  with  the  pre- 
liminary definition  given  above  :  —  ( a }  It  recognizes  the  immanence  of 
God  and  his  immediate  agency  in  nature,  instead  of  assuming  an  antithesis 
between  the  laws  of  nature  and  the  will  of  God.  (  b )  It  regards  the  mira- 
cle as  simply  an  extraordinary  act  of  that  same  God  who  is  already  present 
in  all  natural  operations  and  who  in  them  is  revealing  his  general  plan. 
(  c  )  It  holds  that  natural  law,  as  the  method  of  God's  regular  activity,  in 
no  way  precludes  unique  exertions  of  his  power  when  these  will  best  secure 
his  purpose  in  creation.  ( d  }  It  leaves  it  possible  that  all  miracles  may 
have  their  natural  explanations  and  may  hereafter  be  traced  to  natural 
causes,  while  both  miracles  and  their  natural  causes  may  be  only  names 
for  the  one  and  self -same  will  of  God.  (e)  It  reconciles  the  claims  of 
both  science  and  religion  :  of  science,  by  permitting  any  possible  or  prob- 


36  THE   SCRIPTURES   A    REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

able  physical  antecedents  of  the  miracle ;  of  religion,  by  maintaining  that 
these  very  antecedents  together  with  the  miracle  itself  are  to  be  interpreted 
as  signs  of  God's  special  commission  to  him  under  whose  teaching  or 
leadership  the  miracle  is  wrought. 

2.  Possibility  of  Miracle. 

An  event  in  nature  may  be  caused  by  an  agent  in  nature  yet  above 
nature.  This  is  evident  from  the  following  considerations  : 

( a )  Lower  forces  and  laws  in  nature  are  frequently  counteracted  and 
transcended  by  the  higher  ( as  mechanical  forces  and  laws  by  chemical,  and 
chemical  by  vital),  while  yet  the  lower  forces  and  laws  are  not  suspended 
or  annihilated,  but  are  merged  in  the  higher,  and  made  to  assist  in  accom- 
plishing purposes  to  which  they  are  altogether  unequal  when  left  to  them- 
selves. 

(6)  The  human  will  acts  upon  its  physical  organism,  and  so  upon  nature, 
and  produces  results  which  nature  left  to  herself  never  could  accomplish, 
while  yet  no  law  of  nature  is  suspended  or  violated.  Gravitation  still  ope- 
rates upon  the  axe,  even  while  man  holds  it  at  the  surface  of  the  water — 
for  the  axe  still  has  weight  (c/.  2  K.  6  :  5-7). 

(  c  )  In  all  free  causation,  there  is  an  acting  without  means.  Man  acts 
upon  external  nature  through  his  physical  organism,  but,  in  moving  his 
physical  organism,  he  acts  directly  upon  matter.  In  other  words,  the 
human  will  can  use  means,  only  because  it  has  the  power  of  acting  initially 
without  means. 

( d  )  What  the  human  will,  considered  as  a  supernatural  force,  and  what 
the  chemical  and  vital  forces  of  nature  itself,  are  demonstrably  able  to 
accomplish,  cannot  be  regarded  as  beyond  the  power  of  God,  so  long  as 
God  dwells  in  and  controls  the  universe.  If  man's  will  can  act  directly 
upon  matter  in  his  own  physical  organism,  God's  will  can  work  imme- 
diately upon  the  system  which  he  has  created  and  which  he  sustains.  In 
other  words,  if  there  be  a  God,  and  if  he  be  a  personal  being,  miracles  are 
possible.  The  impossibility  of  miracles  can  be  maintained  only  upon  prin- 
ciples of  atheism  or  pantheism. 

(  e )  This  possibility  of  miracles  becomes  doubly  sure  to  those  who  see 
in  Christ  none  other  than  the  immanent  God  manifested  to  creatures.  The 
Logos  or  divine  Reason  who  is  the  principle  of  all  growth  and  evolution 
can  make  God  known  only  by  means  of  successive  new  impartations  of  his 
energy.  Since  all  progress  implies  increment,  and  Christ  is  the  only 
source  of  life,  the  whole  history  of  creation  is  a  witness  to  the  possibility 
of  miracle. 

3.  Probability  of  Miracles. 

A.  We  acknowledge  that,  so  long  as  we  confine  our  attention  to  nature, 
there  is  a  presumption  against  miracles.  Experience  testifies  to  the  uni- 
formity of  natural  law.  A  general  uniformity  is  needful,  in  order  to  make 
possible  a  rational  calculation  of  the  future,  and  a  proper  ordering  of  life. 


MIRACLES,    AS  ATTESTING   REVELATIOK.  37 

B.  But  we  deny  that  this  uniformity  of  nature  is  absolute  and  univer- 
sal.    (  a )  It  is  not  a  truth  of  reason  that  can  have  no  exceptions,  like  the 
axiom  that  a  whole  is  greater  than  its  parts.     ( 6  )  Experience  could  not 
warrant  a  belief  in  absolute  and  universal  uniformity,  unless  experience 
were  identical  with  absolute  and  universal  knowledge.     (  c  )  We  know,  on 
the  contrary,  from  geology,  that  there  have  been  breaks  in  this  uniformity, 
such  as  the  introduction  of  vegetable,  animal  and  human  life,  which  can- 
not be  accounted  for,  except  by  the  manifestation  in  nature  of  a  super- 
natural power. 

C.  Since  the  inworking  of  the  moral  law  into  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature  shows  that  nature  exists,  not  for  itself,  but  for  the  con- 
templation and  use  of  moral  beings,  it  is  probable  that  the  God  of  nature 
will  produce  effects  aside  from  those  of  natural  law,  whenever  there  are 
sufficiently  important  moral  ends  to  be  served  thereby. 

D.  The  existence  of  moral  disorder  consequent  upon  the  free  acts  of 
man's  will,  therefore,  changes  the  presumption  against  miracles  into  a  pre- 
sumption in  their  favor.     The  non-appearance  of  miracles,  in  this  case, 
would  be  the  greatest  of  wonders. 

E.  As  belief  in  the  possibility  of  miracles  rests  upon  our  belief  in  the 
existence  of  a  personal  God,  so  belief  in  the  probability  of  miracles  rests 
upon  our  belief  that  God  is  a  moral  and  benevolent  being.     He  who  has 
no  God  but  a  God  of  physical  order  will  regard  miracles  as  an  impertinent 
intrusion  upon  that  order.     But  he  who  yields  to  the  testimony  of  con- 
science and  regards  God  as  a  God  of  holiness,  will  see  that  man's  unholi- 
ness  renders  God's  miraculous  interposition  most  necessary  to  man  and 
most  becoming  to  God.     Our  view  of  miracles  will  therefore  be  determined 
by  our  belief  in  a  moral,  or  in  a  non-moral,  God. 

F.  From  the  point  of  view  of  ethical  monism  the  probability  of  miracle 
becomes  even  greater.     Since  God  is  not  merely  the  intellectual  but  the 
moral  Eeason  of  the  world,  the  disturbances  of  the  world-order  which  are 
due  to  sin  are  the  matters  which  most  deeply  affect  him.     Christ,  the  life  of 
the  whole  system  and  of  humanity  as  well,  must  suffer  ;  and,  since  we  have 
evidence  that  he  is  merciful  as  well  as  just,  it  is  probable  that  he  will  rec- 
tify the  evil  by  extraordinary  means,  when  merely  ordinary  means  do  not 
avail. 

4.  The  amount  of  testimony  necessary  to  prove  a  miracle  is  no 
greater  than  that  which  is  requisite  to  prove  the  occurrence  of  any  other 
unusual  but  confessedly  possible  event. 

Hume,  indeed,  argued  that  a  miracle  is  so  contradictory  of  all  human 
experience  that  it  is  more  reasonable  to  believe  any  amount  of  testimony 
false  than  to  believe  a  miracle  to  be  true. 

The  argument  is  fallacious,  because 

(  a  )  It  is  chargeable  with  a  petitio  principii,  in  making  our  own  per- 
sonal experience  the  measure  of  all  human  experience.  The  same  principle 
would  make  the  proof  of  any  absolutely  new  fact  impossible.  Even  though 
God  should  work  a  miracle,  he  could  never  prove  it. 


38  THE   SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

( b  )  It  involves  a  self-contradiction,  since  it  seeks  to  overthrow  our  faith 
in  human  testimony  by  adducing  to  the  contrary  the  general  experience  of 
men,  of  which  we  know  only  from  testimony.  This  general  experience, 
moreover,  is  merely  negative,  and  cannot  neutralize  that  which  is  positive, 
except  upon  principles  which  would  invalidate  all  testimony  whatever. 

(  c  )  It  requires  belief  in  a  greater  wonder  than  those  which  it  would 
escape.  That  multitudes  of  intelligent  and  honest  men  should  against  all 
their  interests  unite  in  deliberate  and  persistent  falsehood,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances narrated  in  the  New  Testament  record,  involves  a  change  in  the 
sequences  of  nature  far  more  incredible  than  the  miracles  of  Christ  and  his 
apostles. 

5.    Evidentia  I  force  of  Mirac  les. 

(a)  Miracles  are  the  natural  accompaniments  and  attestations  of  new 
communications  from  God.  The  great  epochs  of  miracles  —  represented  by 
Moses,  the  prophets,  the  first  and  second  comings  of  Christ  —  are  coinci- 
dent with  the  great  epochs  of  revelation.  Miracles  serve  to  draw  attention 
to  new  truth,  and  cease  when  this  truth  has  gained  currency  and  foothold. 

(  b )  Miracles  generally  certify  to  the  truth  of  doctrine,  not  directly,  but 
indirectly ;  otherwise  a  new  miracle  must  needs  accompany  each  new 
doctrine  taught.  Miracles  primarily  and  directly  certify  to  the  divine  com- 
mission and  authority  of  a  religious  teacher,  and  therefore  warrant  accept- 
ance of  his  doctrines  and  obedience  to  his  commands  as  the  doctrines  and 
commands  of  God,  whether  these  be  communicated  at  intervals  or  all 
together,  orally  or  in  written  documents. 

(c)  Miracles,  therefore,  do  not  stand  alone  as  evidences.  Power  alone 
cannot  prove  a  divine  commission.  Purity  of  life  and  doctrine  must  go 
with  the  miracles  to  assure  UP  that  a  religious  teacher  has  come  from  God. 
The  miracles  and  the  doctrine  in  this  manner  mutually  support  each  other, 
and  form  parts  of  one  whole.  The  internal  evidence  for  the  Christian 
system  may  have  greater  power  over  certain  minds  and  over  certain  ages 
than  the  external  evidence. 

(  d  )  Yet  the  Christian  miracles  do  not  lose  their  value  as  evidence  in  the 
process  of  ages.  The  loftier  the  structure  of  Christian  life  and  doctrine  the 
greater  need  that  its  foundation  be  secure.  The  authority  of  Christ  as  a 
teacher  of  supernatural  truth  rests  upon  his  miracles,  and  especially  upon 
the  miracle  of  his  resurrection.  That  one  miracle  to  which  the  church 
looks  back  as  the  source  of  her  life  carries  with  it  irresistibly  all  the  other 
miracles  of  the  Scripture  record ;  upon  it  alone  we  may  safely  rest  the 
proof  that  the  Scriptures  are  an  authoritative  revelation  from  God. 

(e)  The  resurrection  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  —  by  which  we  mean 
his  coming  forth  from  the  sepulchre  in  body  as  well  as  in  spirit  —  is  demon- 
strated by  evidence  as  varied  and  as  conclusive  as  that  which  proves  to  us 
any  single  fact  of  ancient  history.  Without  it  Christianity  itself  is  inexpli- 
cable, as  is  shown  by  the  failure  of  all  modern  rationalistic  theories  to 
account  for  its  rise  and  progress. 


PKOPHECY,  AS  ATTESTING  REVELATION.          39 

6.  Counterfeit  Miracles. 

Since  only  an  act  directly  wrought  by  God  can  properly  be  called  a 
miracle,  it  follows  that  surprising  events  brought  about  by  evil  spirits  or 
by  men,  through  the  use  of  natural  agencies  beyond  our  knowledge,  are 
not  entitled  to  this  appellation.  The  Scriptures  recognize  the  existence  of 
such,  but  denominate  them  "lying  wonders"  (2  Thess.  2:9). 

These  counterfeit  miracles  in  various  ages  argue  that  the  belief  in  miracles 
is  natural  to  the  race,  and  that  somewhere  there  must  exist  the  true.  They 
serve  to  show  that  not  all  supernatural  occurrences  are  divine,  and  to  impress 
upon  us  the  necessity  of  careful  examination  before  we  accept  them  as 
divine. 

False  miracles  may  commonly  be  distinguished  from  the  true  by  ( a)  their 
accompaniments  of  immoral  conduct  or  of  doctrine  contradictory  to  truth 
already  revealed  —  as  in  modern  spiritualism;  (6)  their  internal  character- 
istics of  inanity  and  extravagance  —  as  in  the  liquefaction  of  the  blood  of 
St.  Januarius,  or  the  miracles  of  the  Apocryphal  New  Testament ;  (  c  )  the 
insufficiency  of  the  object  which  they  are  designed  to  further — as  in  the 
case  of  Apollonius  of  Tyana,  or  of  the  miracles  said  to  accompany  the  pub- 
lication of  the  doctrines  of  the  immaculate  conception  and  of  the  papal 
infallibility;  (d)  their  lack  of  substantiating  evidence  —  as  in  mediaeval 
miracles,  so  seldom  attested  by  contemporary  and  disinterested  witnesses ; 
(e)  their  denial  or  undervaluing  of  God's  previous  revelation  of  himself  in 
nature — as  shown  by  the  neglect  of  ordinary  means,  in  the  cases  of  Faith- 
cure  and  of  so-called  Christian  Science. 

IV.    PROPHECY  AS  ATTESTING  A  DIVINE  REVELATION. 

We  here  consider  prophecy  in  its  narrow  sense  of  mere  prediction, 
reserving  to  a  subsequent  chapter  the  consideration  of  prophecy  as  inter- 
pretation of  the  divine  will  in  general. 

1.  Definition.     Prophecy  is  the  foretelling  of  future  events  by  virtue  of 
direct  communication  from  God  —  a  foretelling,  therefore,  which,  though 
not  contravening  any  laws  of  the  human  mind,  those  laws,  if  fully  known, 
would  not,  without  this  agency  of  God,  be  sufficient  to  explain. 

2.  Relation  of  Prophecy  to  Miracles.     Miracles  are  attestations  of 
revelation  proceeding  from  divine  power  ;  prophecy  is  an  attestation  of  rev- 
elation proceeding  from  divine  knowledge.     Only  God  can  know  the  con- 
tingencies of  the  future.     The  possibility  and  probability  of  prophecy  may 
be  argued  upon  the  same  grounds  upon  which  we  argue  the  possibility  and 
probability  of  miracles.     As  an  evidence  of  divine  revelation,  however, 
prophecy  possesses  two  advantages  over  miracles,  namely :  (  a )  The  proof, 
in  the  case  of  prophecy,  is  not  derived  from  ancient  testimony,  but  is  under 
our  eyes.     ( 6 )  The  evidence  of  miracles  cannot  become  stronger,  whereas 
every  new  fulfilment  adds  to  the  argument  from  prophecy. 

3.  Requirements  in  Prophecy,  considered  as  an  Evidence  of  Revela- 
tion.    ( a  )    The  utterance  must  be  distant  from  the  event.     (  b )  Nothing 
must  exist  to  suggest  the  event  to  merely  natural  prescience.     ( c  )  The 


40  THE   SOBIPTUEES  A   [REVELATION   FROM  GOD. 

utterance  must  be  free  from  ambiguity.  (  d  )  Yet  it  must  not  be  so  pre- 
cise as  to  secure  its  own  fulfilment.  ( e  )  It  must  be  followed  in  due  time 
by  the  event  predicted. 

4.  General  Features  of  Prophecy  in  the  Scriptures,     (a]  Its  large 
amount  —  occupying  a  great  portion  of  the  Bible,  and  extending  over  many 
hundred  years.     (  6  )  Its  ethical  and  religious  nature  —  the  events  of  the 
future  being  regarded  as  outgrowths  and  results  of  men's  present  attitude 
toward  God.     (c)  Its  unity  in  diversity — finding  its  central  point  in 
Christ  the  true  servant  of  God  and  deliverer  of  his  people.     ( d)  Its  actual 
fulfilment  as  regards  many  of  its  predictions  —  while  seeming  non-fulfil- 
ments are  explicable  from  its  figurative  and  conditional  nature. 

5.  Messianic  Prophecy  in  general.     ( a  )  Direct  predictions  of  events 
—  as  in  Old  Testament  prophecies  of  Christ's  birth,  suffering  and  subse- 
quent glory.     (  b  )  General  prophecy  of  the  Kingdom  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, and  of  its  gradual  triumph.     (  c  )  Historical  types  in  a  nation  and 
in  individuals  —  as  Jonah  and  David,     (d)  Prefigurations  of  the  future 
in  rites  and  ordinances  —  as  in  sacrifice,  circumcision,  and  the  passover. 

6.  /Special  Prophecies  uttered  by  Christ,     (a)  As  to  his  own  death 
and  resurrection.     (  6  )  As  to  events  occurring  between  his  death  and  the 
destruction  of  Jerusalem  ( multitudes  of  impostors  ;  wars  and  rumors  of 
wars;  famine  and  pestilence),     (c)  As  to  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem 
and  the  Jewish  polity  (Jerusalem  compassed  with  armies;  abomination  of 
desolation  in  the  holy  place  ;  flight  of  Christians ;  misery  ;  massacre  ;  dis- 
persion),    (d)  As  to  the  world- wide  diffusion  of  his  gospel  (the  Bible 
already  the  most  widely  circulated  book  in  the  world ). 

7.  On  the  double  sense  of  Prophecy. 

(a]  Certain  prophecies  apparently  contain  a  fulness  of  meaning  which 
is  not  exhausted  by  the  event  to  which  they  most  obviously  and  literally 
refer.  A  prophecy  which  had  a  partial  fulfilment  at  a  time  not  remote 
from  its  utterance,  may  find  its  chief  fulfilment  in  an  event  far  distant. 
Since  the  principles  of  God's  administration  find  ever  recurring  and  ever 
enlarging  illustration  in  history,  prophecies  which  have  already  had  a 
partial  fulfilment  may  have  whole  cycles  of  fulfilment  yet  before  them. 

(  b  )  The  prophet  was  not  always  aware  of  the  meaning  of  his  own  proph- 
ecies ( 1  Pet.  1 : 11 ).  It  is  enough  to  constitute  his  prophecies  a  proof  of 
divine  revelation,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  correspondences  between 
them  and  the  actual  events  are  such  as  to  indicate  divine  wisdom  and  pur- 
pose in  the  giving  of  them  —  in  other  words,  it  is  enough  if  the  inspiring 
Spirit  knew  their  meaning,  even  though  the  inspired  prophet  did  not. 

8.  Purpose  of  Prophecy  —  so  far  as  it  is  yet  unfulfilled.     (  a )  Not  to 
enable  us  to  map  out  the  details  of  the  future  ;  but  rather  (  6 )  To  give  gen- 
eral assurance  of  God's  power  and  foreseeing  wisdom,  and  of  the  certainty 
of  his  triumph  ;  and  (  c )  To  furnish,  after  fulfilment,  the  proof  that  God 
saw  the  end  from  the  beginning. 


PRINCIPLES   OF  HISTORICAL  EVIDENCE.  41 

9.  Evidential  force  of  Prophecy  —  so  far  as  it  is  fulfilled.  Prophecy, 
like  miracles,  does  not  stand  alone  as  evidence  of  the  divine  commission  of 
the  Scripture  writers  and  teachers.  It  is  simply  a  corroborative  attesta- 
tion, which  unites  with  miracles  to  prove  that  a  religious  teacher  has  come 
from  God  and  speaks  with  divine  authority.  We  cannot,  however,  dispense 
with  this  portion  of  the  evidences,  —  for  unless  the  death  and  resurrection 
of  Christ  are  events  foreknown  and  foretold  by  himself,  as  well  as  by  the 
ancient  prophets,  we  lose  one  main  proof  of  his  authority  as  a  teacher  sent 
from  God. 

Having  thus  removed  the  presumption  originally  existing  against  mir- 
acles and  prophecy,  we  may  now  consider  the  ordinary  laws  of  evidence 
and  determine  the  rules  to  be  followed  in  estimating  the  weight  of  the 
Scripture  testimony. 

V.  PRINCIPLES  OF  HISTORICAL  EVIDENCE  APPLICABLE  TO  THE  PROOF  OF 
A  DIVINE  REVELATION  (  mainly  derived  from  Greenleaf ,  Testimony  of  the 
Evangelists,  and  from  Starkie  on  Evidence  ). 

1.  As  to  documentary  evidence. 

(a)  Documents  apparently  ancient,  not  bearing  upon  their  face  the 
marks  of  forgery,  and  found  in  proper  custody,  are  presumed  to  be  genuine 
until  sufficient  evidence  is  brought  to  the  contrary.  The  New  Testament 
documents,  since  they  are  found  in  the  custody  of  the  church,  their  natural 
and  legitimate  depository,  must  by  this  rule  be  presumed  to  be  genuine. 

(6)  Copies  of  ancient  documents,  made  by  those  most  interested  in  their 
faithfulness,  are  presumed  to  correspond  with  the  originals,  even  although 
those  originals  no  longer  exist.  Since  it  was  the  church's  interest  to  have 
faithful  copies,  the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  objector  to  the  Christian 
documents. 

(  c )  In  determining  matters  of  fact,  after  the  lapse  of  considerable  time, 
documentary  evidence  is  to  be  allowed  greater  weight  than  oral  testimony. 
Neither  memory  nor  tradition  can  long  be  trusted  to  give  absolutely  correct 
accounts  of  particular  facts.  The  New  Testament  documents,  therefore, 
are  of  greater  weight  in  evidence  than  tradition  would  be,  even  if  only 
thirty  years  had  elapsed  since  the  death  of  the  actors  in  the  scenes  they 
relate. 

2.  As  to  testimony  in  general. 

( a  )  In  questions  as  to  matters  of  fact,  the  proper  inquiry  is  not  whether 
it  is  possible  that  the  testimony  may  be  false,  but  whether  there  is  sufficient 
probability  that  it  is  true.  It  is  unfair,  therefore,  to  allow  our  examination 
of  the  Scripture  witnesses  to  be  prejudiced  by  suspicion,  merely  because 
their  story  is  a  sacred  one. 

( 6 )  A  proposition  of  fact  is  proved  when  its  truth  is  established  by  com- 
petent and  satisfactory  evidence.  By  competent  evidence  is  meant  such 
evidence  as  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  be  proved  admits.  By  satisfactory 
evidence  is  meant  that  amount  of  proof  which  ordinarily  satisfies  an 


42  THE   SCRIPTURES  A   REVELATION   FROM  GOD. 

unprejudiced  mind  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  Scripture  facts  are  there- 
fore proved  when  they  are  established  by  that  kind  and  degree  of  evidence 
which  would  in  the  affairs  of  ordinary  life  satisfy  the  mind  and  conscience 
of  a  common  man.  When  we  have  this  kind  and  degree  of  evidence  it  is 
unreasonable  to  require  more. 

(c)  In  the  absence  of  circumstances  which  generate  suspicion,  every 
witness  is  to  be  presumed  credible,  until  the  contrary  is  shown ;  the  burden 
of  impeaching  his  testimony  lying  upon  the  objector.  The  principle  which 
leads  men  to  give  true  witness  to  facts  is  stronger  than  that  which  leads 
them  to  give  false  witness.  It  is  therefore  unjust  to  compel  the  Christian 
to  establish  the  credibility  of  his  witnesses  before  proceeding  to  adduce 
their  testimony,  and  it  is  equally  unjust  to  allow  the  uncorroborated  testi- 
mony of  a  profane  writer  to  outweigh  that  of  a  Christian  writer.  Christian 
witnesses  should  not  be  considered  interested,  and  therefore  untrustworthy  ; 
for  they  became  Christians  against  their  worldly  interests,  and  because  they 
could  not  resist  the  force  of  testimony.  Varying  accounts  among  them 
should  be  estimated  as  we  estimate  the  varying  accounts  of  profane  writers. 

(c?)  A  slight  amount  of  positive  testimony,  so  long  as  it  is  uncontradicted, 
outweighs  a  very  great  amount  of  testimony  that  is  merely  negative.  The 
silence  of  a  second  witness,  or  his  testimony  that  he  did  not  see  a  certain 
alleged  occurrence,  cannot  counterbalance  the  positive  testimony  of  a  first 
witness  that  he  did  see  it.  We  should  therefore  estimate  the  silence  of  pro- 
fane writers  with  regard  to  facts  narrated  in  Scripture  precisely  as  we  should 
estimate  it  if  the  facts  about  which  they  are  silent  were  narrated  by  other 
profane  writers,  instead  of  being  narrated  by  the  writers  of  Scripture. 

(  e  )  "  The  credit  due  to  the  testimony  of  witnesses  depends  upon  :  first, 
their  ability  ;  secondly,  their  honesty  ;  thirdly,  their  number  and  the  con- 
sistency of  their  testimony;  fourthly,  the  conformity  of  their  testimony  with 
experience  ;  and  fifthly,  the  coincidence  of  their  testimony  with  collateral 
circumstances. "  We  confidently  submit  the  New  Testament  witnesses  to 
each  and  all  of  these  tests. 


CHAPTER  II. 

POSITIVE   PROOFS  THAT  THE   SCRIPTURES  ARE  A   DIVINE 
REVELATION. 

I.  THE  GENUINENESS  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  DOCUMENTS,  or  proof  that  the 
books  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments  were  written  at  the  age  to  which  they 
are  assigned  and  by  the  men  or  class  of  men  to  whom  they  are  ascribed. 

1.     Genuineness  of  the  Books  of  the  New  Testament. 

We  do  not  need  to  adduce  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  books  of  the  New 
Testament  as  far  back  as  the  third  century,  for  we  possess  manuscripts  of 
them  which  are  at  least  fourteen  hundred  years  old,  and*  since  the  third 
century,  references  to  them  have  been  inwoven  into  all  history  and  litera- 
ture. We  begin  our  proof,  therefore,  by  showing  that  these  documents  not 
only  existed,  but  were  generally  accepted  as  genuine,  before  the  close  of 
the  second  century. 

A.  All  the  books  of  the  New  Testament,  with  the  single  exception  of 
2  Peter,  were  not  only  received  as  genuine,  but  were  used  in  more  or  less 
collected  form,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  second  century.     These  collections 
of  writings,  so  slowly  transcribed  and  distributed,  imply  the  long  continued 
previous  existence  of  the  separate  books,  and  forbid  us  to  fix  their  origin 
later  than  the  first  half  of  the  second  century. 

(a)  Tertullian  (160-230)  appeals  to  the  '  New  Testament '  as  made  up  of 
the  '  Gospels '  and  'Apostles. '  He  vouches  for  the  genuineness  of  the  four 
gospels,  the  Acts,  1  Peter,  1  John,  thirteen  epistles  of  Paul,  and  the  Apoca- 
lypse ;  in  short,  to  twenty-one  of  the  twenty-seven  books  of  our  Canon. 

( b }  The  Muratorian  Canon  in  the  West  and  the  Peshito  Version  in  the 
East  (having  a  common  date  of  about  160)  in  their  catalogues  of  the  New 
Testament  writings  mutually  complement  each  other's  slight  deficiencies, 
and  together  witness  to  the  fact  that  at  that  time  every  book  of  our  present 
New  Testament,  with  the  exception  of  2  Peter,  was  received  as  genuine. 

(  c )  The  Canon  of  Marcion  (140),  though  rejecting  all  the  gospels  but 
that  of  Luke,  and  all  the  epistles  but  ten  of  Paul's,  shows,  nevertheless, 
that  at  that  early  day  "  apostolic  writings  were  regarded  as  a  complete 
original  rule  of  doctrine. "  Even  Marcion,  moreover,  does  not  deny  the 
genuineness  of  those  writings  which  for  doctrinal  reasons  he  rejects. 

B.  The  Christian  and  Apostolic  Fathers  who  lived  in  the  first  half  of 
the  second  century  not  only  quote  from  these  books  and  allude  to  them, 
but  testify  that  they  were  written  by  the  apostles  themselves.     We  are 
therefore  compelled  to  refer  their  origin  still  further  back,  namely,  to  the 
first  century,  when  the  apostles  lived. 

43 


44  THE  SCRIPTURES  A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

(  a  )  Irenseus  (  120-200)  mentions  and  quotes  the  four  gospels  by  name, 
and  among  them  the  gospel  according  to  John:  ««  Afterwards  John,  the 
disciple  of  the  Lord,  who  also  leaned  upon  his  breast,  he  likewise  published 
a  gospel,  while  he  dwelt  in  Ephesus  in  Asia."  And  Irenseus  was  the  dis- 
ciple and  friend  of  Poly  carp  (  80-166  ),  who  was  himself  a  personal  acquain- 
tance of  the  Apostle  John.  The  testimony  of  Irenseus  is  virtually  the 
evidence  of  Polycarp,  the  contemporary  and  friend  of  the  Apostle,  that  each 
of  the  gospels  was  written  by  the  person  whose  name  it  bears. 


(6)  Justin  Martyr  (died  148)  speaks  of  'memoirs  (  aTro/n^oveiy^ara  )  of 
Jesus  Christ,'  and  his  quotations,  though  sometimes  made  from  memory, 
are  evidently  cited  from  our  gospels. 

(c)  Papias  (  80-164  ),  whom  Irenseus  calls  a  'hearer  of  John,'  testifies 
that  Matthew  "  wrote  in  the  Hebrew  dialect  the  sacred  oracles  (rd  ^dym)," 
and  that  "  Mark,  the  interpreter  of  Peter,  wrote  after  Peter,  (vcregov  Ilerp^  ) 
[  or  under  Peter's  direction  ],  an  unsystematic  account  (  oi>  r&f-ei  )  "  of  the 
same  events  and  discourses. 

(  d  )  The  Apostolic  Fathers,  —  Clement  of  Eome  (  died  101  ),  Ignatius  of 
Antioch  (martyred  115),  and  Polycarp  (80-166),  —  companions  and  friends 
of  the  apostles,  have  left  us  in  their  writings  over  one  hundred  quotations 
from  or  allusions  to  the  New  Testament  writings,  and  among  these  every 
book,  except  four  minor  epistles  (2  Peter,  Jude,  2  and  3  John)  is  repre- 
sented. 

(  e  )  In  the  synoptic  gospels,  the  omission  of  all  mention  of  the  fulfil- 
ment of  Christ's  prophecies  with  regard  to  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem  is 
evidence  that  these  gospels  were  written  before  the  occurrence  of  that 
event.  In  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  universally  attributed  to  Luke,  we  have 
an  allusion  to  '  the  former  treatise',  or  the  gospel  by  the  same  author,  which 
must,  therefore,  have  been  written  before  the  end  of  Paul's  first  imprison- 
ment at  Rome,  and  probably  with  the  help  and  sanction  of  that  apostle. 

C.  It  is  to  be  presumed  that  this  acceptance  of  the  New  Testament  doc- 
uments as  genuine,  on  the  part  of  the  Fathers  of  the  churches,  was  for 
good  and  sufficient  reasons,  both  internal  and  external,  and  this  presump- 
tion is  corroborated  by  the  following  considerations  : 

(  a  )  There  is  evidence  that  the  early  churches  took  every  care  to  assure 
themselves  of  the  genuineness  of  these  writings  before  they  accepted  them. 

(  b  )  The  style  of  the  New  Testament  writings,  and  their  complete  cor- 
respondence with  all  we  know  of  the  lands  and  times  in  which  they  profess 
to  have  been  written,  affords  convincing  proof  that  they  belong  to  the 
apostolic  age. 

(c)  The  genuineness  of  the  fourth  gospel  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that 
Tatian  (  155-170  ),  the  Assyrian,  a  disciple  of  Justin,  repeatedly  quoted  it 
without  naming  the  author,  and  composed  a  Harmony  of  our  four  gospels 
which  he  named  the  Diatessaron  ;  while  Basilides  (  130  )  and  Valentinus 
(  150  ),  the  Gnostics,  both  quote  from  it. 


THE  GENUINENESS   OF  THE   SCRIPTURE   DOCUMENTS.  45 

( d )  The  epistle  to  the  Hebrews  appears  to  have  been  accepted  during 
the  first  century  after  it  was  written  ( so  Clement  of  Borne,  Justin  Martyr, 
and  the  Peshito  Version  witness).  Then  for  two  centuries,  especially  in 
the  Eoman  and  North  African  churches,  and  probably  because  its  internal 
characteristics  were  inconsistent  with  the  tradition  of  a  Pauline  authorship, 
its  genuineness  was  doubted  ( so  Tertullian,  Cyprian,  Irenseus,  Muratorian 
Canon).  At  the  end  of  the  fourth  century,  Jerome  examined  the  evidence 
and  decided  in  its  favor;  Augustine  did  the  same;  the  third  Council  of 
Carthage  formally  recognized  it  (397) ;  from  that  time  the  Latin  churches 
united  with  the  East  in  receiving  it,  and  thus  the  doubt  was  finally  and 
forever  removed. 

(  e  )  As  to  2  Peter,  Jude,  and  2  and  3  John,  the  epistles  most  frequently 
held  to  be  spurious,  we  may  say  that,  although  we  have  no  conclusive 
external  evidence  earlier  than  A.  D.  160,  and  in  the  case  of  2  Peter  none 
earlier  than  A.  D.  230-250,  we  may  fairly  urge  in  favor  of  their  genuine- 
ness not  only  their  internal  characteristics  of  literary  style  and  moral  value, 
but  also  the  general  acceptance  of  them  all  since  the  third  century  as  the 
actual  productions  of  the  men  or  class  of  men  whose  names  they  bear. 

(/)  Upon  no  other  hypothesis  than  that  of  their  genuineness  can  the 
general  acceptance  of  these  four  minor  epistles  since  the  third  century,  and 
of  all  the  other  books  of  the  New  Testament  since  the  middle  of  the  second 
century,  be  satisfactorily  accounted  for.  If  they  had  been  mere  collections 
of  floating  legends,  they  could  not  have  secured  wide  circulation  as  sacred 
books  for  which  Christians  must  answer  with  their  blood.  If  they  had  been 
forgeries,  the  churches  at  large  could  neither  have  been  deceived  as  to 
their  previous  non-existence,  nor  have  been  induced  unanimously  to  pre- 
tend that  they  were  ancient  and  genuine.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  other 
accounts  of  their  origin,  inconsistent  with  their  genuineness,  are  now  cur- 
rent, we  proceed  to  examine  more  at  length  the  most  important  of  these 
opposing  views. 

D.  Rationalistic  Theories  as  to  the  origin  of  the  gospels.  These  are 
attempts  to  eliminate  the  miraculous  element  from  the  New  Testament 
records,  and  to  reconstruct  the  sacred  history  upon  principles  of  naturalism. 

Against  them  we  urge  the  general  objection  that  they  are  unscientific  in 
their  principle  and  method.  To  set  out  in  an  examination  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament documents  with  the  assumption  that  all  history  is  a  mere  natural 
development,  and  that  miracles  are  therefore  impossible,  is  to  make  history 
a  matter,  not  of  testimony,  but  of  a  priori  speculation.  It  indeed  renders 
any  history  of  Christ  and  his  apostles  impossible,  since  the  witnesses  whose 
testimony  with  regard  to  miracles  is  discredited  can  no  longer  be  con- 
sidered worthy  of  credence  in  their  account  of  Christ's  life  or  doctrine. 

1st.     The  Myth-theory  of  Strauss  ( 1808-1874). 

According  to  this  view,  the  gospels  are  crystallizations  into  story  of  Mes- 
sianic ideas  which  had  for  several  generations  filled  the  minds  of  imagina- 
tive men  in  Palestine.  The  myth  is  a  narrative  in  which  such  ideas  are 
unconsciously  clothed,  and  from  which  the  element  of  intentional  and 
deliberate  deception  is  absent. 


46  THE   SCRIPTURES  A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

We  object  to  the  Myth-theory  of  Strauss,  that 

(a)  The  time  between  the  death  of  Christ  and  the  publication  of  the 
gospels  was  far  too  short  for  the  growth  and  consolidation  of  such  mythi- 
cal histories.  Myths,  on  the  contrary,  as  the  Indian,  Greek,  Eoman  and 
Scandinavian  instances  bear  witness,  are  the  slow  growth  of  centuries. 

(  b )  The  first  century  was  not  a  century  when  such  formation  of  myths 
was  possible.  Instead  of  being  a  credulous  and  imaginative  age,  it  was  an 
age  of  historical  inquiry  and  of  Sadduceeism  in  matters  of  religion. 

(  c )  The  gospels  cannot  be  a  mythical  outgrowth  of  Jewish  ideas  and 
expectations,  because,  in  their  main  features,  they  run  directly  counter  to 
these  ideas  and  expectations.  The  sullen  and  exclusive  nationalism  of  the 
Jews  could  not  have  given  rise  to  a  gospel  for  all  nations,  nor  could  their 
expectations  of  a  temporal  monarch  have  led  to  the  story  of  a  suffering 
Messiah. 

( d )  The  belief  and  propagation  of  such  myths  are  inconsistent  with 
what  we  know  of  the  sober  characters  and  self-sacrificing  lives  of  the 
apostles. 

(e)  The  mythical  theory  cannot  account  for   the  acceptance  of  the 
gospels  among  the  Gentiles,  who  had  none  of  the  Jewish  ideas  and  expec- 
tations. 

(/)  It  cannot  explain  Christianity  itself,  with  its  belief  in  Christ's  cruci- 
fixion and  resurrection,  and  the  ordinances  which  commemorate  these  facts. 

2nd.     The  Tendency-theory  of  Baur  ( 1792-1860  ). 

This  maintains  that  the  gospels  originated  in  the  middle  of  the  second 
century,  and  were  written  under  assumed  names  as  a  means  of  reconciling 
opposing  Jewish  and  Gentile  tendencies  in  the  church.  "These  great 
national  tendencies  find  their  satisfaction,  not  in  events  corresponding  to 
them,  but  in  the  elaboration  of  conscious  fictions." 

We  object  to  the  Tendency-theory  of  Baur,  that 

( a )  The  destructive  criticism  to  which  it  subjects  the  gospels,  if  applied 
to  secular  documents,  would  deprive  us  of  any  certain  knowledge  of  the 
past,  and  render  all  history  impossible. 

( 6  )  The  antagonistic  doctrinal  tendencies  which  it  professes  to  find  in 
the  several  gospels  are  more  satisfactorily  explained  as  varied  but  consistent 
aspects  of  the  one  system  of  truth  held  by  all  the  apostles. 

(  c  )  It  is  incredible  that  productions  of  such  literary  power  and  lofty 
religious  teaching  as  the  gospels  should  have  sprung  up  in  the  middle  of 
the  second  century,  or  that,  so  springing  up,  they  should  have  been  pub- 
lished under  assumed  names  and  for  covert  ends. 

(  d )  The  theory  requires  us  to  believe  in  a  moral  anomaly,  namely,  that 
a  faithful  disciple  of  Christ  in  the  second  century  could  be  guilty  of  fabri- 
cating a  life  of  his  master,  and  of  claiming  authority  for  it  on  the  ground 
that  the  author  had  been  a  companion  of  Christ  or  his  apostles. 


THE   GENUINENESS   OF  THE   CHRISTIAN   DOCUMENTS.  47 

( e  )  This  theory  cannot  account  for  the  universal  acceptance  of  the  gos- 
pels at  the  end  of  the  second  century,  among  widely  separated  communi- 
ties where  reverence  for  writings  of  the  apostles  was  a  mark  of  orthodoxy, 
and  where  the  Gnostic  heresies  would  have  made  new  documents  instantly 
liable  to  suspicion  and  searching  examination. 

(/)  The  acknowledgment  by  Baur  that  the  epistles  to  the  Bomans,  Gala- 
tians  and  Corinthians  were  written  by  Paul  in  the  first  century  is  fatal  to 
his  theory,  since  these  epistles  testify  not  only  to  miracles  at  the  period 
at  which  they  were  written,  but  to  the  main  events  of  Jesus'  life  and  to  the 
miracle  of  his  resurrection,  as  facts  already  long  acknowledged  in  the 
Christian  church. 

3d.     The  Bomance- theory  of  Benan  ( 1823-1892 ). 

This  theory  admits  a  basis  of  truth  in  the  gospels  and  holds  that  they 
all  belong  to  the  century  following  Jesus'  death.  "According  to"  Mat- 
thew, Mark,  etc.,  however,  means  only  that  Matthew,  Mark,  etc.,  wrote 
these  gospels  in  substance.  Benan  claims  that  the  facts  of  Jesus'  life  were 
so  sublimated  by  enthusiasm,  and  so  overlaid  with  pious  fraud,  that  the  gos- 
pels in  their  present  form  cannot  be  accepted  as  genuine, —  in  short,  the 
gospels  are  to  be  regarded  as  historical  romances  which  have  only  a  foun- 
dation in  fact. 

To  this  Bomance-theory  of  Benan,  we  object  that 

( a  )  It  involves  an  arbitrary  and  partial  treatment  of  the  Christian  doc- 
uments. The  claim  that  one  writer  not  only  borrowed  from  others,  but 
interpolated  ad  libitum,  is  contradicted  by  the  essential  agreement  of  the 
manuscripts  as  quoted  by  the  Fathers,  and  as  now  extant. 

(  6 )  It  attributes  to  Christ  and  to  the  apostles  an  alternate  fervor  of 
romantic  enthusiasm  and  a  false  pretense  of  miraculous  power  which  are 
utterly  irreconcilable  wfth  the  manifest  sobriety  and  holiness  of  their  lives 
and  teachings.  If  Jesus  did  not  work  miracles,  he  was  an  impostor. 

(  c )  It  fails  to  account  for  the  power  and  progress  of  the  gospel,  as  a 
system  directly  opposed  to  men's  natural  tastes  and  prepossessions  —  a 
system  which  substitutes  truth  for  romance  and  law  for  impulse. 

4th.     The  Development-theory  of  Harnack  ( born  1851). 

This  holds  Christianity  to  be  a  historical  development  from  germs  which 
were  devoid  of  both  dogma  and  miracle.  Jesus  was  a  teacher  of  ethics, 
and  the  original  gospel  is  most  clearly  represented  by  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount.  Greek  influence,  and  especially  that  of  the  Alexandrian  philoso- 
phy, added  to  this  gospel  a  theological  and  supernatural  element,  and  so 
changed  Christianity  from  a  life  into  a  doctrine. 

We  object  to  the  Development-theory  of  Harnack,  that 

(  a )  The  Sermon  on  the  Mount  is  not  the  sum  of  the  gospel,  nor  its 
original  form.  Mark  is  the  most  original  of  the  gospels,  yet  Mark  omits 
the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  and  Mark  is  preeminently  the  gospel  of  the 
miracle-worker. 


48  THE   SCRIPTURES  A   REVELATION  FROM  GOD. 

(6)  All  four  gospels  lay  the  emphasis,  not  on  Jesus'  life  and  ethical 
teaching,  but  on  his  death  and  resurrection.  Matthew  implies  Christ's 
deity  when  it  asserts  his  absolute  knowledge  of  the  Father  (11  :  27),  his 
universal  judgeship  (25  :32),  his  supreme  authority  (28  : 18),  and  his 
omnipresence  (28  :  20),  while  the  phrase  "Son  of  man"  implies  that  he  is 
also  "Son  of  God." 

(  c )  The  preexistence  and  atonement  of  Christ  cannot  be  regarded  as 
accretions  upon  the  original  gospel,  since  these  find  expression  in  Paul 
who  wrote  before  any  of  our  evangelists,  and  in  his  epistles  anticipated  the 
Logos-doctrine  of  John. 

( d)  We  may  grant  that  Greek  influence,  through  the  Alexandrian  phi- 
losophy, helped  the  New  Testament  writers  to  discern  what  was  already 
present  in  the  life  and  work  and  teaching  of  Jesus ;  but,  like  the  microscope 
which  discovers  but  does  not  create,  it  added  nothing  to  the  substance  of 
the  faith. 

(e)  Though  Mark  says  nothing  of  the  virgin-birth  because  his  story  is 
limited  to  what  the  apostles  had  witnessed  of  Jesus'  deeds,  Matthew  appar- 
ently gives  us  Joseph's  story  and  Luke  gives  Mary's  story — both  stories 
naturally  published  only  after  Jesus'  resurrection. 

(/)  The  larger  understanding  of  doctrine  after  Jesus'  death  was  itself 
predicted  by  our  Lord  (John  16  :  12).  The  Holy  Spirit  was  to  bring  his 
teachings  to  remembrance,  and  to  guide  into  all  the  truth  (16  : 13),  and 
the  apostles  were  to  continue  the  work  of  teaching  which  he  had  begun 
(Acts  1  : 1). 

2.     Genuineness  of  the  Books  of  the  Old  Testament. 

Since  nearly  one  half  of  the  Old  Testament  is  of  anonymous  authorship 
and  certain  of  its  books  may  be  attributed  to  definite  historic  characters 
only  by  way  of  convenient  classification  or  of  literary  personification,  we 
here  mean  by  genuineness  honesty  of  purpose  and  freedom  from  any- 
thing counterfeit  or  intentionally  deceptive  so  far  as  respects  the  age  or 
the  authorship  of  the  documents. 

We  show  the  genuineness  of  the  Old  Testament  books  : 
(  a  )    From  the  witness  of  the  New  Testament,  in  which  all  but  six  books 
of  the  Old  Testament  are  either  quoted  or  alluded  to  as  genuine. 

(  b  )  From  the  testimony  of  Jewish  authorities,  ancient  and  modern, 
who  declare  the  same  books  to  be  sacred,  and  only  the  same  books,  that 
are  now  comprised  in  our  Old  Testament  Scriptures. 

(  c  )  From  the  testimony  of  the  Septuagint  translation,  dating  from  the 
first  half  of  the  third  century,  or  from  280  to  180  B.  C. 

(d)  From  indications  that  soon  after  the  exile,  and  so  early  as  the 
times  of  Ezra  and  Nehemiah  (  500-450  B.  C. ),  the  Pentateuch  together  with 
the  book  of  Joshua  was  not  only  in  existence  but  was  regarded  as  authori- 
tative. 

(  e  )  From  the  testimony  of  the  Samaritan  Pentateuch,  dating  from  the 
time  of  Ezra  and  Nehemiah  (500-450  B.  C.  ). 


CREDIBILITY   OF   THE   WRITERS   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  49 

(/)  From  the  finding  of  "the  book  of  the  law"  in  the  temple,  in  the 
eighteenth  year  of  King  Josiah,  or  in  621  B.  0. 

(#)  From  references  in  the  prophets  Hosea  (B.  C.  743-737)  and  Amos 
( 759-745 )  to  a  course  of  divine  teaching  and  revelation  extending  far  back 
of  their  day. 

(h)  From  the  repeated  assertions  of  Scripture  that  Moses  himself  wrote 
a  law  for  his  people,  confirmed  as  these  are  by  evidence  of  literary  and 
legislative  activity  in  other  nations  far  antedating  his  time. 

II.     CREDIBILITY  or  THE  WRITERS  OF  THE  SCRIPTURES. 

We  shall  attempt  to  prove  this  only  of  the  writers  of  the  gospels  ;  for  if 
they  are  credible  witnesses,  the  credibility  of  the  Old  Testament,  to  which 
they  bore  testimony,  follows  as  a  matter  of  course. 

1.  They  are  capable  or  competent  witnesses,— thai  is,  they  possessed 
actual  knowledge  with  regard  to  the  facts  they  professed  to  relate,     (a) 
They  had  opportunities  of  observation  and  inquiry.     (  b  )  They  were  men 
of  sobriety  and  discernment,  and  could  not  have  been  themselves  deceived, 
(c)  Their  circumstances  were  such  as  to  impress  deeply  upon  their  minds 
the  events  of  which  they  were  witnesses. 

2.  They  are  honest  witnesses.     This  is  evident  when  we  consider  that : 
(a )  Their  testimony  imperiled  all  their  worldly  interests.    (6)  The  moral 
elevation  of  their  writings,  and  their  manifest  reverence  for  truth  and  con- 
stant inculcation  of  it,  show  that  they  were  not  wilful  deceivers,  but  good 
men.     (c)  There  are  minor  indications  of  the  honesty  of  these  writers  in 
the  circumstantiality  of  their  story,  in  the  absence  of  any  expectation  that 
their  narratives  would  be  questioned,  in  their  freedom  from  all  disposition 
to  screen  themselves  or  the  apostles  from  censure. 

3.  The  writings  of  the  evangelists  mutually  support  each  other.     We 
argue  their  credibility  upon  the  ground  of  their  number  and  of  the  con- 
sistency of  their  testimony.     While  there  is  enough  of  discrepancy  to 
show  that  there  has  been  no  collusion  between  them,  there  is  concurrence 
enough  to  make  the  falsehood  of  them  all  infinitely .  improbable.     Four 
points  under  this  head  deserve  mention  :  (a)  The  evangelists  are  indepen- 
dent witnesses.     This  is  sufficiently  shown  by  the  futility  of  the  attempts  to 
prove  that  any  one  of  them  has  abridged  or  transcribed  another.     (  b )  The 
discrepancies  between  them  are  none  of   them  irreconcilable  with  the 
truth  of  the  recorded  facts,  but  only  present  those  facts  in  new  lights  or 
with  additional  detail,     (c)  That  these  witnesses  were  friends  of  Christ 
does  not  lessen  the  value  of  their  united  testimony,  since  they  followed 
Christ  only  because  they  were  convinced  that  these  facts  were  true.     (  d  ) 
While  one  witness  to  the  facts  of  Christianity  might  establish  its  truth,  the 
combined  evidence  of  four  witnesses  gives  us  a  warrant  for  faith  in  the  facts 
of  the  gospel  such  as  we  possess  for  no  other  facts  in  ancient  history  what- 
soever.    The  same  rule  which  would  refuse  belief  in  the  events  recorded 
in  the  gospels  " would  throw  doubt  on  any  event  in  history." 


50  THE  SCRIPTUKES   A   REVELATION"  FROM   GOD. 

4.  The  conformity  of  the  gospel  testimony  with  experience.     We  have 
already  shown  that,  granting  the  fact  of  sin  and  the  need  of  an  attested 
revelation  from  God,  miracles  can  furnish  no  presumption  against  the  tes- 
timony of  those  who  record  such  a  revelation,  but,  as  essentially  belonging 
to  such  a  revelation,  miracles  may  be  proved  by  the  same  kind  and  degree 
of  evidence  as  is  required  in  proof  of  any  other  extraordinary  facts.     We 
may  assert,  then,  that  in  the  New  Testament  histories  there  is  no  record 
of  facts  contrary  to  experience,  but  only  a  record  of  facts  not  witnessed  in 
ordinary  experience  —  of  facts,  therefore,  in  which  we  may  believe,  if  the 
evidence  in  other  respects  is  sufficient. 

5.  Coincidence  of  this  testimony  with  collateral  facts  and  circum- 
stances.    Under  this  head  we  may  refer  to  (  a )  the  numberless  correspon- 
dences between  the  narratives  of  the  evangelists  and  contemporary  history; 
(  6  )  the  failure  of  every  attempt  thus  far  to  show  that  the  sacred  history  is 
contradicted  by  any  single  fact  derived  from  other  trustworthy  sources ; 
(c)  the  infinite  improbability  that  this  minute  and  complete  harmony 
should  ever  have  been  secured  in  fictitious  narratives. 

6.  Conclusion  from  the  argument  for  the  credibility  of  the  writers  of 
the  gospels.     These  writers  having  been  proved  to  be  credible  witnesses, 
their  narratives,  including  the  accounts  of  the  miracles  and  prophecies  of 
Christ  and  his  apostles,  must  be  accepted  as  true.     But  God  would  not 
work  miracles  or  reveal  the  future  to  attest  the  claims  of  false  teachers. 
Christ  and  his  apostles  must,  therefore,  have  been  what  they  claimed  to  be, 
teachers  sent  from  God,  and  their  doctrine  must  be  what  they  claimed  it 
to  be,  a  revelation  from  God  to  men. 

III.     THE  SUPERNATURAL  CHARACTER  or  THE  SCRIPTURE  TEACHING. 
1.     Scripture  teaching  in  general. 

A.  The  Bible  is  the  work  of  one  mind. 

( a )  In  spite  of  its  variety  of  authorship  and  the  vast  separation  of  its 
writers  from  one  another  in  point  of  time,  there  is  a  unity  of  subject,  spirit, 
and  aim  throughout  the  whole. 

(  6  )  Not  one  moral  or  religious  utterance  of  all  these  writers  has  been 
contradicted  or  superseded  by  the  utterances  of  those  who  have  come  later, 
but  all  together  constitute  a  consistent  system. 

(  c )  Each  of  these  writings,  whether  early  or  late,  has  represented  moral 
and  religious  ideas  greatly  in  advance  of  the  age  in  which  it  has  appeared, 
and  these  ideas  still  lead  the  world.  * 

(  d )  It  is  impossible  to  account  for  this  unity  without  supposing  such  a 
supernatural  suggestion  and  control  that  the  Bible,  while  in  its  various 
parts  written  by  human  agents,  is  yet  equally  the  work  of  a  superhuman 
intelligence. 

B.  This  one  mind  that  made  the  Bible  is  the  same  mind  that  made  the 
soul,  for  the  Bible  is  divinely  adapted  to  the  soul. 

(a)  It  shows  complete  acquaintance  with  the  soul. 


SUPERNATURAL   CHARACTER   OF  SCRIPTURE  TEACHING.         51 

(6)  It  judges  the  soul — contradicting  its  passions,  revealing  its  guilt, 
and  humbling  its  pride. 

( c )  It  meets  the  deepest  needs  of  the  soul — by  solutions  of  its  problems, 
disclosures  of  God's  character,  presentations  of  the  way  of  pardon,  conso- 
lations and  promises  for  life  and  death. 

( d )  Yet  it  is  silent  upon  many  questions  for  which  writings  of  merely 
human  origin  seek  first  to  provide  solutions. 

(e)  There  are  infinite  depths  and  inexhaustible  reaches  of  meaning  in 
Scripture,  which  difference  it  from  all  other  books,  and  which  compel  us  to 
believe  that  its  author  must  be  divine. 

2.  Moral  /System  of  the  New  Testament. 

The  perfection  of  this  system  is  generally  conceded.  All  will  admit  that 
it  greatly  surpasses  any  other  system  known  among  men.  Among  its  dis- 
tinguishing characteristics  may  be  mentioned : 

(a)  Its  comprehensiveness, — including  all  human  duties  in  its  code, 
even  the  most  generally  misunderstood  and  neglected,  while  it  permits  no 
vice  whatsoever. 

(6)  Its  spirituality, — accepting  no  merely  external  conformity  to  right 
precepts,  but  judging  all  action  by  the  thoughts  and  motives  from  which  it 
springs. 

(c)  Its  simplicity, — inculcating  principles  rather  than  imposing  rules; 
reducing  these  principles  to  an  organic  system  ;  and  connecting  this  system 
with  religion  by  summing  up  all  human  duty  in  the  one  command  of  love 
to  God  and  man. 

(d)  Its  practicality,  —  exemplifying  its  precepts  in  the  life  of  Jesus 
Christ;  and,  while  it  declares  man's  depravity  and  inability  in  his  own 
strength  to  keep  the  law,  furnishing  motives  to  obedience,  and  the  divine 
aid  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  make  this  obedience  possible. 

We  may  justly  argue  that  a  moral  system  so  pure  and  perfect,  since  it 
surpasses  all  human  powers  of  invention  and  runs  counter  to  men's  natural 
tastes  and  passions,  must  have  had  a  supernatural,  and  if  a  supernatural, 
then  a  divine,  origin. 

In  contrast  with  the  Christian  system  of  morality  the  defects  of  heathen 
systems  are  so  marked  and  fundamental,  that  they  constitute  a  strong 
corroborative  evidence  of  the  divine  origin  of  the  Scripture  revelation. 

3.  The  person  and  character  of  Christ. 

A.  The  conception  of  Christ's  person  as  presenting  deity  and  humanity 
indissolubly  united,  and  the  conception  of  Christ's  character,  with  its  fault- 
less and  all-comprehending  excellence,  cannot  be  accounted  for  upon  any 
other  hypothesis  than  that  they  were  historical  realities. 

(  a )  No  source  can  be  assigned  from  which  the  evangelists  could  have 
derived  such  a  conception.  The  Hindu  avatars  were  only  temporary 
unions  of  deity  with  humanity.  The  Greeks  had  men  half-deified,  but  no 


52  THE   SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

unions  of  God  and  man.  The  monotheism  of  the  Jews  found  the  person 
of  Christ  a  perpetual  stumbling-block.  The  Essenes  were  in  principle  more 
opposed  to  Christianity  than  the  Rabbinists. 

(  b  )  No  mere  human  genius,  and  much  less  the  genius  of  Jewish  fisher- 
men, could  have  originated  this  conception.  Bad  men  invent  only  such 
characters  as  they  sympathize  with.  But  Christ's  character  condemns  bad- 
ness. Such  a  portrait  could  not  have  been  drawn  without  supernatural 
aid.  But  such  aid  would  not  have  been  given  to  fabrication.  The  concep- 
tion can  be  explained  only  by  granting  that  Christ's  person  and  character 
were  historical  realities. 

B.  The  acceptance  and  belief  in  the  New  Testament  descriptions  of 
Jesus  Christ  cannot  be  accounted  for  except  upon  the  ground  that  the 
person  and  character  described  had  an  actual  existence. 

(  a  )  If  these  descriptions  were  false,  there  were  witnesses  still  living  who 
had  known  Christ  and  who  would  have  contradicted  them.  (  b  )  There  was 
no  motive  to  induce  acceptance  of  such  false  accounts,  but  every  motive  to 
the  contrary.  ( c  )  The  success  of  such  falsehoods  could  be  explained  only 
by  supernatural  aid,  but  God  would  never  have  thus  aided  falsehood.  This 
person  and  character,  therefore,  must  have  been  not  fictitious  but  real;  and 
if  real,  then  Christ's  words  are  true,  and  the  system  of  which  his  person 
and  character  are  a  part  is  a  revelation  from  God. 

4.  The  testimony  of  Christ  to  himself — as  being  a  messenger  from 
God  and  as  being  one  with  God. 

Only  one  personage  in  history  has  claimed  to  teach  absolute  truth,  to  be 
one  with  God,  and  to  attest  his  divine  mission  by  works  such  as  only  God 
could  perform. 

A.  This  testimony  cannot  be  accounted  for  upon  the  hypothesis  that 
Jesus  was  an  intentional  deceiver  :  for  (  a)  the  perfectly  consistent  holiness 
of  his  life ;   ( 6 )  the  unwavering  confidence  with  which  he  challenged 
investigation  of  his  claims  and  staked  all  upon  the  result ;  ( c )  the  vast 
improbability  of  a  lifelong  lie  in  the  avowed  interests  of  truth ;  and  ( d ) 
the  impossibility  that  deception  should  have  wrought  such  blessing  to  the 
world,  — all  show  that  Jesus  was  no  conscious  impostor. 

B.  Nor  can  Jesus'  testimony  to  himself  be  explained  upon  the  hypoth- 
esis that  he  was  self-deceived  :  for  this  would  argue  ( a )  a  weakness  and 
folly  amounting  to  positive  insanity.     But  his  whole  character  and  life 
exhibit  a  calmness,  dignity,  equipoise,  insight,  self-mastery,  utterly  incon- 
sistent with  such  a  theory.    Or  it  would  argue  (  b )  a  self -ignorance  and  self- 
exaggeration  which  could  spring  only  from  the  deepest  moral  perversion. 
But  the  absolute  purity  of  his  conscience,  the  humility  of  his  spirit,  the 
self-denying  beneficence  of  his  life,  show  this  hypothesis  to  be  incredible. 

If  Jesus,  then,  cannot  be  charged  with  either  mental  or  moral  unsound- 
ness,  his  testimony  must  be  true,  and  he  himself  must  be  one  with  God  and 
the  revealer  of  God  to  men. 


HISTORICAL   RESULTS   OF   SCRIPTURE  TEACHING.  53 

IV.  THE  HISTORICAL  RESULTS  OF  THE  PROPAGATION  OF  SCRIPTURE 
DOCTRINE. 

1.  The  rapid  progress  of  the  gospel  in  the  first  centuries  of  our  era 
shows  its  divine  origin. 

A.  That  Paganism  should  have  been  in  three  centuries  supplanted  by 
Christianity,  is  an  acknowledged  wonder  of  history. 

B.  The  wonder  is  the  greater  when  we  consider  the  obstacles  to  the 
progress  of  Christianity : 

( a )  The  scepticism  of  the  cultivated  classes ;  ( 6 )  the  prejudice  and 
hatred  of  the  common  people ;  and  (  c  )  the  persecutions  set  on  foot  by 
government. 

C.  The  wonder  becomes  yet  greater  when  we  consider  the  natural  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  means  used  to  secure  this  progress. 

(a)  The  proclaimers  of  the  gospel  were  in  general  unlearned  men,  belong- 
ing to  a  despised  nation.  ( 6 )  The  gospel  which  they  proclaimed  was  a 
gospel  of  salvation  through  faith  in  a  Jew  who  had  been  put  to  an  ignomi- 
nious death.  (  c  )  This  gospel  was  one  which  excited  natural  repugnance, 
by  humbling  men's  pride,  striking  at  the  root  of  their  sins,  and  demanding 
a  life  of  labor  and  self-sacrifice.  (  d  )  The  gospel,  moreover,  was  an  exclu- 
sive one,  suffering  no  rival  and  declaring  itself  to  be  the  universal  and  only 
religion. 

The  progress  of  a  religion  so  unprepossessing  and  uncompromising  to 
outward  acceptance  and  dominion,  within  the  space  of  three  hundred  years, 
cannot  be  explained  without  supposing  that  divine  power  attended  its  pro- 
mulgation, and  therefore  that  the  gospel  is  a  revelation  from  God. 

2.  The  beneficent  influence  of  the  /Scripture  doctrines  and  precepts , 
wherever  they  have  had  sway,  shows  their  divine  origin.     Notice  : 

A.  Their  influence  on  civilization  in  general,  securing  a  recognition  of 
principles  which  heathenism  ignored,  such  as  Garbett  mentions :  ( a )  the 
importance  of  the  individual ;  ( b )  the  law  of  mutual  love ;  (  c  )  the  sacred- 
ness  of  human  life ;  ( d  )  the  doctrine  of  internal  holiness  ;  (  e )  the  sanctity 
of  home  ;  (/)  monogamy,  and  the  religious  equality  of  the  sexes  ;  (g)  iden- 
tification of  belief  and  practice. 

The  continued  corruption  of  heathen  lands  shows  that  this  change  is  not 
due  to  any  laws  of  merely  natural  progress.  The  confessions  of  ancient 
writers  show  that  it  is  not  due  to  philosophy.  Its  only  explanation  is  that 
the  gospel  is  the  power  of  God. 

B.  Their  influence  upon  individual  character  and  happiness,  wherever 
they  have  been  tested  in  practice.    This  influence  is  seen  ( a  )  in  the  moral 
transformations  they  have  wrought  —  as  in  the  case  of  Paul  the  apostle,  and 
of  persons  in  every  Christian  community ;  ( 6 )  in  the  self-denying  labors 
for  human  welfare  to  which  they  have  led — as  in  the  case  of  Wilberforce  and 
Judson ;  (c)  in  the  hopes  they  have  inspired  in  times  of  sorrow  and  death. 

These  beneficent  fruits  cannot  have  their  source  in  merely  natural  causes, 
apart  from  the  truth  and  divinity  of  the  Scriptures ;  for  in  that  case  the 


54  THE   SCRIPTURES  A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

contrary  beliefs  would  be  accompanied  by  the  same  blessings.  But  since 
we  find  these  blessings  only  in  connection  with  Christian  teaching,  we  may 
justly  consider  this  as  their  cause.  This  teaching,  then,  must  be  true,  and 
the  Scriptures  must  be  a  divine  revelation.  Else  God  has  made  a  lie  to  be 
the  greatest  blessing  to  the  race. 


CHAPTER  ill. 

INSPIRATION  OF  THE   SCRIPTURES. 

I.  DEFINITION  OF  INSPIRATION. 

Inspiration  is  that  influence  of  the  Spirit  of  God  upon  the  minds  of  the 
Scripture  writers  which  made  their  writings  the  record  of  a  progressive 
divine  revelation,  sufficient,  when  taken  together  and  interpreted  by  the 
same  Spirit  who  inspired  them,  to  lead  every  honest  inquirer  to  Christ  and 
to  salvation. 

(  a )  Inspiration  is  therefore  to  be  denned,  not  by  its  method,  but  by  its 
result.  It  is  a  general  term  including  all  those  kinds  and  degrees  of  the 
Holy  Spirit's  influence  which  were  brought  to  bear  upon  the  minds  of  the 
Scripture  writers,  in  order  to  secure  the  putting  into  permanent  and  written 
form  of  the  truth  best  adapted  to  man's  moral  and  religious  needs. 

(  6  )  Inspiration  may  often  include  revelation,  or  the  direct  communi- 
cation from  God  of  truth  to  which  man  could  not  attain  by  his  unaided 
powers.  It  may  include  illumination,  or  the  quickening  of  man's  cogni- 
tive powers  to  understand  truth  already  revealed.  Inspiration,  however, 
does  not  necessarily  and  always  include  either  revelation  or  illumination. 
It  is  simply  the  divine  influence  which  secures  a  transmission  of  needed 
truth  to  the  future,  and,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  truth  to  be  trans- 
mitted, it  may  be  only  an  inspiration  of  superintendence,  or  it  may  be  also 
and  at  the  same  time  an  inspiration  of  illumination  or  revelation. 

(  c  )  It  is  not  denied,  but  affirmed,  that  inspiration  may  qualify  for  oral 
utterance  of  truth,  or  for  wise  leadership  and  daring  deeds.  Men  may  be 
inspired  to  render  external  service  to  God's  kingdom,  as  in  the  cases  of 
Bezalel  and  Samson ;  even  though  this  service  is  rendered  unwillingly  or 
unconsciously,  as  in  the  cases  of  Balaam  and  Cyrus.  All  human  intelli- 
gence, indeed,  is  due  to  the  inbreathing  of  that  same  Spirit  who  created 
man  at  the  beginning.  We  are  now  concerned  with  inspiration,  however, 
only  as  it  pertains  to  the  authorship  of  Scripture. 

II.  PEOOF  OF  INSPIRATION. 

1.  Since  we  have  shown  that  God  has  made  a  revelation  of  himself  to 
man,  we  may  reasonably  presume  that  he  will  not  trust  this  revelation 
wholly  to  human  tradition  and  misrepresentation,  but  will  also  provide  a 
record  of  it  essentially  trustworthy  and  sufficient ;  in  other  words,  that  the 
same  Spirit  who  originally  communicated  the  truth  will  preside  over  its 
publication,  so  far  as  is  needed  to  accomplish  its  religious  purpose. 

2.  Jesus,  who  has  been  proved  to  be  not  only  a  credible  witness,  but  a 
messenger  from  God,  vouches  for  the  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament,  by 

55 


56  THE   SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION"   FROM   GOD. 

quoting  it  with  the  formula:  "It  is  written"  ;  by  declaring  that  "one  jot 
or  one  tittle"  of  it  "shall  in  no  wise  pass  away,"  and  that  "the  Scripture 
cannot  be  broken." 

3.  Jesus  commissioned  his  apostles  as  teachers  and  gave  them  promises 
of  a  supernatural  aid  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  their  teaching,  like  the  promises 
made  to  the  Old  Testament  prophets. 

4.  The  apostles  claim  to  have  received  this  promised  Spirit,  and  under 
his  influence  to  speak  with  divine  authority,  putting  their  writings  upon  a 
level  with  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures.     We  have  not  only  direct  state- 
ments that  both  the  matter  and  the  form  of  their  teaching  were  supervised 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  but  we  have  indirect  evidence  that  this  was  the  case  in 
the  tone  of  authority  which  pervades  their  addresses  and  epistles. 

5.  The   apostolic  writers  of  the  New  Testament,  unlike  professedly 
inspired  heathen  sages  and  poets,  gave  attestation  by  miracles  or  prophecy 
that  they  were  inspired  by  God,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the 
productions  of  those  who  were  not  apostles,  such  as  Mark,  Luke,  Hebrews, 
James,  and  Jude,  were  recommended  to  the  churches  as  inspired,  by  apos- 
tolic sanction  and  authority. 

6.  The  chief  proof  of  inspiration,  however,  must  always  be  found  in  the 
internal  characteristics  of  the  Scriptures  themselves,  as  these  are  disclosed 
to  the  sincere  inquirer  by  the  Holy  Spirit.     The  testimony  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  combines  with  the  teaching  of  the  Bible  to  convince  the  earnest 
reader  that  this  teaching  is  as  a  whole  and  in  all  essentials  beyond  the  power 
of  man  to  communicate,  and  that  it  must  therefore  have  been  put  into  per- 
manent and  written  form  by  special  inspiration  of  God. 

III.     THEOKEES  OF  INSPIRATION. 
1.     The  Intuition-theory. 

This  holds  that  inspiration  is  but  a  higher  development  of  that  natural 
insight  into  truth  which  all  men  possess  to  some  degree;  a  mode  of  intelli- 
gence in  matters  of  morals  and  religion  which  gives  rise  to  sacred  books,  as 
a  corresponding  mode  of  intelligence  in  matters  of  secular  truth  gives  rise 
to  great  works  of  philosophy  or  art.  This  mode  of  intelligence  is  regarded 
as  the  product  of  man's  own  powers,  either  without  special  divine  influence 
or  with  only  the  inworking  of  an  impersonal  God. 

With  regard  to  this  theory  we  remark : 

(  a  )  Man  has,  indeed,  a  certain  natural  insight  into  truth,  and  we  grant 
that  inspiration  uses  this,  so  far  as  it  will  go,  and  makes  it  an  instrument  in 
discovering  and  recording  facts  of  nature  or  history. 

( b  )  In  all  matters  of  morals  and  religion,  however,  man's  insight  into 
truth  is  vitiated  by  wrong  affections,  and,  unless  a  supernatural  wisdom  can 
guide  him,  he  is  certain  to  err  himself,  and  to  lead  others  into  error. 

( c  )  The  theory  in  question,  holding  as  it  does  that  natural  insight  is 
the  only  source  of  religious  truth,  involves  a  self-contradiction ;  —  if  the 
theory  be  true,  then  one  man  is  inspired  to  utter  what  a  second  is  inspired 


THEORIES   OF   INSPIRATION.  57 

to  pronounce  false.    The  Vedas,  the  Koran  and  the  Bible  cannot  be  inspired 
to  contradict  each  other. 

(  d )  It  makes  moral  and  religious  truth  to  be  a  purely  subjective  thing 
—  a  matter  of  private  opinion —  having  no  objective  reality  independently 
of  men's  opinions  regarding  it. 

(  e  )  It  logically  involves  the  denial  of  a  personal  God  who  is  truth  and 
reveals  truth,  and  so  makes  man  to  be  the  highest  intelligence  in  the  uni- 
verse. This  is  to  explain  inspiration  by  denying  its  existence  ;  since,  if 
there  be  no  personal  God,  inspiration  is  but  a  figure  of  speech  for  a 
purely  natural  fact. 

2.  TJie  Illumination  Theory. 

This  regards  inspiration  as  merely  an  intensifying  and  elevating  of  the 
religious  perceptions  of  the  Christian,  the  same  in  kind,  though  greater  in 
degree,  with  the  illumination  of  every  believer  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  It 
holds,  not  that  the  Bible  is,  but  that  it  contains,  the  word  of  God,  and  that 
not  the  writings,  but  only  the  writers,  were  inspired.  The  illumination 
given  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  however,  puts  the  inspired  writer  only  in  full 
possession  of  his  normal  powers,  but  does  not  communicate  objective  truth 
beyond.his  ability  to  discover  or  understand. 

With  regard  to  this  theory  we  remark  : 

( a )  There  is  unquestionably  an  illumination  of  the  mind  of  every  believer 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  we  grant  that  there  may  have  been  instances  in 
which  the  influence  of  the  Spirit,  in  inspiration,  amounted  only  to 
illumination. 

(  b )  But  we  deny  that  this  was  the  constant  method  of  inspiration,  or 
that  such  an  influence  can  account  for  the  revelation  of  new  truth  to  the 
prophets  and  apostles.  The  illumination  of  the  Holy  Spirit  gives  no  new 
truth,  but  only  a  vivid  apprehension  of  the  truth  already  revealed.  Any 
original  communication  of  truth  must  have  required  a  work  of  the  Spirit 
different,  not  in  degree,  but  in  kind. 

(c)  Mere  illumination  could  not  secure  the  Scripture  writers  from 
frequent  and  grievous  error.     The  spiritual  perception  of  the  Christian 
is  always  rendered  to  some  extent  imperfect  and  deceptive  by  remaining 
depravity.    The  subjective  element  so  predominates  in  this  theory,  that  no 
certainty  remains  even  with  regard  to  the  trustworthiness  of  the  Scriptures 
as  a  whole. 

(d)  The  theory  is  logically  indefensible,  as  intimating  that  illumina- 
tion with  regard  to  truth  can  be  imparted  without  imparting  truth  itself, 
whereas  God  must  first  furnish  objective  truth  to  be  perceived  before  he 
can  illuminate  the  mind  to  perceive  the  meaning  of  that  truth. 

3.  The  Dictation-theory. 

This  theory  holds  that  inspiration  consisted  in  such  a  possession  of  the 
minds  and  bodies  of  the  Scripture  writers  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  that  they 
became  passive  instruments  or  amanuenses — pens,  not  penmen,  of  God. 


58  THE  SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

Of  this  view  we  may  remark : 

(a)  We  grant  that  there  are  instances  when  God's  communications  were 
uttered  in  an  audible  voice  and  took  a  definite  form  of  words,  and  that  this 
was  sometimes  accompanied  with  the  command  to  commit  the  words  to 
writing. 

(  6 )  The  theory  in  question,  however,  rests  upon  a  partial  induction  of 
Scripture  facts,  — unwarrantably  assuming  that  such  occasional  instances 
of  direct  dictation  reveal  the  invariable  method  of  God's  communications  of 
truth  to  the  writers  of  the  Bible. 

(c)  It  cannot  account  for  the  manifestly  human  element  in  the  Script- 
ures.    There  are  peculiarities  of  style  which  distinguish  the  productions  of 
each  writer  from  those  of  every  other,  and  there  are  variations  in  accounts 
of  the  same  transaction  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  theory  of  a  solely 
divine  authorship. 

(d)  It  is  inconsistent  with  a  wise  economy  of  means,  to  suppose  that 
the  Scripture  writers  should  have  had  dictated  to  them  what  they  knew 
already,  or  what  they  could  inform  themselves  of  by  the  use  of  their  nat- 
ural powers. 

( e  )  It  contradicts  what  we  know  of  the  law  of  God's  working  in  the  soul. 
The  higher  and  nobler  God's  communications,  the  more  fully  is  man  in 
possession  and  use  of  his  own  faculties.  We  cannot  suppose  that  this  high- 
est work  of  man  under  the  influence  of  the  Spirit  was  purely  mechanical. 

4.     The  Dynamical  Theory. 

The  true  view  holds,  in  opposition  to  the  first  of  these  theories,  that 
inspiration  is  not  simply  a  natural  but  also  a  supernatural  fact,  and  that  it 
is  the  immediate  work  of  a  personal  God  in  the  soul  of  man. 

It  holds,  in  opposition  to  the  second,  that  inspiration  belongs,  not  only 
to  the  men  who  wrote  the  Scriptures,  but  to  the  Scriptures  which  they 
wrote,  so  that  these  Scriptures,  when  taken  together,  constitute  a  trust- 
worthy and  sufficient  record  of  divine  revelation. 

It  holds,  in  opposition  to  the  third  theory,  that  the  Scriptures  contain  a 
human  as  well  as  a  divine  element,  so  that  while  they  present  a  body  of 
divinely  revealed  truth,  this  truth  is  shaped  in  human  moulds  and  adapted 
to  ordinary  human  intelligence. 

In  short,  inspiration  is  characteristically  neither  natural,  partial,  nor 
mechanical,  but  supernatural,  plenary,  and  dynamical.  Further  explan- 
ations will  be  grouped  under  the  head  of  The  Union  of  the  Divine  and 
Human  Elements  in  Inspiration,  in  the  section  which  immediately  follows. 

IV.     THE  UNION  OF  THE  DIVINE  AND  HUMAN  ELEMENTS  IN  INSPIRATION. 

1.  The  Scriptures  are  the  production  equally  of  God  and  of  man,  and 
are  therefore  never  to  be  regarded  as  merely  human  or  merely  divine. 

The  mystery  of  inspiration  consists  in  neither  of  these  terms  separately, 
but  in  the  union  of  the  two.  Of  this,  however,  there  are  analogies  in  the 
interpenetration  of  human  powers  by  the  divine  efficiency  in  regeneration 


DIVIDE   AND   HUMAN   ELEMENTS   IN   INSPIRATION.  59 

and  sanctification,  and  in  the  union  of  the  divine  and  human  natures  in  the 
person  of  Jesus  Christ. 

2.  This  union  of  the  divine  and  human  agencies  in  inspiration  is  not  to 
be  conceived  of  as  one  of  external  impartation  and  reception. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  whom  God  raised  up  and  providentially  qualified 
to  do  this  work,  spoke  and  wrote  the  words  of  God,  when  inspired,  not  as 
from  without,  but  as  from  within,  and  that  not  passively,  but  in  the  most 
conscious  possession  and  the  most  exalted  exercise  of  their  own  powers  of 
intellect,  emotion,  and  will. 

3.  Inspiration,  therefore,  did  not  remove,  but  rather  pressed  into  its 
own  service,  all  the  personal  peculiarities  of  the  writers,  together  with  their 
defects  of  culture  and  literary  style. 

Every  imperfection  not  inconsistent  with  truth  in  a  human  composition 
may  exist  in  inspired  Scripture.  The  Bible  is  God's  word,  in  the  sense 
that  it  presents  to  us  divine  truth  in  human  forms,  and  is  a  revelation  not 
for  a  select  class  but  for  the  common  mind.  Kightly  understood,  this  very 
humanity  of  the  Bible  is  a  proof  of  its  divinity. 

4.  In  inspiration  God  may  use  all  right  and  normal  methods  of  literary 
composition. 

As  we  recognize  in  literature  the  proper  function  of  history,  poetry,  and 
fiction  ;  of  prophecy,  parable,  and  drama ;  of  personification  and  proverb  ; 
of  allegory  and  dogmatic  instruction  ;  and  even  of  myth  and  legend  ;  we 
cannot  deny  the  possibility  that  God  may  use  any  one  of  these  methods  of 
communicating  truth,  leaving  it  to  us  to  determine  in  any  single  case  which 
of  these  methods  he  has  adopted. 

5.  The  inspiring  Spirit  has  given  the  Scriptures  to  the  world  by  a  pro- 
cess of  gradual  evolution. 

As  in  communicating  the  truths  of  natural  science,  God  has  communi- 
cated the  truths  of  religion  by  successive  steps,  germinally  at  first,  more 
fully  as  men  have  been  able  to  comprehend  them.  The  education  of  the 
race  is  analogous  to  the  education  of  the  child.  First  come  pictures, 
object-lessons,  external  rites,  predictions  ;  then  the  key  to  these  in  Christ, 
and  their  didactic  exposition  in  the  Epistles. 

6.  Inspiration  did  not  guarantee  inerrancy  in  things  not  essential  to  the 
main  purpose  of  Scripture. 

Inspiration  went  no  further  than  to  secure  a  trustworthy  transmission 
by  the  sacred  writers  of  the  truth  they  were  commissioned  to  deliver.  It 
was  not  omniscience.  It  was  a  bestowal  of  various  kinds  and  degrees  of 
knowledge  and  aid,  according  to  need ;  sometimes  suggesting  new  truth, 
sometimes  presiding  over  the  collection  of  preexisting  material  and  guard- 
ing from  essential  error  in  the  final  elaboration.  As  inspiration  was  not 
omniscience,  so  it  was  not  complete  sanctification.  It  involved  neither 
personal  infallibility,  nor  entire  freedom  from  sin. 

7.  Inspiration  did  not  always,  or  even  generally,  involve  a  direct  com- 
munication to  the  Scripture  writers  of  the  words  they  wrote. 


60  THE   SCRIPTURES  A    REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

Thought  is  possible  without  words,  and  in  the  order  of  nature  precedes 
words.  The  Scripture  writers  appear  to  have  been  so  influenced  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  that  they  perceived  and  felt  even  the  new  truths  they  were  to 
publish,  as  discoveries  of  their  own  minds,  and  were  left  to  the  action  of 
their  own  minds  in  the  expression  of  these  truths,  with  the  single  exception 
that  they  were  supernaturally  held  back  from  the  selection  of  wrong  words, 
and  when  needful  were  provided  with  right  ones.  Inspiration  is  therefore 
not  verbal,  while  yet  we  claim  that  no  form  of  words  which  taken  in  its 
connections  would  teach  essential  error  has  been  admitted  into  Scripture. 

8.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the  ever-present  human  element,  the  all-per- 
vading inspi^ition  of  the  Scriptures  constitutes  these  various  writings  an 
organic  whole. 

Since  the  Bible  is  in  all  its  parts  the  work  of  God,  each  part  is  to  be 
judged,  not  by  itself  alone,  but  in  its  connection  with^every  other  part. 
The  Scriptures  are  not  to  be  interpreted  as  so  many  merely  human  produc- 
tions by  different  authors,  but  as  also  the  work  of  one  divine  mind.  Seem- 
ingly trivial  things  are  to  be  explained  from  their  connection  with  the  whole. 
One  history  is  to  be  built  up  from  the  several  accounts  of  the  life  of  Christ. 
One  doctrine  must  supplement  another.  The  Old  Testament  is  part  of  a 
progressive  system,  whose  culmination  and  key  are  tojbe  found  in  the  New. 
The  central  subject  and  thought  which  binds  .all  parts  of  the  Bible  together, 
and  in  the  light  of  which  they  are  to  be  interpreted,  is  the  person  and  work 
of  Jesus  Christ. 

9.  When  the  unity  of  the  Scripture  is  fully  recognized,  the  Bible,  in 
spite  of  imperfections  in  matters  non-essential  to  its  religious  purpose,  fur- 
nishes a  safe  and  sufficient  guide  to  truth  and  to  salvation. 

The  recognition  of  the  Holy  Spirit's  agency  makes  it  rational  and  natural 
to  believe  in  the  organic  unity  of  Scripture.  When  the  earlier  parts  are 
taken  in  connection  with  the  later,  and  when  each  part  is  interpreted  by 
the  whole,  most  of  the  difficulties  connected  with  inspiration  disappear. 
Taken  together,  with  Christ  as  its  culmination  and  explanation,  the  Bible 
furnishes  the  Christian  rule  of  faith  and  practice. 

10.  While  inspiration  constitutes   Scripture  an  authority  more  trust- 
worthy than  are  individual  reason  or  the  creeds  of  the  church,  the  only 
ultimate  authority  is  Christ  himself. 

Christ  has  not  so  constructed  Scripture  as  to  dispense  with  his  personal 
presence  and  teaching  by  his  Spirit.  The  Scripture  is  the  imperfect  mirror 
of  Christ.  It  is  defective,  yet  it  reflects  him  and  leads  to  him.  Authority 
resides  not  in  it,  but  in  him,  and  his  Spirit  enables  the  individual  Christian 
and  the  collective  church  progressively  to  distinguish  the  essential  from 
the  non-essential,  and  so  to  perceive  the  truth  as  it  is  in  Jesus.  In  thus 
judging  Scripture  and  interpreting  Scripture,  we  are  not  rationalists,  but 
are  rather  believers  in  him  who  promised  to  be  with  us  alway  even  unto 
the  end  of  the  world  and  to  lead  us  by  his  Spirit  into  all  the  truth. 

11.  The  preceding  discussion  enables  us  at  least  to  lay  down  three  car- 
dinal principles  and  to  answer  three  common  questions  with  regard  to 
inspiration. 


OBJECTIONS  TO  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  INSPIRATION.  61 

Principles  :  ( a )  The  human  mind  can  be  inhabited  and  energized  by  God 
while  yet  attaining  and  retaining  its  own'highest  intelligence  and  freedom. 
( 6 )  The  Scriptures  being  the  work  of  the  one  God,  as  well  as  of  the  men 
in  whom  God  moved  and  dwelt,  constitute  an  articulated  and  organic  unity, 
(c)  The  unity  and  authority  of  Scripture  as  a  whole  are  entirely  consis- 
tent with  its  gradual  evolution  and  with  great  imperfection  in  its  non-essen- 
tial parts. 

Questions  :  (a)  Is  any  part  of  Scripture  uninspired?  Answer  :  Every 
part  of  Scripture  is  inspired  in  its  connection  and  relation  with  every 
other  part.  (  b  )  Are  there  degrees  of  inspiration  ?  Answer  :  There  are 
degrees  of  value,  but  not  of  inspiration.  Each  part  in  its  connection  with 
the  rest  is  made  completely  true,  and  completeness  has  no  degrees.  (  c ) 
How  may  we  know  what  parts  are  of  most  value  and  what  is  the  teaching 
of  the  whole  ?  Answer  :  The  same  Spirit  of  Christ  who  inspired  the 
Bible  is  promised  to  take  of  the  things  of  Christ,  and,  by  showing  them  to 
us,  to  lead  us  progressively  into  all  the  truth. 

V.     OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  INSPIRATION. 

In  connection  with  a  divine-human  work  like  the  Bible,  insoluble  diffi- 
culties may  be  expected  to  present  themselves.  So  long,  however,  as  its 
inspiration  is  sustained  by  competent  and  sufficient  evidence,  these  difficul- 
ties cannot  justly  prevent  our  full  acceptance  of  the  doctrine,  any  more  than 
disorder  and  mystery  in  nature  warrant  us  in  setting  aside  the  proofs  of  its 
divine  authorship.  These  difficulties  are  lessened  with  time  ;  some  have 
already  disappeared  ;  many  may  be  due  to  ignorance,  and  may  be  removed 
hereafter  ;  those  which  are  permanent  may  be  intended  to  stimulate  inquiry 
and  to  discipline  faith. 

It  is  noticeable  that  the  common  objections  to  inspiration  are  urged,  not 
so  much  against  the  religious  teaching  of  the  Scriptures,  as  against  certain 
errors  in  secular  matters  which  are  supposed  to  be  interwoven  with  it.  But 
if  these  are  proved  to  be  errors  indeed,  it  will  not  necessarily  overthrow 
the  doctrine  of  inspiration ;  it  will  only  compel  us  to  give  a  larger  place 
to  the  human  element  in  the  composition  of  the  Scriptures,  and  to  regard 
them  more  exclusively  as  a  text-book  of  religion.  As  a  rule  of  religious 
faith  and  practice,  they  will  still  be  the  infallible  word  of  God.  The  Bible 
is  to  be  judged  as  a  book  whose  one  aim  is  man's  rescue  from  sin  and 
reconciliation  to  God,  and  in  these  respects  it  will  still  be  found  a  record 
of  substantial  truth.  This  will  appear  more  fully  as  we  examine  the  objec- 
tions one  by  one. 

1.     Errors  in  matters  of  Science. 
Upon  this  objection  we  remark  : 

(  a )  We  do  not  admit  the  existence  of  scientific  error  in  the  Scripture. 
What  is  charged  as  such  is  simply  truth  presented  in  popular  and  impres- 
sive forms. 

The  common  mind  receives  a  more  correct  idea  of  unfamiliar  facts  when 
these  are  narrated  in  phenomenal  language  and  in  summary  form  than 


62  THE   SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

when  they  are  described  in  the  abstract  terms  and  in  the  exact  detail  of 
science. 

(  6  )  It  is  not  necessary  to  a  proper  view  of  inspiration  to  suppose  that 
the  human  authors  of  Scripture  had  in  mind  the  proper  scientific  interpre- 
tation of  the  natural  events  they  recorded. 

It  is  enough  that  this  was  in  the  mind  of  the  inspiring  Spirit.  Through 
the  comparatively  narrow  conceptions  and  inadequate  language  of  the 
Scripture  writers,  the  Spirit  of  inspiration  may  have  secured  the  expres- 
sion of  the  truth  in  such  germinal  form  as  to  be  intelligible  to  the  times 
in  which  it  was  '.first  published,  and  yet  capable  of  indefinite  expansion  as 
science  should  advance.  In  the  miniature  picture  of  creation  in  the  first 
chapter  of  Genesis,  and  in  its  power  of  adjusting  itself  to  every  advance  of 
scientific  investigation,  we  have  a  strong  proof  of  inspiration. 

(c)  It  may  be  safely  said  that  science  has  not  yet  shown  any  fairly 
interpreted  passage  of  Scripture  to  be  untrue. 

With  regard  to  the  antiquity  of  the  race,  we  may  say  that  owing  to  the 
differences  of  reading  between  the  Septuagint  and  the  Hebrew  there  is  room 
for  doubt  whether  either  of  the  received  chronologies  has  the  sanction  of 
inspiration.  Although  science  has  made  probable  the  existence  of  man 
upon  the  earth  at  a  period  preceding  the  dates  assigned  in  these  chronol- 
ogies, no  statement  of  inspired  Scripture  is  thereby  proved  false. 

(d)  Even  if  error  in  matters  of  science  were  found  in  Scripture,  it  would 
not  disprove  inspiration,  since  inspiration  concerns  itself  with  science  only 
so  far  as  correct  scientific  views  are  necessary  to  morals  and  religion. 

2.     Errors  in  matters  of  History. 

To  this  objection  we  reply  : 

(a)  What  are  charged  as  such  are  often  mere  mistakes  in  transcription, 
and  have  no  force  as  arguments  against  inspiration,  unless  it  can  first  be 
shown  that  inspired  documents  are  by  the  very  fact  of  their  inspiration 
exempt  from  the  operation  of  those  laws  which  affect  the  transmission  of 
other  ancient  documents. 

(  6 )  Other  so-called  errors  are  to  be  explained  as  a  permissible  use  of 
round  numbers,  which  cannot  be  denied  to  the  sacred  writers  except  upon 
the  principle  that  mathematical  accuracy  was  more  important  than  the 
general  impression  to  be  secured  by  the  narrative. 

(  c  )  Diversities  of  statement  in  accounts  of  the  same  event,  so  long  as 
they  touch  no  substantial  truth,  may  be  due  to  the  meagreness  of  the 
narrative,  and  might  be  fully  explained  if  some  single  fact,  now  unrecorded, 
were  only  known.  To  explain  these  apparent  discrepancies  would  not  only 
be  beside  the  purpose  of  the  record,  but  would  destroy  one  valuable 
evidence  of  the  independence  of  the  several  writers  or  witnesses. 

(d)  While  historical  and  archaeological  discovery  in  many  important 
particulars  goes  to  sustain  the  general  correctness  of  the  Scripture  narra- 
tives, and  no  statement  essential  to  the  moral  and  religious  teaching  of 
Scripture  has  been  invalidated,  inspiration  is  still  consistent  with  much 
imperfection  in  historical  detail  and  its  narratives  "do  not  seem  to  be 
exempted  from  possibilities  of  error. " 


OBJECTIONS  TO  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   INSPIRATION.  63 

3.  Errors  in  Morality. 

(a)  What  are  charged  as  such  are  sometimes  evil  acts  and  words  of  good 
men  —  words  and  acts  not  sanctioned  by  God.  These  are  narrated  by  the 
inspired  writers  as  simple  matter  of  history,  and  subsequent  results,  or  the 
story  itself,  is  left  to  point  the  moral  of  the  tale. 

( 6 )  Where  evil  acts  appear  at  first  sight  to  be  sanctioned,  it  is  frequently 
some  right  intent  or  accompanying  virtue,  rather  than  the  act  itself,  upon 
which  commendation  is  bestowed. 

(  c  )  Certain  commands  and  deeds  are  sanctioned  as  relatively  just  — 
expressions  of  justice  such  as  the  age  could  comprehend,  and  are  to  be 
judged  as  parts  of  a  progressively  unfolding  system  of  morality  whose  key 
and  culmination  we  have  in  Jesus  Christ. 

(  d  )  God's  righteous  sovereignty  affords  the  key  to  other  events.  He  has 
the  right  to  do  what  he  will  with  his  own,  and  to  punish  the  transgressor 
when  and  where  he  will ;  and  he  may  justly  make  men  the  foretellers  or 
executors  of  his  purposes. 

( e  )  Other  apparent  immoralities  are  due  to  unwarranted  interpretations. 
Symbol  is  sometimes  taken  for  literal  fact ;  the  language  of  irony  is  under- 
stood as  sober  affirmation  ;  the  glow  and  freedom  of  Oriental  description 
are  judged  by  the  unimpassioned  style  of  Western  literature;  appeal  to 
lower  motives  is  taken  to  exclude,  instead  of  preparing  for,  the  higher. 

4.  Errors  of  Reasoning. 

(a)  What  are  charged  as  such  are  generally  to  be  explained  as  valid 
argument  expressed  in  highly  condensed  form.     The  appearance  of  error 
may  be  due  to  the  suppression  of  one  or  more  links  in  the  reasoning. 

( b )  Where  we  cannot  see  the  propriety  of  the  conclusions  drawn  from 
given  premises,  there  is  greater  reason  to  attribute  our  failure  to  ignorance 
of  divine  logic  on  our  part,  than  to  accommodation  or  ad  hominem  argu- 
ments on  the  part  of  the  Scripture  writers. 

( c )  The  adoption  of  Jewish  methods  of  reasoning,  where  it  could  be 
proved,  would  not  indicate  error  on  the  part  of  the  Scripture  writers,  but 
rather  an  inspired  sanction  of  the  method  as  applied  to  that  particular  case. 

(d)  If  it  should  appear  however  upon  further  investigation  that  Eab- 
binical  methods  have  been  wrongly  employed  by  the  apostles  in  their  argu- 
mentation, we  might  still  distinguish  between  the  truth  they  are  seeking 
to  convey  and  the  arguments  by  which  they  support  it.     Inspiration  may 
conceivably  make  known  the  truth,  yet  leave  the  expression  of  the  truth  to 
human  dialectic  as  well  as  to  human  rhetoric. 

5.  Errors  in  quoting  or  interpreting  the  Old  Testament. 

(a)  What  are  charged  as  such  are  commonly  interpretations  of  the 
meaning  of  the  original  Scripture  by  the  same  Spirit  who  first  inspired  it. 

(  6 )  Where  an  apparently  false  translation  is  quoted  from  the  Septuagint, 
the  sanction  of  inspiration  is  given  to  it,  as  expressing  a  part  at  least  of  the 


64  THE  SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION   FROM   GOD. 

fulness  of  meaning  contained  in  the  divine  original — a  fulness  of  meaning 
which  two  varying  translations  do  not  in  some  cases  exhaust. 

(  c  }  The  freedom  of  these  inspired  interpretations,  however,  does  not 
warrant  us  in  like  freedom  of  interpretation  in  the  case  of  other  passages 
whose  meaning  has  not  been  authoritatively  made  known. 

(d)  While  we  do  not  grant  that  the  New  Testament  writers  in  any 
proper  sense  misquoted  or  misinterpreted  the  Old  Testament,  we  do  not 
regard  absolute  correctness  in  these  respects  as  essential  to  their  inspira- 
tion. The  inspiring  Spirit  may  have  communicated  truth,  and  may  have 
secured  in  the  Scriptures  as  a  whole  a  record  of  that  truth  sufficient  for 
men's  moral  and  religious  needs,  without  imparting  perfect  gifts  of  scholar- 
ship or  exegesis. 

6.  Errors  in  Prophecy. 

(a)  What  are  charged  as  such  may  frequently  be  explained  by  remem- 
bering that  much  of  prophecy  is  yet  unfulfilled. 

( 6 )  The  personal  surmises  of  the  prophets  as  to  the  meaning  of  the 
prophecies  they  recorded  may  have  been  incorrect,  while  yet  the  prophe- 
cies themselves  are  inspired. 

(c)  The  prophet's  earlier  utterances  are  not  to  be  severed  from  the  later 
utterances  which  elucidate  them,  nor  from  the  whole  revelation  of  which 
they  form  a  part.  It  is  unjust  to  forbid  the  prophet  to  explain  his  own 
meaning. 

(  d)  The  character  of  prophecy  as  a  rough  general  sketch  of  the  future, 
in  highly  figurative  language,  and  without  historical  perspective,  renders 
it  peculiarly  probable  that  what  at  first  sight  seem  to  be  errors  are  due 
to  a  misinterpretation  on  our  part,  which  confounds  the  drapery  with  the 
substance,  or  applies  its  language  to  events  to  which  it  had  no  reference. 

7.  Certain  books  unworthy  of  a  place  in  inspired  Scripture. 

(a)  This  charge  may  be  shown,  in  each  single  case,  to  rest  upon  a  mis- 
apprehension of  the  aim  and  method  of  the  book,  and  its  connection  with 
the  remainder  of  the  Bible,  together  with  a  narrowness  of  nature  or  of 
doctrinal  view,  which  prevents  the  critic  from  appreciating  the  wants  of  the 
peculiar  class  of  men  to  which  the  book  is  especially  serviceable. 

( 6  )  The  testimony  of  church  history  and  general  Christian  experience 
to  the  profitableness  and  divinity  of  the  disputed  books  is  of  greater  weight 
than  the  personal  impressions  of  the  few  who  criticize  them. 

( c  )  Such  testimony  can  be  adduced  in  favor  of  the  value  of  each  one  of 
the  books  to  which  exception  is  taken,  such  as  Esther,  Job,  Song  of  Solo- 
mon, Ecclesiastes,  Jonah,  James,  Revelation. 

8.  Portions  of  the  Scripture  books  written  by  others  than  the  persons 
to  whom  they  are  ascribed. 

The  objection  rests  upon  a  misunderstanding  of  the  nature  and  object  of 
inspiration.  It  may  be  removed  by  considering  that 


OBJECTIONS  TO   THE   DOCTRINE   OF   INSPIRATION.  65 

(a)  In  the  case  of  books  made  up  from  preexisting  documents,  inspira- 
tion simply  preserved  the  compilers  of  them  from  selecting  inadequate  or 
improper  material.  The  fact  of  such  compilation  does  not  impugn  their 
value  as  records  of  a  divine  revelation,  since  these  books  supplement  each 
other's  deficiencies  and  together  are  sufficient  for  man's  religious  needs. 

( 6 )  In  the  case  of  additions  to  Scripture  books  by  later  writers,  it  is 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  additions,  as  well  as  the  originals,  were  made 
by  inspiration,  and  no  essential  truth  is  sacrificed  by  allowing  the  whole  to 
go  under  the  name  of  the  chief  author. 

(  c  )  It  is  unjust  to  deny  to  inspired  Scripture  the  right  exercised  by 
all  historians  of  introducing  certain  documents  and  sayings  as  simply  his- 
torical, while  their  complete  truthfulness  is  neither  vouched  for  nor  denied. 

9.  Sceptical  or  fictitious  Narratives. 

( a )  Descriptions  of  human  experience  may  be  embraced  in  Scripture, 
not  as  models  for  imitation,  but  as  illustrations  of  the  doubts,  struggles,  and 
needs  of  the  soul.  In  these  cases  inspiration  may  vouch,  not  for  the  cor- 
rectness of  the  views  expressed  by  those  who  thus  describe  their  mental 
history,  but  only  for  the  correspondence  of  the  description  with  actual  fact, 
and  for  its  usefulness  as  indirectly  teaching  important  moral  lessons. 

(  b  )  Moral  truth  may  be  put  by  Scripture  writers  into  parabolic  or  dra- 
matic form,  and  the  sayings  of  Satan  and  of  perverse  men  may  form  parts 
of  such  a  production.  In  such  cases,  inspiration  may  vouch,  not  for  the 
historical  truth,  much  less  for  the  moral  truth  of  each  separate  statement, 
but  only  for  the  correspondence  of  the  whole  with  ideal  fact ;  in  other 
words,  inspiration  may  guarantee  that  the  story  is  true  to  nature,  and  is 
valuable  as  conveying  divine  instruction. 

(c)  In  none  of  these  cases  ought  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  man's 
words  from  God's  words,  or  ideal  truth  from  actual  truth,  to  prevent  our 
acceptance  of  the  fact  of  inspiration  ;  for  in  this  very  variety  of  the  Bible, 
combined  with  the  stimulus  it  gives  to  inquiry  and  the  general  plainness  of 
its  lessons,  we  have  the  very  characteristics  we  should  expect  in  a  book 
whose  authorship  was  divine. 

10.  Acknowledgment  of  the  non-inspiration  of  Scripture  teachers 
and  their  writings. 

This  charge  rests  mainly  upon  the  misinterpretation  of  two  particular 

passages  : 

(a )  Acts  23 : 5  ("I  wist  not,  brethren,  that  he  was  the  high  priest "  ) 
may  be  explained  either  as  the  language  of  indignant  irony :  "  I  would  not 
recognize  such  a  man  as  high  priest"  ;   or,  more  naturally,  an  actual  con- 
fession of  personal  ignorance  and  fallibility,  which  does  not  affect  the  inspi- 
ration of  any  of  Paul's  final  teachings  or  writings. 

( b )  1  Cor.  7  : 12, 10  ("I,  not  the  Lord"  ;  "not  I,  butthe  Lord").   Here 
the  contrast  is  not  between  the  apostle  inspired  and  the  apostle  uninspired, 
but  between  the  apostle's  words  and  an  actual  saying  of  our  Lord,  as  in 

5 


66  THE  SCRIPTURES   A   REVELATION  PROM  GOD. 

Mat.  5  : 32  ;  19  : 3-10 ;  Mark  10  : 11 ;  Luke  16 : 18  (Stanley  on  Corinthians), 
The  expressions  may  be  paraphrased  : — "  With  regard  to  this  matter  no 
express  command  was  given  by  Christ  before  his  ascension.  As  one  inspired 
by  Christ,  however,  I  give  you  my  command." 


PAET    IT. 

THE  NATUKE,  DECREES  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 
CHAPTER  I. 

THE  ATTRIBUTES   OF   GOD. 

In  contemplating  the  words  and  acts  of  God,  as  in  contemplating  the 
words  and  acts  of  individual  men,  we  are  compelled  to  assign  uniform  and 
permanent  effects  to  uniform  and  permanent  causes.  Holy  acts  and  words, 
we  argue,  must  have  their  source  in  a  principle  of  holiness ;  truthful  acts 
and  words,  in  a  settled  proclivity  to  truth  ;  benevolent  acts  and  words,  in  a 
benevolent  disposition. 

Moreover,  these  permanent  and  uniform  sources  of  expression  and  action 
to  which  we  have  applied  the  terms  principle,  proclivity,  disposition,  since 
they  exist  harmoniously  in  the  same  person,  must  themselves  inhere,  and 
find  their  unity,  in  an  underlying  spiritual  substance  or  reality  of  which 
they  are  the  inseparable  characteristics  and  partial  manifestations. 

Thus  we  are  led  naturally  from  the  works  to  the  attributes,  and  from  the 
attributes  to  the  essence,  of  God. 

I.  DEFINITION  OF  THE  TERM  ATTRIBUTES. 

The  attributes  of  God  are  those  distinguishing  characteristics  of  the 
divine  nature  which  are  inseparable  from  the  idea  of  God  and  which  con- 
stitute the  basis  and  ground  for  his  various  manifestations  to  his  creatures. 

We  call  them  attributes,  because  we  are  compelled  to  attribute  them  to 
God  as  fundamental  qualities  or  powers  of  his  being,  in  order  to  give 
rational  account  of  certain  constant  facts  in  God's  self -revelations. 

II.  RELATION  OF  THE  DIVINE  ATTRIBUTES  TO  THE  DIVINE  ESSENCE. 

1.  The  attributes  have  an  objective  existence.  They  are  not  mere 
names  for  human  conceptions  of  God — conceptions  which  have  their  only 
ground  in  the  imperfection  of  the  finite  mind.  They  are  qualities  objec- 
tively distinguishable  from  the  divine  essence  and  from  each  other. 

The  nominalistic  notion  that  God  is  a  being  of  absolute  simplicity,  and 
that  in  his  nature  there  is  no  internal  distinction  of  qualities  or  powers, 
tends  directly  to  pantheism ;  denies  all  reality  of  the  divine  perfections ; 
or,  if  these  in  any  sense  still  exist,  precludes  all  knowledge  of  them  on  the 
part  of  finite  beings.  To  say  that  knowledge  and  power,  eternity  and  holi- 
ness, are  identical  with  the  essence  of  God  and  with  each  other,  is  to  deny 
that  we  know  God  at  all. 

67 


68          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

The  Scripture  declarations  of  the  possibility  of  knowing  God,  together 
with  the  manifestation  of  the  distinct  attributes  of  his  nature,  are  conclu- 
sive against  this  false  notion  of  the  divine  simplicity, 

2.  The  attributes  inhere  in  the  divine  essence.     They  are  not  separate 
existences.     They  are  attributes  of  God. 

While  we  oppose  the  nominalistic  view  which  holds  them  to  be  mere 
names  with  which,  by  the  necessity  of  our  thinking,  we  clothe  the  one  sim- 
ple divine  essence,  we  need  equally  to  avoid  the  opposite  realistic  extreme 
of  making  them  separate  parts  of  a  composite  God. 

We  cannot  conceive  of  attributes  except  as  belonging  to  an  underlying 
essence  which  furnishes  their  ground  of  unity.  In  representing  God  as  a 
compound  of  attributes,  realism  endangers  the  living  unity  of  the  Godhead. 

3.  The  attributes  belong  to  the  divine  essence  as  such.  They  are  to  be 
distinguished  from  those  other  powers  or  relations  which  do  not  appertain 
to  the  divine  essence  universally. 

The  personal  distinctions  (proprietates)  in  the  nature  of  the  one  God 
are  not  to  be  denominated  attributes ;  for  each  of  these  personal  distinctions 
belongs  not  to  the  divine  essence  as  such  and  universally,  but  only  to  the 
particular  person  of  the  Trinity  who  bears  its  name,  while  on  the  contrary 
all  of  the  attributes  belong  to  each  of  the  persons. 

The  relations  which  God  sustains  to  the  world  (predicata),  moreover, 
such  as*  creation,  preservation,  government,  are  not  to  be  denominated 
attributes ;  for  these  are  accidental,  not  necessary  or  inseparable  from  the 
idea  of  God.  God  would  be  God,  if  he  had  never  created. 

4.  The  attributes  manifest  the  divine  essence.  The  essence  is  revealed 
only  through  the  attributes.     Apart  from  its  attributes  it  is  unknown  and 
unknowable. 

But  though  we  can  know  God  only  as  he  reveals  to  us  his  attributes,  we 
do,  notwithstanding,  in  knowing  these  attributes,  know  the  being  to  whom 
these  attributes  belong.  That  this  knowledge  is  partial  does  not  prevent 
its  corresponding,  so  far  as  it  goes,  to  objective  reality  in  the  nature  of  God. 

All  God's  revelations  are,  therefore,  revelations  of  himself  in  and  through 
his  attributes.  Our  aim  must  be  to  determine  from  God's  works  and  words 
what  qualities,  dispositions,  determinations,  powers  of  his  otherwise  unseen 
and  unsearchable  essence  he  has  actually  made  known  to  us ;  or  in  other 
words,  what  are  the  revealed  attributes  of  God. 

III.     METHODS  OF  DETERMINING  THE  DIVINE  ATTRIBUTES. 

We  have  seen  that  the  existence  of  God  is  a  first  truth.  It  is  presup- 
posed in  all  human  thinking,  and  is  more  or  less  consciously  recognized  by 
all  men.  This  intuitive  knowledge  of  God  we  have  seen  to  be  corroborated 
and  explicated  by  arguments  drawn  from  nature  and  from  mind.  Eeason 
leads  us  to  a  causative  and  personal  Intelligence  upon  whom  we  depend. 
This  Being  of  indefinite  greatness  we  clothe,  by  a  necessity  of  our  thinking, 
with  all  the  attibutes  of  perfection.  The  two  great  methods  of  determining 
what  these  attributes  are,  are  the  Kational  and  the  Biblical. 


CLASSIFICATION"   OF  THE   ATTRIBUTES.  69 

1.  The  Rational  method.    This  is  threefold : — ( a  )  the  via  negationis, 
or  the  way  of  negation,  which  consists  in  denying  to  God  all  imperfections 
observed  in  created  beings ;  (  b  )  the  via  eminentice,  or  the  way  of  climax, 
which  consists  in  attributing  to  God  in  infinite  degree  all  the  perfections 
found  in  creatures ;  and  (  c )  the  via  causalitatis,  or  the  way  of  causality, 
which  consists  in  predicating  of  God  those  attributes  which  are  required  in 
him  to  explain  the  world  of  nature  and  of  mind. 

This  rational  method  explains  God's  nature  from  that  of  his  creation, 
whereas  the  creation  itself  can  be  fully  explained  only  from  the  nature  of 
God.  Though  the  method  is  valuable,  it  has  insuperable  limitations,  and 
its  place  is  a  subordinate  one.  While  we  use  it  continually  to  confirm  and 
supplement  results  otherwise  obtained,  our  chief  means  of  determining  the 
divine  attributes  must  be 

2.  The  Biblical  method.    This  is  simply  the  inductive  method,  applied 
to  the  facts  with  regard  to  God  revealed  in  the  Scriptures.     Now  that  we 
have  proved  the  Scriptures  to  be  a  revelation  from  God,  inspired  in  every 
part,  we  may  properly  look  to  them  as  decisive  authority  with  regard  to 
God's  attributes. 

IV.     CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  ATTRIBUTES. 

The  attributes  may  be  divided  into  two  great  classes :  Absolute  or  Imma- 
nent, and  Kelative  or  Transitive. 

By  Absolute  or  Immanent  Attributes,  we  mean  attributes  which  respect 
the  inner  being  of  God,  which  are  involved  in  God's  relations  to  himself, 
and  which  belong  to  his  nature  independently  of  his  connection  with  the 
universe. 

By  Eelative  or  Transitive  Attributes,  we  mean  attributes  w.hich  respect 
the  outward  revelation  of  God's  being,  which  are  involved  in  God's  relations 
to  the  creation,  and  which  are  exercised  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of 
the  universe  and  its  dependence  upon  him. 

Under  the  head  of  Absolute  or  Immanent  Attributes,  we  make  a  three-fold 
division  into  Spirituality,  with  the  attributes  therein,involved,  namely,  Life 
and  Personality ;  Infinity,  with 'the  attributes  therein  involved,  namely, 
Self-existence,  Immutability,  and  Unity ;  and  Perfection,  with  the  attri- 
butes therein  involved,  namely,  Truth,  Love,  aud  Holiness. 

Under  the  head  of  Kelative  or  Transitive  Attributes,  we  make  a  three- 
fold division,  according  to  the  order  of  their  revelation,  into  Attributes 
having  relation  to  Time  and  Space,  as  Eternity  and  Immensity ;  Attributes 
having  relation  to  Creation,  as  Omnipresence,  Omniscience,  and  Omnipo- 
tence ;  and  Attributes  having  relation  to  Moral  Beings,  as  Veracity  and 
Faithfulness,  or  Transitive  Truth ;  Mercy  and  Goodness,  or  Transitive 
Love  and  Justice  and  Righteousness,  or  Transitive  Holiness. 


70          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

This  classification  may  be  better  understood  from  the  following  schedule  : 

1.  Absolute  or  Immanent  Attributes  : 

A.  Spiritualty,  involving  j [«> 

S(a)  Self -existence, 
(6)  Immutability, 
(c)  Unity. 

r  (a)  Truth, 
C.  Perfection,  involving  <  ( 6 )  Love, 

((c)  Holiness. 

2.  Kelative  or  Transitive  Attributes : 

A.  Belated  to  Time  and  Space-  { <  ?>  Eternity 

f  ( b  )  Immensity. 


r  (  a )  Omnipresence, 

B.  Belated  to  Creation —  <  ( b  )  Omniscience, 

u.c)  Omnipotence. 


( a )  Veracity  and  Faithfulness,  >>    & 
or  Transitive  Truth. 

(  6  )  Mercy  and  Goodness, 
0.  Belated  to  Moral  Beings-    ^       Qr  J^j  ^  | 

(c)  Justice  and  Bighteousness,  | 
or  Transitive  Holiness.       J  ? 

V.    ABSOLUTE  OB  IMMANENT  ATTRIBUTES. 

First  division. — /Spirituality,  and  attributes  therein  involved. 

In  calling  spirituality  an  attribute  of  God,  we  mean,  not  that  we  are  jus- 
tified in  applying  to  the  divine  nature  the  adjective  "spiritual,"  but  that 
the  substantive  "  Spirit "  describes  that  nature  (  John  4  : 24,  marg. — "God 
is  spirit";  Bom.  1 : 20  — "the  invisible  things  of  him";  1  Tim.  1  :17  — 
"incorruptible,  invisible";  Col.  1:15— "the  invisible  God").  This 
implies,  negatively,  that  (  a )  God  is  not  matter.  Spirit  is  not  a  refined 
form  of  matter  but  an  immaterial  substance,  invisible,  uncompounded, 
indestructible.  (6)  God  is  not  dependent  upon  matter.  It  cannot  be 
shown  that  the  human  mind,  in  any  other  state  than  the  present,  is  depen- 
dent for  consciousness  upon  its  connection  with  a  physical  organism 
Much  less  is  it  true  that  God  is  dependent  upon  the  material  universe  as 
his  sensorium.  God  is  not  only  spirit,  but  he  is  pure  spirit.  He  is  not 
only  not  matter,  but  he  has  no  necessary  connection  with  matter  ( Luke 
24  : 39  —  "A  spirit  hath  not  flesh  and  bones,  as  ye  behold  me  having  "  ). 

Those  passages  of  Scripture  which  seem  to  ascribe  to  God  the  posses- 
sion of  bodily  parts  and  organs,  as  eyes  and  hands,  are  to  be  regarded  as 


ABSOLUTE  OR   IMMANENT   ATTRIBUTES.  71 

anthropomorphic  and  symbolic.  When  God  is  spoken  of  as  appearing  to 
the  patriarchs  and  walking  with  them,  the  passages  are  to  be  explained  as 
referring  to  God's  temporary  manifestations  of  himself  in  human  form  — 
manifestations  which  prefigured  the  final  tabernacling  of  the  Son  of  God 
in  human  flesh.  Side  by  side  with  these  anthropomorphic  expressions 
and  manifestations,  moreover,  are  specific  declarations  which  repress  any 
materializing  conceptions  of  God ;  as,  for  example,  that  heaven  is  his  throne 
and  the  earth  his  footstool  (Is.  66  : 1 ),  and  that  the  heaven  of  heavens  can- 
not contain  him  (1  K.  8  :27). 

We  come  now  to  consider  the  positive  import  of  the  term  Spirit.  The 
spirituality  of  God  involves  the  two  attributes  of  Life  and  Personality. 

1.  Life. 

The  Scriptures  represent  God  as  the  living  God. 

Life  is  a  simple  idea,  and  is  incapable  of  real  definition.  We  know  it, 
however,  in  ourselves,  and  we  can  perceive  the  insufficiency  or  inconsist- 
ency of  certain  current  definitions  of  it.  We  cannot  regard  life  in  God  as 

(a)  Mere  process,  without  a  subject;  for  we  cannot  conceive  of  a 
divine  life  without  a  God  to  live  it. 

Nor  can  we  regard  life  as 

( b  )  Mere  correspondence  with  outward  condition  and  environment ; 
for  this  would  render  impossibly  a  life  of  God  before  the  existence  of  the 
universe. 

( c )  Life  is  rather  mental  energy,  or  energy  of  intellect,  affection,  and 
will.  God  is  the  living  God,  as  having  in  his  own  being  a  source  of  being 
and  activity,  both  for  himself  aud  others. 

2.  Personality. 

The  Scriptures  represent  God  as  a  personal  being.  By  personality  we 
mean  the  power  of  self -consciousness  and  of  self-determination.  By  way 
of  further  explanation  we  remark  : 

(  a }  Self-consciousness  is  more  than  consciousness.  This  last  the  brute 
may  be  supposed  to  possess,  since  the  brute  is  not  an  automaton.  Man  is 
distinguished  from  the  brute  by  his  power  to  objectify  self.  Man  is  not 
only  conscious  of  his  own  acts  and  states,  but  by  abstraction  and  reflection 
he  recognizes  the  self  which  is  the  subject  of  these  acts  and  states.  ( b ) 
Self-determination  is  more  than  determination.  The  brute  shows  determi- 
nation, but  his  determination  is  the  result  of  influences  from  without;  there 
is  no  inner  spontaneity.  Man,  by  virtue  of  his  free-will,  determines  his 
action  from  within.  He  determines  self  in  view  of  motives,  but  his  deter- 
mination is  not  caused  by  motives ;  he  himself  is  the  cause. 

God,  as  personal,  is  in  the  highest  degree  self-conscious  and  self-deter- 
mining. The  rise  in  our  own  minds  of  the  idea  of  God,  as  personal, 
depends  largely  upon  our  recognition  of  personality  in  ourselves.  Those 
who  deny  spirit  in  man  place  a  bar  in  the  way  of  the  recognition  of  this 
attribute  of  God. 


72          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

Second  Division. — Infinity,  and  attributes  therein  involved. 

By  infinity  we  mean,  not  that  the  divine  nature  has  no  known  limits 
or  bounds,  but  that  it  has  no  limits  or  bounds.  That  which  has  simply  no 
known  limits  is  the  indefinite.  The  infinity  of  God  implies  that  he  is  in 
no  way  limited  by  the  universe  or  confined  to  the  universe  ;  he  is  tran- 
scendent as  well  as  immanent.  Transcendence,  however,  must  not  be  con- 
ceived as  freedom  from  merely  spatial  restrictions,  but  rather  as  unlimited 
resource,  of  which  God's  glory  is  the  expression. 

In  explanation  of  the  term  infinity,  we  may  notice  : 

( a  )  That  infinity  can  belong  to  but  one  Being,  and  therefore  cannot  be 
shared  with  the  universe.  Infinity  is  not  a  negative  but  a  positive  idea. 
It  does  not  take  its  rise  from  an  impotence  of  thought,  but  is  an  intuitive 
conviction  which  constitutes  the  basis  of  all  other  knowledge. 

(6)  That  the  infinity  of  God  does  not  involve  his  identity  with  'the  all, 
or  the  sum  of  existence,  nor  prevent  the  coexistence  of  derived  and  finite 
beings  to  which  he  bears  relation.  Infinity  implies  simply  that  God  exists 
in  no  necessary  relation  to  finite  things  or  beings,  and  that  whatever  limita- 
tion of  the  divine  nature  results  from  their  existence  is,  on  the  part  of  God, 
a  self-limitation. 

( c )  That  the  infinity  of  God  is  to  be  conceived  of  as  intensive,  rather 
than  as  extensive.  We  do  not  attribute  to  God  infinite  extension,  bui 
rather  infinite  energy  of  spiritual  life.  That  which  acts  up  to  the  measure 
of  its  power  is  simply  natural  and  physical  force.  Man  rises  above  nature 
by  virtue  of  his  reserves  of  power.  But  in  God  the  reserve  is  infinite. 
There  is  a  transcendent  element  in  him,  which  no  self-revelation  exhausts, 
whether  creation  or  redemption,  whether  law  or  promise. 

Of  the  attributes  involved  in  Infinity,  we  mention  : 

1.  Self-existence. 

By  self-existence  we  mean 

( a )  That  God  is  ' '  causa  sui, "  having  the  ground  of  his  existence  in  him- 
self. Every  being  must  have  the  ground  of  its  existence  either  in  or  out 
of  itself.  We  have  the  ground  of  our  existence  outside  of  us.  God  is  not 
thus  dependent.  He  is  a  se  ;  hence  we  speak  of  the  aseity  of  God. 

But  lest  this  should  be  be  misconstrued,  we  add 

(  b )  That  God  exists  by  the  necessity  of  his  own  being.  It  is  his  nature 
to  be.  Hence  the  existence  of  God  is  not  a  contingent  but  a  necessary 
existence.  It  is  grounded,  not  in  his  volitions,  but  in  his  nature. 

2.  Immutability. 

By  this  we  mean  that  the  nature,  attributes,  and  will  of  God  are  exempt 
from  all  change.  Reason  teaches  us  that  no  change  is  possible  in  God, 
whether  of  increase  or  decrease,  progress  or  deterioration,  contraction  or 
development.  All  change  must  be  to  better*  or  to  worse.  But  God  is 
absolute  perfection,  and  no  change  to  better  is  possible.  Change  to  worse 
would  be  equally  inconsistent  with  perfection.  No'cause  for  such  change 
exists,  either  outside  of  God  or  in  God  himself. 


ABSOLUTE   OB   IMMANENT  ATTRIBUTES.  73 

The  passages  of  Scripture  which  seem  at  first  sight  to  ascribe  change  to 
God  are  to  be  explained  in  one  of  three  ways  : 

(  a )  As  illustrations  of  the  varied  methods  in  which  God  manifests  his 
immutable  truth  and  wisdom  in  creation. 

(  6 )  As  anthropomorphic  representations  of  the  revelation  of  God's 
unchanging  attributes  in  the  changing  circumstances  and  varying  moral 
conditions  of  creatures. 

( c )  As  describing  executions,  in  time,  of  purposes  eternally  existing  in 
the  mind  of  God.  Immutability  must  not  be  confounded  with  immobility. 
This  would  deny  all  those  imperative  volitions  of  God  by  which  he  enters 
into  history,  The  Scriptures  assure  us  that  creation,  miracles,  incarnation, 
regeneration,  are  immediate  aCts  of  God.  Immutability  is  consistent  with 
constant  activity  and  perfect  freedom. 

3.     Unity. 

By  this  we  mean  (a)  that  the  divine  nature  is  undivided  and  indivisible 
(  unus  )  ;  and  (  6  )  that  there  is  but  one  infinite  and  perfect  Spirit  (unicus ). 

Against  polytheism,  tritheism,  or  dualism,  we  may  urge  that  the  notion 
of  two  or  more  Gods  is  self-contradictory  ;  since  each  limits  the  other  and 
destroys  his  godhood.  In  the  nature  of  things,  infinity  and  absolute  per- 
fection are  possible  only  to  one.  It  is  unphilosophical,  moreover,  to 
assume  the  existence  of  two  or  more  Gods,  when  one  will  explain  all  the 
facts.  The  unity  of  God  is,  however,  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Trinity ;  for,  while  this  doctrine  holds  to  the  existence  of 
hypostatical,  or  personal,  distinctions  in  the  divine  nature,  it  also  holds 
that  this  divine  nature  is  numerically  and  eternally  one. 

Third  Division. — Perfection,  and  attributes  therein  involved. 

By  perfection  we  mean,  not  mere  quantitative  completeness,  but  qualita- 
tive excellence.  The  attributes  involved  in  perfection  are  moral  attributes. 
Bight  action  among  men  presupposes  a  perfect  moral  organization,  a  nor- 
mal state  of  intellect,  affection  and  will.  So  God's  activity  presupposes  a 
principle  of  intelligence,  of  affection,  of  volition,  in  his  inmost  being,  and 
the  existence  of  a  worthy  object  for  each  of  these  powers  of  his  nature. 
But  in  eternity  past  there  is  nothing  existing  outside  or  apart  from  God. 
He  must  find,  and  he  does  find,  the  sufficient  object  of  intellect,  affection, 
and  will,  in  himself.  There  is  a  self-knowing,  a  self -loving,  a  self -willing, 
which  constitute  his  absolute  perfection.  The  consideration  of  the  imma- 
nent attributes  is,  therefore,  properly  concluded  with  an  account  of  that 
truth,  love,  and  holiness,  which  render  God  entirely  sufficient  to  himself. 

1.     Truth. 

By  truth  we  mean  that  attribute  of  the  divine  nature  in  virtue  of  which 
God's  being  and  God's  knowledge  eternally  conform  to  each  other. 

In  further  explanation  we  remark  : 
A.     Negatively  : 

(a)  The  immanent  truth  of  God  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  that 
veracity  and  faithfulness  which  partially  manifest  it  to  creatures.  These 


74          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

are  transitive  truth,   and  they  presuppose  the  absolute  and  immanent 
attribute. 

( 6 )  Truth  in  God  is  not  a  merely  active  attribute  of  the  divine  nature. 
God  is  truth,  not  only  in  the  sense  that  he  is  the  being  who  truly  knows, 
but  also  in  the  sense  that  he  is  the  truth  that  is  known.  The  passive  pre- 
cedes the  active  ;  truth  of  being  precedes  truth  of  knowing. 

B.     Positively : 

(a)  All  truth  among  men,  whether  mathematical,  logical,  moral,  or 
religious,  is  to  be  regarded  as  having  its  foundation  in  this  immanent  truth 
of  the  divine  nature  and  as  disclosing  facts  in  the  being  of  God. 

( 6 )  This  attribute  therefore  constitutes  the  principle  and  guarantee  of 
all  revelation,  while  it  shows  the  possibility  of  an  eternal  divine  self- 
contemplation  apart  from  and  before  all  creation.  It  is  to  be  understood 
only  in  the  light  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 

2.     Love. 

By  love  we  mean  that  attribute  of  the  divine  nature  in  virtue  of  which 
God  is  eternally  moved  to  self-communication. 

In  further  explanation  we  remark  : 

A.  Negatively : 

( a )  The  immanent  love  of  God  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  mercy  and 
goodness  toward  creatures.  These  are  its  manifestations,  and  are  to  be 
denominated  transitive  love. 

(  6 )  Love  is  not  the  all-inclusive  ethical  attribute  of  God.  It  does  not 
include  truth,  nor  does  it  include  holiness. 

(  c }  Nor  is  God's  love  a  mere  regard  for  being  in  general,  irrespective 
of  its  moral  quality. 

(d)  God's  love  is  not  a  merely  emotional  affection,  proceeding  from 
sense  or  impulse,  nor  is  it  prompted  by  utilitarian  considerations. 

B.  Positively : 

( a )  The  immanent  love  of  God  is  a  rational  and  voluntary  affection, 
grounded  in  perfect  reason  and  deliberate  choice. 

( b )  Since  God's  love  is  rational,  it  involves  a  subordination  of  the 
emotional  element  to  a  higher  law  than  itself,  namely,  that  of  truth  and 
holiness. 

( c )  The  immanent  love  of  God  therefore  requires  and  finds  a  perfect 
standard  in  his  own  holiness,  and  a  personal  object  in  the  image  of  his  own 
infinite  perfections.     It  is  to  be  understood  only  in  the  light  of  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Trinity. 

( d }  The  immanent  love  of  God  constitutes  a  ground  of  the  divine  bless- 
edness. Since  there  is  an  infinite  and  perfect  object  of  love,  as  well  as  of 
knowledge  and  will,  in  God's  own  nature,  the  existence  of  the  universe  is 
not  necessary  to  his  serenity  and  joy. 


ABSOLUTE   OE   IMMANENT   ATTKIBUTES.  75 

(  e )  The  love  of  God  involves  also  the  possibility  of  divine  suffering, 
and  the  suffering  on  account  of  sin  which  holiness  necessitates  on  the  part 
of  God  is  itself  the  atonement. 

3.     Holiness. 

Holiness  is  self -affirming  purity.  In  virtue  of  this  attribute  of  his  nature, 
God  eternally  wills  and  maintains  his  own  moral  excellence.  In  this  defi- 
nition are  contained  three  elements  :  first,  purity  ;  secondly,  purity  will- 
ing ;  thirdly,  purity  willing  itself. 

In  further  explanation  we  remark  : 

A.  Negatively,  that  holiness  is  not 

(  a )  Justice,  or  purity  demanding  purity  from  creatures.  Justice,  the 
relative  or  transitive  attribute,  is  indeed  the  manifestation  and  expression 
of  the  immanent  attribute  of  holiness,  but  it  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  it. 

(6)  Holiness  is  not  a  complex  term  designating  the  aggregate  of  the 
divine  perfections.  On  the  other  hand,  the  notion  of  holiness  is,  both  in 
Scripture  and  in  Christian  experience,  perfectly  simple,  and  perfectly  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  other  attributes. 

(  c )  Holiness  is  not  God's  self-love,  in  the  sense  of  supreme  regard  for 
his  own  interest  and  happiness.  There  is  no  utilitarian  element  in  holiness. 

( d )  Holiness  is  not  identical  with,  or  a  manifestation  of,  love.  Since 
self-maintenance  must  precede  self-impartation,  and  since  benevolence  has 
its  object,  motive,  standard  and  limit  in  righteousness,  holiness  the  self- 
amrming  attribute  can  in  no  way  be  resolved  into  love  the  self -communi- 
cating. 

B.  Positively,  that  holiness  is 

(a)  Purity  of  substance. — In  God's  moral  nature,  as  necessarily  acting, 
there  are  indeed  the  two  elements  of  willing  and  being.  But  the  passive 
logically  precedes  the  active ;  being  comes  before  willing  ;  God  is  pure 
before  he  wills  purity.  Since  purity,  however,  in  ordinary  usage  is  a 
negative  term  and  means  only  freedom  from  stain  or  wrong,  we  must 
include  in  it  also  the  positive  idea  of  moral  rightness.  God  is  holy  in  that 
he  is  the  source  and  standard  of  the  right. 

(6)  Energy  of  will. — This  purity  is  not  simply  a  passive  and  dead  qual- 
ity ;  it  is  the  attribute  of  a  personal  being ;  it  is  penetrated  and  pervaded 
by  will.  Holiness  is  the  free  moral  movement  of  the  Godhead. 

( c)  Self-affirmation. — Holiness  is  God's  self -willing.  His  own  purity  is 
the  supreme  object  of  his  regard  and  maintenance.  God  is  holy,  in  that 
his  infinite  moral  excellence  affirms  and  asserts  itself  as  the  highest  possi- 
ble motive  and  end.  Like  truth  and  love,  this  attribute  can  be  under- 
stood only  in  the  light  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 


76  NATURE,    DECREES,    AND   WORKS   OF   GOD. 

VI.    BELATIVE  OR  TRANSITIVE  ATTRIBUTES. 

First  Division. — Attributes  having  relation  to  Time  and  Space. 

1.  Eternity. 

By  this  we  mean  that  God's  nature  (  a )  is  without  beginning  or  end  ;  (  b  ) 
is  free  from  all  succession  of  time ;  and  (  c )  contains  in  itself  the  cause  of 
time. 

Eternity  is  infinity  in  its  relation  to  time.  It  implies  that  God's  nature 
is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  time.  God  is  not  in  time.  It  is  more  correct 
to  say  that  time  is  in  God.  Although  there  is  logical  succession  in  God's 
thoughts,  there  is  no  chronological  succession. 

Yet  we  are  far  from  saying  that  time,  now  that  it  exists,  has  no  objective 
reality  to  God.  To  him,  past,  present,  and  future  are  "one  eternal  now," 
not  in  the  sense  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  them,  but  only  in  the 
sense  that  he  sees  past  and  future  as  vividly  as  he  sees  the  present.  With 
creation  time  began,  and  since  the  successions  of  history  are  veritable  suc- 
cessions, he  who  sees  according  to  truth  must  recognize  them. 

2.  Immensity. 

By  this  we  mean  that  God's  nature  ( a )  is  without  extension  ;  (  6  )  is  sub- 
ject to  no  limitations  of  space  ;  and  ( c)  contains  in  itself  the  cause  of  space. 

Immensity  is  infinity  in  its  relation  to  space.  God's  nature  is  not  subject 
to  the  law  of  space.  God  is  not  in  space.  It  is  more  correct  to  say  that 
space  is  in  God.  Yet  space  has  an  objective  reality  to  God.  With  creation 
space  began  to  be,  and  since  God  sees  according  to  truth,  he  recognizes 
relations  of  space  in  his  creation. 

Second  Division. — Attributes  having  relation  to  Creation. 

1.     Omnipresence. 

By  this  we  mean  that  God,  in  the  totality  of  his  essence,  without  diffu- 
sion or  expansion,  multiplication  or  division,  penetrates  and  fills  the 
universe  in  all  its  parts. 

In  explanation  of  this  attribute  we  may  say  : 

(a)  God's  omnipresence  is  not  potential  but  essential. — We  reject  the 
Socinian  representation  that  God's  essence  is  in  heaven,  only  his  power  on 
earth.  When  God  is  said  to  "  dwell  in  the  heavens,"  we  are  to  understand 
the  language  either  as  a  symbolic  expression  of  exaltation  above  earthly 
things,  or  as  a  declaration  that  his  most  special  and  glorious  self-manifesta- 
tions are  to  the  spirits  of  heaven. 

(  6 )  God's  omnipresence  is  not  the  presence  of  a  part  but  of  the  whole  of 
God  in  every  place. — This  follows  from  the  conception  of  God  as  incor- 
poreal. We  reject  the  materialistic  representation  that  God  is  composed  of 
material  elements  which  can  be  divided  or  sundered.  There  is  no  multi- 
plication or  diffusion  of  his  substance  to  correspond  with  the  parts  of  his 
dominions.  The  one  essence  of  God  is  present  at  the  same  moment  in  all. 

(c  )  God's  omnipresence  is  not  necessary  but  free. — We  reject  the  pan- 
theistic notion  that  God  is  bound  to  the  universe  as  the  universe  is  bound 


RELATIVE   OR  TRANSITIVE  ATTRIBUTES.  77 

to  God.  God  is  immanent  in  the  universe,  not  by  compulsion,  but  by 
the  free  act  of  his  own  will,  and  this  immanence  is  qualified  by  his  tran- 
scendence. 

2.  Omniscience. 

By  this  we  mean  God's  perfect  and  eternal  knowledge  of  all  things  which 
are  objects  of  knowledge,  whether  they  be  actual  or  possible,  past,  present, 
or  future. 

(  a  )  The  omniscience  of  God  may  be  argued  from  his  omnipresence,  as 
well  as  from  his  truth  or  self-knowledge,  in  which  the  plan  of  creation  has 
its  eternal  ground,  and  from  prophecy,  which  expresses  God's  omniscience. 

(  6 )  Since  it  is  free  from  all  imperfection,  God's  knowledge  is  immediate, 
as  distinguished  from  the  knowledge  that  comes  through  sense  or  imagina- 
tion ;  simultaneous,  as  not  acquired  by  successive  observations,  or  built 
up  by  processes  of  reasoning  ;  distinct,  as  free  from  all  vagueness  or  con- 
fusion ;  true,  as  perfectly  corresponding  to  the  reality  of  things ;  eternal, 
as  comprehended  in  one  timeless  act  of  the  divine  mind. 

( c )  Since  God  knows  things   as  they   are,  he  knows  the  necessary 
sequences  of  his  creation  as  necessary,  the  free  acts  of  his  creatures  as  free, 
the  ideally  possible  as  ideally  possible. 

(d)  The  fact  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  present  condition  of  things 
from  which  the  future  actions  of  free  creatures  necessarily  follow  by  nat- 
ural law  does  not  prevent  God  from  foreseeing  such  actions,  since  his 
knowledge  is  not  mediate,  but  immediate.     He  not  only  foreknows  the 
motives  which  will  occasion  men's  acts,  but  he  directly  foreknows  the  acts 
themselves.     The  possibility  of  such  direct  knowledge  without  assignable 
grounds  of  knowledge  is  apparent  if  we  admit  that  time  is  a  form  of  finite 
thought  to  which  the  divine  mind  is  not  subject. 

(  e )  Prescience  is  not  itself  causative.  It  is  not  to  be  confounded  with 
the  predetermining  will  of  God.  Free  actions  do  not  take  place  because 
they  are  foreseen,  but  they  are  foreseen  because  they  are  to  take  place. 

(/ )  Omniscience  embraces  the  actual  and  the  possible,  but  it  does  not 
embrace  the  self-contradictory  and  the  impossible,  because  these  are  not 
objects  of  knowledge. 

( g )  Omniscience,  as  qualified  by  holy  will,  is  in  Scripture  denominated 
"wisdom."  In  virtue  of  his  wisdom  God  chooses  the  highest  ends  and 
uses  the  fittest  means  to  accomplish  them. 

3.  Omnipotence. 

By  this  we  mean  the  power  of  God  to  do  all  things  which  are  objects  of 
power,  whether  with  or  without  the  use  of  means. 

( a  )  Omnipotence  does  not  imply  power  to  do  that  which  is  not  an  object 
of  power ;  as,  for  example,  that  which  is  self -contradictory  or  contradictory 
to  the  nature  of  God. 

(  6  )  Omnipotence  does  not  imply  the  exercise  of  all  his  power  on  the 
part  of  God.  He  has  power  over  his  power ;  in  other  words,  his  power  is 


78         NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

under  the  control  of  wise  and  holy  will.  God  cau  do  all  he  will,  but  he 
will  not  do  all  he  can.  Else  his  power  is  mere  force  acting  necessarily, 
and  God  is  the  slave  of  his  own  omnipotence. 

( c)  Omnipotence  in  God  does  not  exclude,  but  implies,  the  power  of  self 
limitation.  Since  all  such  self -limitation  is  free,  proceeding  from  neither 
external  nor  internal  compulsion,  it  is  the  act  and  manifestation  of  God's 
power.  Human  freedom  is  not  rendered  impossible  by  the  divine  omnipo- 
tence, but  exists  by  virtue  of  it.  It  is  an  act  of  omnipotence  when  God 
humbles  himself  to  the  taking  of  human  flesh  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ. 

Third  Division. — Attributes  having  relation  to  Moral  Beings. 

1.  Veracity  and  Faithfulness,  or  Transitive  Truth. 

By  veracity  and  faithfulness  we  mean  the  transitive  truth  of  God,  in  its 
twofold  relation  to  his  creatures  in  general  and  to  his  redeemed  people  in 
particular. 

(  a )  In  virtue  of  his  veracity,  all  his  revelations  to  creatures  consist  with 
his  essential  being  and  with  each  other. 

(6)  In  virtue  of  his  faithfulness,  he  fulfills  all  his  promises  to  his  people, 
whether  expressed  in  words  or  implied  in  the  constitution  he  has  given 
them. 

2.  Mercy  and  Goodness,  or  Transitive  Love. 

By  mercy  and  goodness  we  mean  the  transitive  love  of  God  in  its  two- 
fold relation  to  the  disobedient  and  to  the  obedient  portions  of  his 
creatures. 

(  a  )  Mercy  is  that  eternal  principle  of  God's  nature  which  leads  him  to 
seek  the  temporal  good  and  eternal  salvation  of  those  who  have  opposed 
themselves  to  his  will,  even  at  the  cost  of  infinite  self-sacrifice. 

( b )  Goodness  is  the  eternal  principle  of  God's  nature  which  leads  him  to 
communicate  of  his  own  life  and  blessedness  to  those  who  are  like  him  in 
moral  character.  Goodness,  therefore,  is  nearly  identical  with  the  love  of 
complacency  ;  mercy,  with  the  love  of  benevolence. 

3.  Justice  and  Righteousness,  or  Transitive  Holiness. 

By  justice  and  righteousness  we  mean  the  transitive  holiness  of  God,  in 
virtue  of  which  his  treatment  of  his  creatures  conforms  to  the  purity  of  his 
nature, —  righteousness  demanding  from  all  moral  beings  conformity  to  the 
moral  perfection  of  God,  and  justice  visiting  non-conformity  to  that  perfec- 
tion with  penal  loss  or  suffering. 

(a]  Since  justice   and  righteousness  are  simply  transitive  holiness — 
righteousness  designating  this  holiness  chiefly  in  its  mandatory,  justice 
chiefly  in  its  punitive,  aspect, — they  are  not  mere  manifestations  of  benev- 
olence, or  of  God's  disposition  to  secure  the  highest  happiness  of  his 
creatures,  nor  are  they  grounded  in  the  nature  of  things  as  something 
apart  from  or  above  God. 

( b )  Transitive  holiness,  as  righteousness,  imposes  law  in  conscience  and 
Scripture,  and  may  be  called  legislative  holiness.     As  justice,  it  executes 


RANK   AND   RELATIONS   OF  THE   ATTRIBUTES.  79 

the  penalties  of  law,  and  may  be  called  distributive  or  judicial  holiness. 
In  righteousness  God  reveals  chiefly  his  love  of  holiness ;  in  justice,  chiefly 
his  hatred  of  sin. 

(  c)  Neither  justice  nor  righteousness,  therefore,  is  a  matter  of  arbitrary 
wilL  They  are  revelations  of  the  inmost  nature  of  God,  the  one  in  the 
form  of  moral  requirement,  the  other  in  the  form  of  judicial  sanction.  As 
God  cannot  but  demand  of  his  creatures  that  they  be  like  him  in  moral 
character,  so  he  cannot  but  enforce  the  law  which  he  imposes  upon  them. 
Justice  just  as  much  binds  God  to  punish  as  it  binds  the  sinner  to  be 
punished. 

(  d )  Neither  justice  nor  righteousness  bestows  rewards.  This  follows 
from  the  fact  that  obedience  is  due  to  God,  instead  of  being  optional  or  a 
gratuity.  No  creature  can  claim  anything  for  his  obedience.  If  God 
rewards,  he  rewards  in  virtue  of  his  goodness  and  faithfulness,  not  in  virtue 
of  his  justice  or  his  righteousness.  What  the  creature  cannot  claim,  how- 
ever, Christ  can  claim,  and  the  rewards  which  are  goodness  to  the  creature 
are  righteousness  to  Christ.  God  rewards  Christ's  work  for  us  and  in  us. 

( e )  Justice  in  God,  as  the  revelation  of  his  holiness,  is  devoid  of  all  pas- 
sion or  caprice.  There  is  in  God  no  selfish  anger.  The  penalties  he 
inflicts  upon  transgression  are  not  vindictive  but  vindicative.  They  express 
the  revulsion  of  God's  nature  from  moral  evil,  the  judicial  indignation  of 
purity  against  impurity,  the  self-assertion  of  infinite  holiness  against  its 
antagonist  and  would-be  destroyer.  But  because  its  decisions  are  calm, 
they  are  irreversible. 

VII.    BANK  AND  EELATIONS  OF  THE  SEVERAL  ATTRIBUTES. 

The  attributes  have  relations  to  each  other.  Like  intellect,  affection  and 
will  in  man,  no  one  of  them  is  to  be  conceived  of  as  exercised  separately 
from  the  rest.  Each  of  the  attributes  is  qualified  by  all  the  others.  God's 
love  is  immutable,  wise,  holy.  Infinity  belongs  to  God's  knowledge,  power, 
justice.  Yet  this  is  not  to  say  that  one  attribute  is  of  as  high  rank  as 
another.  The  moral  attributes  of  truth,  love,  holiness,  are  worthy  of 
higher  reverence  from  men,  and  they  are  more  jealously  guarded  by  God, 
than  the  natural  attributes  of  omnipresence,  omniscience,  and  omnipo- 
tence. And  yet  even  among  the  moral  attributes  one  stands  as  supreme. 
Of  this  and  of  its  supremacy  we  now  proceed  to  speak. 

1.     Holiness  the  fundamental  attribute  in  God. 

That  holiness  is  the  fundamental  attribute  in  God,  is  evident: 

( a )  From  Scripture, —  in  which  God's  holiness  is  not  only  most  con- 
stantly and  powerfully  impressed  upon  the  attention  of  man,  but  is  declared 
to  be  the  chief  subject  of  rejoicing  and  adoration  in  heaven. 

(  6  )  From  our  own  moral  constitution, — in  which  conscience  asserts  its 
supremacy  over  every  other  impulse  and  affection  of  our  nature.  As  we 
may  be  kind,  but  must  be  righteous,  so  God,  in  whose  image  we  are  made, 
may  be  merciful,  but  must  be  holy. 


80  NATURE,    DECREES,    AND   WORKS  OF   GOD. 

(c)  From  the  actual  dealings  of  God,  —  in  which  holiness  conditions 
and  limits  the  exercise  of  other  attributes.  Thus,  for  example,  in  Christ's 
redeeming  work,  though  love  makes  the  atonement,  it  is  violated  holiness 
that  requires  it  ;  and  in  the  eternal  punishment  of  the  wicked,  the  demand 
of  holiness  for  self  -vindication  overbears  the  pleading  of  love  for  the  suf- 
ferers. 


From  God's  eternal  purpose  of  salvation,  —  in  which  justice  and 
mercy  are  reconciled  only  through  the  foreseen  and  predetermined  sacri- 
fice of  Christ.  The  declaration  that  Christ  is  '  '  the  Lamb  .  .  .  slain  from 
the  foundation  of  the  world  "  implies  the  existence  of  a  principle  in  the 
divine  nature  which  requires  satisfaction,  before  God  can  enter  upon  the 
work  of  redemption.  That  principle  can  be  none  other  than  holiness. 

2.     The  holiness  of  God  the  ground  of  moral  obligation. 

A.  Erroneous  Views.     The  ground  of  moral  obligation  is  not 

(  a  )  In  power,  —  whether  of  civil  law  (  Hobbes,  Gassendi  ),  or  of  divine 
will  (Occam,  Descartes).  We  are  not  bound  to  obey  either  of  these, 
except  upon  the  ground  that  they  are  right.  This  theory  assumes  that 
nothing  is  good  or  right  in  itself,  and  that  morality  is  mere  prudence. 

(  6  )  Nor  in  utility,  —  whether  our  own  happiness  or  advantage  present 
or  eternal  (Paley),  for  supreme  regard  for  our  own  interest  is  not  virtu- 
ous ;  or  the  greatest  happiness  or  advantage  to  being  in  general  (  Edwards  ), 
for  we  judge  conduct  to  be  useful  because  it  is  right,  not  right  because  it  is 
useful.  This  theory  would  compel  us  to  believe  that  in  eternity  past  God 
was  holy  only  because  of  the  good  he  got  from  it,  —  that  is,  there  was  no 
such  thing  as  holiness  in  itself,  and  no  such  thing  as  moral  character  in  God. 

(c)  Nor  in  the  nature  of  things  (Price),  —  whether  by  this  we  mean  their 
fitness  (Clarke),  truth  (  Wollaston),  order  (  Jouffroy),  relations  (  Wayland), 
worthiness  (Hickok),  sympathy  (Adam  Smith),  or  abstract  right  (Haven 
and  Alexander);  for  this  nature  of  things  is  not  ultimate,  but  has  its  ground 
in  the  nature  of  God.  We  are  bound  to  worship  the  highest  ;  if  anything 
exists  beyond  and  above  God,  we  are  bound  to  worship  that,  —that  indeed 
is  God. 

B.  The  Scriptural  View.  —  According  to  the  Scriptures,  the  ground  of 
moral  obligation  is  the  holiness  of  God,  or  the  moral  perfection  of  the 
divine  nature,  conformity  to  which  is  the  law  of  our  moral  being  (Bobin- 
son,  Chalmers,  Calderwood,  Gregory,  Wuttke).     We  show  this  : 

(a)  From  the  commands:  "Ye  shall  be  holy,"  where  the  ground  of 
obligation  assigned  is  simply  and  only  :  "for  I  am  holy"  (1  Pet.  1  :  16)  ; 
and  "Ye  therefore  shall  be  perfect,"  where  the  standard  laid  down  is  :  "as 
your  heavenly  Father  is  perfect"  (Mat.  5  :  48).  Here  we  have  an  ultimate 
reason  and  ground  for  being  and  doing  right,  namely,  that  God  is  right,  or, 
in  other  words,  that  holiness  is  his  nature. 

(  6  )  From  the  nature  of  the  love  in  which  the  whole  law  is  summed  up 
(  Mat.  22  :  37  —"Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  "  ;  Eom.  13  :  10  —  "love 
therefore  is  the  fulfilment  of  the  law").  This  love  is  not  regard  for 


RANK   AND   RELATIONS   OP  THE   ATTRIBUTES.  81 

abstract  right  or  for  the  happiness  of  being,  much  less  for  one's  own 
interest,  but  it  is  regard  for  God  as  the  fountain  and  standard  of  moral 
excellence,  or  in  other  words,  love  for  God  as  holy.  Hence  this  love  is 
the  principle  and  source  of  holiness  in  man. 

( c )  From  the  example  of  Christ,  whose  life  was  essentially  an  exhibi- 
tion of  supreme  regard  for  God,  and  of  supreme  devotion  to  his  holy  will. 
As  Christ  saw  nothing  good  but  what  was  in  God  (Mark  10  :18 — "none 
is  good  save  one,  even  God " ),  and  did  only  what  he  saw  the  Father  do 
( John  5  : 19  ;  see  also  30  — "I  seek  not  mine  own  will,  but  the  will  of  him 
that  sent  me  " ),  so  for  us,  to  be  like  God  is  the  sum  of  all  duty,  and  God's 
infinite  moral  excellence  is  the  supreme  reason  why  we  should  be  like  him. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DOCTRINE  OF  THE  TRINITY. 

In  the  nature  of  the  one  God  there  are  three  eternal  distinctions  which 
are  represented  to  us  under  the  figure  of  persons,  and  these  three  are 
equal.  This  tripersonality  of  the  Godhead  is  exclusively  a  truth  of  revela- 
tion. It  is  clearly,  though  not  formally,  made  known  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, and  intimations  of  it  may  be  found  in  the  Old. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  may  be  expressed  in  the  six  following 
statements  :  1.  In  Scripture  there  are  three  who  are  recognized  as  God. 
2.  These  three  are  so  described  in  Scripture  that  we  are  compelled  to  con- 
ceive of  them  as  distinct  persons.  3.  This  tripersonality  of  the  divine 
nature  is  not  merely  economic  and  temporal,  but  is  immanent  and  eternal. 
4.  This  tripersonality  is  not  tritheism ;  for  while  there  are  three  persons, 
there  is  but  one  essence.  5.  The  three  persons,  Father,  Son  and  Holy 
Spirit,  are  equal.  6.  Inscrutable  yet  not  self-contradictory,  this  doctrine 
furnishes  the  key  to  all  other  doctrines. — These  statements  we  proceed  now 
to  prove  and  to  elucidate. 

I.    IN  SCRIPTURE  THERE  ARE  THREE  WHO  ARE  RECOGNIZED  AS  GOD. 
1.     Proofs  from  the  New  Testament. 

A.  The  Father  is  recognized  as  God, — and  that  in  so  great  a  number  of 
passages  ( such  as  John  6  : 27  —  "  him  the  Father,  even  God,  hath  sealed," 
and  1  Pet.  1:2  —  "  foreknowledge  of  God  the  Father  ")  that  we  need  not 
delay  to  adduce  extended  proof. 

B.  Jesus  Christ  is  recognized  as  God. 
(  a  )    He  is  expressly  called  God. 

In  John  1:1  —  Oeof  %v  6  adyof — the  absence  of  the  article  shows  Qe6f  to  be 
the  predicate  (  cf.  4  :  24  —  Trvevpa  6  Qe6c  ).  This  predicate  precedes  the  verb 
by  way  of  emphasis,  to  indicate  progress  in  the  thought  =  '  the  Logos  was 
not  only  with  God,  but  was  God '  ( see  Meyer  and  Luthardt,  Coinm.  in  loco}. 
"  Only  o^dyof  can  be  the  subject,  for  in  the  whole  Introduction  the  ques- 
tion is,  not  who  God  is,  but  who  the  Logos  is  "  ( Godet ). 

In  John  1  : 18,  fiovoyev^q  Qe6q — 'the  only  begotten  God ' — must  be  regarded 
as  the  correct  reading,  and  as  a  plain  ascription  of  absolute  Deity  to  Christ. 
He  is  not  simply  the  only  revealer  of  God,  but  he  is  himself  God  revealed. 

In  John  20  :  28,  the  address  of  Thomas  '0  Kvptfa  pov  nal  6  6e6g  pov,  —  « My 
Lord  and  my  God ' —  since  it  was  unrebuked  by  Christ,  is  equivalent  to  an 
assertion  on  his  own  part  of  his  claim  to  Deity. 

In  Bom.  9  : 5,  the  clause  o  &v  eni  Trdvruv  9e6f  e^oy^rdf  cannot  be  translated 
*  blessed  be  the  God  over  all, '  for  &v  is  superfluous  if  the  clause  is  a  dox- 
ology  ;  "  ev/(o-yiiT6f  precedes  the  name  of  God  in  a  doxology,  but  follows  it> 


SCRIPTURE   RECOGNIZES  THREE   AS   GOD.  83 

as  here,  in  a  description"  (Hovey).  The  clause  can  therefore  justly  be 
interpreted  only  as  a  description  of  the  higher  nature  of  the  Christ  who 
had  just  been  said,  TO  nara  crap/car,  or  according  to  his  lower  nature,  to  have 
had  his  origin  from  Israel  (see  Tholuck,  Com.  in  loco). 

In  Titus  2  : 13,  kiufyaveiav  r?/f  66%r)s  TOV  [teydhov  Qeov  ml  aurrjpo^  fjn&v  'Irjaov 
Xptorov  we  regard  ( with  Ellicott )  as  "a  direct,  definite,  and  even  studied 
declaration  of  Christ's  divinity  "  =  "  the  .  .  .  appearing  of  the  glory  of 
our  great  God  and  Savior  Jesus  Christ "  ( so  English  Bevised  Version ). 
'Eirupdveia  is  a  term  applied  specially  to  the  Son  and  never  to  the  Father, 
and  fie-yaZov  is  uncalled  for  if  used  of  the  Father,  but  peculiarly  appropriate 
if  used  of  Christ.  Upon  the  same  principles  we  must  interpret  the  similar 
text  2  Pet.  1:1  (see  Huther,  in  Meyer's  Com. :  "The  close  juxtaposition 
indicates  the  author's  certainty  of  the  oneness  of  God  and  Jesus  Christ "). 

In  Heb.  1  :  8,  frpoc  °&  rbv  vl6v  •  &  -&p6vo<;  aov,  6  0eof,  ei£  TOV  aitiva  is  quoted  as 
an  address  to  Christ,  and  verse  10  which  follows — "Thou,  Lord,  in  the 
beginning  hast  laid  the  foundation  of  the  earth" — by  applying  to  Christ 
an  Old  Testament  ascription  to  Jehovah,  shows  that  6  9edf,  in  verse  8,  is 
used  in  the  sense  of  absolute  Godhead. 

In  1  John  5  :  20  —  £G[iEv  ev  ro>  d2.rji9'tv&,  ev  TCJ  vlu  avTov  'I^aoi;  Xp«7r<p.  oi»rdf 
eo-Ttv  6  dXq&ivbs  0edf —  "  it  would  be  a  flat  repetition,  after  the  Father  had 
been  twice  called  6  dty$tv6$,  to  say  now  again  :  'this  is  6  afaf&ivbg  e^df.'  Our 
being  in  God  has  its  basis  in  Christ  his  Son,  and  this  also  makes  it  more 
natural  that  OVTOQ  should  be  referred  to  w£.  But  ought  not  6  dAjj6iv6^  then 
to  be  without  the  article  (  as  in  John  1:1  —  Qe6c  fjv  6  Adyo?  )  ?  No,  for  it  is 
John's  purpose  in  1  John  5  :  20  to  say,  not  what  Christ  is,  but  who  he 
is.  In  declaring  what  one  is,  the  predicate  must  have  no  article ;  in 
declaring  who  one  is,  the  predicate  must  have  the  article.  St.  John  here 
says  that  this  Son,  on  whom  our  being  in  the  true  God  rests,  is  this  true 
God  himself  "  (  see  Ebrard,  Com.  in  loco  ). 

(  b )  Old  Testament  descriptions  of  God  are  applied  to  him. 

This  application  to  Christ  of  titles  and  names  exclusively  appropriated 
to  God  is  inexplicable,  if  Christ  was  not  regarded  as  being  himself  God. 
The  peculiar  awe  with  which  the  term  '  Jehovah '  was  set  apart  by  a  nation 
of  strenuous  monotheists,  as  the  sacred  and  incommunicable  name  of  the 
one  self-existent  and  covenant-keeping  God,  forbids  the  belief  that  the 
Scripture  writers  could  have  used  it  as  the  designation  of  a  subordinate 
and  created  being. 

( c  )   He  possesses  the  attributes  of  God. 

Among  these  are  life,  self-existence,  immutability,  truth,  love,  holiness, 
eternity,  omnipresence,  omniscience,  omnipotence.  All  these  attributes  are 
ascribed  to  Christ  in  connections  which  show  that  the  terms  are  used  in  no 
secondary  sense,  nor  in  any  sense  predicable  of  a  creature. 

(d )   The  works  of  God  are  ascribed  to  him. 

We  do  not  here  speak  of  miracles,  which  may  be  wrought  by  communi- 
cated power,  but  of  such  works  as  the  creation  of  the  world,  the  upholding 
of  all  things,  the  final  raising  of  the  dead,  and  the  judging  of  all  men. 


84          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

Power  to  perform  these  works  cannot  be  delegated,  for  they  are  character- 
istic of  omnipotence. 

(  e  )  He  receives  honor  and  worship  due  only  to  God. 

In  addition  to  the  address  of  Thomas,  in  John  20  : 28,  which  we  have 
already  cited  among  the  proofs  that  Jesus  is  expressly  called  God,  and  in 
which  divine  honor  is  paid  to  him,  we  may  refer  to  the  prayer  and  worship 
offered  by  the  apostolic  and  post-apostolic  church. 

(/)    His  name  is  associated  with  that  of  God  upon  a  footing  of  equality. 

We  do  not  here  allude  to  1  John  5  : 7  ( the  three  heavenly  witnesses ),  for 
the  latter  part  of  this  verse  is  unquestionably  spurious  ;  but  to  the  formula 
of  baptism,  to  the  apostolic  benedictions,  and  to  those  passages  in  which 
eternal  life  is  said  to  be  dependent  equally  upon  Christ  and  upon  God,  or 
in  which  spiritual  gifts  are  attributed  to  Christ  equally  with  the  Father. 

( g )  Equality  with  God  is  expressly  claimed. 

Here  we  may  refer  to  Jesus'  testimony  to  himself,  already  treated  of 
among  the  proofs  of  the  supernatural  character  of  the  Scripture  teaching 
(  see  pages  50,  51 ).  Equality  with  God  is  not  only  claimed  for  himself  by 
Jesus,  but  it  is  claimed  for  him  by  his  apostles. 

(  h )  Further  proof  of  Christ's  deity  may  be  found  in  the  application  to 
him  of  the  phrases :  *  Son  of  God, '  '  Image  of  God ' ;  in  the  declarations 
of  his  oneness  with  God ;  in  the  attribution  to  him  of  the  fulness  of  the 
Godhead. 

(  i )  These  proofs  of  Christ's  deity  from  the  New  Testament  are  corrobo- 
rated by  Christian  experience. 

Christian  experience  recognizes  Christ  as  an  absolutely  perfect  Savior, 
perfectly  revealing  the  Godhead  and  worthy  of  unlimited  worship  and 
adoration  ;  that  is,  it  practically  recognizes  him  as  Deity.  But  Christian 
experience  also  recognizes  that  through  Christ  it  has  introduction  and 
reconciliation  to  God  as  one  distinct  from  Jesus  Christ,  as  one  who  was 
alienated  from  the  soul  by  its  sin,  but  who  is  now  reconciled  through 
Jesus's  death.  In  other  words,  while  recognizing  Jesus  as  God,  we  are 
also  compelled  to  recognize  a  distinction  between  the  Father  and  the  Son 
through  whom  we  come  to  the  Father. 

Although  this  experience  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  independent  witness 
to  Jesus'  claims,  since  it  only  tests  the  truth  already  made  known  in  the 
Bible,  still  the  irresistible  impulse  of  every  person  whom  Christ  has  saved 
to  lift  his  Eedeemer  to  the  highest  place,  and  bow  before  him  in  the  lowliest 
worship,  is  strong  evidence  that  only  that  interpretation  of  Scripture  can 
be  true  which  recognizes  Christ's  absolute  Godhead.  It  is  the  church's 
consciousness  of  her  Lord's  divinity,  indeed,  and  not  mere  speculation 
upon  the  relations  of  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost,  that  has  compelled  the 
formulation  of  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 

In  contemplating  passages  apparently  inconsistent  with  those  now  cited, 
in  that  they  impute  to  Christ  weakness  and  ignorance,  limitation  and  sub- 
jection, we  are  to  remember,  first,  that  our  Lord  was  truly  man,  as  well  as 


SCRIPTURE   RECOGNIZES  THREE  AS  GOD.  85 

truly  God,  and  that  this  ignorance  and  weakness  may  be  predicated  of  him 
as  the  God-man  in  whom  deity  and  humanity  are  united  ;  secondly,  that 
the  divine  nature  itself  was  in  some  way  limited  and  humbled  during  our 
Savior's  earthly  life,  and  that  these  passages  may  describe  him  as  he  was 
in  his  estate  of  humiliation,  rather  than  in  his  original  and  present  glory ; 
and,  thirdly,  that  there  is  an  order  of  office  and  operation  which  is  consist- 
ent with  essential  oneness  and  equality,  but  which  permits  the  Father  to  be 
spoken  of  as  first  and  the  Son  as  second.  These  statements  will  be  further 
elucidated  in  the  treatment  of  the  present  doctrine  and  in  subsequent 
examination  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Person  of  Christ. 

0.    The  Holy  Spirit  is  recognized  as  God. 

( a )  He  is  spoken  of  as  God  ;  ( 6 )  the  attributes  of  God  are  ascribed  to 
him,  such  as  life,  truth,  love,  holiness,  eternity,  omnipresence,  omniscience, 
omnipotence  ;  (  c )  he  does  the  works  of  God,  such  as  creation,  regenera- 
tion, resurrection ;  (  d  )  he  receives  honor  due  only  to  God ;  (  e  )  he  is  asso- 
ciated with  God  on  a  footing  of  equality,  both  in  the  formula  of  baptism 
and  in  the  apostolic  benedictions. 

As  spirit  is  nothing  less  than  the  inmost  principle  of  life,  and  the  spirit 
of  man  is  man  himself,  so  the  spirit  of  God  must  be  God  (see  1  Cor.  2  : 11 
—  Meyer).  Christian  experience,  moreover,  expressed  as  it  is  in  the 
prayers  and  hymns  of  the  church,  furnishes  an  argument  for  the  deity  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  similar  to  that  for  the  deity  of  Jesus  Christ.  When  our 
eyes  are  opened  to  see  Christ  as  a  Savior,  we  are  compelled  to  recognize 
the  work  in  us  of  a  divine  Spirit  who  has  taken  of  the  things  of  Christ  and 
has  shown  them  to  us ;  and  this  divine  Spirit  we  necessarily  distinguish 
both  from  the  Father  and  from  the  Son.  Christian  experience,  however, 
is  not  an  original  and  independent  witness  to  the  deity  of  the  Holy  Spirit : 
it  simply  shows  what  the  church  has  held  to  be  the  natural  and  unforced 
interpretation  of  the  Scriptures,  and  so  confirms  the  Scripture  argument 
already  adduced. 

This  proof  of  the  deity  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  invalidated  by  the  limita- 
tions of  his  work  under  the  Old  Testament  dispensation.  John  7 : 39  — • 
"for  the  Holy  Spirit  was  not  yet"  —  means  simply  that  the  Holy  Spirit 
could  not  fulfill  his  peculiar  office  as  Bevealer  of  Christ  until  the  atoning 
work  of  Christ  should  be  accomplished. 

2.    Intimations  of  the  Old  Testament. 

The  passages  which  seem  to  show  that  even  in  the  Old  Testament  there 
are  three  who  are  implicitly  recognized  as  God  may  be  classed  under  four 
heads : 

A.    Passages  which  seem  to  teach  plurality  of  some  sort  in  the  Godhead. 

(a)  The  plural  noun  D'JlS^  is  employed,  and  that  with  a  plural  verb — a 
use  remarkable,  when  we  consider  that  the  singular  ^N  was  also  in  exist- 
ence ;  ( b )  God  uses  plural  pronouns  in  speaking  of  himself  ;  ( c  )  Jehovah 
distinguishes  himself  from  Jehovah  ;  ( d )  a  Son  is  ascribed  to  Jehovah  ; 
( e  )  the  Spirit  of  God  is  distinguished  from  God ;  (/)  there  are  a  three- 
fold ascription  and  a  threefold  benediction. 


86  NATURE,    DECREES,    AND   WORKS   OF  GOD. 

The  fact  that  D'ifw  is  sometimes  used  in  a  narrower  sense,  as  applicable 
to  the  Son  ( Ps.  45  : 6  ;  cf.  Heb.  1:8),  need  not  prevent  us  from  believing 
that  the  term  was  originally  chosen  as  containing  an  allusion  to  a  certain 
plurality  in  the  divine  nature.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  to  call  this  plural  a 
simple  pluralis  inajestaticus;  since  it  is  easier  to  derive  this  common 
figure  from  divine  usage  than  to  derive  the  divine  usage  from  this  common 
figure  —  especially  when  we  consider  the  constant  tendency  of  Israel  to 
polytheism. 

B.  Passages  relating  to  the  Angel  of  Jehovah. 

(a)  The  angel  of  Jehovah  identifies  himself  with  Jehovah ;  (b)  he  is 
identified  with  Jehovah  by  others ;  ( c  )  he  accepts  worship  due  only  to 
God.  Though  the  phrase  *  angel  of  Jehovah '  is  sometimes  used  in  the 
later  Scriptures  to  denote  a  merely  human  messenger  or  created  angel,  it 
seems  in  the  Old  Testament,  with  hardly  more  than  a  single  exception,  to 
designate  the  pre-incarnate  Logos,  whose  manifestations  in  angelic  or 
human  form  foreshadowed  his  final  coming  in  the  flesh. 

C.  Descriptions  of  the  divine  Wisdom  and  Word. 

(  a )  Wisdom  is  represented  as  distinct  from  God,  and  as  eternally  exist- 
ing with  God  ;  ( b )  the  Word  of  God  is  distinguished  from  God,  as  execu- 
tor of  his  will  from  everlasting. 

It  must  be  acknowledged  that  in  none  of  these  descriptions  is  the  idea  of 
personality  clearly  developed.  Still  less  is  it  true  that  John  the  apostle 
derived  his  doctrine  of  the  Logos  from  the  interpretations  of  these  descrip- 
tions in  Philo  Judseus.  John's  doctrine  ( John  1  : 1-18 )  is  radically  differ- 
ent from  the  Alexandrian  Logos-idea  of  Philo.  This  last  is  a  Platonizing 
speculation  upon  the  mediating  principle  between  God  and  the  world. 
Philo  seems  at  times  to  verge  towards  a  recognition  of  personality  in  the 
Logos,  though  his  monotheistic  scruples  lead  him  at  other  times  to  take 
back  what  he  has  given,  and  to  describe  the  Logos  either  as  the  thought  of 
God  or  as  its  expression  in  the  world.  But  John  is  the  first  to  present 
to  us  a  consistent  view  of  this  personality,  to  identify  the  Logos  with  the 
Messiah,  and  to  distinguish  the  Word  from  the  Spirit  of  God. 

D.  Descriptions  of  the  Messiah. 

(a)  He  is  one  with  Jehovah  ;  ( b )  yet  he  is  in  some  sense  distinct  from 
Jehovah. 

It  is  to  be  remembered,  in  considering  this,  as  well  as  other  classes  of 
passages  previously  cited,  that  no  Jewish  writer  before  Christ's  coming  had 
succeeded  in  constructing  from  them  a  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  Only  to 
those  who  bring  to  them  the  light  of  New  Testament  revelation  do  they 
show  their  real  meaning. 

Our  general  conclusion  with  regard  to  the  Old  Testament  intimations 
must  therefore  be  that,  while  they  do  not  by  themselves  furnish  a  sufficient 
basis  for  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  they  contain  the  germ  of  it,  and  may 
be  used  in  confirmation  of  it  when  its  truth  is  substantially  proved  from 
the  New  Testament. 


SCRIPTURE   DESCRIBES  THE  THREE   AS   PERSONS.  87 

II.  THESE  THREE  ABE  so  DESCRIBED  IN  SCRIPTURE  THAT  WE  ARE  COM- 
PELLED TO  CONCEIVE  OF  THEM  AS  DISTINCT  PERSONS. 

1.  The  Father  and  the  Son  are  persons  distinct  from  each  other. 

(  a )  Christ  distinguishes  the  Father  from  himself  as  { another ' ;  (  6  )  the 
Father  and  the  Son  are  distinguished  as  the  begetter  and  the  begotten  ; 
( c  )  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  distinguished  as  the  sender  and  the  sent. 

2.  The  Father  and  the  Son  are  persons  distinct  from  the  Spirit. 

( a  )  Jesus  distinguishes  the  Spirit  from  himself  and  from  the  Father ; 
( 6 )  the  Spirit  proceeds  from  the  Father ;  ( c  )  the  Spirit  is  sent  by  the 
Father  and  by  the  Son. 

3.  The  Holy  Spirit  is  a  person. 

A.  Designations  proper  to  personality  are  given  him. 

'  ( a )  The  masculine  pronoun  e/cm>of ,  though  Trvev/Lia.  is  neuter  ;  (  6 )  the 
name  Trapd/cA^rof ,  which  cannot  be  translated  by  '  comfort ',  or  be  taken  as 
the  name  of  any  abstract  influence.  The  Comforter,  Instructor,  Patron, 
Guide,  Advocate,  whom  this  term  brings  before  us,  must  be  a  person.  This 
is  evident  from  its  application  to  Christ  in  1  John  2  : 1  —  "we  have  an 
Advocate  —  Trapd^rov  —  with  the  Father,  Jesus  Christ  the  righteous." 

B.  His  name  is  mentioned  in  immediate  connection  with  other  per- 
sons, and  in  such  a  way  as  to  imply  his  own  personality. 

(  a  )  In  connection  with  Christians  ;  ( b  )  in  connection  with  Christ ;  (  c ) 
in  connection  with  the  Father  and  the  Son.  If  the  Father  and  the  Son  are 
persons,  the  Spirit  must  be  a  person  also. 

C.  He  performs  acts  proper  to  personality. 

That  which  searches,  knows,  speaks,  testifies,  reveals,  convinces,  com- 
mands, strives,  moves,  helps,  guides,  creates,  recreates,  sanctifies,  inspires, 
makes  intercession,  orders  the  affairs  of  the  church,  performs  miracles, 
raises  the  dead  —  cannot  be  a  mere  power,  influence,  efflux,  or  attribute  of 
God,  but  must  be  a  person. 

D.  He  is  affected  as  a  person  by  the  acts  of  others. 

That  which  can  be  resisted,  grieved,  vexed,  blasphemed,  must  be  a  per- 
son ;  for  only  a  person  can  perceive  insult  and  be  offended.  The  blas- 
phemy against  the  Holy  Ghost  cannot  be  merely  blasphemy  against  a 
power  or  attribute  of  God,  since  in  that  case  blasphemy  against  God  would 
be  a  less  crime  than  blasphemy  against  his  power.  That  against  which 
the  unpardonable  sin  can  be  committed  must  be  a  person. 

E.  He  manifests  himself  in  visible  form  as  distinct  from  the  Father  and 
the  Son,  yet  in  direct  connection  with  personal  acts  performed  by  them. 

F.  This  ascription  to  the  Spirit  of  a  personal  subsistence  distinct  from 
that  of  the  Father  and  of  the  Son  cannot  be  explained  as  personification ; 
for: 

( a )  This  would  be  to  interpret  sober  prose  by  the  canons  of  poetry. 
Such  sustained  personification  is  contrary  to  the  genius  of  even  Hebrew 
poetry,  in  which  Wisdom  itself  is  most  naturally  interpreted  as  designating 


88  NATURE,    DECREES,    AtfD   WORKS   OP   GOD. 

a  personal  existence.  (  6  )  Such  an  interpretation  would  render  a  multitude 
of  passages  either  tautological,  meaningless,  or  absurd,  —  as  can  be  easily 
seen  by  substituting  for  the  name  Holy  Spirit  the  terms  which  are  wrongly 
held  to  be  its  equivalents  ;  such  as  the  power,  or  influence,  or  efflux,  or 
attribute  of  God.  (  c  )  It  is  contradicted,  moreover,  by  all  those  passages 
in  which  the  Holy  Spirit  is  distinguished  from  his  own  gifts. 

III.    THIS   TBIPEBSONALITY  OF  THE  DIVINE  NATUBE  is  NOT  MEBELY 

ECONOMIC  AND  TEMPOBAL,  BUT  IS  IMMANENT  AND  ETEBNAL. 

1.  Scripture  proof  that  these  distinctions  of  personality  are  eternal. 

We  prove  this  ( a )  from  those  passages  which  speak  of  the  existence  of 
the  Word  from  eternity  with  the  Father  ;  (  6  )  from  passages  asserting  or 
implying  Christ's  preexistence ;  ( c )  from  passages  implying  intercourse 
between  the  Father  and  the  Son  before  the  foundation  of  the  world; 
( d  )  from  passages  asserting  the  creation  of  the  world  by  Christ ;  ( e )  from 
passages  asserting  or  implying  the  eternity  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

2.  Errors  refuted  by  the  foregoing  passages. 

A.  The  Sabellian. 

Sabellius  ( of  Ptolemais  in  Pentapolis,  250  )  held  that  Father,  Son,  and 
Holy  Spirit  are  mere  developments  or  revelations  to  creatures,  in  time, 
of  the  otherwise  concealed  Godhead —  developments  which,  since  creatures 
will  always  exist,  are  not  transitory,  but  which  at  the  same  time  are  not 
eternal  a  parte  ante.  God  as  united  to  the  creation  is  Father ;  God  as  united 
to  Jesus  Christ  is  Son  ;  God  as  united  to  the  church  is  Holy  Spirit.  The 
Trinity  of  Sabellius  is  therefore  an  economic  and  not  an  immanent  Trinity 
—  a  Trinity  of  forms  or  manifestations,  but  not  a  necessary  and  eternal 
Trinity  in  the  divine  nature. 

Some  have  interpreted  Sabellius  as  denying  that  the  Trinity  is  eternal  a 
parte  post,  as  well  as  a  parte  ante,  and  as  holding  that,  when  the  purpose 
of  these  temporary  manifestations  is  accomplished,  the  Triad  is  resolved 
into  the  Monad.  This  view  easily  merges  in  another,  which  makes  the 
persons  of  the  Trinity  mere  names  for  the  ever  shifting  phases  of  the 
divine  activity. 

It  is  evident  that  this  theory,  in  whatever  form  it  may  be  held,  is  far 
from  satisfying  the  demands  of  Scripture.  Scripture  speaks  of  the  second 
person  of  the  Trinity  as  existing  and  acting  before  the  birth  of  Jesus 
Christ,  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit  as  existing  and  acting  before  the  formation 
of  the  church.  Both  have  a  personal  existence,  eternal  in  the  past  as  well 
as  in  the  future  —  which  this  theory  expressly  denies. 

B.  The  Arian. 

Arms  ( of  Alexandria ;  condemned  by  Council  of  Nice,  325  )  held  that 
the  Father  is  the  only  divine  being  absolutely  without  beginning  ;  the  Son 
and  the  Holy  Spirit,  through  whom  God  creates  and  recreates,  having  been 
themselves  created  out  of  nothing  before  the  world  was  ;  and  Christ  being 
called  God,  because  he  is  next  in  rank  to  God,  and  is  endowed  by  God 
with  divine  power  to  create. 


THE  THREE  PERSONS  ARE  EQUAL.  89 

The  followers  of  Arius  have  differed  as  to  the  precise  rank  and  claims  of 
Christ.  While  Socinus  held  with  Arius  that  worship  of  Christ  was  obliga- 
tory, the  later  Unitarians  have  perceived  the  impropriety  of  worshiping 
even  the  highest  of  created  beings,  and  have  constantly  tended  to  a  view  of 
the  Bedeemer  which  regards  him  as  a  mere  man,  standing  in  a  peculiarly 
intimate  relation  to  God. 

It  is  evident  that  the  theory  of  Arius  does  not  satisfy  the  demands  of 
Scripture.  A  created  God,  a  God  whose  existence  had  a  beginning  and 
therefore  may  come  to  an  end,  a  God  made  of  a  substance  which  once  was 
not,  and  therefore  a  substance  different  from  that  of  the  Father,  is  not  God, 
but  a  finite  creature.  But  the  Scripture  speaks  of  Christ  as  being  in  the 
beginning  God,  with  God,  and  equal  with  God. 

IV.  THIS  TBrPEBSONALTTY  IS  NOT  TBITHBISM  J  FOB,    WHILE  THEBE    ABE 

THBEE  PEBSONS,  THESE  is  BUT  ONE  ESSENCE. 

(a)  The  term  *  person'  only  approximately  represents  the  truth. 
Although  this  word,  more  nearly  than  any  other  single  word,  expresses 
the  conception  which  the  Scriptures  give  us  of  the  relation  between  the 
Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit,  it  is  not  itself  used  in  this  connection 
in  Scripture,  and  we  employ  it  in  a  qualified  sense,  not  in  the  ordinary 
sense  in  which  we  apply  the  word  '  person '  to  Peter,  Paul,  and  John. 

(  b )  The  necessary  qualification  is  that,  while  three  persons  among  men 
have  only  a  specific  unity  of  nature  or  essence — that  is,  have  the  same 
species  of  nature  or  essence, —  the  persons  of  the  Godhead  have  a  numeri- 
cal unity  of  nature  or  essence — that  is,  have  the  same  nature  or  essence. 
The  undivided  essence  of  the  Godhead  belongs  equally  to  each  of  the  per- 
sons ;  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  each  possesses  all  the  substance  and 
all  the  attributes  of  Deity.  The  plurality  of  the  Godhead  is  therefore  not 
a  plurality  of  essence,  but  a  plurality  of  hypostatical,  or  personal,  distinc- 
tions. God  is  not  three  and  one,  but  three  in  one.  The  one  indivisible 
essence  has  three  modes  of  subsistence. 

( c  )  This  oneness  of  essence  explains  the  fact  that,  while  Father,  Son,  and 
Holy  Spirit,  as  respects  their  personality,  are  distinct  subsistences,  there  is 
an  intercommunion  of  persons  and  an  immanence  of  one  divine  person  in 
another  which  permits  the  peculiar  work  of  one  to  be  ascribed,  with  a  sin- 
gle limitation,  to  either  of  the  others,  and  the  manifestation  of  one  to  be 
recognized  in  the  manifestation  of  another.  The  limitation  is  simply  this, 
that  although  the  Son  was  sent  by  the  Father,  and  the  Spirit  by  the  Father 
and  the  Son,  it  cannot  be  said  vice  versa'ih&t  the  Father  is  sent  either  by 
the  Son,  or  by  the  Spirit.  The  Scripture  representations  of  this  intercom- 
munion prevent  us  from  conceiving  of  the  distinctions  called  Father,  Son, 
and  Holy  Spirit  as  involving  separation  between  them. 

V.  THE  THBEE  PEBSONS,  FATHEB,  SON,  AND  HOLY  SPIBIT,  ABE  EQUAL. 
In  explanation,  notice  that : 

1.     These  titles  belong  to  the  Persons. 

(  a  )  The  Father  is  not  God  as  such  ;  for  God  is  not  only  Father,  but 
also  Son  and  Holy  Spirit.  The  term  '  Father '  designates  that  hypostat- 


90          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

ical  distinction  in  the  divine  nature  in  virtue  of  which  God  is  related  to  the 
Son,  and  through  the  Son  and  the  Spirit  to  the  church  and  the  world.  As 
author  of  the  believer's  spiritual  as  well  as  natural  life,  God  is  doubly  his 
Father  ;  but  this  relation  which  God  sustains  to  creatures  is  not  the  ground 
of  the  title.  God  is  Father  primarily  in  virtue  of  the  relation  which  he 
sustains  to  the  eternal  Son ;  only  as  we  are  spiritually  united  to  Jesus 
Christ  do  we  become  children  of  God. 

( 6  )  The  Son  is  not  God  as  such ;  for  God  is  not  only  Son,  but  also 
Father  and  Holy  Spirit.  *  The  Son '  designates  that  distinction  in  virtue 
of  which  God  is  Belated  to  the  Father,  is  sent  by  the  Father  to  redeem  the 
world,  and  with  the  Father  sends  the  Holy  Spirit. 

(  c )  The  Holy  Spirit  is  not  God  as  such ;  for-  God  is  not  only  Holy  Spirit, 
but  also  Father  and  Son.  *  The  Holy  Spirit '  designates  that  distinction  in 
virtue  of  which  God  is  related  to  the  Father  and  the  Son,  and  is  sent  by 
them  to  accomplish  the  work  of  renewing  the  ungodly  and  of  sanctifying 
the  church. 

2.     Qualified  sense  of  these  titles. 

Like  the  word  '  person  *,  the  names  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit  are  not 
to  be  confined  within  the  precise  limitations  of  meaning  which  would  be 
required  if  they  were  applied  to  men. 

( a )  The  Scriptures  enlarge  our  conceptions  of  Christ's  Sonship  by 
giving  to  him  in  his  preexistent  state  the  names  of  the  Logos,  the  Image, 
and  the  Effulgence  of  God. — The  term  *  Logos '  combines  in  itself  the  two 
ideas  of  thought  and  word,  of  reason  and  expression.  While  the  Logos  as 
divine  thought  or  reason  is  one  with  God,  the  Logos  as  divine  word  or 
expression  is  distinguishable  from  God.  Words  are  the  means  by  which 
personal  beings  express  or  reveal  themselves.  Since  Jesus  Christ  was  "  the 
Word  "  before  there  were  any  creatures  to  whom  revelations  could  be  made, 
it  would  seem  to  be  only  a  necessary  inference  from  this  title  that  in  Christ 
God  must  be  from  eternity  expressed  or  revealed  to  himself  ;  in  other 
words,  that  the  Logos  is  the  principle  of  truth,  or  self -consciousness,  in 
God. — The  term  *  Image '  suggests  the  ideas  of  copy  or  counterpart.  Man 
is  the  image  of  God  only  relatively  and  derivatively.  Christ  is  the  Image 
of  God  absolutely  and  archetypally.  As  the  perfect  representation  of  the 
Father's  perfections,  the  Son  would  seem  to  be  the  object  and  principle  of 
love  in  the  Godhead. —  The  term  « Effulgence,'  finally,  is  an  allusion  to  the 
sun  and  its  radiance.  As  the  effulgence  of  the  sun  manifests  the  sun's 
nature,  which  otherwise  would  be  unrevealed,  yet  is  inseparable  from 
the  sun  and  ever  one  with  it,  so  Christ  reveals  God,  but  is  eternally  one 
with  God.  Here  is  a  principle  of  movement,  of  will,  which  seems  to  con- 
nect itself  with  the  holiness,  or  self-asserting  purity,  of  the  divine  nature. 

(  6  )  The  names  thus  given  to  the  second  person  of  the  Trinity,  if  they 
have  any  significance,  bring  him  before  our  minds  in  the  general  aspect 
of  Eevealer,  and  suggest  a  relation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  to  God's 
immanent  attributes  of  truth,  love,  and  holiness.  The  prepositions  used  to 
describe  the  internal  relations  of  the  second  person  to  the  first  are  not  pre- 


THE  THEEE   PERSONS   HAVE  ONE  ESSENCE.  91 

positions  of  rest,  but  prepositions  of  direction  and  movement.  The  Trinity, 
as  the  organism  of  Deity,  secures  a  life-movement  of  the  Godhead,  a  pro- 
cess in  which  God  evermore  objectifies  himself  and  in  the  Son  gives  forth 
of  his  fulness.  Christ  represents  the  centrifugal  action  of  the  deity.  But 
there  must  be  centripetal  action  also.  In  the  Holy  Spirit  the  movement  is 
completed,  and  the  divine  activity  and  thought  returns  into  itself.  True 
religion,  in  reuniting  us  to  God,  reproduces  in  us,  in  our  limited  measure, 
this  eternal  process  of  the  divine  mind.  Christian  experience  witnesses  that 
God  in  himself  is  unknown ;  Christ  is  the  organ  of  external  revelation ;  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  the  organ  of  internal  revelation — only  he  can  give  us  an 
inward  apprehension  or  realization  of  the  truth.  It  is  "  through  the  eter- 
nal Spirit"  that  Christ  "offered  himself  without  blemish  unto  God,"  and 
it  is  only  through  the  Holy  Spirit  that  the  church  has  access  to  the  Father, 
or  fallen  creatures  can  return  to  God. 

(  c  )  In  the  light  of  what  has  been  said,  we  may  understand  somewhat 
more  fully  the  characteristic  differences  between  the  work  of  Christ  and 
that  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  We  may  sum  them  up  in  the  four  statements  that, 
first,  all  outgoing  seems  to  be  the  work  of  Christ,  all  return  to  God  the 
work  of  the  Spirit ;  secondly,  Christ  is  the  organ  of  external  revelation, 
the  Holy  Spirit  the  organ  of  internal  revelation  ;  thirdly,  Christ  is  our 
advocate  in  heaven,  the  Holy  Spirit  is  our  advocate  in  the  soul ;  fourthly,  in 
the  work  of  Christ  we  are  passive,  in  the  work  of  the  Spirit  we  are  active. 
Of  the  work  of  Christ  we  shall  treat  more  fully  hereafter,  in  speaking  of 
his  Offices  as  Prophet,  Priest,  and  King.  The  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
will  be  treated  when  we  come  to  speak  of  the  Application  of  Eedemption  in 
Begeneration  and  Sanetifi cation.  Here  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  is  represented  in  the  Scriptures  as  the  author  of  life  —  in  creation, 
in  the  conception  of  Christ,  in  regeneration,  in  resurrection  ;  and  as  the 
giver  of  light  —  in  the  inspiration  of  Scripture  writers,  in  the  conviction  of 
sinners,  in  the  illumination  and  sanctification  of  Christians. 

3.     Generation  and  procession  consistent  with  equality. 

That  the  Sonship  of  Christ  is  eternal,  is  intimated  in  Psalm  2:7.  "  This 
day  have  I  begotten  thee  "  is  most  naturally  interpreted  as  the  declar- 
ation of  an  eternal  fact  in  the  divine  nature.  Neither  the  incarnation,  the 
baptism,  the  transfiguration,  nor  the  resurrection  marks  the  beginning  of 
Christ's  Sonship,  or  constitutes  him  Son  of  God.  These  are  but  recogni- 
tions or  manifestations  of  a  preexisting  Sonship,  inseparable  from  his  God- 
hood.  He  is  "born  before  every  creature"  (while  yet  no  created  thing 
existed  —  see  Meyer  on  Col.  1 : 15 )  and  "by  the  resurrection  of  the  dead" 
is  not  made  to  be,  but  only  "declared  to.  be,"  "  according  to  the  Spirit  of 
holiness"  (=  according  to  his  divine  nature)  "the  Son  of  God  with 
power  "  ( see  Philippi  and  Alford  on  Rom.  1:3,  4).  This  Sonship  is  unique 
—  not  predicable  of,  or  shared  with,  any  creature.  The  Scriptures  inti- 
mate, not  only  an  eternal  generation  of  the  Son,  but  an  eternal  procession 
of  the  Spirit. 

The  Scripture  terms  'generation'  and  'procession,*  as  applied  to  the 
Son  and  to  the  Holy  Spirit,  are  but  approximate  expressions  of  the  truth, 


92          HATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

and  we  are  to  correct  by  other  declarations  of  Scripture  any  imperfect 
impressions  which  we  might  derive  solely  from  them.  We  use  these  terms 
in  a  special  sense,  which  we  explicitly  state  and  define  as  excluding  all 
notion  of  inequality  between  the  persons  of  the  Trinity.  The  eternal  gen- 
eration of  the  Son  to  which  we  hold  is 

( a  )  Not  creation,  but  the  Father's  communication  of  himself  to  the 
Son.  Since  the  names,  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit  are  not  applicable  to 
the  divine  essence,  but  are  only  applicable  to  its  hypostatical  distinctions, 
they  imply  no  derivation  of  the  essence  of  the  Son  from  the  essence  of 
the  Father. 

( b  )  Not  a  commencement  of  existence,  but  an  eternal  relation  to  the 
Father, —  there  never  having  been  a  time  when  the  Son  began  to  be,  or 
when  the  Son  did  not  exist  as  God  with  the  Father. 

( c  )  Not  an  act  of  the  Father's  will,  but  an  internal  necessity  of  the 
divine  nature, — so  that  the  Son  is  no  more  dependent  upon  the  Father  than 
the  Father  is  dependent  upon  the  Son,  and  so  that,  if  it  be  consistent  with 
deity  to  be  Father,  it  is  equally  consistent  with  deity  to  be  Son. 

(  d )  Not  a  relation  in  any  way  analogous  to  physical  derivation,  but  a  life- 
movement  of  the  divine  nature,  in  virtue  of  which  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Spirit,  while  equal  in  essence  and  dignity,  stand  to  each  other  in  an  order 
of  personality,  office,  and  operation,  and  in  virtue  of  which  the  Father 
works  through  the  Son,  and  the  Father  and  the  Son  through  the  Spirit. 

The  same  principles  upon  which  we  interpret  the  declaration  of  Christ's 
eternal  Sonship  apply  to  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit  from  the  Father 
through  the  Son,  and  show  this  to  be  not  inconsistent  with  the  Spirit's 
equal  dignity  and  glory. 

We  therefore  only  formulate  truth  which  is  concretely  expressed  in 
Scripture,  and  which  is  recognized  by  all  ages  of  the  church  in  hymns  and 
prayers  addressed  to  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  when  we  assert  that  in 
the  nature  of  the  one  God  there  are  three  eternal  distinctions,  which  are 
best  described  as  persons,  and  each  of  which  is  the  proper  and  equal  object 
of  Christian  worship. 

We  are  also  warranted  in  declaring  that,  in  virtue  of  these  personal 
distinctions  or  modes  of  subsistence,  God  exists  in  the  relations,  respect- 
ively, first,  of  Source,  Origin,  Authority,  and  in  this  relation  is  the  Father ; 
secondly,  of  Expression,  Medium,  Revelation,  and  in  this  relation  is  the 
Son ;  thirdly,  of  Apprehension,  Accomplishment,  Realization,  and  in  this 
relation  is  the  Holy  Spirit. 

VI.    INSOBUTABLE,  YET  NOT  SELF-CONTRADICTOBT,  THIS  DOCTRINE  FUB- 

NISHES  THE  KEY  TO  ALL  OTHEB  DOCTRINES. 

1.     The  mode  of  this  triune  existence  is  inscrutable. 
It  is  inscrutable  because  there  are  no  analogies  to  it  in  our  finite  experi- 
ence.   For  this  reason  all  attempts  are  vain  adequately  to  represent  it : 

( a  )  From  inanimate  things  —  as  the  fountain,  the  stream,  and  the  rivulet 
trickling  from  it  ( Athanasius ) ;  the  cloud,  the  rain,  and  the  rising  mist 


INSCRUTABLE,    YET  NOT  SELF-CONTRADICTORY.  93 

(  Boardman  )  ;  color,  shape^  and  size  (  F.  W.  Robertson ) ;  the  actinic,  lumi- 
nif  erous,  and  calorific  principles  in  the  ray  of  light  ( Solar  Hieroglyphics, 
34). 

( 6 )  From  the  constitution  or  processes  of  our  own  minds  —  as  the 
psychological  unity  of  intellect,  affection,  and  will  ( substantially  held  by 
Augustine  )  ;  the  logical  unity  of  thesis,  antithesis,  and  synthesis  (  Hegel )  ; 
the  metaphysical  unity  of  subject,  object,  and  subject-object  ( Melanchthon, 
Olshausen,  Shedd). 

No  one  of  these  furnishes  any  proper  analogue  of  the  Trinity,  since  in 
no  one  of  them  is  there  found  the  essential  element  of  tripersonality.  Such 
illustrations  may  sometimes  be  used  to  disarm  objection,  but  they  furnish 
no  positive  explanation  of  the  mystery  of  the  Trinity,  and,  unless  carefully 
guarded,  may  lead  to  grievous  error. 

2.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  is  not  self -contradictory. 

This  it  would  be,  only  if  it  declared  God  to  be  three  in  the  same  numerical 
sense  in  which  he  is  said  to  be  one.  This  we  do  not  assert.  We  assert 
simply  that  the  same  God  who  is  one  with  respect  to  his  essence  is  three 
with  respect  to  the  internal  distinctions  of  that  essence,  or  with  respect  to 
the  modes  of  his  being.  The  possibility  of  this  cannot  be  denied,  except 
by  assuming  that  the  human  mind  is  in  all  respects  the  measure  of  the 
divine. 

The  fact  that  the  ascending  scale  of  life  is  marked  by  increasing  differen- 
tiation of  faculty  and  function  should  rather  lead  us  to  expect  in  the  highest 
of  all  beings  a  nature  more  complex  than  our  own.  In  man  many  faculties 
are  united  in  one  intelligent  being,  and  the  more  intelligent  man  is,  the 
more  distinct  from  each  other  these  faculties  become  ;  until  intellect  and 
affection,  conscience  and  will  assume  a  relative  independence,  and  there 
arises  even  the  possibility  of  conflict  between  them.  There  is  nothing  irra- 
tional or  self -contradictory  in  the  doctrine  that  in  God  the  leading  functions 
are  yet  more  markedly  differentiated,  so  that  they  become  personal,  while 
at  the  same  time  these  personalities  are  united  by  the  fact  that  they  each 
and  equally  manifest  the  one  indivisible  essence. 

3.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  has  important  relations  to  other  doc- 
trines. 

A.  It  is  essential  to  any  proper  theism. 

Neither  God's  independence  nor  God's  blessedness  can  be  maintained 
upon  grounds  of  absolute  unity.  Anti-trinitarianism  almost  necessarily 
makes  creation  indispensable  to  God's  perfection,  tends  to  a  belief  in  the 
eternity  of  matter,  and  ultimately  leads,  as  in  Mohammedanism,  and  in 
modern  Judaism  and  Unitarianism,  to  Pantheism.  "  Love  is  an  impossible 
exercise  to  a  solitary  being."  Without  Trinity  we  cannot  hold  to  a  living 
Unity  in  the  Godhead. 

B.  It  is  essential  to  any  proper  revelation. 

If  there  be  no  Trinity,  Christ  is  not  God,  and  cannot  perfectly  know  or 
reveal  God.  Christianity  is  no  longer  the  one,  all-inclusive,  and  final  reve- 


94          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

lation,  but  only  one  of  many  conflicting  and  competing  systems,  each  of 
which  has  its  portion  of  truth,  but  also  its  portion  of  error.  So  too  with 
the  Holy  Spirit.  "  As  God  can  be  revealed  only  through  God,  so  also  can 
he  be  appropriated  only  through  God.  If  the  Holy  Spirit  be  not  God, 
then  the  love  and  self -communication  of  God  to  the  human  soul  are  not  a 
reality."  In  other  words,  without  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  we  go  back 
to  mere  natural  religion  and  the  far-off  God  of  deism,  —  and  this  is  ulti- 
mately exchanged  for  pantheism  in  the  way  already  mentioned. 

C.  It  is  essential  to  any  proper  redemption. 

If  God  be  absolutely  and  simply  one,  there  can  be  no  mediation  or  atone- 
ment, since  between  God  and  the  most  exalted  creature  the  gulf  is  infinite. 
Christ  cannot  bring  us  nearer  to  God  than  he  is  himself.  Only  one  who  is 
God  can  reconcile  us  to  God.  So,  too,  only  one  who  is  God  can  purify  our 
souls.  A  God  who  is  only  unity,  but  in  whom  is  no  plurality,  may  be  our 
Judge,  but,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  cannot  be  our  Savior  or  our  Sanctifier. 

D.  It  is  essential  to  any  proper  model  for  human  life. 

If  there  be  no  Trinity  immanent  in  the  divine  nature,  then  Fatherhood 
in  God  has  had  a  beginning  and  it  may  have  an  end ;  Sonship,  moreover, 
is  no  longer  a  perfection,  but  an  imperfection,  ordained  for  a  temporary 
purpose.  But  if  fatherly  giving  and  filial  receiving  are  eternal  in  God, 
then  the  law  of  love  requires  of  us  conformity  to  God  in  both  these  respects 
as  the  highest  dignity  of  our  being. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   DECREES   OF   GOD. 

L  DEFINITION  OF  DECREES. 

By  the  decrees  of  God  we  mean  that  eternal  plan  by  which  God  has 
rendered  certain  all  the  events  of  the  universe,  past,  present,  and  future. 
Notice  in  explanation  that : 

( a )  The  decrees  are  many  only  to  our  finite  comprehension ;  in  their 
own  nature  they  are  but  one  plan,  which  embraces  not  only  effects  but  also 
causes,  not  only  the  ends  to  be  secured  but  also  the  means  needful  to 
secure  them. 

(  6 )  The  decrees,  as  the  eternal  act  of  an  infinitely  perfect  will,  though 
they  have  logical  relations  to  each  other,  have  no  chronological  relation. 
They  are  not  therefore  the  result  of  deliberation,  in  any  sense  that  implies 
short-sightedness  or  hesitancy. 

( c )  Since  the  will  in  which  the  decrees  have  their  origin  is  a  free  will, 
the  decrees  are  not  a  merely  instinctive  or  necessary  exercise  of  the  divine 
intelligence  or  volition,  such  as  pantheism  supposes. 

(  d)  The  decrees  have  reference  to  things  outside  of  God.  God  does  not 
decree  to  be  holy,  nor  to  exist  as  three  persons  in  one  essence. 

(  e )  The  decrees  primarily  respect  the  acts  of  God  himself,  in  Creation, 
Providence,  and  Grace  ;  secondarily,  the  acts  of  free  creatures,  which  he 
foresees  will  result  therefrom. 

(/)  The  decree  to  act  is  not  the  act.  The  decrees  are  an  internal  exer- 
cise and  manifestation  of  the  divine  attributes,  and  are  not  to  be  confounded 
with  Creation,  Providence,  and  Redemption,  which  are  the  execution  of  the 
decrees. 

(  g  )  The  decrees  are  therefore  not  addressed  to  creatures  ;  are  not  of  the 
nature  of  statute  law ;  and  lay  neither  compulsion  nor  obligation  upon  the 
wills  of  men. 

(  h )  All  human  acts,  whether  evil  or  good,  enter  into  the  divine  plan  and 
so  are  objects  of  God's  decrees,  although  God's  actual  agency  with  regard 
to  the  evil  is  only  a  permissive  agency. 

(  i  )  While  God's  total  plan  with  regard  to  creatures  is  called  predesti- 
nation, or  f oreordination,  his  purpose  so  to  act  that  certain  will  believe  and 
be  saved  is  called  election,  and  his  purpose  so  to  act  that  certain  will  refuse 
to  believe  and  be  lost  is  called  reprobation.  We  discuss  election  and  repro- 
bation, in  a  later  chapter,  as  a  part  of  the  Application  of  Redemption. 

95 


96  NATURE,    DECREES,   AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

II.      PBOOF  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  DECREES. 

1.  From  Scripture. 

A.  The  Scriptures  declare  that  all  things  are  included  in  the  divine 
decrees.  B.  They  declare  that  special  things  and  events  are  decreed  ;  as, 
for  example,  (  a  )  the  stability  of  the  physical  universe  ;  (  b  )  the  outward 
circumstances  of  nations  ;  (  c )  the  length  of  human  life  ;  ( d  )  the  mode  of 
our  death  ;  ( e )  the  free  acts  of  men,  both  good  acts  and  evil  acts.  0. 
They  declare  that  God  has  decreed  (a  )  the  salvation  of  believers  ;  (  b  )  the 
establishment  of  Christ's  kingdom;  (c)  the  work  of  Christ  and  of  his 
people  in  establishing  it. 

2.  From  Reason. 

(  a )  From  the  divine  foreknowledge. 

Foreknowledge  implies  fixity,  and  fixity  implies  decree.  —  From  eternity 
God  foresaw  all  the  events  of  the  universe  as  fixed  and  certain.  This  fixity 
and  certainty  could  not  have  had  its  ground  either  in  blind  fate  or  in  the 
variable  wills  of  men,  since  neither  of  these  had  an  existence.  It  could 
have  had  its  ground  in  nothing  outside  the  divine  mind,  for  in  eternity 
nothing  existed  besides  the  divine  mind.  But  for  this  fixity  there  must 
have  been  a  cause  ;  if  anything  in  the  future  was  fixed,  something  must 
have  fixed  it.  This  fixity  could  have  had  its  ground  only  in  the  plan  and 
purpose  of  God.  In  fine,  if  God  foresaw  the  future  as  certain,  it  must  have 
been  because  there  was  something  in  himself  which  made  it  certain  ;  or,  in 
other  words,  because  he  had  decreed  it. 

Decreeing  creation  implies  decreeing  the  foreseen  results  of  creation.  — 
To  meet  the  objection  that  God  might  have  foreseen  the  events  of  the  uni- 
verse, not  because  he  had  decreed  each  one,  but  only  because  he  had 
decreed  to  create  the  universe  and  institute  its  laws,  we  may  put  the  argu- 
ment in  another  form.  In  eternity  there  could  have  been  no  cause  of  the 
future  existence  of  the  universe,  outside  of  God  himself,  since  no  being 
existed  but  God  himself.  In  eternity  God  foresaw  that  the  creation  of  the 
world  and  the  institution  of  its  laws  would  make  certain  its  actual  history 
even  to  the  most  insignificant  details.  But  God  decreed  to  create  and  to 
institute  these  laws.  In  so  decreeing  he  necessarily  decreed  all  that  was 
to  come.  In  fine,  God  foresaw  the  future  events  of  the  universe  as  certain, 
because  he  had  decreed  to  create  ;  but  this  determination  to  create  involved 
also  a  determination  of  all  the  actual  results  of  that  creation  ;  or,  in  other 
words,  God  decreed  those  results. 

No  undecreed  event  can  be  foreseen. — We  grant  that  God  decrees  pri- 
marily and  directly  his  own  acts  of  creation,  providence,  and  grace ;  but 
we  claim  that  this  involves  also  a  secondary  and  indirect  decreeing  of  the 
acts  of  free  creatures  which  he  foresees  will  result  therefrom.  There  is 
therefore  no  such  thing  in  God  as  scientia  media,  or  knowledge  of  an 
event  that  is  to  be,  though  it  does  not  enter  into  the  divine  plan  ;  for  to  say 
that  God  foresees  an  undecreed  event,  is  to  say  that  he  views  as  future  an 
event  that  is  merely  possible ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  he  views  an  event 
not  as  it  is. 


OBJECTION'S  TO  THE   DOCTRIKE   OF   DECREES.  97 

Only  knowledge  of  that  which  is  decreed  is  foreknowledge. —  Knowledge 
of  a  plan  as  ideal  or  possible  may  precede  decree ;  but  knowledge  of  a  plan 
as  actual  or  fixed  must  follow  decree.  Only  the  latter  knowledge  is 
properly  /oreknowledge.  God  therefore  foresees  creation,  causes,  laws, 
events,  consequences,  because  he  has  decreed  creation,  causes,  laws,  events, 
consequences  ;  that  is,  because  he  has  embraced  all  these  in  his  plan.  The 
denial  of  decrees  logically  involves  the  denial  of  God's  foreknowledge  of 
free  human  actions ;  and  to  this  Socinians,  and  some  Arminians,  are 
actually  led. 

(  b  )  From  the  divine  wisdom. 

It  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  proceed  in  every  undertaking  according  to  a 
plan.  The  greater  the  undertaking,  the  more  needful  a  plan.  Wisdom, 
moreover,  shows  itself  in  a  careful  provision  for  all  possible  circumstances 
and  emergencies  that  can  arise  in  the  execution  of  its  plan.  That  many 
such  circumstances  and  emergencies  are  uncontemplated  and  unprovided 
for  in  the  plans  of  men,  is  due  only  to  the  limitations  of  human  wisdom. 
It  belongs  to  infinite  wisdom,  therefore,  not  only  to  have  a  plan,  but  to 
embrace  all,  even  the  minutest  details,  in  the  plan  of  the  universe. 

(  c  )    From  the  divine  immutability. 

What  God  does,  he  always  purposed  to  do.  Since  with  him  there  is  no 
increase  of  knowledge  or  power,  such  as  characterizes  finite  beings,  it  fol- 
lows that  what  under  any  given  circumstances  he  permits  or  does,  he  must 
have  eternally  decreed  to  permit  or  do.  To  suppose  that  God  has  a  multi- 
tude of  plans,  and  that  he  changes  his  plan  with  the  exigencies  of  the  situ- 
ation, is  to  make  him  infinitely  dependent  upon  the  varying  wills  of  his 
creatures,  and  to  deny  to  him  one  necessary  element  of  perfection,  namely, 
immutability. 

(  d )    From  the  divine  benevolence. 

The  events  of  the  universe,  if  not  determined  by  the  divine  decrees,  must 
be  determined  either  by  chance  or  by  the  wills  of  creatures.  It  is  contrary 
to  any  proper  conception  of  the  divine  benevolence  to  suppose  that  God 
permits  the  course  of  nature  and  of  history,  and  the  ends  to  which  both 
these  are  moving,  to  be  determined  for  myriads  of  sentient  beings  by  any 
other  force  or  will  than  his  own.  Both  reason  and  revelation,  therefore, 
compel  us  to  accept  the  doctrine  of  the  Westminster  Confession,  that  "  God 
did  from  all  eternity,  by  the  most  just  and  holy  counsel  of  his  own  will, 
freely  and  unchangeably  ordain  whatsoever  comes  to  pass." 

III.     OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  DOOTKINE  OF  DECEEES. 

1.     That  they  are  inconsistent  with  the  free  agency  of  man. 

To  this  we  reply  that : 

A.  The  objection  confounds  the  decrees  with  the  execution  of  the 
decrees.  The  decrees  are,  like  foreknowledge,  an  act  eternal  to  the  divine 
nature,  and  are  no  more  inconsistent  with  free  agency  than  foreknowledge 
is.  Even  foreknowledge  of  events  implies  that  those  events  are  fixed.  If 
this  absolute  fixity  and  foreknowledge  is  not  inconsistent  with  free  agency, 
7 


98  NATURE,   DECREES,   AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

much  less  can  that  which  is  more  remote  from  man's  action,  namely,  the 
hidden  cause  of  this  fixity  and  foreknowledge  —  God's  decrees  —  be  incon- 
sistent with  free  agency.  If  anything  be  inconsistent  with  man's  free 
agency,  it  must  be,  not  the  decrees  themselves,  but  the  execution  of  the 
decrees  in  creation  and  providence. 

B.  The  objection  rests  upon  a  false  theory  of  free  agency — namely,  that 
free  agency  implies  indeterminateness  or  uncertainty ;  in  other  words,  that 
free  agency  cannot  coexist  with  certainty  as  to  the  results  of  its  exercise. 
But  it  is  necessity,  not  certainty,  with  which  free  agency  is  inconsistent. 
Free  agency  is  the  power  of  self-determination  in  view  of  motives,  or  man's 
power  ( a  )  to  chose  between  motives,  and  (  b  )  to  direct  his  subsequent 
activity  according  to  the  motive  thus  chosen.  Motives  are  never  a  cause, 
but  only  an  occasion  ;  they  influence,  but  never  compel ;  the  man  is  the 
cause,  aud  herein  is  his  freedom.  But  it  is  also  true  that  man  is  never  in  a 
state  of  indeterminateness  ;  never  acts  without  motive,  or  contrary  to  all 
motives  ;  there  is  always  a  reason  why  he  acts,  and  herein  is  his  rationality. 
Now,  so  far  as  man  acts  according  to  previously  dominant  motive — see  (b ) 
above — we  may  by  knowing  his  motive  predict  his  action,  and  our  certainty 
what  that  action  will  be  in  no  way  affects  his  freedom.  We  may  even  bring 
motives  to  bear  upon  others,  the  influence  of  which  we  foresee,  yet  those 
who  act  upon  them  may  act  in  perfect  freedom.  But  if  man,  influenced  by 
man,  may  still  be  free,  then  man,  influenced  by  divinely  foreseen  motives, 
may  still  be  free,  and  the  divine  decrees,  which  simply  render  certain 
man's  actions,  may  also  be  perfectly  consistent  with  man's  freedom. 

There  is,  however,  a  smaller  class  of  human  actions  by  which  character 
is  changed,  rather  than  expressed,  and  in  which  the  man  acts  according  to 
a  motive  different  from  that  which  has  previously  been  dominant — see  (a) 
above.  These  actions  also  are  foreknown  by  God,  although  they  cannot 
be  predicted  by  man.  Man's  freedom  in  them  would  be  inconsistent  with 
God's  decrees,  if  the  previous  certainty  of  their  occurrence  were,  not  cer- 
tainty, but  necessity  ;  or,  in  other  words,  if  God's  decrees  were  in  all  cases 
decrees  efficiently  to  produce  the  acts  of  his  creatures.  But  this  is  not  the 
case.  God's  decrees  may  be  executed  by  man's  free  causation,  as  easily  as 
by  God's  ;  and  God's  decreeing  this  free  causation,  in  decreeing  to  create  a 
universe  of  which  he  foresees  that  this  causation  will  be  a  part,  in  no  way 
interferes  with  the  freedom,  of  such  causation,  but  rather  secures  and  estab- 
lishes it.  Both  consciousness  and  conscience  witness  that  God's  decrees 
are  not  executed  by  laying  compulsion  upon  the  free  wills  of  men. 

It  may  aid  us,  in  estimating  the  force  of  this  objection,  to  note  the  four 
senses  in  which  the  term  'freedom'  may  be  used.  It  may  be  used  as 
equivalent  to  ( 1 )  physical  freedom,  or  absence  of  outward  constraint ;  (2) 
formal  freedom,  or  a  state  of  moral  indeterminateness ;  ( 3  )  moral  free- 
dom, or  self-determinateness  in  view  of  motives ;  (4)  real  freedom,  or  abil- 
ity to  conform  to  the  divine  standard.  With  the  first  of  these  we  are  not  now 
concerned,  since  all  agree  that  the  decrees  lay  no  outward  constraint  upon 
men.  Freedom  in  the  second  sense  has  no  existence,  since  all  men  have 
character.  Free  agency,  or  freedom  in  the  third  sense,  has  just  been  shown 
to  be  consistent  with  the  decrees.  Freedom  in  the  fourth  sense,  or  real 


OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  DECREES.        99 

freedom,  is  the  special  gift  of  God,  and  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  free 
agency.  The  objection  mentioned  above  rests  wholly  upon  the  second  of 
these  definitions  of  free  agency.  This  we  have  shown  to  be  false,  and  with 
this  the  objection  itself  falls  to  the  ground. 

2.  That  they  take  away  all  motive  for  human  exertion. 
To  this  we  reply  that : 

(  a )  They  cannot  thus  influence  men,  since  they  are  not  addressed  to 
men,  are  not  the  rule  of  human  action,  and  become  known  only  after  the 
event.  This  objection  is  therefore  the  mere  excuse  of  indolence  and 
disobedience. 

(  6  )  The  objection  confounds  the  decrees  of  God  with  fate.  But  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  fate  is  unintelligent,  while  the  decrees  are  framed  by  a 
personal  God  in  infinite  wisdom  ;  fate  is  indistinguishable  from  material 
causation  and  leaves  no  room  for  human  freedom,  while  the  decrees  exclude 
all  notion  of  physical  necessity ;  fate  embraces  no  moral  ideas  or  ends, 
while  the  decrees  make  these  controlling  in  the  universe. 

( c )  The  objection  ignores  the  logical  relation  between  the  decree  of 
the  end  and  the  decree  of  the  means  to  secure  it.     The  decrees  of  God  not 
only  ensure  the  end  to  be  obtained,  but  they  ensure  free  human  action 
as  logically  prior  thereto.     All  conflict  between  the  decrees  and  human 
exertion  must  therefore  be  apparent  and  not  real.     Since  consciousness 
and  Scripture  assure  us  that  free  agency  exists,  it  must  exist  by  divine 
decree;    and  though  we  may  be  ignorant  of  the  method  in  which  the 
decrees  are  executed,  we  have  no  right  to  doubt  either  the  decrees  or  the 
freedom.     They  must  be  held  to  be  consistent,  until  one  of  them  is  proved 
to  be  a  delusion. 

( d )  Since  the  decrees  connect  means  and  ends  together,  and  ends  are 
decreed  only  as  the  result  of  means,  they  encourage  effort  instead  of  dis- 
couraging it.     Belief  in  God's  plan  that  success  shall  reward  toil,  incites 
to  courageous  and  persevering  effort.     Upon  the  very  ground  of  God's 
decree,  the  Scripture  urges  us  to  the  diligent  use  of  means. 

3.  That  they  make  God  the  author  of  sin. 
To  this  we  reply  : 

( a )  They  make  God,  not  the  author  of  sin,  but  the  author  of  free  beings 
who  are  themselves  the  authors  of  sin.  God  does  not  decree  efficiently  to 
work  evil  desires  or  choices  in  men.  He  decrees  sin  only  in  the  sense  of 
decreeing  to  create  and  preserve  those  who  will  sin  ;  in  other  words,  he 
decrees  to  create  and  preserve  human  wills  which,  in  their  own  self-chosen 
courses,  will  be  and  do  evil.  In  all  this,  man  attributes  sin  to  himself  and 
not  to  God,  and  God  hates,  denounces,  and  punishes  sin. 

( 6  )  The  decree  to  permit  sin  is  therefore  not  an  efficient  but  a  permis- 
sive decree,  or  a  decree  to  permit,  in  distinction  from  a  decree  to  produce 
by  his  own  efficiency.  No  difficulty  attaches  to  such  a  decree  to  permit  sin, 
which  does  not  attach  to  the  actual  permission  of  it.  But  God  does  actually 
permit  sin,  and  it  must  be  right  for  him  to  permit  it.  It  must  therefore 


100  NATURE,   DECREES,   AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

be  right  for  him  to  decree  to  permit  it.  If  God's  holiness  and  wisdom  and 
power  are  not  impugned  by  the  actual  existence  of  moral  evil,  they  are  not 
impugned  by  the  original  decree  that  it  should  exist. 

(  c  )  The  difficulty  is  therefore  one  which  in  substance  clings  to  all  theis- 
tic  systems  alike  —  the  question  why  moral  evil  is  permitted  under  the 
government  of  a  God  infinitely  holy,  wise,  powerful,  and  good.  This 
problem  is,  to  our  finite  powers,  incapable  of  full  solution,  and  must  remain 
to  a  great  degree  shrouded  in  mystery.  With  regard  to  it  we  can  only  say  : 

Negatively,  —  that  God  does  not  permit  moral  evil  because  he  is  not  unal- 
terably opposed  to  sin  ;  nor  because  moral  evil  was  unforeseen  and  inde- 
pendent of  his  will ;  nor  because  he  could  not  have  prevented  it  in  a  moral 
system.  Both  observation  and  experience,  which  testify  to  multiplied 
instances  of  deliverance  from  sin  without  violation  of  the  laws  of  man's 
being,  forbid  us  to  limit  the  power  of  God. 

Positively,  —  we  seem  constrained  to  say  that  God  permits  moral  evil 
because  moral  evil,  though  in  itself  abhorrent  to  his  nature,  is  yet  the  inci- 
dent of  a  system  adapted  to  his  purpose  of  self-revelation ;  and  further, 
because  it  is  his  wise  and  sovereign  will  to  institute  and  maintain  this  sys- 
tem of  which  moral  evil  is  an  incident,  rather  than  to  withhold  his  self- 
revelation  or  to  reveal  himself  through  another  system  in  which  moral  evil 
hould  be  continually  prevented  by  the  exercise  of  divine  power. 

IV.    CONCLUDING  EEMABKS. 

1.  Practical  uses  of  the  doctrine  of  decrees. 

(a)  It  inspires  humility  by  its  representation  of  God's  unsearchable 
counsels  and  absolute  sovereignty.  (  6  )  It  teaches  confidence  in  him  who 
has  wisely  ordered  our  birth,  our  death,  and  our  surroundings,  even  to  the 
minutest  particulars,  and  has  made  all  things  work  together  for  the  triumph 
of  his  kingdom  and  the  good  of  those  who  love  him;  (c)  It  shows  the 
enemies  of  God  that,  as  their  sins  have  been  foreseen  and  provided  for  in 
God's  plan,  so  they  can  never,  while  remaining  in  their  sins,  hope  to  escape 
their  decreed  and  threatened  penalty.  (  d )  It  urges  the  sinner  to  avail 
himself  of  the  appointed  means  of  grace,  if  he  would  be  counted  among  the 
number  of  those  for  whom  God  has  decreed  salvation. 

2.  True  method  of  preaching  the  doctrine. 

( a )  We  should  most  carefully  avoid  exaggeration  or  unnecessarily  obnox- 
ious statement.  (  6  )  We  should  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  decrees  are  not 
grounded  in  arbitrary  will,  but  in  infinite  wisdom.  (  c  )  We  should  make 
it  plain  that  whatever  God  does  or  will  do,  he  must  from  eternity  have  pur- 
posed to  do.  (  d )  We  should  illustrate  the  doctrine  so  far  as  possible  by 
instances  of  completeness  and  far-sightedness  in  human  plans  of  great 
enterprises.  (  e  )  We  may  then  make  extended  application  of  the  truth  to 
the  encouragement  of  the  Christian  and  the  admonition  of  the  unbeliever. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  WOEKS  OF  GOD  ;  OB  THE  EXECUTION  OF  THE  DECBEES. 


SECTION  I. — CREATION. 

I.  DEFINITION  OF  CREATION. 

By  creation  we  mean  that  free  act  of  the  triune  God  by  which  in  the 
beginning  for  his  own  glory  he  made,  without  the  use  of  preexisting  mate- 
rials, the  whole  visible  and  invisible  universe. 

Creation  is  designed  origination,  by  a  transcendent  and  personal  God, 
of  that  which  itself  is  not  God.  The  universe  is  related  to  God  as  our  own 
volitions  are  related  to  ourselves.  They  are  not  ourselves,  and  we  are 
greater  than  they.  Creation  is  not  simply  the  idea  of  God,  or  even  the 
plan  of  God,  but  it  is  the  idea  externalized,  the  plan  executed  ;  in  other 
words,  it  implies  an  exercise,  not  only  of  intellect,  but  also  of  will,  and  this 
will  is  not  an  instinctive  and  unconscious  will,  but  a  will  that  is  personal 
and  free.  Such  exercise  of  will  seems  to  involve,  not  self-development,  but 
self-limitation,  on  the  part  of  God ;  the  transformation  of  energy  into 
force,  and  so  a  beginning  of  time,  with  its  finite  successions.  But,  what- 
ever the  relation  of  creation  to  time,  creation  makes  the  universe  wholly 
dependent  upon  God,  as  its  originator. 

In  further  explanation  of  our  definition  we  remark  that 

(  a )  Creation  is  not  "production  out  of  nothing,"  as  if  "  nothing "  were 
a  substance  out  of  which  ' '  something  "  could  be  formed. 

(  b  )  Creation  is  not  a  fashioning  of  preexisting  materials,  nor  an  emana- 
tion from  the  substance  of  Deity,  but  is  a  making  of  that  to  exist  which 
once  did  not  exist,  either  in  form  or  substance. 

(c)  Creation  is  not  a  distinctive  or  necessary  process  of  the  divine 
nature,  but  is  the  free  act  of  a  rational  will,  put  forth  for  a  definite  and 
sufficient  end. 

( d )  Creation  is  the  act  of  the  triune  God,  in  the  sense  that  all  the  persons 
of  the  Trinity,  themselves  uncreated,  have  a  part  in  it  —  the  Father  as  the 
originating,  the  Son  as  the  mediating,  the  Spirit  as  the  realizing  cause. 

II.  PROOF  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CREATION. 

Creation  is  a  truth  of  which  mere  science  or  reason  cannot  fully  assure 
us.  Physical  science  can  observe  and  record  changes,  but  it  knows  nothing 
of  origins.  Beason  cannot  absolutely  disprove  the  eternity  of  matter. 

101 


102         NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

For  proof  of  the  doctrine  of  Creation,  therefore,  we  rely  wholly  upon 
Scripture.  Scripture  supplements  science,  and  renders  its  explanation  of 
the  universe  complete. 

1.    Direct  Scripture  Statements. 

A.  Genesis  1  :1  —  "In  the  beginning  God  created  the  heaven  and  the 
earth.  "  To  this  it  has  been  objected  that  the  verb  fcO3  does  not  necessarily 
denote  production  without  the  use  of  preexisting  ma  terials  (see  Gen.  1  :27 
—  "  God  created  man  in  his  own  image  "  ;  cf.  2:7  —  "  th  e  Lord  God  formed 
man  of  the  dust  of  the  ground  "  ;  also  Ps.  51  :  10  —  "  Create  in  me  a  clean 
heart"). 

We  grant,  in  reply,  that  the  argument  for  absolute  creation  derived  from 
the  mere  word  JO3  is  not  entirely  conclusive.  Other  considerations  in 
connection  with  the  use  of  this  word  ,  however,  seem  to  render  this  inter- 
pretation of  Gen.  1  :  1  the  most  plausible.  Some  of  these  considerations 
we  proceed  to  mention. 

(a)  While  we  acknowledge  that  the  verb  #?3  "does  not  necessarily  or 
invariably  denote  production  without  the  use  of  preexisting  materials,  we 
still  maintain  that  it  signifies  the  production  of  an  effect  for  which  no  nat- 
ural antecedent  existed  before,  and  which  can  be  only  the  result  of  divine 
agency."  For  this  reason,  in  the  Kal  species  it  is  used  only  of  God,  and  is 
never  accompanied  by  any  accusative  denoting  material. 


(  b  )  In  the  account  of  the  creation,  N  T  3  seems  to  be  distinguished  from 
"  to  make  "  either  with  or  without  the  use  of  already  existing  material 
*O3,  "created  in  making"  or  "made  by  creation,"  in  2  ;  3  ;  and 
H,  of  the  firmament,  in  1  :  7),  and  from  13T,  "  to  form  "  out  of  such  mate- 
rial. (  See  K^l,  of  man  regarded  as  a  spiritual  being,  in  1  :  27  ;  but  "VSP^ 
of  man  regarded  as  a  physical  being,  in  2  :  7.  ) 

(  c)  The  context  shows  that  the  meaning  here  is  a  making  without  the 
use  of  preexisting  materials.  Since  the  earth  in  its  rude,  unformed,  chaotic 
condition  is  still  called  "the  earth"  in  verse  2,  the  word  N}3  in  verse  1 
cannot  refer  to  any  shaping  or  fashioning  of  the  elements,  but  must  signify 
the  calling  of  them  into  being. 

(d)  The  fact  that  N^3  may  have  had  an  original  signification  of  "cutting," 
"forming,"  and  that  it  retains  this  meaning  in  the  Piel  conjugation,  need 
not  prejudice  the  conclusion  thus  reached,  since  terms  expressive  of  the 
most  spiritual  processes  are  derived  from  sensuous  roots.  If  &O3  does  not 
signify  absolute  creation,  no  word  exists  in  the  Hebrew  language  that  can 
express  this  idea. 

(  e  )  But  this  idea  of  production  without  the  use  of  preexisting  materials 
unquestionably  existed  among  the  Hebrews:  The  later  Scriptures  show 
that  it  had  become  natural  to  the  Hebrew  mind.  The  possession  of  this 
idea  by  the  Hebrews,  while  it  is  either  not  found  at  all  or  is  very  dimly 
and  ambiguously  expressed  in  the  sacred  books  of  the  heathen,  can  be 
best  explained  by  supposing  that  it  was  derived  from  this  early  revelation 
in  Genesis. 


THEOBIES  WHICH  OPPOSE  CREATION.  103 

B.  Hebrews  11:3  —  "  By  faith  we  understand  that  the  worlds  have  been 
framed  by  the  word  of  God,  so  that  what  is  seen  hath  not  been  made  out 
of  things  which  appear  "==  the  world  was  not  made  out  of  sensible  and 
preexisting  material,  but  by  the  direct  fiat  of  omnipotence  (  see  Alford,  and 
Liinemann,  Meyer's  Com.  in  loco). 

2.    Indirect  evidence  from  Scripture. 

(  a  )  The  past  duration  of  the  world  is  limited  ;  (  b  )  before  the  world 
began  to  be,  each  of  the  persons  of  the  Godhead  already  existed  ;  (  c  )  the 
origin  of  the  universe  is  ascribed  to  God,  and  to  each  of  the  persons  of  the 
Godhead.  These  representations  of  Scripture  are  not  only  most  consistent 
with  the  view  that  the  universe  was  created  by  God  without  use  of  preex- 
isting material,  but  they  are  inexplicable  upon  any  other  hypothesis. 


THEOBIES  WHICH  OPPOSE  CREATION. 
1.    Dualism. 
Of  dualism  there  are  two  forms  : 

A.  That  which  holds  to  two  self  -existent  principles,  God  and  matter. 
These  are  distinct  from  and  coeternal  with  each  other.  Matter,  however, 
is  an  unconscious,  negative,  and  imperfect  substance,  which  is  subordinate 
to  God  and  is  made  the  instrument  of  his  will.  This  was  the  underlying 
principle  of  the  Alexandrian  Gnostics.  It  was  essentially  an  attempt  to 
combine  with  Christianity  the  Platonic  or  Aristotelian  conception  of  the 
vXrj.  In  this  way  it  was  thought  to  account  for  the  existence  of  evil,  and 
to  escape  the  difficulty  of  imagining  a  production  without  use  of  preexist- 
ing material.  Basilides  (  nourished  125  )  and  Valentinus  (  died  160  ),  the 
representatives  of  this  view,  were  influenced  also  by  Hindu  philosophy, 
and  their  dualism  is  almost  indistinguishable  from  pantheism.  A  similar 
view  has  been  held  in  modern  times  by  John  Stuart  Mill  and  apparently  by 
Frederick  W.  Kobertson. 

With  regard  to  this  view  we  remark  : 

(a)  The  maxim  ex  nihilo  nihilfit,  upon  which  it  rests,  is  true  only  in 
so  far  as  it  asserts  that  no  event  takes  place  without  a  cause.  It  is  false,  if 
it  mean  that  nothing  can  ever  be  made  except  out  of  material  previously 
existing.  The  maxim  is  therefore  applicable  only  to  the  realm  of  second 
causes,  and  does  not  bar  the  creative  power  of  the  great  first  Cause.  The 
doctrine  of  creation  does  not  dispense  with  a  cause  ;  on  the  other  hand, 
it  assigns  to  th,e  universe  a  sufficient  cause  in  God. 

(  b  )  Although  creation  without  the  use  of  preexisting  material  is  incon- 
ceivable, in  the  sense  of  being  unpicturable  to  the  imagination,  yet  the 
eternity  of  matter  is  equally  inconceivable.  For  creation  without  pre- 
existing material,  moreover,  we  find  remote  analogies  in  our  own  creation 
of  ideas  and  volitions,  a  fact  as  inexplicable  as  God's  bringing  of  new  sub- 
stances into  being. 

(  c  )  It  is  unphilosophical  to  postulate  two  eternal  substances,  when  one 
self-existent  Cause  of  all  things  will  account  for  the  facts.  (  d  )  It  contra- 


104         NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

diets  our  fundamental  notion  of  God  as  absolute  sovereign  to  suppose  the 
existence  of  any  other  substance  to  be  independent  of  his  will.  (  e  )  This 
second  substance  with  which  God  must  of  necessity  work,  since  it  is,  accord- 
ing to  the  theory,  inherently  evil  and  the  source  of  evil,  not  only  limits 
God's  power,  but  destroys  his  blessedness.  (/)  This  theory  does  not 
answer  its  purpose  of  accounting  for  moral  evil,  unless  it  be  also  assumed 
that  spirit  is  material, — in  which  case  dualism  gives  place  to  materialism. 

The  other  form  of  dualism  is : 

B.  That  which  holds  to  the  eternal  existence  of  two  antagonistic  spirits, 
one  evil  and  the  other  good.  In  this  view,  matter  is  not  a  negative  and 
imperfect  substance  which  nevertheless  has  self-existence,  but  is  either  the 
work  or  the  instrument  of  a  personal  and  positively  malignant  intelligence, 
who  wages  war  against  all  good.  This  was  the  view  of  the  Manichseans. 
Manichseanism  is  a  compound  of  Christianity  and  the  Persian  doctrine  of 
two  eternal  and  opposite  intelligences.  Zoroaster,  however,  held  matter  to 
be  pure,  and  to  be  the  creation  of  the  good  Being.  Mani  apparently 
regarded  matter  as  captive  to  the  evil  spirit,  if  not  absolutely  his  creation. 

Of  this  view  we  need  only  say  that  it  is  refuted  ( a )  by  all  the  arguments 
for  the  unity,  omnipotence,  sovereignty,  and  blessedness  of  God  ;  ( 6  )  by 
the  Scripture  representations  of  the  prince  of  evil  as  the  creature  of  God 
and  as  subject  to  God's  control. 

2.  Emanation. 

This  theory  holds  that  the  universe  is  of  the  same  substance  with  God, 
and  is  the  product  of  successive  evolutions  from  his  being.  This  was  the 
view  of  the  Syrian  Gnostics.  Their  system  was  an  attempt  to  interpret 
Christianity  in  the  forms  of  Oriental  theosophy.  A  similar  doctrine  was 
taught,  in  the  last  century,  by  Swedenborg. 

We  object  to  it  on  the  following  grounds  :  ( a )  It  virtually  denies  the 
infinity  and  transcendence  of  God, — by  applying  to  him  a  principle  of 
evolution,  growth,  and  progress  which  belongs  only  to  the  finite  and  imper- 
fect. (  6  )  It  contradicts  the  divine  holiness,  —  since  man,  who  by  the 
theory  is  of  the  substance  of  God,  is  nevertheless  morally  evil.  (  c )  It 
leads  logically  to  pantheism, —  since  the  claim  that  human  personality  is 
illusory  cannot  be  maintained  without  also  surrendering  belief  in  the  per- 
sonality of  God. 

3.  Creation  from  eternity. 

This  theory  regards  creation  as  an  act  of  God  in  eternity  past.  It  was 
propounded  by  Origen,  and  has  been  held  in  recent  times  by  Martensen, 
Martineau,  John  Caird,  Knight,  and  Pfleiderer.  The  necessity  of  suppos- 
ing such  creation  from  eternity  has  been  argued  from  God's  omnipotence, 
God's  timelessness,  God's  immutability,  and  God's  love.  We  consider 
each  of  these  arguments  in  their  order. 

( a )  Creation  from  eternity  is  not  necessitated  by  God's  omnipotence. 
Omnipotence  does  not  necessarily  imply  actual  creation  ;  it  implies  only 


THEORIES   WHICH   OPPOSE  CREATION.  105 

power  to  create.  Creation,  moreover,  is  in  the  nature  of  the  case  a  thing 
begun.  Creation  from  eternity  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  and  that  which 
is  self -contradictory  is  not  an  object  of  power. 

(6)  Creation  from  eternity  is  not  necessitated  by  God's  timelessness. 
Because  God  is  free  from  the  law  of  time  it  does  not  follow  that  creation  is 
free  from  that  law.  Bather  is  it  true  that  no  eternal  creation  is  conceiv- 
able, since  this  involves  an  infinite  number.  Time  must  have  had  a  begin- 
ning, and  since  the  universe  and  time  are  coexistent,  creation  could  not 
have  been  from  eternity. 

(c)  Creation  from  eternity  is  not  necessitated  by  God's  immutability. 
His  immutability  requires,  not  an  eternal  creation,  but  only  an  eternal  plan 
of  creation.   The  opposite  principle  would  compel  us  to  deny  the  possibility 
of  miracles,  incarnation,  and  regeneration.   Like  creation,  these  too  would 
need  to  be  eternal. 

( d )  Creation  from  eternity  is  not  necessitated  by  God's  love.     Creation 
is  finite  and  cannot  furnish  perfect  satisfaction  to  the  infinite  love  of  God. 
God  has  moreover  from  eternity  an  object  of  love  infinitely  superior  to  any 
possible  creation,  in  the  person  of  his  Son. 

(e}  Creation  from  eternity,  moreover,  is  inconsistent  with  the  divine 
independence  and  personality.  Since  God's  power  and  love  are  infinite,  a 
creation  that  satisfied  them  must  be  infinite  in  extent  as  well  as  eternal  in 
past  duration  —  in  other  words,  a  creation  equal  to  God.  But  a  God  thus 
dependent  upon  external  creation  is  neither  free  nor  sovereign.  A  God 
existing  in  necessary  relations  to  the  universe,  if  different  in  substance  from 
the  universe,  must  be  the  God  of  dualism ;  if  of  the  same  substance  with  the 
universe,  must  be  the  God  of  pantheism. 

4.  Spontaneous  generation. 

This  theory  holds  that  creation  is  but  the  name  for  a  natural  process  still 
going  on,  —  matter  itself  having  in  it  the  power,  under  proper  conditions, 
of  taking  on  new  functions,  and  of  developing  into  organic  forms.  This 
view  is  held  by  Owen  and  Bastian.  We  object  that 

(a)  It  is  a  pure  hypothesis,  not  only  unverified,  but  contrary  to  all  known 
facts.  No  credible  instance  of  the  production  of  living  forms  from  inor- 
ganic material  has  yet  been  adduced.  So  far  as  science  can  at  present  teach 
us,  the  law  of  nature  is  *'  omne  vivum  e  vivo,"  or  "ex  ovo." 

(  6  )  If  such  instances  could  be  authenticated,  they  would  prove  nothing 
as  against  a  proper  doctrine  of  creation,  —  for  there  would  still  exist  an 
impossibility  of  accounting  for  these  vivific  properties  of  matter,  except 
upon  the  Scriptural  view  of  an  intelligent  Contriver  and  Originator  of 
matter  and  its  laws.  In  short,  evolution  implies  previous  involution,  —  if 
anything  comes  out  of  matter,  it  must  first  have  been  put  in. 

(c)  This  theory,  therefore,  if  true,  only  supplements  the  doctrine  of 
original,  absolute,  immediate  creation,  with  another  doctrine  of  mediate 
and  derivative  creation,  or  the  development  of  the  materials  and  forces 
originated  at  the  beginning.  This  development,  however,  cannot  proceed  to 


106  NATURE,   DECREES,   AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

any  valuable  end  without  guidance  of  the  same  intelligence  which  initiated 
it.  The  Scriptures,  although  they  do  not  sanction  the  doctrine  of  sponta- 
neous generation,  do  recognize  processes  of  development  as  supplementing 
the  divine  fiat  which  first  called  the  elements  into  being. 

IV.  THE  MOSAIC  ACCOUNT  OP  CREATION. 

1.  Its  twofold  nature,  —  as  uniting  the  ideas  of  creation  and  of  develop- 
ment. 

( a  )  Creation  is  asserted.  —  The  Mosaic  narrative  avoids  the  error  of  mak- 
ing the  universe  eternal  or  the  result  of  an  eternal  process.  The  cosmogony 
of  Genesis,  unlike  the  cosmogonies  of  the  heathen,  is  prefaced  by  the 
originating  act  of  God,  and  is  supplemented  by  successive  manifestations 
of  creative  power  in  the  introduction  of  brute  and  of  human  life. 

(6)  Development  is  recognized. — The  Mosaic  account  represents  the 
present  order  of  things  as  the  result,  not  simply  of  original  creation,  but 
also  of  subsequent  arrangement  and  development.  A  fashioning  of  inor- 
ganic materials  is  described,  and  also  a  use  of  these  materials  in  providing 
the  conditions  of  organized  existence.  Life  is  described  as  reproducing 
itself,  after  its  first  introduction,  according  to  its  own  laws  and  by  virtue  of 
its  own  inner  energy. 

2.  Its  proper  interpretation. 

We  adopt  neither  (  a  )  the  allegorical,  or  mythical,  ( b )  the  hyperliteral, 
nor  (c)  the  hyperscientific  interpretation  of  the  Mosaic  narrative  ;  but 
rather  (d)  the  pictorial-summary  interpretation, — which  holds  that  the 
account  is  a  rough  sketch  of  the  history  of  creation,  true  in  all  its  essential 
features,  but  presented  in  a  graphic  form  suited  to  the  common  mind  and 
to  earlier  as  well  as  to  later  ages.  While  conveying  to  primitive  man  as 
accurate  an  idea  of  God's  work  as  man  was  able  to  comprehend,  the  revela- 
tion was  yet  given  in  pregnant  language,  so  that  it  could  expand  to  all  the 
ascertained  results  of  subsequent  physical  research.  This  general  corres- 
pondence of  the  narrative  with  the  teachings  of  science,  and  its  power  to 
adapt  itself  to  every  advance  in  human  knowledge,  differences  it  from  every 
other  cosmogony  current  among  men. 

V.  GOD'S  END  IN  CREATION. 

Infinite  wisdom  must,  in  creating,  propose  to  itself  the  most  comprehen- 
sive and  the  most  valuable  of  ends, — the  end  most  worthy  of  God,  and  the 
end  most  fruitful  in  good.  Only  in  the  light  of  the  end  proposed  can  we 
properly  judge  of  God's  work,  or  of  God's  character  as  revealed  therein. 

In  determining  this  end,  we  turn  first  to  : 

1.     The  testimony  of  Scripture. 

This  may  be  summed  up  in  four  statements.  God  finds  his  end  (  a  )  in 
himself  ;  ( b  )  in  his  own  will  and  pleasure  ;  ( c  )  in  his  own  glory ;  (  d  )  in 
the  making  known  of  his  power,  his  wisdom,  his  holy  name.  All  these 
statements  may  be  combined  in  the  following,  namely,  that  God's  supreme 
end  in  creation  is  nothing  outside  of  himself,  but  is  his  own  glory  —  in  the 


GOD'S   EtfD   IN   CREATION".  107 

revelation,  in  and  through  creatures,  of  the  infinite  perfection  of  his  own 
being. 

Since  holiness  is  the  fundamental  attribute  in  God,  to  make  himself,  his 
own  pleasure,  his  own  glory,  his  own  manifestation,  to  be  his  end  in  crea- 
tion, is  to  find  his  chief  end  in  his  own  holiness,  its  maintenance,  expres- 
sion, and  communication.  To  make  this  his  chief  end,  however,  is  not  to 
exclude  certain  subordinate  ends,  such  as  the  revelation  of  his  wisdom, 
power,  and  love,  and  the  consequent  happiness  of  innumerable  creatures  to 
whom  this  revelation  is  made. 

2.     The  testimony  of  reason. 

That  his  own  glory,  in  the  sense  just  mentioned,  is  God's  supreme  end 
in  creation,  is  evident  from  the  following  considerations  : 

(a)  God's  own  glory  is  the  only  end  actually  and  perfectly  attained  in 
the  universe.  Wisdom  and  omnipotence  cannot  choose  an  end  which  is 
destined  to  be  forever  unattained;  for  "what  his  soul  desireth,  even  that 
he  doeth"  (Job  23  :13).  God's  supreme  end  cannot  be  the  happiness  of 
creatures,  since  many  are  miserable  here  and  will  be  miserable  forever. 
God's  supreme  end  cannot  be  the  holiness  of  creatures,  for  many  are 
unholy  here  and  will  be  unholy  forever.  But  while  neither  the  holiness 
nor  the  happiness  of  creatures  is  actually  and  perfectly  attained,  God's 
glory  is  made  known  and  will  be  made  known  in  both  the  saved  and  the 
lost.  This  then  must  be  God's  supreme  end  in  creation. 

(6)  God's  glory  is  the  end  intrinsically  most  valuable.  The  good  of 
creatures  is  of  insignificant  importance  compared  with  this.  Wisdom  dic- 
tates that  the  greater  interest  should  have  precedence  of  the  less.  Because 
God  can  choose  no  greater  end,  he  must  choose  for  his  end  himself.  But 
this  is  to  choose  his  holiness,  and  his  glory  in  the  manifestation  of  that 
holiness. 

( c )  His  own  glory  is  the  only  end  which  consists  with  God's  independ- 
ence and  sovereignty.  Every  being  is  dependent  upon  whomsoever  or 
whatsoever  he  makes  his  ultimate  end.  If  anything  in  the  creature  is  the 
last  end  of  God,  God  is  dependent  upon  the  creature.  But  since  God  is 
dependent  only  on  himself,  he  must  find  in  himself  his  end. 

(  d  )  His  own  glory  is  an  end  which  comprehends  and  secures,  as  a  sub- 
ordinate end,  every  interest  of  the  universe.  The  interests  of  the  universe 
are  bound  up  in  the  interests  of  God.  There  is  no  holiness  or  happiness 
for  creatures  except  as  God  is  absolute  sovereign,  and  is  recognized  as 
such.  It  is  therefore  not  selfishness,  but  benevolence,  for  God  to  make 
his  own  glory  the  supreme  object  of  creation.  Glory  is  not  vain-glory,  and 
in  expressing  his  ideal,  that  is,  in  expressing  himself,  in  his  creation,  he 
communicates  to  his  creatures  the  utmost  possible  good. 

(  e )  God's  glory  is  the  end  which  in  a  right  moral  system  is  proposed  to 
creatures.  This  must  therefore  be  the  end  which  he  in  whose  image  they 
are  made  proposes  to  himself.  He  who  constitutes  the  centre  and  end  of 


108         NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

all  his  creatures  must  find  his  centre  and  end  in  himself.  This  principle 
of  moral  philosophy,  and  the  conclusion  drawn  from  it,  are  both  explicitly 
and  implicitly  taught  in  Scripture. 

VI.    RELATION  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CREATION  TO  OTHER  DOCTRINES. 

1.  To  the  holiness  and  benevolence  of  God. 

Creation,  as  the  work  of  God,  manifests  of  necessity  God's  moral  attri- 
butes. But  the  existence  of  physical  and  moral  evil  in  the  universe  appears, 
at  first  sight,  to  impugn  these  attributes,  and  to  contradict  the  Scripture 
declaration  that  the  work  of  God's  hand  was  "very  good"  (Gen.  1 :31). 
This  difficulty  may  be  in  great  part  removed  by  considering  that : 

(  a )  At  its  first  creation,  the  world  was  good  in  two  senses  :  first,  as  free 
from  moral  evil,  —  sin  being  a  later  addition,  the  work,  not  of  God,  but  of 
created  spirits  ;  secondly,  as  adapted  to  beneficent  ends,  —  for  example, 
the  revelation  of  God's  perfection,  and  the  probation  and  happiness  of 
intelligent  and  obedient  creatures. 

( 6 )  Physical  pain  and  imperfection,  so  far  as  they  existed  before  the 
introduction  of  moral  evil,  are  to  be  regarded  :  first,  as  congruous  parts  of 
a  system  of  which  sin  was  foreseen  to  be  an  incident ;  and  secondly,  as 
constituting,  in  part,  the  means  of  future  discipline  and  redemption  for  the 
fallen. 

2.  To  the  wisdom  and  free-will  of  God. 

No  plan  whatever  of  a  finite  creation  can  fully  express  the  infinite  per- 
fection of  God.  Since  God,  however,  is  immutable,  he  must  always  have 
had  a  plan  of  the  universe  ;  since  he  is  perfect,  he  must  have  had  the  best 
possible  plan.  As  wise,  God  cannot  choose  a  plan  less  good,  instead  of  one 
more  good.  As  rational,  he  cannot  between  plans  equally  good  make  a 
merely  arbitrary  choice.  Here  is  no  necessity,  but  only  the  certainty  that 
infinite  wisdom  will  act  wisely.  As  no  compulsion  from  without,  so  no 
necessity  from  within,  moves  God  to  create  the  actual  universe.  Creation 
is  both  wise  and  free. 

3.  To  Christ  as  the  Revealer  of  God. 

Since  Christ  is  the  Revealer  of  God  in  creation  as  well  as  in  redemption, 
the  remedy  for  pessimism  is  (  1 )  the  recognition  of  God's  transcendence  — 
the  universe  at -present  not  fully  expressing  his  power,  his  holiness  or  his 
love,  and  nature  being  a  scheme  of  progressive  evolution  which  we  imper- 
fectly comprehend  and  in  which  there  is  much  to  follow ;  (  2  )  the  recog- 
nition of  sin  as  the  free  act  of  the  creature,  by  which  all  sorrow  and  pain 
have  been  caused,  so  that  God  is  in  no  proper  sense  its  author  ;  ( 3  )  the 
recognition  of  Christ  for  us  on  the  Cross  and  Christ  in  us  by  his  Spirit,  as 
revealing  the  age-long  sorrow  and  suffering  of  God's  heart  on  account  of 
human  transgression,  and  as  manifested,  in  self-sacrificing  love,  to  deliver 
men  from  the  manifold  evils  in  which  their  sins  have  involved  them  ;  and 
( 4 )  the  recognition  of  present  probation  and  future  judgment,  so  that  pro- 
vision is  made  for  removing  the  scandal  now  resting  upon  the  divine 
government  and  for  justifying  the  ways  of  God  to  men. 


DEFINITION   OF   PRESERVATION.  109 

4.  To  Providence  and  Redemption* 

Christianity  is  essentially  a  scheme  of  supernatural  love  and  power.  It 
conceives  of  God  as  above  the  world,  as  well  as  in  it,  —  able  to  manifest 
himself,  and  actually  manifesting  himself,  in  ways  unknown  to  mere  nature. 

But  this  absolute  sovereignty  and  transcendence,  which  are  manifested 
in  providence  and  redemption,  are  inseparable  from  creatorship.  If  the 
world  be  eternal,  like  God,  it  must  be  an  efflux  from  the  substance  of  God 
and  must  be  absolutely  equal  with  God.  Only  a  proper  doctrine  of  creation 
can  secure  God's  absolute  distinctness  from  the  world  and  his  sovereignly 
over  it. 

The  logical  alternative  of  creation  is  therefore  a  system  of  pantheism,  in 
which  God  is  an  impersonal  and  necessary  force.  Hence  the  pantheistic 
dicta  of  Fichte  :  "  The  assumption  of  a  creation  is  the  fundamental  error 
of  all  false  metaphysics  and  false  theology  "  ;  of  Hegel :  "  God  evolves  the 
world  out  of  himself,  in  order  to  take  it  back  into  himself  again  in  the 
Spirit"  ;  and  of  Strauss  :  "Trinity  and  creation,  speculatively  viewed,  are 
one  and  the  same,  —  only  the  one  is  viewed  absolutely,  the  other 
empirically." 

5.  To  the  Observance  of  the  Sabbath. 

We  perceive  from  this  point  of  view,  moreover,  the  importance  and  value 
of  the  Sabbath,  as  commemorating  God's  act  of  creation,  and  thus  God's 
personality,  sovereignty  and  transcendence. 

( a )  The  Sabbath  is  of  perpetual  obligation  as  God's  appointed  memorial 
of  his  creating  activity.  The  Sabbath  requisition  antedates  the  decalogue 
and  forms  a  part  of  the  moral  law.  Made  at  the  creation,  it  applies  to  man 
as  man,  everywhere  and  always,  in  his  present  state  of  being. 

(  b )  Neither  our  Lord  nor  his  apostles  abrogated  the  Sabbath  of  the  deca- 
logue. The  new  dispensation  does  away  with  the  Mosaic  prescriptions  as 
to  the  method  of  keeping  the  Sabbath,  but  at  the  same  time  declares  its 
observance  to  be  of  divine  origin  and  to  be  a  necessity  of  human  nature. 

(  c )  The  Sabbath  law  binds  us  to  set  apart  a  seventh  portion  of  our  time 
for  rest  and  worship.  It  does  not  enjoin  the  simultaneous  observance  by 
all  the  world  of  a  fixed  portion  of  absolute  time,  nor  is  such  observance 
possible.  Christ's  example  and  apostolic  sanction  have  transferred  the 
Sabbath  from  the  seventh  day  to  the  first,  for  the  reason  that  this  last  is 
the  day  of  Christ's  resurrection,  and  so  the  day  when  God's  spiritual  cre- 
ation became  in  Christ  complete. 


SECTION  II.  —  PRESERVATION. 

1.     DEFINITION  OF  PEESERVATION. 

Preservation  is  that  continuous  agency  of  God  by  which  he  maintains 
in  existence  the  things  he  has  created,  together  with  the  properties  and 
powers  with  which  he  has  endowed  them.  As  the  doctrine  of  Creation  is 


110  NATURE,    DECREES,    AND    WORKS   OF   GOD. 

our  attempt  to  explain  the  existence  of  the  universe,  so  the  doctrine  of 
Preservation  is  our  attempt  to  explain  its  continuance. 

In  explanation  we  remark  : 

( a)  Preservation  is  not  creation,  for  preservation  presupposes  creation. 
That  which  is  preserved  must  already  exist,  and  must  have  come  into  exist- 
ence by  the  creative  act  of  God. 

( 6  )  Preservation  is  not  a  mere  negation  of  action,  or  a  refraining  to 
destroy,  on  the  part  of  God.  It  is  a  positive  agency  by  which,  at  every 
moment,  he  sustains  the  persons  and  the  forces  of  the  universe. 

( c )  Preservation  implies  a  natural  concurrence  of  God  in  all  operations 
of  matter  and  of  mind.  Though  personal  beings  exist  and  God's  will  is  not 
the  sole  force,  it  is  still  true  that,  without  his  concurrence,  no  person  or 
force  can  continue  to  exist  or  to  act. 

II.  PBOOP  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  PRESERVATION. 

1.  From  Scripture. 

In  a  number  of  Scripture  passages,  preservation  is  expressly  distin- 
guished from  creation.  Though  God  rested  from  his  work  of  creation 
and  established  an  order  of  natural  forces,  a  special  and  continuous  divine 
activity  is  declared  to  be  put  forth  in  the  upholding  of  the  universe  and  its 
powers.  This  divine  activity,  moreover,  is  declared  to  be  the  activity  of 
Christ ;  as  he  is  the  mediating  agent  in  creation,  so  he  is  the  mediating 
agent  in  preservation. 

2.  From  Reason. 

We  may  argue  the  preserving  agency  of  God  from  the  following 
considerations  : 

( a )  Matter  and  mind  are  not  self-existent.     Since  they  have  not  the 
cause  of  their  being  in  themselves,  their  continuance  as  well  as  their  origin 
must  be  due  to  a  superior  power. 

( b )  Force  implies  a  will  of  which  it  is  the  direct  or  indirect  expression, 
We  know  of  force  only  through  the  exercise  of  our  own  wills.      Since  will 
is  the  only  cause  of  which  we  have  direct  knowledge,  second  causes  in 
nature  may  be  regarded  as  only  secondary,  regular,  and  automatic  workings 
of  the  great  first  Cause. 

( c  )  God's  sovereignty  requires  a  belief  in  his  special  preserving  agency  ; 
since  this  sovereignty  would  not  be  absolute,  if  anything  occurred  or 
existed  independent  of  his  will. 

III.  THEORIES  WHICH  VIRTUALLY  DENY  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  PRESERVATION. 
1.     Deism. 

This  view  represents  the  universe  as  a  self-sustained  mechanism,  from 
which  God  withdrew  as  soon  as  he  had  created  it,  and  which  he  left  to  a 
process  of  self-development.  It  was  held  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  by  the  English  Herbert,  Collins,  Tindal,  and  Bolingbroke. 


REMARKS   UPON"  THE   DIVIDE   CONCURRENCE.  Hi 

We  object  to  this  view  that : 

(  a )  It  rests  upon  a  false  analogy.  —  Man  is  able  to  construct  a  self -mov- 
ing watch  only  because  he  employs  preexisting  forces,  such  as  gravity, 
elasticity,  cohesion.  But  in  a  theory  which  likens  the  universe  to  a  machine, 
these  forces  are  the  very  things  to  be  accounted  for. 

(  b  )  It  is  a  system  of  anthropomorphism,  while  it  professes  to  exclude 
anthropomorphism. — Because  the  upholding  of  all  things  would  involve  a 
multiplicity  of  minute  cares  if  man  were  the  agent,  it  conceives  of  the 
upholding  of  the  universe  as  involving  such  burdens  in  the  case  of  God. 
Thus  it  saves  the  dignity  of  God  by  virtually  denying  his  omnipresence, 
omniscience,  and  omnipotence. 

(  c )  It  cannot  be  maintained  without  denying  all  providential  interfer- 
ence, in  the  history  of  creation  and  the  subsequent  history  of  the  world. — 
But  the  introduction  of  life,  the  creation  of  man,  incarnation,  regeneration, 
the  communion  of  intelligent  creatures  with  a  present  God,  and  interposi- 
tions of  God  in  secular  history,  are  matters  of  fact. 

2.     Continuous  Creation. 

This  view  regards  the  universe  as  from  moment  to  moment  the  result  of 
a  new  creation.  It  was  held  by  the  New  England  theologians  Edwards, 
Hopkins,  and  Emmons,  and  more  recently  in  Germany  by  Kothe. 

To  this  we  object,  upon  the  following  grounds  : 

(  a )  It  contradicts  the  testimony  of  consciousness  that  regular  and 
executive  activity  is  not  the  mere  repetition  of  an  initial  decision,  but  is  an 
exercise  of  the  will  entirely  different  in  kind. 

( b  )  It  exaggerates  God's  power  only  by  sacrificing  his  truth,  love,  and 
holiness;  —  for  if  finite  personalities  are  not  what  they  seem  —  namely, 
objective  existences  —  God's  veracity  is  impugned  ;  if  the  human  soul  have 
no  real  freedom  and  life,  God's  love  has  made  no  self -communication  to 
creatures  ;  if  God's  will  is  the  only  force  in  the  universe,  God's  holiness 
can  no  longer  be  asserted,  for  the  divine  will  must  in  that  case  be  regarded 
as  the  author  of  human  sin. 

(  c )  As  deism  tends  to  atheism,  so  the  doctrine  of  continuous  creation 
tends  to  pantheism. — Arguing  that,  because  we  get  our  notion  of  force 
from  the  action  of  our  own  wills,  therefore  all  force  must  be  will,  and  divine 
will,  it  is  compelled  to  merge  the  human  will  in  this  all-comprehending 
will  of  God.  Mind  and  matter  alike  become  phenomena  of  one  force, 
which  has  the  attributes  of  both  ;  and,  with  the  distinct  existence  and  per- 
sonality of  the  human  soul,  we  lose  the  distinct  existence  and  personality 
of  God,  as  well  as  the  freedom  and  accountability  of  man. 

IV.    KEMARKS  UPON  THE  DIVINE  CONCURRENCE. 

(  a  )  The  divine  efficiency  interpenetrates  that  of  man  without  destroying 
or  absorbing  it.  The  influx  of  God's  sustaining  energy  is  such  that  men 
retain  their  natural  faculties  and  powers.  God  does  not  work  all,  but  all 
in  all. 


WORKS   OF   GOD. 

( b )  Though  God  preserves  mind  and  body  in  their  working,  we  are 
ever  to  remember  that  God  concurs  with  the  evil  acts  of  his  creatures  only 
as  they  are  natural  acts,  and  not  as  they  are  eviL 


SECTION  III.— PROVIDENCE. 

I.  DEFINITION  OP  PROVIDENCE. 

Providence  is  that  continuous  agency  of  God  by  which  he  makes  all  the 
events  of  the  physical  and  moral  universe  fulfill  the  original  design  with 
which  he  created  it. 

As  Creation  explains  the  existence  of  the  universe,  and  as  Preservation 
explains  its  continuance,  so  Providence  explains  its  evolution  and  progress. 

In  explanation  notice  : 

( a )  Providence  is  not  to  be  taken  merely  in  its  etymological  sense  of 
foreseeing.  It  is  /orseeing  also,  or  a  positive  agency  in  connection  with 
all  the  events  of  history. 

(  6 )  Providence  is  to  be  distinguished  from  preservation.  While  preser- 
vation is  a  maintenance  of  the  existence  and  powers  of  created  things, 
providence  is  an  actual  care  and  control  of  them. 

(  c  )  Since  the  original  plan  of  God  is  all-comprehending,  the  providence 
which  executes  the  plan  is  all-comprehending  also,  embracing  within  its 
scope  things  small  and  great,  and  exercising  care  over  individuals  as  well 
as  over  classes. 

( d  )  In  respect  to  the  good  acts  of  men,  providence  embraces  all  those 
natural  influences  of  birth  and  surroundings  which  prepare  men  for  the 
operation  of  God's  word  and  Spirit,  and  which  constitute  motives  to  obe- 
dience. 

(  e  )  In  respect  to  the  evil  acts  of  men,  providence  is  never  the  efficient 
cause  of  sin,  but  is  by  turns  preventive,  permissive,  directive,  and  deter- 
minative. 

(/)  Since  Christ  is  the  only  revealer  of  God,  and  he  is  the  medium  of 
every  divine  activity,  providence  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  work  of  Christ ; 
see  1  Cor.  8:6  —  "  one  Lord,  Jesus  Christ,  through  whom  are  all  things  "  ; 
c/.  John  5  : 17 —  "  My  Father  worketh  even  until  now,  and  I  work." 

II.  PROOF  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  PROVIDENCE. 
1.     Scriptural  Proof. 

The  Scripture  witnesses  to 

A.  A  general  providential  government  and  control  (  a )  over  the  uni- 
verse at  large  ;  (  b  )  over  the  physical  world  ;  (  c  )  over  the  brute  creation  ; 
(  d )  over  the  affairs  of  nations ;  ( e )  over  man's  birth  and  lot  in  life  ; 
(/)  over  the  outward  successes  and  failures  of  men's  lives  ;  (g)  over  things 


PROOF  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  PROVIDENCE.         113 

seemingly  accidental  or  insignificant ;  ( h )  in  the  protection  of  the 
righteous ;  ( i )  in  the  supply  of  the  wants  of  God's  people  \(j)  in  the 
arrangement  of  answers  to  prayer  ;  ( k  )  in  the  exposure  and  punishment 
of  the  wicked. 

B.  A  government  and  control  extending  to  the  free  actions  of  men  — 
(  a)  to  men's  free  acts  in  general ;  (  6 )  to  the  sinful  acts  of  men  also. 

God's  providence  with  respect  to  men's  evil  acts  is  described  in  Scripture 
as  of  four  sorts  : 

( a )  Preventive, —  God  by  his  providence  prevents  sin  which  would 
otherwise  be  committed.  That  he  thus  prevents  sin  is  to  be  regarded  as 
matter,  not  of  obligation,  but  of  grace. 

( 6 )  Permissive, —  God  permits  men  to  cherish  and  to  manifest  the  evil 
dispositions  of  their  hearts.  God's  permissive  providence  is  simply  the 
negative  act  of  withholding  impediments  from  the  path  of  the  sinner, 
instead  of  preventing  his  sin  by  the  exercise  of  divine  power.  It  implies 
no  ignorance,  passivity,  or  indulgence,  but  consists  with  hatred  of  the  sin 
and  determination  to  punish  it. 

(  c  )  Directive, —  God  directs  the  evil  aots  of  men  to  ends  unforeseen  and 
unintended  by  the  agents.  When  evil  is  in  the  heart  and  will  certainly 
come  out,  God  orders  its  flow  in  one  direction  rather  than  in  another,  so 
that  its  course  can  be  best  controlled  and  least  harm  may  result.  This  is 
sometimes  called  overruling  providence. 

(d)  Determinative, —  God  determines  the  bounds  reached  by  the  evil 
passions  of  his  creatures,  and  the  measure  of  their  effects.  Since  moral 
evil  is  a  germ  capable  of  indefinite  expansion,  God's  determining  the 
measure  of  its  growth  does  not  alter  its  character  or  involve  God's  com- 
plicity with  the  perverse  wills  which  cherish  it. 

2.     Rational  proof. 

A.  Arguments  a  priori  from  the  divine  attributes,     (a)    From  the 
immutability  of  God.     This  makes  it  certain  that  he  will  execute  his  eter- 
nal plan  of  the  universe  and  its  history.     But  the  execution  of  this  plan 
involves  not  only  creation  and  preservation,  but  also  providence.  ( 6  )  From 
the  benevolence  of  God.     This  renders  it  certain  that  he  will  care  for  the 
intelligent  universe  he  has  created.   What  it  was  worth  his  while  to  create, 
it  is  worth  his  while  to  care  for.    But  this  care  is  providence.     (  c )    From 
the  justice  of  God.     As  the  source  of  moral  law,  God  must  assure  the  vin- 
dication of  law  by  administering  justice  in  the  universe  and  punishing 
the  rebellious.     But  this  administration  of  justice  is  providence. 

B.  Arguments  a  posteriori  from  the  facts  of  nature  and  of  history. 
(  a  )  The  outward  lot  of  individuals  and  nations  is  not  wholly  in  their  own 
hands,  but  is  in  many  acknowledged  respects  subject  to  the  disposal  of  a 
higher  power.     ( 6 )    The  observed  moral  order  of  the  world,  although 
imperfect,  cannot  be  accounted  for  without  recognition  of  a  divine  provi- 
dence.    Vice  is  discouraged  and  virtue  rewarded,  in  ways  which  are  beyond 
the  power  of  mere  nature.     There  must  be  a  governing  mind  and  will,  and 
this  mind  and  will  must  be  the  mind  and  will  of  God. 

8 


114          NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

III.     THEOBIES  OPPOSING  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  PROVIDENCE. 

1.  Fatalism. 

Fatalism  maintains  the  certainty,  but  denies  the  freedom,  of  human  self- 
determination,  —  thus  substituting  fate  for  providence. 

To  this  view  we  object  that  (  a  )  it  contradicts  consciousness,  which  testi- 
fies that  we  are  free  ;  (  b  )  it  exalts  the  divine  power  at  the  expense  of 
God's  truth,  wisdom,  holiness,  love  ;  (  c  )  it  destroys  all  evidence  of  the 
personality  and  freedom  of  God  ;  (  d )  it  practically  makes  necessity  the 
only  God,  and  leaves  the  imperatives  of  our  moral  nature  without  present 
validity  or  future  vindication. 

2.  Casualism. 

Casualism  transfers  the  freedom  of  mind  to  nature,  as  fatalism  transfers 
the  fixity  of  nature  to  mind.  It  thus  exchanges  providence  for  chance. 

Upon  this  view  we  remark  : 

(  a  )  If  chance  be  only  another  name  for  human  ignorance,  a  name  for 
the  fact  that  there  are  trivial  occurrences  in  life  which  have  no  meaning  or 
relation  to  us,  —  we  may  acknowledge  this,  and  still  hold  that  providence 
arranges  every  so-called  chance,  for  purposes  beyond  our  knowledge. 
Chance,  in  this  sense,  is  providential  coincidence  which  we  cannot  under- 
stand, and  do  not  need  to  trouble  ourselves  about. 

(  6  )  If  chance  be  taken  in  the  sense  of  utter  absence  of  all  causal  con- 
nections in  the  phenomena  of  matter  and  mind,  —  we  oppose  to  this  notion 
the  fact  that  the  causal  judgment  is  formed  in  accordance  with  a  funda- 
mental and  necessary  law  of  human  thought,  and  that  no  science  or  knowl- 
edge is  possible  without  the  assumption  of  its  validity. 

( c )  If  chance  be  used  in  the  sense  of  undesigning  cause,  —  it  is  evi- 
dently insufficient  to  explain  the  regular  and  uniform  sequences  of  nature, 
or  the  moral  progress  of  the  human  race.  These  things  argue  a  superin- 
tending and  designing  mind  —  in  other  words,  a  providence.  Since  reason 
demands  not  only  a  cause,  but  a  sufficient  cause,  for  the  order  of  the  phys- 
ical and  moral  world,  casualism  must  be  ruled  out. 

3.  Theory  of  a  merely  general  providence. 

Many  who  acknowledge  God's  control  over  the  movements  of  planets 
and  the  destinies  of  nations  deny  any  divine  arrangement  of  particular 
events.  Most  of  the  arguments  against  deism  are  equally  valid  against  the 
theory  of  a  merely  general  providence.  This  view  is  indeed  only  a  form  of 
deism,  which  holds  that  God  has  not  wholly  withdrawn  himself  from  the 
universe,  but  that  his  activity  within  it  is  limited  to  the  maintenance  of 
general  laws. 

In  addition  to  the  arguments  above  alluded  to,  we  may  urge  against  this 
theory  that : 

(  a  )  General  control  over  the  course  of  nature  and  of  history  is  impossi- 
ble without  control  over  the  smallest  particulars  which  affect  the  course  of 
nature  and  of  history.  Incidents  so  slight  as  well-nigh  to  escape  observa- 


RELATIONS  OF  TFE  DOCTRINE  OF  PROVIDENCE.      115 

tion  at  the  time  of  their  occurrence  are  frequently  found  to  determine  the 
whole  future  of  a  human  life,  and  through  that  life  the  fortunes  of  a  whole 
empire  and  of  a  whole  age. 

(  6  )  The  love  of  God  which  prompts  a  general  care  for  the  universe  must 
also  prompt  a  particular  care  for  the  smallest  events  which  affect  the  happi- 
ness of  his  creatures.  It  belongs  to  love  to  regard  nothing  as  trifling  or 
beneath  its  notice  which  has  to  do  with  the  interests  of  the  object  of  its 
affection.  Infinite  love  may  therefore  be  expected  to  provide  for  all,  even 
the  minutest  things  in  the  creation.  Without  belief  in  this  particular  care, 
men  cannot  long  believe  in  God's  general  care.  Faith  in  a  particular  provi- 
dence is  indispensable  to  the  very  existence  of  practical  religion  ;  for  men 
will  not  worship  or  recognize  a  God  who  has  no  direct  relation  to  them. 

(  c )  In  times  of  personal  danger,  and  in  remarkable  conjunctures  of  pub- 
lic affairs,  men  instinctively  attribute  to  God  a  control  of  the  events  which 
take  place  around  them.  The  prayers  which  such  startling  emergencies 
force  from  men's  lips  are  proof  that  God  is  present  and  active  in  human 
affairs.  This  testimony  of  our  mental  constitution  must  be  regarded  as 
virtually  the  testimony  of  him  who  framed  this  constitution. 

(d}  Christian  experience  confirms  the  declarations  of  Scripture  that 
particular  events  are  brought  about  by  God  with  special  reference  to  the 
good  or  ill  of  the  individual.  Such  events  occur  at  times  in  such  direct 
connection  with  the  Christian's  prayers  that  no  doubt  remains  with  regard 
to  the  providential  arrangement  of  them.  The  possibility  of  such  divine 
agency  in  natural  events  cannot  be  questioned  by  one  who,  like  the  Chris- 
tian, has  had  experience  of  the  greater  wonders  of  regeneration  and  daily 
intercourse  with  God,  and  who  believes  in  the  reality  of  creation,  incarna- 
tion, and  miracles. 

IV.     KELATIONS  OF  THE  DOCTKINE  OF  PROVIDENCE. 
1.     To  miracles  and  works  of  grace. 

Particular  providence  is  the  agency  of  God  in  what  seem  to  us  the  minor 
affairs  of  nature  and  human  life.  Special  providence  is  only  an  instance 
of  God's  particular  providence  which  has  special  relation  to  us  or  makes 
peculiar  impression  upon  us.  It  is  special,  not  as  respects  the  means 
which  God  makes  use  of,  but  as  respects  the  effect  produced  upon  us.  In 
special  providence  we  have  only  a  more  impressive  manifestation  of  God's 
universal  control. 

Miracles  and  works  of  grace  like  regeneration  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
belonging  to  a  different  order  of  things  from  God's  special  providences. 
They  too,  like  special  providences,  may  have  their  natural  connections  and 
antecedents,  although  they  more  readily  suggest  their  divine  authorship. 
Nature  and  God  are  not  mutually  exclusive, — nature  is  rather  God's 
method  of  working.  Since  nature  is  only  the  manifestation  of  God,  special 
providence,  miracle,  and  regeneration  are  simply  different  degrees  of 
extraordinary  nature.  Certain  of  the  wonders  of  Scripture,  such  as  the 
destruction  of  Sennacherib's  army  and  the  dividing  of  the  Bed  Sea,  the 


116         NATURE,  DECREES,  AND  WORKS  OF  GOD. 

plagues  of  Egypt,  the  flight  of  quails,  and  the  draught  of  fishes,  can  be 
counted  as  exaggerations  of  natural  forces,  while  at  the  same  time  they  are 
operations  of  the  wonder-working  God. 

2.     To  prayer  and  its  answer. 

What  has  been  said  with  regard  to  God's  connection  with  nature  suggests 
the  question,  how  God  can  answer  prayer  consistently  with  the  fixity  of 
natural  law. 

A.  Negatively,  we  remark  that  the  true  solution  is  not  to  be  reached: 

(  a )  By  making  the  sole  effect  of  prayer  to  be  its  reflex  influence  upon 
the  petitioner.  —  Prayer  presupposes  a  God  who  hears  and  answers.  It 
will  not  be  offered,  unless  it  is  believed  to  accomplish  objective  as  well  as 
subjective  results. 

(  6 )  Nor  by  holding  that  God  answers  prayer  simply  by  spiritual  means, 
such  as  the  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  upon  the  spirit  of  man.  —  The  realm 
of  spirit  is  no  less  subject  to  law  than  the  realm  of  matter.  Scripture  and 
experience,  moreover,  alike  testify  that  in  answer  to  prayer  events  take 
place  in  the  outward  world  which  would  not  have  taken  place  if  prayer  had 
not  gone  before. 

( c  )  Nor  by  maintaining  that  God  suspends  or  breaks  in  upon  the  order 
of  nature,  in  answering  every  prayer  that  is  offered.  —  This  view  does  not 
take  account  of  natural  laws  as  having  objective  existence,  and  as  revealing 
the  order  of  God's  being.  Omnipotence  might  thus  suspend  natural  law, 
but  wisdom,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  would  not. 

( d  )  Nor  by  considering  prayer  as  a  physical  force,  linked  in  each  case  to 
its  answer,  as  physical  cause  is  linked  to  physical  effect. —  Prayer  is  not  a 
force  acting  directly  upon  nature  ;  else  there  would  be  no  discretion  as  to 
its  answer.  It  can  accomplish  results  in  nature,  only  as  it  influences  God. 

It  seems  more  in  accordance  with  both  Scripture  and  reason  to  say  that: 

B.  God  may  answer  prayer,  even  when  that  answer  involves  changes  in 
the  sequences  of  nature, — 

(  a )  By  new  combinations  of  natural  forces,  in  regions  withdrawn  from 
our  observation,  so  that  effects  are  produced  which  these  same  forces  left 
to  themselves  would  never  have  accomplished.  As  man  combines  the  laws 
of  chemical  attraction  and  of  combustion,  to  fire  the  gunpowder  and  split 
the  rock  asunder,  so  God  may  combine  the  laws  of  nature  to  bring  about 
answers  to  prayer.  In  all  this  there  may  be  no  suspension  or  violation  of 
law,  but  a  use  of  law  unknown  to  us. 

Since  prayer  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  appeal  to  a  personal  and 
present  God,  whose  granting  or  withholding  of  the  requested  blessing  is 
believed  to  be  determined  by  the  prayer  itself,  we  must  conclude  that 
prayer  moves  God,  or,  in  other  words,  induces  the  putting  forth  on  his 
part  of  an  imperative  volition. 

(  6 )  God  may  have  so  prearranged  the  laws  of  the  material  universe  and 
the  events  of  history  that,  while  the  answer  to  prayer  is  an  expression  of 


RELATIONS  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  PROVIDENCE.      11? 

his  will,  it  is  granted  through  the  working  of  natural  agencies,  and  in  per- 
fect accordance  with  the  general  principle  that  results,  both  temporal  and 
spiritual,  are  to  be  attained  by  intelligent  creatures  through  the  use  of  the 
appropriate  and  appointed  means. 

Since  God  is  immanent  in  nature,  an  answer  to  prayer,  coming  about 
through  the  intervention  of  natural  law,  may  be  as  real  a  revelation  of 
God's  personal  care  as  if  the  laws  of  nature  were  suspended,  and  God  inter- 
posed by  an  exercise  of  his  creative  power.  Prayer  and  its  answer,  though 
having  God's  immediate  volition  as  their  connecting  bond,  may  yet  be 
provided  for  in  the  original  plan  of  the  universe. 

C.  If  asked  whether  this  relation  between  prayer  and  its  providential 
answer  can  be  scientifically  tested,  we  reply  that  it  may  be  tested  just  as  a 
father's  love  may  be  tested  by  a  dutiful  son. 

( a )  There  is  a  general  proof  of  it  in  the  past  experience  of  the  Chris- 
tian and  in  the  past  history  of  the  church. 

(  6  )  In  condescension  to  human  blindness,  God  may  sometimes  submit 
to  a  formal  test  of  his  faithfulness  and  power, — as  in  the  case  of  Elijah 
and  the  priests  of  Baal. 

(c)  When  proof  sufficient  to  convince  the  candid  inquirer  has  been 
already  given,  it  may  not  consist  with  the  divine  majesty  to  abide  a  test 
imposed  by  mere  curiosity  or  scepticism, —  as  in  the  case  of  the  Jews  who 
sought  a  sign  from  heaven. 

(d)  Since  God's  will  is  the  link  between  prayer  and  its  answer,  there 
can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  physical  demonstration  of  its  efficacy  in  any  pro- 
posed case.     Physical  tests  have  no  application  to  things  into  which  free 
will  enters  as  a  constitutive  element.     But  there  are  moral  tests,  and  moral 
tests  are  as  scientific  as  physical  tests  can  be. 

3.     To  Christian  activity. 

Here  the  truth  lies  between  the  two  extremes  of  quietism  and  naturalism. 

( a)  In  opposition  to  the  false  abnegation  of  human  reason  and  will  which 
quietism  demands,  we  hold  that  God  guides  us,  not  by  continual  miracle, 
but  by  his  natural  providence  and  the  energizing  of  our  faculties  by  his 
Spirit,  so  that  we  rationally  and  freely  do  our  own  work,  and  work  out 
our  own  salvation. 

( 6 )  In  opposition  to  naturalism,  we  hold  that  God  is  continually  near 
the  human  spirit  by  his  providential  working,  and  that  this  providential 
working  is  so  adjusted  to  the  Christian's  nature  and  necessities  as  to  fur- 
nish instruction  with  regard  to  duty,  discipline  of  religious  character,  and 
needed  help  and  comfort  in  trial. 

In  interpreting  God's  providences,  as  in  interpreting  Scripture,  we  are 
dependent  upon  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  work  of  the  Spirit  is,  indeed,  in 
great  part  an  application  of  Scripture  truth  to  present  circumstances. 
While  we  never  allow  ourselves  to  act  blindly  and  irrationally,  but  accus- 
tom ourselves  to  weigh  evidence  with  regard  to  duty,  we  are  to  expect,  as 
the  gift  of  the  Spirit,  an  understanding  of  circumstances — a  fine  sense  of 


118  NATURE,    DECREES,    AND   WORKS   OF   GOD. 

God's  providential  purposes  with  regard  to  us,  which  will  make  our  true 
course  plain  to  ourselves,  although  we  may  not  always  be  able  to  explain  it 
to  others. 

4.     To  the  evil  acts  of  free  agents. 

(a)  Here  we  must  distinguish  between  the  natural  agency  and  the 
moral  agency  of  God,  or  between  acts  of  permissive  providence  and  acts 
of  efficient  causation.  We  are  ever  to  remember  that  God  neither  works 
evil,  nor  causes  his  creatures  to  work  evil.  All  sin  is  chargeable  to  the  self- 
will  and  perversity  of  the  creature ;  to  declare  God  the  author  of  it  is 
the  greatest  of  blasphemies. 

( 6 )  But  while  man  makes  up  his  evil  decision  independently  of  God, 
God  does,  by  his  natural  agency,  order  the  method  in  which  this  inward 
evil  shall  express  itself,  by  limiting  it  in  time,  place,  and  measure,  or  by 
guiding  it  to  the  end  which  his  wisdom  and  love,  and  not  man's  intent,  has 
set.  In  all  this,  however,  God  only  allows  sin  to  develop  itself  after  its 
own  nature,  so  that  it  may  be  known,  abhorred,  and  if  possible  overcome 
and  forsaken. 

( c )  In  cases  of  persistent  iniquity,  God's  providence  still  compels  the 
sinner  to  accomplish  the  design  with  which  he  and  all  things  have  been 
created,  namely,  the  manifestation  of  God's  holiness.  Even  though  he 
struggle  against  God's  plan,  yet  he  must  by  his  very  resistance  serve  it. 
His  sin  is  made  its  own  detector,  judge,  and  tormentor.  His  character  and 
doom  are  made  a  warning  to  others.  Befusing  to  glorify  God  in  his  salva- 
tion, he  is  made  to  glorify  God  in  his  destruction. 


SECTION   IV. — GOOD   AND   EVIL   ANGELS. 

As  ministers  of  divine  providence  there  is  a  class  of  finite  beings,  greater 
in  intelligence  and  power  than  man  in  his  present  state,  some  of  whom 
positively  serve  God's  purpose  by  holiness  and  voluntary  execution  of  his 
will,  some  negatively,  by  giving  examples  to  the  universe  of  defeated  and 
punished  rebellion,  and  by  illustrating  God's  distinguishing  grace  in  man's 
salvation. 

The  scholastic  subtleties  which  encumbered  this  doctrine  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  the  exaggerated  representations  of  the  power  of  evil  spirits 
which  then  prevailed,  have  led,  by  a  natural  reaction,  to  an  undue  depre- 
ciation of  it  in  more  recent  times. 

But  there  is  certainly  a  possibility  that  the  ascending  scale  of  created 
intelligences  does  not  reach  its  topmost  point  in  man.  As  the  distance 
between  man  and  the  lowest  forms  of  life  is  filled  in  with  numberless  gra- 
dations of  being,  so  it  is  possible  that  between  man  and  God  there  exist 
creatures  of  higher  than  human  intelligence.  This  possibility  is  turned  to 
certainty  by  the  express  declarations  of  Scripture.  The  doctrine  is  inter- 
woven with  the  later  as  well  as  with  the  earlier  books  of  revelation. 


SCBIPTURE   STATEMENTS   AND   INTIMATIONS.  119 

1.  SCBIPTUEE  STATEMENTS  AND  INTIMATIONS. 
1.     As  to  the  nature  and  attributes  of  angels, 
(a)  They  are  created  beings. 

(6)  They  are  incorporeal  beings. 

(  c )  They  are  personal — that  is,  intelligent  and  voluntary  —  agents. 

( d )  They  are  possessed  of  superhuman  intelligence  and  power,  yet  an 
intelligence  and  power  that  has  its  fixed  limits. 

( e )  They  are  an  order  of  intelligences  distinct  from  man  and  older 
than  man. 

The  constant  representation  of  angels  as  personal  beings  in  Scripture 
cannot  be  explained  as  a  personification  of  abstract  good  and  evil,  in  accom- 
modation to  Jewish  superstitions,  without  wresting  many  narrative  passages 
from  their  obvious  sense  ;  implying  on  the  part  of  Christ  either  dissimu- 
lation or  ignorance  as  to  an  important  point  of  doctrine ;  and  surrendering 
belief  in  the  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament  from  which  these  Jewish 
views  of  angelic  beings  were  derived. 

The  same  remark  applies  to  the  view  which  regards  Satan  as  but  a  col- 
lective term  for  all  evil  beings,  human  or  superhuman.  The  Scripture 
representations  of  the  progressive  rage  of  the  great  adversary,  from  his  first 
assault  on  human  virtue  in  Genesis  to  his  final  overthrow  in  Revelation, 
join  with  the  testimony  of  Christ  just  mentioned,  to  forbid  any  other  con- 
clusion than  this,  that  there  is  a  personal  being  of  great  power,  who  carries 
on  organized  opposition  to  the  divine  government. 

2.  As  to  their  number  and  organization, 
(a)  They  are  of  great  multitude. 

(  b )  They  constitute  a  company,  as  distinguished  from  a  race. 

(  c  )  They  are  of  various  ranks  and  endowments. 

(d)  They  have  an  organization. 

With  regard  to  the  '  cherubim '  of  Genesis,  Exodus,  and  Ezekiel,  —  with 
which  the  '  seraphim '  of  Isaiah  and  the  '  living  creatures '  of  the  book  of 
Eevelation  are  to  be  identified,  —  the  most  probable  interpretation  is  that 
which  regards  them,  not  as  actual  beings  of  higher  rank  than  man,  but  as 
symbolic  appearances,  intended  to  represent  redeemed  humanity,  endowed 
with  all  the  creature  perfections  lost  by  the  Fall,  and  made  to  be  the 
dwelling-place  of  God. 

3.  As  to  their  moral  character. 
( a  )  They  were  all  created  holy. 

( b  )  They  had  a  probation. 

( c  )  Some  preserved  their  integrity. 

(d)  Some  fell  from  their  state  of  innocence. 

( e )  The  good  are  confirmed  in  good. 


120  NATURE,    DECREES,    AND   WORKS   OF   GOD. 

(/)  The  evil  are  confirmed  in  evil. 

4.    As  to  their  employments. 

A.  The  employments  of  good  angels. 

(a)  They  stand  in  the  presence  of  God  and  worship  him. 

(  b )  They  rejoice  in  God's  works. 

( c  )  They  execute  God's  will,  —  by  working  in  nature  ; 

(  d  )  by  guiding  the  affairs  of  nations  ; 

(  e  )  by  watching  over  the  interests  of  particular  churches  ; 

(/)  by  assisting  and  protecting  individual  believers  ; 

(#)  by  punishing  God's  enemies. 

A  general  survey  of  this  Scripture  testimony  as  to  the  employments  of 
good  angels  leads  us  to  the  following  conclusions  : 

First,  —  that  good  angels  are  not  to  be  considered  as  the  mediating 
agents  of  God's  regular  and  common  providence,  but  as  the  ministers  of 
his  special  providence  in  the  affairs  of  his  church.  He  *  maketh  his  angels 
winds '  and  '  a  flaming  fire,'  not  in  his  ordinary  procedure,  but  in  connec- 
tion with  special  displays  of  his  power  for  moral  ends  (  Deut.  33  : 2  ;  Acts 
7  :  53  ;  Gal.  3  : 19 ;  Heb.  2:2).  Their  intervention  is  apparently  occasional 
and  exceptional — not  at  their  own  option,  but  only  as  it  is  permitted  or 
commanded  by  God.  Hence  we  are  not  to  conceive  of  angels  as  coining 
between  us  and  God,  nor  are  we,  without  special  revelation  of  the  fact,  to 
attribute  to  them  in  any  particular  case  the  effects  which  the  Scriptures 
generally  ascribe  to  divine  providence.  Like  miracles,  therefore,  angelic 
appearances  generally  mark  God's  entrance  upon  new  epochs  in  the  unfold- 
ing of  his  plans.  Hence  we  read  of  angels  at  the  completion  of  creation 
(Job  38  : 7 ) ;  at  the  giving  of  the  law  (  Gal.  3  : 19 )  ;  at  the  birth  of  Christ 
(Luke  2  : 13) ;  at  the  two  temptations  in  the  wilderness  and  in  Gethsemane 
( Mat.  4  : 11,  Luke  22  :43 ) ;  at  the  resurrection  (Mat.  28  : 2 ) ;  at  the  ascen- 
sion (  Acts  1 :10) ;  at  the  final  judgment  ( Mat.  25  :31 ). 

Secondly,  — that  their  power,  as  being  in  its  nature  dependent  and  derived, 
is  exercised  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  spiritual  and  natural  world. 
They  cannot,  like  God,  create,  perform  miracles,  act  without  means,  search 
the  heart.  Unlike  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  can  influence  the  human  mind 
directly,  they  can  influence  men  only  in  ways  analogous  to  those  by  which 
men  influence  each  other.  As  evil  angels  may  tempt  men  to  sin,  so  it  is 
probable  that  good  angels  may  attract  men  to  holiness. 

B.  The  employments  of  evil  angels. 

(  a  )  They  oppose  God  and  strive  to  defeat  his  will.  This  is  indicated 
in  the  names  applied  to  their  chief.  The  word  "Satan"  means  "adver- 
sary"—  primarily  to  God,  secondarily  to  men  ;  the  term  "  devil"  signifies 
"slanderer "  —  of  God  to  men,  and  of  men  to  God.  It  is  indicated  also  in 
the  description  of  the  "man  of  sin"  as  "he  that  opposeth  and  exalteth 
himself  against  all  that  is  called  God. " 


OBJECTIONS  TO  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   ANGELS.  121 

( 6 )  They  hinder  man's  temporal  and  eternal  welfare,  —  sometimes  by 
exercising  a  certain  control  over  natural  phenomena,  but  more  commonly 
by  subjecting  man's  soul  to  temptation.  Possession  of  man's  being,  either 
physical  or  spiritual,  by  demons,  is  also  recognized  in  Scripture. 

Satan's  temptations  are  represented  as  both  negative  and  positive, —  he 
takes  away  the  seed  sown,  and  he  sows  tares.  He  controls  many  subordi- 
nate evil  spirits  ;  there  is  only  one  devil,  but  there  are  many  angels  or 
demons,  and  through  their  agency  Satan  may  accomplish  his  purposes. 

Possession  is  distinguished  from  bodily  or  mental  disease,  though  such 
disease  often  accompanies  possession  or  results  from  it.  —  The  demons 
speak  in  their  own  persons,  with  supernatural  knowledge,  and  they  are 
directly  addressed  by  Christ.  Jesus  recognizes  Satanic  agency  in  these 
cases  of  possession,  and  he  rejoices  in  the  casting  out  of  demons,  as  a  sign 
of  Satan's  downfall.  These  facts  render  it  impossible  to  interpret  the 
narratives  of  demoniac  possession  as  popular  descriptions  of  abnormal 
physical  or  mental  conditions. 

( c )  Yet,  in  spite  of  themselves,  they  execute  God's  plans  of  punishing 
the  ungodly,  of  chastening  the  good,  and  of  illustrating  the  nature  and 
fate  of  moral  evil. 

A  survey  of  the  Scripture  testimony  with  regard  to  the  employments  of 
evil  spirits  leads  to  the  following  general  conclusions  : 

First, — the  power  of  evil  spirits  over  men  is  not  independent  of  the 
human  will.  This  power  cannot  be  exercised  without  at  least  the  original 
consent  of  the  human  will,  and  may  be  resisted  and  shaken  off  through 
prayer  and  faith  in  God. 

Secondly, —  their  power  is  limited,  both  in  time  and  in  extent,  by  the 
permissive  will  of  God.  Evil  spirits  are  neither  omnipotent,  omniscient, 
nor  omnipresent.  We  are  to  attribute  disease  and  natural  calamity  to  their 
agency,  only  when  this  is  matter  of  special  revelation.  Opposed  to  God  as 
evil  spirits  are,  God  compels  them  to  serve  his  purposes.  Their  power  for 
harm  lasts  but  for  a  season,  and  ultimate  judgment  and  punishment  will 
vindicate  God's  permission  of  their  evil  agency. 

II.     OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  DOCTBINE  OF  ANGELS. 

1.     To  the  doctrine  of  angels  in  general.     It  is  objected : 

( a  )  That  it  is  opposed  to  the  modern  scientific  view  of  the  world,  as  a 
system  of  definite  forces  and  laws. — We  reply  that,  whatever  truth  there 
may  be  in  this  modern  view,  it  does  not  exclude  the  play  of  divine  or 
human  free  agency.  It  does  not,  therefore,  exclude  the  possibility  of  angelic 
agency. 

(  6  )  That  it  is  opposed  to  the  modern  doctrine  of  infinite  space  above 
and  beneath  us  —  a  space  peopled  with  worlds.  With  the  surrender  of  the 
old  conception  of  the  firmament,  as  a  boundary  separating  this  world  from 
the  regions  beyond,  it  is  claimed  that  we  must  give  up  all  belief  in  a  heaven 
of  the  angels. — We  reply  that  the  notions  of  an  infinite  universe,  of  heaven 
as  a  definite  place,  and  of  spirits  as  confined  to  fixed  locality,  are  without 


122  NATURE,    DECREES,    AND   WORKS   OF   GOD. 

certain  warrant  either  in  reason  or  in  Scripture.     We  know  nothing  of  the 
modes  of  existence  of  pure  spirits. 

2.  To  the  doctrine  of  evil  angels  in  particular.  It  is  objected  that : 
(  a )  The  idea  of  the  fall  of  angels  is  self -contradictory,  since  a  fall  deter, 
mined  by  pride  presupposes  pride  —  that  is,  a  fall  before  the  fall. — We 
reply  that  the  objection  confounds  the  occasion  of  sin  with  the  sin  itself. 
The  outward  motive  to  disobedience  is  not  disobedience.  The  fall  took 
place  only  when  that  outward  motive  was  chosen  by  free  will.  When  the 
motive  of  independence  was  selfishly  adopted,  only  then  did  the  innocent 
desire  for  knowledge  and  power  become  pride  and  sin.  How  an  evil  voli- 
tion could  originate  in  spirits  created  pure  is  an  insoluble  problem.  Our 
faith  in  God's  holiness,  however,  compels  us  to  attribute  the  origin  of  this 
evil  volition,  not  to  the  Creator,  but  to  the  creature. 

(  b )  It  is  irrational  to  suppose  that  Satan  should  have  been  able  to 
change  his  whole  nature  by  a  single  act,  so  that  he  thenceforth  willed  only 
evil. —  But  we  reply  that  the  circumstances  of  that  decision  are  unknown 
to  us ;  while  the  power  of  single  acts  permanently  to  change  character  is 
matter  of  observation  among  men. 

(c)  It  is  impossible  that  so  wise  a  being  should  enter  upon  a  hopeless 
rebellion. — We  answer  that  no  amount  of  mere  knowledge  ensures  right 
moral  action.     If  men  gratify  present  passion,  in  spite  of  their  knowledge 
that  the  sin  involves  present  misery  and  future  perdition,  it  is  not  impossi- 
ble that  Satan  may  have  done  the  same. 

(d)  It  is  inconsistent  with  the  benevolence  of  God  to  create  and  uphold 
spirits,  who  he  knows  will  be  and  do  evil. — We  reply  that  this  is  no  more 
inconsistent  with  God's  benevolence  than  the  creation  and  preservation  of 
men,  whose  action  God  overrules  for  the  furtherance  of  his  purposes,  and 
whose  iniquity  he  finally  brings  to  light  and  punishes. 

(e)  The  notion  of  organization  among  evil  spirits  is  self-contradictory, 
since  the  nature  of  evil  is  to  sunder  and  divide.— We  reply  that  such 
organization  of  evil  spirits  is  no  more  impossible  than  the  organization  of 
wicked  men,  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  their  selfish  ends.     Common 
hatred  to  God  may  constitute  a  principle  of  union  among  them,  as  among 
men. 

(/)  The  doctrine  is  morally  pernicious,  as  transferring  the  blame  of 
human  sin  to  the  being  or  beings  who  tempt  men  thereto. — We  reply  that 
neither  conscience  nor  Scripture  allows  temptation  to  be  an  excuse  for  sin, 
or  regards  Satan  as  having  power  to  compel  the  human  will.  The  objection, 
moreo™r,  contradicts  our  observation, — for  only  where  the  personal  exist- 
ence ri  Satan  is  recognized,  do  we  find  sin  recognized  in  its  true  nature. 

(g)  The  doctrine  degrades  man,  by  representing  him  as  the  tool  and 
slave  of  Satan.  —  We  reply  that  it  does  indeed  show  his  actual  state  to  be 
degraded,  but  only  with  the  result  of  exalting  our  idea  of  his  original 
dignity,  and  of  his  possible  glory  in  Christ.  The  fact  that  man's  sin  was 
suggested  from  without,  and  not  from  within,  may  be  the  one  mitigating 
circumstance  which  renders  possible  his  redemption. 


PRACTICAL  USES  OF  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  ANGELS.  123 

HE.       PBACTICAIi  USES  OF  THE   DOCTKINE   OP  ANGELS. 

A.  Uses  of  the  doctrine  of  good  angels. 

(a)  It  gives  us  a  new  sense  of  the  greatness  of  the  divine  resources,  and 
of  God's  grace  in  our  creation,  to  think  of  the  multitude  of  unfallen  intel- 
ligences who  executed  the  divine  purposes  before  man  appeared. 

( b  )  It  strengthens  our  faith  in  God's  providential  care,  to  know  that 
spirits  of  so  high  rank  are  deputed  to  minister  to  creatures  who  are 
environed  with  temptations  and  are  conscious  of  sin. 

(  c  )  It  teaches  us  humility,  that  beings  of  so  much  greater  knowledge 
and  power  than  ours  should  gladly  perform  these  unnoticed  services,  in 
behalf  of  those  whose  only  claim  upon  them  is  that  they  are  children  of 
the  same  common  Father. 

( d  )  It  helps  us  in  the  struggle  against  sin,  to  learn  that  these  messen- 
gers of  God  are  near,  to  mark  our  wrong  doing  if  we  fall,  and  to  sustain  us 
if  we  resist  temptation. 

(  e  )  It  enlarges  our  conceptions  of  the  dignity  of  our  own  being,  and  of 
the  boundless  possibilities  of  our  future  existence,  to  remember  these 
forms  of  typical  innocence  and  love,  that  praise  and  serve  God  unceasingly 
in  heaven. 

B.  Uses  of  the  doctrine  of  evil  angels. 

(a)  It  illustrates  the  real  nature  of  sin,  and  the  depth  of  the  ruin  to 
which  it  may  bring  the  soul,  to  reflect  upon  the  present  moral  condition 
and  eternal  wretchedness  to  which  these  spirits,  so  highly  endowed,  have 
brought  themselves  by  their  rebellion  against  God. 

(  b )  It  inspires  a  salutary  fear  and  hatred  of  the  first  subtle  approaches 
of  evil  from  within  or  from  without,  to  remember  that  these  may  be  the 
covert  advances  of  a  personal  and  malignant  being,  who  seeks  to  overcome 
our  virtue  and  to  involve  us  in  his  own  apostasy  and  destruction. 

(  c  )  It  shuts  us  up  to  Christ,  as  the  only  Being  who  is  able  to  deliver 
us  or  others  from  the  enemy  of  ah1  good. 

(  d )  It  teaches  us  that  our  salvation  is  wholly  of  grace,  since  for  such 
multitudes  of  rebellious  spirits  no  atonement  and  no  renewal  were  provided 
—  simple  justice  having  its  way,  with  no  mercy  to  interpose  or  save. 


PAET  V. 

ANTHROPOLOGY,  OK  THE  DOCTEINE  OF  MAN. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PRELIMINARY. 

1.    MAN  A  CREATION  OF  GOD  AND  A  CHILD  OF  GOD. 

The  fact  of  man's  creation  is  declared  in  Gen.  1  :  27 —  "And  God  created 
man  in  his  own  image,  in  the  image  of  God  created  he  him  " ;  2:7  —  "And 
Jehovah  God  formed  man  of  the  dust  of  the  ground,  and  breathed  into 
his  nostrils  the  breath  of  life  ;  and  man  became  a  living  soul. " 

(a)  The  Scriptures,  on  the  one  hand,  negative  the  idea  that  man  is  the 
mere  product  of  unreasoning  natural  forces.  They  refer  his  existence  to  a 
cause  different  from  mere  nature,  namely,  the  creative  act  of  God. 

(6)  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Scriptures  do  not  disclose  the  method 
of  man's  creation.  Whether  man's  physical  system  is  or  is  not  derived, 
by  natural  descent,  from  the  lower  animals,  the  record  of  creation  does  not 
inform  us.  As  the  command  "Let  the  earth  bring  forth  living  creatures  " 
(  Gen.  1 :  24 )  does  not  exclude  the  idea  of  mediate  creation,  through 
natural  generation,  so  the  forming  of  man  "of  the  dust  of  the  ground" 
(  Gen.  2:7)  does  not  in  itself  determine  whether  the  creation  of  man's  body 
was  mediate  or  immediate. 

(c)  Psychology,  however,  comes  in  to  help  our  interpretation  of  Script- 
ure.   The  radical  differences  between   man's  soul  and  the  principle  of 
intelligence  in  the  lower  animals,  especially  man's  possession  of  self-con- 
sciousness, general  ideas,  the  moral  sense,  and  the  power  of  self-determin- 
ation, show  that  that  which  chiefly  constitutes  him  man  could  not  have  been 
derived,  by  any  natural  process  of  development,  from  the  inferior  creatures. 
We  are  compelled,  then,  to  believe  that  God's  "breathing  into  man's  nos- 
trils the  breath  of  life  "  (Gen.  2:7),  though  it  was  a  mediate  creation  as 
presupposing  existing  material  in  the  shape  of  animal  forms,  was  yet  an 
immediate  creation  in  the  sense  that  only  a  divine  reinforcement  of  the 
process  of  life  turned  the  animal  into  man.     In  other  words,  man  came 
not  from  the  brute,  but  through  the  brute,  and  the  same  immanent  God 
who  had  previously  created  the  brute  created  also  the  man. 

(d)  Comparative  physiology,  moreover,  has,  up  to  the  present  time, 
done  nothing  to  forbid  the  extension  of  this  doctrine  to  man's  body.     No 
single  instance  has  yet  been  adduced  of  the  transformation  of  one  animal 
species  into  another,  either  by  natural  or  artificial  selection  ;  much  less  has 
it  been  demonstrated  that  the  body  of  the  brute  has  ever  been  developed 

134 


UNITY   OF  THE   HUMAN"   RACE.  125 

into  that  of  man.  All  evolution  implies  progress  and  reinforcement  of  life, 
and  is  unintelligible  except  as  the  immanent  God  gives  new  impulses  to  the 
process.  Apart  from  the  direct  agency  of  God,  the  view  that  man's 
physical  system  is  descended  by  natural  generation  from  some  ancestral 
simian  form  can  be  regarded  only  as  an  irrational  hypothesis.  Since  the 
soul,  then,  is  an  immediate  creation  of  God,  and  the  forming  of  man's  body 
is  mentioned  by  the  Scripture  writer  in  direct  connection  with  this  creation 
of  the  spirit,  man's  body  was  in  this  sense  an  immediate  creation  also. 

( e )  While  we  concede,  then,  that  man  has  a  brute  ancestry,  we  make 
two  claims  by  way  of  qualification  and  explanation :  first,  that  the  laws 
of  organic  development  which  have  been  followed  in  man's  origin  are  only 
the  methods  of  God  and  proofs  of  his  creatorship ;  secondly,  that  man, 
when  he  appears  upon  the  scene,  is  no  longer  brute,  but  a  self-conscious 
and  self-determining  being,  made  in  the  image  of  his  Creator  and  capable 
of  free  moral  decision  between  good  and  evil. 

\f}  The  truth  that  man  is  the  offspring  of  God  implies  the  correlative 
truth  of  a  common  divine  Fatherhood.  God  is  Father  of  all  men,  in  that 
he  originates  and  sustains  them  as  personal  beings  like  in  nature  to  him- 
self. Even  toward  sinners  God  holds  this  natural  relation  of  Father.  It 
is  his  fatherly  love,  indeed,  which  provides  the  atonement.  Thus  the 
demands  of  holiness  are  met  and  the  prodigal  is  restored  to  the  privileges 
of  sonship  which  have  been  forfeited  by  transgression.  This  natural 
Fatherhood,  therefore,  does  not  exclude,  but  prepares  the  way  for,  God's 
special  Fatherhood  toward  those  who  have  been  regenerated  by  his  Spirit 
and  who  have  believed  on  his  Son ;  indeed,  since  all  God's  creations  take 
place  in  and  through  Christ,  there  is  a  natural  and  physical  sonship  of  all 
men,  by  virtue  of  their  relation  to  Christ,  the  eternal  Son,  which  antedates 
and  prepares  the  way  for  the  spiritual  sonship  of  those  who  join  themselves 
to  him  by  faith.  Man's  natural  sonship  underlies  the  history  of  the  fall, 
and  qualifies  the  doctrine  of  Sin. 

II.    UNITY  OF  THE  HUMAN  BAOB. 

( a )  The  Scriptures  teach  that  the  whole  human  race  is  descended  from 
a  single  pair. 

(  6 )  This  truth  lies  at  the  foundation  of  Paul's  doctrine  of  the  organic 
unity  of  mankind  in  the  first  transgression,  and  of  the  provision  of  salva- 
tion for  the  race  in  Christ. 

(c)  This  descent  of  humanity  from  a  single  pair  also  constitutes  the 
ground  of  man's  obligation  of  natural  brotherhood  to  every  member  of 
the  race. 

The  Scripture  statements  are  corroborated  by  considerations  drawn  from 
history  and  science.  Four  arguments  may  be  briefly  mentioned  : 

1.     The  argument  from  history. 

So  far  as  the  history  of  nations  and  tribes  in  both  hemispheres  can  be 
traced,  the  evidence  points  to  a  common  origin  and  ancestry  in  central  Asia. 


126  ANTHROPOLOGY,   OE  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

2.  The  argument  from  language. 

Comparative  philology  points  to  a  common  origin  of  all  the  more  impor- 
tant languages,  and  furnishes  no  evidence  that  the  less  important  are  not 
also  so  derived. 

3.  The  argument  from  psychology. 

The  existence,  among  all  families  of  mankind,  of  common  mental  and 
moral  characteristics,  as  evinced  in  common  maxims,  tendencies  and  capaci- 
ties, in  the  prevalence  of  similar  traditions,  and  in  the  universal  applicability 
of  one  philosophy  and  religion,  is  most  easily  explained  upon  the  theory 
of  a  common  origin. 

4.  The  argument  from  physiology. 

A.  It  is  the  common  judgment  of  comparative  physiologists  that  man 
constitutes  but  a  single  species.     The  differences  which  exist  between  the 
various  families  of  mankind  are  to  be  regarded  as  varieties  of  this  species. 
In  proof  of  these  statements  we  urge  :      (  a  )  The  numberless  intermediate 
gradations  which  connect  the  so-called  races  with  each  other.     (6)  The 
essential  identity  of  all  races  in  cranial,  osteological,  and  dental  character- 
istics.    (  c  )  The  fertility  of  unions  between  individuals  of  the  most  diverse 
types,  and  the  continuous  fertility  of  the  offspring  of  such  unions. 

B.  Unity  of  species  is  presumptive  evidence  of  unity  of  origin.     One- 
ness of  origin  furnishes  the  simplest  explanation  of  specific  uniformity,  if 
indeed  the  very  conception  of  species  does  not  imply  the  repetition  and 
reproduction  of  a  primordial  type-idea  impressed  at  its  creation  upon  an 
individual  empowered  to  transmit  this  type-idea  to  its  successors. 

(a)  To  this  view  is  opposed  the  theory,  propounded  by  Agassiz,  of 
different  centres  of  creation,  and  of  different  types  of  humanity  correspond- 
ing to  the  varying  fauna  and  flora  of  each.  But  this  theory  makes  the 
plural  origin  of  man  an  exception  in  creation.  Science  points  rather  to 
a  single  origin  of  each  species,  whether  vegetable  or  animal.  If  man  be, 
as  this  theory  grants,  a  single  species,  he  should  be,  by  the  same  rule, 
restricted  to  one  continent  in  his  origin.  This  theory,  moreover,  applies  an 
unproved  hypothesis  with  regard  to  the  distribution  of  organized  beings  in 
general  to  the  very  being  whose  whole  nature  and  history  show  conclusively 
that  he  is  an  exception  to  such  a  general  rule,  if  one  exists.  Since  man  can 
adapt  himself  to  all  climes  and  conditions,  the  theory  of  separate  centres  of 
creation  is,  in  his  case,  gratuitous  and  unnecessary. 

(6)  It  is  objected,  moreover,  that  the  diversities  of  size,  color,  and 
physical  conformation,  among  the  various  families  of  mankind,  are  incon- 
sistent with  the  theory  of  a  common  origin.  But  we  reply  that  these 
diversities  are  of  a  superficial  character,  and  can  be  accounted  for  by  cor- 
responding diversities  of  condition  and  environment.  Changes  which  have 
been  observed  and  recorded  within  historic  times  show  that  the  differences 
alluded  to  may  be  the  result  of  slowly  accumulated  divergences  from  one 
and  the  same  original  and  ancestral  type.  The  difficulty  in  the  case,  more- 
over, is  greatly  relieved  when  we  remember  ( 1 )  that  the  period  during 


ESSENTIAL   ELEMENTS   OF   HUMAN   NATURE. 

which  these  divergences  have  arisen  is  by  no  means  limited  to  six  thousand 
years  (  see  note  on  the  antiquity  of  the  race,  page  62  ) ;  and  (  2  )  that,  since 
species  in  general  exhibit  their  greatest  power  of  divergence  into  varieties 
immediately  after  their  first  introduction,  all  the  varieties  of  the  human 
species  may  have  presented  themselves  in  man's  earliest  history. 

III.     ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS  OF  HUMAN  NATTJKE. 

1.  The  Dichotomous  Theory. 

Man  has  a  two-fold  nature,  —  on  the  one  hand  material,  on  the  other  hand 
immaterial.  He  consists  of  body,  and  of  spirit,  or  soul.  That  there  are 
two,  and  only  two,  elements  in  man's  being,  is  a  fact  to  which  consciousness 
testifies.  This  testimony  is  confirmed  by  Scripture,  in  which  the  prevailing 
representation  of  man's  constitution  is  that  of  dichotomy. 

(  a  )  The  record  of  man's  creation  ( Gen.  2:7),  in  which,  as  a  result  of 
the  inbreathing  of  the  divine  Spirit,  the  body  becomes  possessed  and 
vitalized  by  a  single  principle  —  the  living  soul. 

(  b  )  Passages  in  which  the  human  soul,  or  spirit,  is  distinguished,  both 
from  the  divine  Spirit  from  whom  it  proceeded,  and  from  the  body  which 
it  inhabits. 

( c  )  The  interchangeable  use  of  the  terms  '  soul '  and  'spirit.' 

( d  )  The  mention  of  body  and  soul  (  or  spirit )  as  together  constituting 
the  whole  man. 

2.  The   Trichotomous   Theory. 

Side  by  side  with  this  common  representation  of  human  nature  as  con- 
sisting of  two  parts,  are  found  passages  which  at  first  sight  appear  to  favor 
trichotomy.  It  must  be  acknowledged  that  ^vev^a  (spirit)  and  tyvxfy  (soul), 
although  often  used  interchangeably,  and  always  designating  the  same 
indivisible  substance,  are  sometimes  employed  as  contrasted  terms. 

In  this  more  accurate  use,  ^vx'n  denotes  man's  immaterial  part  in  its  infe- 
rior powers  and  activities ;  —  as  iforf,  man  is  a  conscious  individual,  and,  in 
common  with  the  brute  creation,  has  an  animal  life,  together  with  appetite, 
imagination,  memory,  understanding.  Hvevfia,  on  the  other  hand,  denotes 
man's  immaterial  part  in  its  higher  capacities  and  faculties; — as  frvev/ua, 
man  is  a  being  related  to  God,  and  possessing  powers  of  reason,  conscience, 
and  free  will,  which  difference  him  from  the  brute  creation  and  constitute 
him  responsible  and  immortal. 

The  element  of  truth  in  trichotomy  is  simply  this,  that  man  has  a  triplic- 
ity  of  endowment,  in  virtue  of  which  the  single  soul  has  relations  to  matter, 
to  self,  and  to  God.  The  trichotomous  theory,  however,  as  it  is  ordinarily 
defined,  endangers  the  unity  and  immateriality  of  our  higher  nature,  by 
holding  that  man  consists  of  three  substances,  or  three  component  parts — 
body,  soul,  and  spirit — and  that  soul  and  spirit  are  as  distinct  from  each 
other  as  are  soul  and  body. 

We  regard  the  trichotomous  theory  as  untenable,  not  only  for  the  reasons 
already  urged  in  proof  of  the  dichotomous  theory,  but  from  the  following 
additional  considerations : 


128  ANTHROPOLOGY,   OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

(  a)    Uvevfta,  as  well  as  V^,  is  used  of  the  brute  creation. 


(  6  )  Vvxt  is  ascribed  to  Jehovah. 

(  e  )  The  disembodied  dead  are  called  -fyaxvi. 

(d  )  The  highest  exercises  of  religion  are  attributed  to  the  V^^« 

(  e  )  To  lose  this  Tpvxt  is  to  lose  all. 

(/)  The  passages  chiefly  relied  upon  as  supporting  trichotomy  may 
be  better  explained  upon  the  view  already  indicated,  that  soul  and  spirit 
are  not  two  distinct  substances  or  parts,  but  that  they  designate  the 
immaterial  principle  from  different  points  of  view. 

We  conclude  that  the  immaterial  part  of  man,  viewed  as  an  individual 
and  conscious  life,  capable  of  possessing  and  animating  a  physical  organism, 
is  called  Vw  ;  viewed  as  a  rational  and  moral  agent,  susceptible  of  divine 
influence  and  indwelling,  this  same  immaterial  part  is  called  Trvevjua.  The 
7rvevfj.a,  then,  is  man's  nature  looking  Godward,  and  capable  of  receiving 
and  manifesting  the  Uvevpa  a-yiov  ;  the  -^x^l  is  man's  nature  looking  earth- 
ward, and  touching  the  world  of  sense.  The  Tvey/ia  is  man's  higher  part, 
as  related  to  spiritual  realities  or  as  capable  of  such  relation  ;  the  -^x^i  is 
man's  higher  part,  as  related  to  the  body,  or  as  capable  of  such  relation. 
Man's  being  is  therefore  not  trichotomous  but  dichotomous,  and  his 
immaterial  part,  while  possessing  duality  of  powers,  has  unity  of  substance. 

This  view  of  the  soul  and  spirit  as  different  aspects  of  the  same  spiritual 
principle  furnishes  a  refutation  of  six  important  errors  : 

(a)  That  of  the  Gnostics,  who  held  that  the  we^a  is  part  of  the  divine 
essence,  and  therefore  incapable  of  sin. 

(6)  That  of  the  Apollinarians,  who  taught  that  Christ's  humanity 
embraced  only  ou/ua  and  V*^  ,  while  his  divine  nature  furnished  the  VTTBVIM. 

(c)  That  of  the  Semi-Pelagians,  who  excepted  the  human  irvnifia  from 
the  dominion  of  original  sin. 

(  d  )  That  of  Placeus,  who  held  that  only  the  ^vev^a  was  directly  created 
by  God  (see  our  section  on  Theories  of  Imputation). 

(e)  That  of  Julius  Miiller,  who  held  that  the  V^  comes  to  us  from 
Adam,  but  that  our  irvevfia  was  corrupted  in  a  previous  state  of  being 
(see  page  490). 

(/)  That  of  the  Annihilationists,  who  hold  that  man  at  his  creation  had 
a  divine  element  breathed  into  him,  which  he  lost  by  sin,  and  which  he 
recovers  only  in  regeneration  ;  so  that  only  when  he  has  this  irvevfia  restored 
by  virtue  of  his  union  with  Christ  does  man  become  immortal,  death  being 
to  the  sinner  a  complete  extinction  of  being. 

IV.    OKIGIN  OF  THE  Souii. 

Three  theories  with  regard  to  this  subject  have  divided  opinion  : 

1.     The  Theory  of  Preexistence. 

This  view  was  held  by  Plato,  Philo,  and  Origen  ;  by  the  first,  in  order 


ORIGIN   OF  THE   S0UL.  129 

to  explain  the  soul's  possession  of  ideas  not  derived  from  sense ;  by  the 
second,  to  account  for  its  imprisonment  in  the  body ;  by  the  third,  to  jus- 
tify the  disparity  of  conditions  in  which  men  enter  the  world.  We  concern 
ourselves,  however,  only  with  the  forms  which  the  view  has  assumed  in 
modern  times.  Kant  and  Julius  Muller  in  Germany,  and  Edward  Beecher 
in  America,  have  advocated  it,  upon  the  ground  that  the  inborn  depravity 
of  the  human  will  can  be  explained  only  by  supposing  a  personal  act  of 
self-determination  in  a  previous,  or  timeless,  state  of  being. 

To  the  theory  of  preexistence  we  urge  the  following  objections  : 

(a )  It  is  not  only  wholly  without  support  from  Scripture,  but  it  directly 
contradicts  the  Mosaic  account  of  man's  creation  in  the  image  of  God,  and 
Paul's  description  of  all  evil  and  death  in  the  human  race  as  the  result  of 
Adam's  sin. 

(  b  )  If  the  soul  in  this  preexistent  state  was  conscious  and  personal,  it  is 
inexplicable  that  we  should  have  no  remembrance  of  such  preexistence,  and 
of  so  important  a  decision  in  that  previous  condition  of  being ; —  if  the  soul 
was  yet  unconscious  and  impersonal,  the  theory  fails  to  show  how  a  moral 
act  involving  consequences  so  vast  could  have  been  performed  at  all. 

( c  )  The  view  sheds  no  light  either  upon  the  origin  of  sin,  or  upon  God's 
justice  in  dealing  with  it,  since  it  throws  back  the  first  transgression  to  a 
state  of  being  in  which  there  was  no  flesh  to  tempt,  and  then  represents 
God  as  putting  the  fallen  into  sensuous  conditions  in  the  highest  degree 
unfavorable  to  their  restoration. 

(  d )  While  this  theory  accounts  for  inborn  spiritual  sin,  such  as  pride 
and  enmity  to  God,  it  gives  no  explanation  of  inherited  sensual  sin,  which 
it  holds  to  have  come  from  Adam,  and  the  guilt  of  which  must  logically  be 
denied. 

2.     The  Creatian  Theory. 

This  view  was  held  by  Aristotle,  Jerome,  and  Pelagius,  and  in  modern 
times  has  been  advocated  by  most  of  the  Eoman  Catholic  and  Reformed 
theologians.  It  regards  the  soul  of  each  human  being  as  immediately 
created  by  God  and  joined  to  the  body  either  at  conception,  at  birth,  or  at 
some  time  between  these  two.  The  advocates  of  the  theory  urge  in  its 
favor  certain  texts  of  Scripture,  referring  to  God  as  the  Creator  of  the 
human  spirit,  together  with  the  fact  that  there  is  a  marked  individuality 
in  the  child,  which  cannot  be  explained  as  a  mere  reproduction  of  the 
qualities  existing  in  the  parents. 

Creatianism  is  untenable  for  the  following  reasons  : 

(  a )  The  passages  adduced  in  its  support  may  with  equal  propriety  be 
regarded  as  expressing  God's  mediate  agency  in  the  origination  of  human 
souls  ;  while  the  general  tenor  of  Scripture,  as  well  as  its  representations 
of  God  as  the  author  of  man's  body,  favor  this  latter  interpretation. 

(  b )  Creatianism  regards  the  earthly  father  as  begetting  only  the  body 
of  his  child — certainly  as  not  the  father  of  the  child's  highest  part.      This 
9 


130  ANTHROPOLOGY,   OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN". 

makes  the  beast  to  possess  nobler  powers  of  propagation  than  man  ;  for  the 
beast  multiplies  himself  after  his  own  image. 

(  c  )  The  individuality  of  the  child,  even  in  the  most  extreme  cases,  as  in 
the  sudden  rise  from  obscure  families  and  surroundings  of  marked  men  like 
Luther,  may  be  better  explained  by  supposing  a  law  of  variation  impressed 
upon  the  species  at  its  beginning — a  law  whose  operation  is  foreseen  and 
supervised  by  God. 

(d)  This  theory,  if  it  allows  that  the  soul  is  originally  possessed  of 
depraved  tendencies,  makes  God  the  direct  author  of  moral  evil ;  if  it  holds 
the  soul  to  have  been  created  pure,  it  makes  God  indirectly  the  author  of 
moral  evil,  by  teaching  that  he  puts  this  pure  soul  into  a  body  which 
will  inevitably  corrupt  it. 

3.     The  Traducian  Theory. 

This  view  was  propounded  by  Tertullian,  and  was  implicitly  held  by 
Augustine.  In  modern  times  it  has  been  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the 
Lutheran  Church.  It  holds  that  the  human  race  was  immediately  created 
in  Adam,  and,  as  respects  both  body  and  soul,  was  propagated  from  him 
by  natural  generation  —  all  souls  since  Adam  being  only  mediately  created 
by  God,  as  the  upholder  of  the  laws  of  propagation  which  were  originally 
established  by  him. 

With  regard  to  this  view  we  remrka : 

(a)  It  seems  best  to  accord  with  Scripture,  which  represents  God  as 
creating  the  species  in  Adam  (  Gen.  1 : 27  ),  and  as  increasing  and  perpetu- 
ating it  through  secondary  agencies  ( 1 : 28 ;  c/.  22  ).  Only  once  is  breathed 
into  man's  nostrils  the  breath  of  life  (2:7,  c/.  22 ;  1  Cor.  11 : 8.  Gen.  4:1; 
5  : 3  ;  46  : 26  ;  c/.  Acts  17  : 21-26  ;  Heb.  7  : 10 ),  and  after  man's  formation 
God  ceases  from  his  work  of  creation  ( Gen.  2:2). 

(  6 )  It  is  favored  by  the  analogy  of  vegetable  and  animal  life,  in  which 
increase  of  numbers  is  secured,  not  by  a  multiplicity  of  immediate  creations, 
but  by  the  natural  derivation  of  new  individuals  from  a  parent  stock.  A 
derivation  of  the  human  soul  from  its  parents  no  more  implies  a  materialis- 
tic view  of  the  soul  and  its  endless  division  and  subdivision,  than  the  simi- 
lar derivation  of  the  brute  proves  the  principle  of  intelligence  in  the  lower 
animals  to  be  wholly  material. 

(c)  The  observed  transmission  not  merely  of  physical,  but  of  mental  and 
spiritual,  characteristics  in  families  and  races,  and  especially  the  uniformly 
evil  moral  tendencies  and  dispositions  which  all  men  possess  from  their 
birth,  are  proof  that  in  soul,  as  well  as  in  body,  we  derive  our  being  from 
our  human  ancestry. 

(  d  )  The  traducian  doctrine  embraces  and  acknowledges  the  element  of 
truth  which  gives  plausibility  to  the  creatian  view.  Traducianism,  properly 
denned,  admits  a  divine  concurrence  throughout  the  whole  development  of 
the  human  species,  and  allows,  under  the  guidance  of  a  superintending 
Providence,  special  improvements  in  type  at  the  birth  of  marked  men, 
similar  tc  those  which  we  may  suppose  to  have  occurred  in  the  introduction 
of  new  varieties  in  the  airaial  creation. 


THE   MORAL  MATURE  OF   MAN.  131 

V.     THE  MORAL  NATURE  OF  MAN. 

By  the  moral  nature  of  man  we  mean  those  powers  which  fit  Vn'm  for 
right  or  wrong  action.  These  powers  are  intellect,  sensibility,  and  will, 
together  with  that  peculiar  power  of  discrimination  and  impulsion,  which 
we  call  conscience.  In  order  to  moral  action,  man  has  intellect  or  reason, 
to  discern  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong ;  sensibility,  to  be  moved 
by  each  of  these  ;  free  will,  to  do  the  one  or  the  other.  Intellect,  sensibil- 
ity, and  will,  are  man's  three  faculties.  But  in  connection  with  these  facul- 
ties there  is  a  sort  of  activity  which  involves  them  all,  and  without  which 
there  can  be  no  moral  action,  namely,  the  activity  of  conscience.  Con- 
science applies  the  moral  law  to  particular  cases  in  our  personal  experience, 
and  proclaims  that  law  as  binding  upon  us.  Only  a  rational  and  sentient 
being  can  be  truly  moral ;  yet  it  does  not  come  within  our  province  to  treat 
of  man's  intellect  or  sensibility  in  general.  We  speak  here  only  of  Con- 
science and  of  Will. 

1.     Conscience. 

A.  Conscience  an  accompanying  knowledge.  —  As  already  intimated, 
conscience  is  not  a  separate  faculty,  like  intellect,  sensibility,  and  will,  but 
rather  a  mode  in  which  these  faculties  act.    Like  consciousness,  conscience 
is  an  accompanying  knowledge.     Conscience  is  a  knowing  of  self  ( includ- 
ing our  acts  and  states )  in  connection  with  a  moral  standard,  or  law.    Add- 
ing now  the  element  of  feeling,  we  may  say  that  conscience  is  man's 
consciousness  of  his  own  moral  relations,  together  with  a  peculiar  feeling  in 
view  of  them.     It  thus  involves  the  combined  action  of  the  intellect  and 
of  the  sensibility,  and  that  in  view  of  a  certain  class  of  objects,  viz. :  right 
and  wrong. 

B.  Conscience  discriminative  and  impulsive.  —  But  we  need  to  define 
more  narrowly  both  the  intellectual  and  the  emotional  elements  in  con- 
science.    As  respects  the  intellectual  element,  we  may  say  that  conscience 
is  a  power  of  judgment, — it  declares  our  acts  or  states  to  conform,  or  not  to 
conform,  to  law ;  it  declares  the  acts  or  states  which  conform  to  be  obliga- 
tory, —  those  which  do  not  conform,  to  be  forbidden.    In  other  words, 
conscience  judges  :   ( 1 )  This  is  right  (  or,  wrong  ) ;  (  2 )  I  ought  (  or,  I 
ought  not ).  In  connection  with  this  latter  judgment,  there  comes  into  view 
the  emotional  element  of  conscience, —  we  feel  the  claim  of  duty ;  there 
is  an  inner  sense  that  the  wrong  must  not  be  done.  Thus  conscience  is  ( 1 ) 
discriminative,  and  (  2 )  impulsive. 

C.  Conscience  distinguished  from  other  mental  processes. — The  nature 
and  office  of  conscience  will  be  still  more  clearly  perceived  if  we  distinguish 
it  from  other  processes  and  operations  with  which  it  is  too  often  confounded. 
The  term  conscience  has  been  used  by  various  writers  to  designate  either 
one  or  all  of  the  following  :    1.  Moral  intuition  —  the  intuitive  perception 
of  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong,  as  opposite  moral  categories. 
2.  Accepted  law  —  the  application  of  the  intuitive  idea  to  general  classes 
of  actions,  and  the  declaration  that  these  classes  of  actions  are  right  or 
wrong,  apart  from  our  individual  relation  to  them.     This  accepted  law  is 
the  complex  product  of  (  a)  the  intuitive  idea,  ( 6  )  the  logical  intelligence, 


132  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF   MAN. 

(c)  experiences  of  utility,  (d)  influences  of  society  and  education,  and  (e) 
positive  divine  revelation.  3.  Judgment  —  applying  this  accepted  law  to 
individual  and  concrete  cases  in  our  own  experience,  and  pronouncing  our 
own  acts  or  states  either  past,  present,  or  prospective,  to  be  right  or  wrong. 
4.  Command  —  authoritative  declaration  of  obligation  to  do  the  right,  or 
forbear  the  wrong,  together  with  an  impulse  of  the  sensibility  away  from 
the  one,  and  toward  the  other.  5.  Remorse  or  approval  —  moral  senti- 
ments either  of  approbation  or  disapprobation,  in  view  of  past  acts  or  states, 
regarded  as  wrong  or  right.  6.  Fear  or  hope  —  instinctive  disposition  of 
disobedience  to  expect  punishment,  and  of  obedience  to  expect  reward. 

D.  Conscience  the  moral  judiciary  of  the  soul. — From  what  has  been 
previously  said,  it  is  evident  that  only  3.  and  4.  are  properly  included 
under  the  term  conscience.     Conscience  is  the  moral  judiciary  of  the  soul 
—  the  power  within  of  judgment  and  command.     Conscience  must  judge 
according  to  the  law  given  to  it,  and  therefore,  since  the  moral  standard 
accepted  by  the  reason  may  be  imperfect,  its  decisions,  while  relatively 
just,  may  be  absolutely  unjust.  —  1.  and  2.  belong  to  the  moral  reason, 
but  not  to  conscience  proper.     Hence  the  duty  of  enlightening  and  culti- 
vating the  moral  reason,  so  that  conscience  may  have  a  proper  standard  of 
judgment. —  5.  and  6.  belong  to  the  sphere  of  moral  sentiment,  and  not  to 
conscience  proper.     The  office  of  conscience  is  to  "bear  witness"  (Eom. 
2:15). 

E.  Conscience  in  its  relation  to  God  as  law-giver. — Since  conscience,  in 
the  proper  sense,  gives  uniform  and  infallible  judgment  that  the  right  is 
supremely  obligatory,  and  that  the  wrong  must  be  forborne  at  every  cost, 
it  can  be  called  an  echo  of  God's  voice,  and  an  indication  in  man  of  that 
which  his  own  true  being  requires. 

F.  Conscience  in  its  relation  to  God  as  holy. —  Conscience  is  not  an 
original  authority.      It  points  to  something  higher  than  itself.      The 
"authority  of  conscience  "  is  simply  the  authority  of  the  moral  law,  or 
rather,  the  authority  of  the  personal  God,  of  whose  nature  the  law  is  but  a 
transcript.     Conscience,  therefore,  with  its  continual  and  supreme  demand 
that  the  right  should  be  done,  furnishes  the  best  witness  to  man  of  the 
existence  of  a  personal  God,  and  of  the  supremacy  of  holiness  in  him  in 
whose  image  we  are  made. 

2.     Will. 

A.  Will  denned. — Will  is  the  soul's  power  to  choose  between  motiyes 
and  to  direct  its  subsequent  activity  according  to  the  motive  thus  chosen, — 
in  other  words,  the  soul's  power  to  choose  both  an  end  and  the  means  to 
attain  it.    The  choice  of  an  ultimate  end  we  call  immanent  preference ;  the 
choice  of  means  we  call  executive  volition. 

B.  Will  and  other  faculties. —  (a)  We  accept  the  threefold  division  of 
human  faculties  into  intellect,  sensibility,  and  wilL     (  b  )  Intellect  is  the 
soul  knowing  ;  sensibility  is  the  soul  feeling  ( desires,  affections  )  ;  will  is 
the  soul  choosing  (  end  or  means).     ( c )  In  every  act  of  the  soul,  all  the 
faculties  act.     Knowing  involves   feeling  and  willing ;  feeling  involves 
knowing  and  willing  ;  willing  involves  knowing  and  feeling.     (  d )  Logi- 


THE   MORAL  NATURE   OF   MAN.  133 

cally,  each  latter  faculty  involves  the  preceding  action  of  the  former ;  the 
the  soul  must  know  before  feeling ;  must  know  and  feel  before  willing. 
(e)  Yet  since  knowing  and  feeling  are  activities,  neither  of  these  is 
possible  without  willing. 

C.  Will  and  permanent  states.  —  ( a )   Though  every  act  of  the  soul 
involves  the  action  of  all  the  faculties,  yet  in  any  particular  action  one 
faculty  may  be  more  prominent  than  the  others.     So  we  speak  of  acts  of 
intellect,  of  affection,  of  will.     (  b )  This  predominant  action  of  any  single 
faculty  produces  effects  upon  the  other  faculties  associated  with  it.    The 
action  of  will  gives  a  direction  to  the  intellect  and  to  the  affections,  as  well 
as  a  permanent  bent  to  the  will  itself,     (c )  Each  faculty,  therefore,  has  its 
permanent  states  as  well  as  its  transient  acts,  and  the  will  may  originate 
these  states.     Hence  we  speak  of  voluntary  affections,  and  may  with  equal 
propriety  speak  of  voluntary  opinions.    These  permanent  voluntary  states 
we  denominate  character. 

D.  Will  and  motives.  —  (a  )  The  permanent  states  just  mentioned,  when 
they  have  been  once  determined,  also  influence  the  will.  Internal  views  and 
dispositions,  and  not  simply  external  presentations,  constitute  the  strength 
of  motives.     (  6 )  These  motives  often  conflict,  and  though  the  soul  never 
acts  without  motive,  it  does  notwithstanding  choose  between  motives,  and 
so  determines  the  end  toward  which  it  will  direct  its  activities.     ( c ) 
Motives  are  not  causes,  which  compel  the  will,  but  influences^  which  per- 
suade it.     The  power  of  these  motives,  however,  is  proportioned  to  the 
strength  of  will  which  has  entered  into  them  and  has  made  them  what 
they  are. 

E.  Will  and  contrary  choice.  —  (  a  )  Though  no  act  of  pure  will  is  pos- 
sible, the  soul  may  put  forth  single  volitions  in  a  direction  opposed  to  its 
previous  ruling  purpose,  and  thus  far  man  has  the  power  of  a  contrary 
choice  (  Rom.  7:18  —  "to  will  is  present  with  me  "  ).     ( 6 )  But  in  so  far  as 
will  has  entered  into  and  revealed  itself  in  permanent  states  of  intellect 
and  sensibility  and  in  a  settled  bent  of  the  will  itself,  man  cannot  by  a 
single  act  reverse  his  moral  state,  and  in  this  respect  has  not  the  power  of 
a  contrary  choice.    ( c  )  In  this  latter  case  he  can  change  his  character  only 
indirectly,  by  turning  his  attention  to  considerations  fitted  to  awaken 
opposite  dispositions,  and  by  thus  summoning  up  motives  to  an  opposite 
course. 

F.  Will  and  responsibility. — (a)  By  repeated  acts  of  will  put  forth  in 
a  given  moral  direction,  the  affections  may  become  so  confirmed  in  evil  or 
in  good  as  to  make  previously  certain,  though  not  necessary,  the  future 
good  or  evil  action  of  the  man.     Thus,  while  the  will  is  free,  the  man  may 
be  the  "bondservant  of  sin"  (John  8  : 31-36)  or  the  "servant  of  right- 
eousness" (Eom.  6:15-23;  c/.  Heb.  12-23 — "spirits  of  just  men  made 
perfect ").     ( 6  )  Man  is  responsible  for  all  effects  of  will,  as  well  as  for  will 
itself ;    for  voluntary  affections,   as  well  as  for  voluntary  acts  ;   for  the 
intellectual  views  into  which  will  has  entered,  as  well  as  for  the  acts  of  will 
by  which  these  views  have  been  formed  in  the  past  or  are  maintained  in 
the  present  (  2  Pet.  3  : 5  — "  wilfully  forget "). 


134  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

G.  Inferences  from  this  view  of  the  will.  —  ( a  )  We  can  be  responsible 
for  the  voluntary  evil  affections  with  which  we  are  born,  and  for  the  will's 
inherited  preference  of  selfishness,  only  upon  the  hypothesis  that  we 
originated  these  states  of  the  affections  and  will,  or  had  a  part  in  originat- 
ing them.  Scripture  furnishes  this  explanation,  in  its  doctrine  of  Original 
Sin,  or  the  doctrine  of  a  common  apostasy  of  the  race  in  its  first  father, 
and  our  derivation  of  a  corrupted  nature  by  natural  generation  from  him. 
(  6 )  While  there  remains  to  man,  even  in  his  present  condition,  a  natural 
power  of  will  by  which  he  may  put  forth  transient  volitions  externally 
conformed  to  the  divine  law  and  so  may  to  a  limited  extent  modify  his 
character,  it  still  remains  true  that  the  sinful  bent  of  his  affections  is  not 
directly  under  his  control ;  and  this  bent  constitutes  a  motive  to  evil  so 
constant,  inveterate,  and  powerful,  that  it  actually  influences  every  member 
of  the  race  to  reaffirm  his  evil  choice,  and  renders  necessary  a  special 
working  of  God's  Spirit  upon  his  heart  to  ensure  his  salvation.  Hence  the 
Scripture  doctrine  of  Regeneration. 

H.  Special  objections  to  the  deterministic  theory  of  the  will. —  Deter- 
minism holds  that  man's  actions  are  uniformly  determined  by  motives 
acting  upon  his  character,  and  that  he  has  no  power  to  change  these 
motives  or  to  act  contrary  to  them.  This  denial  that  the  will  is  free  has 
serious  and  pernicious  consequences  in  theology.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
weakens  even  if  it  does  not  destroy  man's  conviction  with  regard  to  respon- 
sibility, sin,  guilt  and  retribution,  and  so  obscures  the  need  of  atonement ; 
on  the  other  hand,  it  weakens  if  it  does  not  destroy  man's  faith  in  his  own 
power  as  well  as  in  God's  power  of  initiating  action,  and  so  obscures  the 
possibility  of  atonement. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  OKIGLNTAL  STATE   OF  MAN. 

In  determining  man's  original  state,  we  are  wholly  dependent  upon 
Scripture.  This  represents  human  nature  as  coming  from  God's  hand, 
and  therefore  "  very  good  "  (Gen.  1  :  31 ).  It  moreover  draws  a  parallel 
between  man's  first  state  and  that  of  his  restoration  (Col.  3  : 10  ;  Eph.  4  : 
24).  In  interpreting  these  passages,  however,  we  are  to  remember  the 
twofold  danger,  on  the  one  hand  of  putting  man  so  high  that  no  progress 
is  conceivable,  on  the  other  hand  of  putting  him  so  low  that  he  could  not 
fall.  We  shall  the  more  easily  avoid  these  dangers  by  distinguishing 
between  the  essentials  and  the  incidents  of  man's  original  state. 

I.    ESSENTIALS  OF  MAN'S  OKIGINAL  STATE. 

These  are  summed  up  in  the  phrase  "the  image  of  God."  In  God's 
image  man  is  said  to  have  been  created  (  Gen.  1  :  26,  27 ).  In  what  did 
this  image  of  God  consist  ?  We  reply  that  it  consisted  in  1.  Natural  like- 
ness to  God,  or  personality  ;  2.  Moral  likeness  to  God,  or  holiness. 

1.  Natural  likeness  to  God,  or  personality. 

Man  was  created  a  personal  being,  and  was  by  this  personality  distin- 
guished from  the  brute.  By  personality  we  mean  the  twofold  power  to 
know  self  as  related  to  the  world  and  to  God,  and  to  determine  self  in 
view  of  moral  ends.  By  virtue  of  this  personality,  man  could  at  hi»  crea- 
tion choose  which  of  the  objects  of  his  knowledge — self,  the  world,  or  God 
— should  be  the  norm  and  centre  of  his  development.  This  natural  like- 
ness to  God  is  inalienable,  and  as  constituting  a  capacity  for  redemption 
gives  value  to  the  life  even  of  the  unregenerate  ( Gen.  9  : 6  ;  1  Cor.  11  :  7  ; 
James  3:9). 

2.  Moral  likeness  to  God,  or  holiness. 

In  addition  to  the  powers  of  self-consciousness  and  self-determination 
just  mentioned,  man  was  created  with  such  a  direction  of  the  affections  and 
the  will,  as  constituted  God  the  supreme  end  of  man's  being,  and  consti- 
tuted man  a  finite  reflection  of  God's  moral  attributes.  Since  holiness  is 
the  fundamental  attribute  of  God,  this  must  of  necessity  be  the  chief  attri- 
bute of  his  image  in  the  moral  beings  whom  he  creates.  That  original 
righteousness  was  essential  to  this  image,  is  also  distinctly  taught  in  Script- 
ure ( Eccl.  7 :29 ;  Eph.  4  : 24  ;  CoL  3 : 10). 

This  original  righteousness,  in  which  the  image  of  God  chiefly  consisted, 
is  to  be  viewed  : 

(  a )  Not  as  constituting  the  substance  or  essence  of  human  nature,  —  for 
in  this  case  human  nature  would  have  ceased  to  exist  as  soon  as  man  sinned. 

(6)  Nor  as  a  gift  from  without,  foreign  to  human  nature,  and  added  to 

135 


136  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   MAN. 

it  after  man's  creation, — for  man  is  said  to  have  possessed  the  divine  image 
by  the  fact  of  creation,  and  not  by  subsequent  bestowal. 

(  c  )  But  rather,  as  an  original  direction  or  tendency  of  man's  affections 
and  will,  still  accompanied  by  the  power  of  evil  choice,  and  so,  differing 
from  the  perfected  holiness  of  the  saints,  as  instinctive  affection  and  child- 
like innocence  differ  from  the  holiness  that  has  been  developed  and  con- 
firmed by  experience  of  temptation. 

(  d )  As  a  moral  disposition,  moreover,  which  was  propagable  to  Adam's 
descendants,  if  it  continued,  and  which,  though  lost  to  him  and  to  them, 
if  Adam  sinned,  would  still  leave  man  possessed  of  a  natural  likeness  to 
God  which  made  him  susceptible  of  God's  redeeming  grace. 

In  the  light  of  the  preceding  investigation,  we  may  properly  estimate 
two  theories  of  man's  original  state  which  claim  to  be  more  Scriptural  and 
reasonable : 

A.  The  image  of  God  as  including  only  personality. 

This  theory  denies  that  any  positive  determination  to  virtue  inhered 
originally  in  man's  nature,  and  regards  man  at  the  beginning  as  simply 
possessed  of  spiritual  powers,  perfectly  adjusted  to  each  other.  This  is  the 
view  of  Schleiermacher,  who  is  followed  by  Mtzsch,  Julius  Miiller,  and 
Hofmann. 

In  addition  to  what  has  already  been  said  in  support  of  the  opposite 
view,  we  may  urge  against  this  theory  the  following  objections  : 

( a )  It  is  contrary  to  analogy,  in  making  man  the  author  of  his  own 
holiness ;  our  sinful  condition  is  not  the  product  of  our  individual  wills, 
nor  is  our  subsequent  condition  of  holiness  the  product  of  anything  but 
God's  regenerating  power. 

(  b )  The  knowledge  of  God  in  which  man  was  originally  created  logically 
presupposes  a  direction  toward  God  of  man's  affections  and  will,  since  only 
the  holy  heart  can  have  any  proper  understanding  of  the  God  of  holiness. 

(  c  )  A  likeness  to  God  in  mere  personality,  such  as  Satan  also  possesses, 
comes  far  short  of  answering  the  demands  of  the  Scripture,  in  which  the 
ethical  conception  of  the  divine  nature  so  overshadows  the  merely  natural. 
The  image  of  God  must  be,  not  simply  ability  to  be  like  God,  but  actual 
likeness. 

B.  The  image  of  God  as  consisting  simply  in  man's  natural  capacity  for 
religion. 

This  view,  first  elaborated  by  the  scholastics,  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Boman 
Catholic  Church.  It  distinguishes  between  the  image  and  the  likeness  of 
God.  The  former  (  Dl¥ —  Gen.  1  : 26  )  alone  belonged  to  man's  nature  at 
its  creation.  The  latter  (rHDT)  was  the  product  of  his  own  acts  of  obedi- 
ence. In  order  that  this  obedience  might  be  made  easier  and  the  conse- 
quent likeness  to  God  more  sure,  a  third  element  was  added  —  an  element 
not  belonging  to  man's  nature  —  namely,  a  supernatural  gift  of  special 
grace,  which  acted  as  a  curb  upon  the  sensuous  impulses,  and  brought 
them  under  the  control  of  reason.  Original  righteousness  was  therefore 


INCIDENTS   OF  MAN'S  ORIGINAL  STATE.  137 

not  a  natural  endowment,  but  a  joint  product  of  man's  obedience  and  of 
God's  supernatural  grace. 

Many  of  the  considerations  already  adduced  apply  equally  as  arguments 
against  this  view.  We  may  say,  however,  with  reference  to  certain  features 
peculiar  to  the  theory  : 

(a)  No  such  distinction  can  justly  be  drawn  between  the  words  D/X  and 
rHD1!.    The  addition  of  the  synonym  simply  strengthens  the  expression, 
and  both  together  signify  "the  very  image." 

( b )  Whatever  is  denoted  by  either  or  both  of  these  words  was  bestowed 
upon  man  in  and  by  the  fact  of  creation,  and  the  additional  hypothesis  of 
a  supernatural  gift  not  originally  belonging  to  man's  nature,  but  subse- 
quently conferred,  has  no  foundation  either  here  or  elsewhere  in  Scripture. 
Man  is  said  to  have  been  created  in  the  image  and  likeness  of  God,  not  to 
have  been  afterwards  endowed  with  either  of  them. 

(c)  The  concreated  opposition  between  sense  and  reason  which  this 
theory  supposes  is  inconsistent  with  the  Scripture  declaration  that  the 
work  of  God's  hands  "was  very  good"  (Gen.  1:31),  and  transfers  the 
blame  of  temptation  and  sin  from  man  to  God.    To  hold  to  a  merely  nega- 
tive innocence,  in  which  evil  desire  was  only  slumbering,  is  to  make  God 
author  of  sin  by  making  him  author  of  the  constitution  which  rendered  sin 
inevitable. 

(  d )  This  theory  directly  contradicts  Scripture  by  making  the  effect  of 
the  first  sin  to  have  been  a  weakening  but  not  a  perversion  of  human 
nature,  and  the  work  of  regeneration  to  be  not  a  renewal  of  the  affections 
but  merely  a  strengthening  of  the  natural  powers.  The  theory  regards 
that  first  sin  as  simply  despoiling  man  of  a  special  gift  of  grace  and  as 
putting  him  where  he  was  when  first  created — still  able  to  obey  God  and 
to  cooperate  with  God  for  his  own  salvation, — whereas  the  Scripture 
represents  man  since  the  fall  as  "  dead  through  .  .  .  trespasses  and  sins  " 
(Eph.  2  : 1),  as  incapable  of  true  obedience  (  Kom.  8:7—  "not  subject  to 
the  law  of  God,  neither  indeed  can  it  be  " ),  and  as  needing  to  be  "  created 
in  Christ  Jesus  for  good  works  "  ( Eph.  2  : 10  ). 

II.    INCIDENTS  OF  MAN'S  OKIGINAL  STATE. 

1.    JResults  of  man's  possession  of  the  divine  image. 

(a)  Reflection  of  this  divine  image  in  man's  physical  form. —  Even  in 
man's  body  were  typified  those  higher  attributes  which  chiefly  constituted 
his  likeness  to  God.  A  gross  perversion  of  this  truth,  however,  is  the  view 
which  holds,  upon  the  ground  of  Gen.  2  : 7,  and  3  : 8,  that  the  image  of  God 
consists  in  bodily  resemblance  to  the  Creator.  In  the  first  of  these  passages, 
it  is  not  the  divine  image,  but  the  body,  that  is  formed  of  dust,  and  into 
this  body  the  soul  that  possesses  the  divine  image  is  breathed.  The  second 
of  these  passages  is  to  be  interpreted  by  those  other  portions  of  the  Pen- 
tateuch in  which  God  is  represented  as  free  from  all  limitations  of  matter 
(Gen.  11  : 5;  18:15). 

(6)  Subjection  of  the  sensuous  impulses  to  the  control  of  the  spirit. — 
Here  we  are  to  hold  a  middle  ground  between  two  extremes.  On  the  one 


138  ANTHROPOLOGY,   OK  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

hand,  the  first  man  possessed  a  body  and  a  spirit  so  fitted  to  each  other  that 
no  conflict  was  felt  between  their  several  claims.  On  the  other  hand,  this 
physical  perfection  was  not  final  and  absolute,  but  relative  and  provisional. 
There  was  still  room  for  progress  to  a  higher  state  of  being  ( Gen.  3  :  22 ). 

(  c  )  Dominion  over  the  lower  creation. — Adam  possessed  an  insight  into 
nature  analogous  to  that  of  susceptible  childhood,  and  therefore  was  able 
to  name  and  to  rule  the  brute  creation  ( Gen.  2  : 19 ).  Yet  this  native 
insight  was  capable  of  development  into  the  higher  knowledge  of  culture 
and  science.  From  Gen.  1  :  26  ( cf.  Ps.  8  :  5-8 ),  it  has  been  erroneously 
inferred  that  the  image  of  God  in  man  consists  in  dominion  over  the  brute 
creation  and  the  natural  world.  But,  in  this  verse,  the  words  "let  them 
have  dominion  "  do  not  define  the  image  of  God,  but  indicate  the  result 
of  possessing  that  image.  To  make  the  image  of  God  consist  in  this 
dominion,  would  imply  that  only  the  divine  omnipotence  was  shadowed 
forth  in  man. 

(  d  )  Communion  with  God. — Our  first  parents  enjoyed  the  divine  pres- 
ence and  teaching  (Gen.  2:16 ).  It  would  seem  that  God  manifested  him- 
self to  them  in  visible  form  (  Gen.  3:8).  This  companionship  was  both 
in  kind  and  degree  suited  to  their  spiritual  capacity,  and  by  no  means 
necessarily  involved  that  perfected  vision  of  God  which  is  possible  to 
beings  of  confirmed  and  unchangeable  holiness  (  Mat.  5  : 8 ;  1  John  3:2). 

2.     Concomitants  of  man's  possession  of  the  divine  image. 

(a)  Surroundings  and  society  fitted  to  yield  hapjpiness  and  to  assist  a 
holy  development  of  human  nature  (  Eden  and  Eve  ).  We  append  some 
recent  theories  with  regard  to  the  creation  of  Eve  and  the  nature  of  Eden. 

(6)  Provisions  for  the  trying  of  man's  virtue.  —  Since  man  was  not  yet 
in  a  state  of  confirmed  holiness,  but  rather  of  simple  childlike  innocence, 
he  could  be  made  perfect  only  through  temptation.  Hence  the  "tree  of 
the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil "  (  Gen.  2:9).  The  one  slight  command 
best  tested  the  spirit  of  obedience.  Temptation  did  not  necessitate  a  fall. 
If  resisted,  it  would  strengthen  virtue.  In  that  case,  the  posse  non  peccare 
would  have  become  the  non  posse  peccare. 

(c)  Opportunity  of  securing  physical  immortality.  — The  body  of  the 
first  man  was  in  itself  mortal  ( 1  Cor.  15  : 45  ).  Science  shows  that  physical 
life  involves  decay  and  loss.  But  means  were  apparently  provided  for 
checking  this  decay  and  preserving  the  body's  youth.  This  means  was  the 
"tree  of  life"  (Gen.  2:9).  If  Adam  had  maintained  his  integrity,  the 
body  might  have  been  developed  and  transfigured,  without  intervention  of 
death.  In  other  words,  the  posse  non  mori  might  have  become  a  non 
posse  mori. 

The  conclusions  we  have  thus  reached  with  regard  to  the  incidents  of 
man's  original  state  are  combated  upon  two  distinct  grounds : 

1st.  The  facts  bearing  upon  man's  prehistoric  condition  point  to  a 
development  from  primitive  savagery  to  civilization.  Among  these  facts 
may  be  mentioned  the  succession  of  implements  and  weapons  from  stone 
to  bronze  and  iron ;  the  polyandry  and  communal  marriage  systems  of  the 


INCIDENTS   OF   MAN'S   ORIGINAL   STATE.  139 

lowest  tribes ;  the  relics  of  barbarous  customs  still  prevailing  among  the 
most  civilized. 

With  regard  to  this  view  we  remark : 

(a)  It  is  based  upon  an  insufficient  induction  of  facts. — History  shows  a 
law  of  degeneration  supplementing  and  often  counteracting  the  tendency 
to  development.  In  the  earliest  times  of  which  we  have  any  record,  we 
find  nations  in  a  high  state  of  civilization  ;  but  in  the  case  of  every  nation 
whose  history  runs  back  of  the  Christian  era  —  as  for  example,  the  Romans, 
the  Greeks,  the  Egyptians — the  subsequent  progress  has  been  downward, 
and  no  nation  is  known  to  have  recovered  from  barbarism  except  as  the 
result  of  influence  from  without. 

(6)  Later  investigations  have  rendered  it  probable  that  the  stone  age 
of  some  localities  was  contemporaneous  with  the  bronze  and  iron  ages  of 
others,  while  certain  tribes  and  nations,  instead  of  making  progress  from 
one  to  the  other,  were  never,  so  far  back  as  we  can  trace  them,  without 
the  knowledge  and  use  of  the  metals.  It  is  to  be  observed,  moreover,  that 
even  without  such  knowledge  and  use  man  is  not  necessarily  a  barbarian, 
though  he  may  be  a  child. 

( c )  The  barbarous  customs  to  which  this  view  looks  for  support  may 
better  be  explained  as  marks  of  broken-down  civilization  than  as  relics  of 
a  primitive  and  universal  savagery.     Even  if  they  indicated  a  former  state 
of  barbarism,  that  state  might  have  been  itself  preceded  by  a  condition  of 
comparative  culture. 

(d)  The  well-nigh  universal  tradition  of  a  golden  age  of  virtue  and 
happiness  may  be  most  easily  explained  upon  the  Scripture  view  of  an 
actual  creation  of  the  race  in  holiness  and  its  subsequent  apostasy. 

2nd.  That  the  religious  history  of  mankind  warrants  us  in  inferring  a 
necessary  and  universal  law  of  progress,  in  accordance  with  which  man 
passes  from  f etichism  to  polytheism  and  monotheism,  —  this  first  theologi- 
cal stage,  of  which  fetichism,  polytheism,  and  monotheism  are  parts,  being 
succeeded  by  the  metaphysical  stage,  and  that  in  turn  by  the  positive. 

This  assumed  law  of  progress,  however,  is  contradicted  by  the  following 
facts : 

(a)  Not  only  did  the  monotheism  of  the  Hebrews  precede  the  great 
polytheistic  systems  of  antiquity,  but  even  these  heathen  religions  are 
purer  from  polytheistic  elements,  the  further  back  we  trace  them  ;  so  that 
the  facts  point  to  an  original  monotheistic  basis  for  them  alL 

(6)  "There  is  no  proof  that  the  Indo-Germanic  or  Semitic  stocks  ever 
practiced  fetich  worship,  or  were  ever  enslaved  by  the  lowest  types  of  myth- 
ological religion,  or  ascended  from  them  to  somewhat  higher  "  (  Fisher  ). 

(  c )  Some  of  the  earliest  remains  of  man  yet  found  show,  by  the  burial 
of  food  and  weapons  with  the  dead,  that  there  already  existed  the  idea  of 
spiritual  beings  and  of  a  future  state,  and  therefore  a  religion  of  a  higher 
sort  than  fetichism. 


140  INCIDENTS  OF  MAN'S  ORIGINAL  STATE. 


The  theory  in  question,  in  making  theological  thought  a  merely 
transient  stage  of  mental  evolution,  ignores  the  fact  that  religion  has  its  root 
in  the  intuitions  and  yearnings  of  the  human  soul,  and  that  therefore  no 
philosophical  or  scientific  progress  can  ever  abolish  it.  While  the  terms 
theological,  metaphysical,  and  positive  may  properly  mark  the  order  in 
which  the  ideas  of  the  individual  and  the  race  are  acquired,  positivism  errs 
in  holding  that  these  three  phases  of  thought  are  mutually  exclusive,  and 
that  upon  the  rise  of  the  later  the  earlier  must  of  necessity  become  extinct. 


CHAPTER  III. 
SIN,  OE  MAN'S  STATE  OF  APOSTASY. 

SECTION   I. —  THE   LAW   OF   GOD. 

As  preliminary  to  a  treatment  of  man's  state  of  apostasy,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  consider  the  nature  of  that  law  of  God,  the  transgression  of 
which  is  sin.  We  may  best  approach  the  subject  by  inquiring  what  is  the 
true  conception  of 

I.    LAW  IN  GENEBAL. 

1.  Law  an  expression  of  will. 

The  essential  idea  of  law  is  that  of  a  general  expression  of  will  enforced 
by  power.  It  implies  :  (  a  )  A  lawgiver,  or  authoritative  will.  (  6  )  Sub- 
jects, or  beings  upon  whom  this  will  terminates.  (  c  )  A  general  command, 
or  expression  of  this  will.  ( d  )  A  power,  enforcing  the  command. 

These  elements  are  found  even  in  what  we  call  natural  law.    The  phrase 

*  law  of  nature '  involves  a  self-contradiction,  when  used  to  denote  a  mode 
of  action  or  an  order  of  sequence  behind  which  there  is  conceived  to  be  no 
intelligent  and  ordaining  will.     Physics  derives  the  term  *  law  *  from  juris- 
prudence, instead  of  jurisprudence  deriving  it  from  physics.     It  is  first 
used  of  the  relations  of  voluntary  agents.    Causation  in  our  own  wills 
enables  us  to  see  something  besides  mere  antecedence  and  consequence  in 
the  world  about  us.     Physical  science,  in  her  very  use  of  the  word  *  law, ' 
implicitly  confesses  that  a  supreme  Will  has  set  general  rules  which  control 
the  processes  of  the  universe. 

2.  Law  a  general  expression  of  will. 

The  characteristic  of  law  is  generality.  It  is  addressed  to  substances  or 
persons  in  classes.  Special  legislation  is  contrary  to  the  true  theory  of 
law. 

3.  Law  implies  power  to  enforce. 

It  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  law,  that  there  be  power  to  enforce. 
Otherwise  law  becomes  the  expression  of  mere  wish  or  advice.  Since 
physical  substances  and  forces  have  no  intelligence  and  no  power  to  resist, 
the  four  elements  already  mentioned  exhaust  the  implications  of  the  term 

*  law  '  as  applied  to  nature.     In  the  case  of  rational  and  free  agents,  how- 
ever, law  implies  in  addition :  (e)  Duty  or  obligation  to  obey;  and  (/) 
Sanctions,  or  pains  and  penalties  for  disobedience. 

4.  Law  expresses  and  demands  nature. 

The  will  which  thus  binds  its  subjects  by  commands  and  penalties  is  an 
expression  of  the  nature  of  the  governing  power,  and  reveals  the  normal 

141 


142  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  MAN. 

relations  of  the  subjects  to  that  power.  Finally,  therefore,  law  (#)  Is  an 
expression  of  the  nature  of  the  lawgiver  ;  and  ( h  )  Sets  forth  the  condition 
or  conduct  in  the  subjects  which  is  requisite  for  harmony  with  that  nature. 
Any  so-called  law  which  fails  to  represent  the  nature  of  the  governing 
power  soon  becomes  obsolete.  All  law  that  is  permanent  is  a  transcript  of 
the  facts  of  being,  a  discovery  of  what  is  and  must  be,  in  order  to  harmony 
between  the  governing  and  the  governed  ;  in  short,  positive  law  is  just  and 
lasting  only  as  it  is  an  expression  and  republication  of  the  law  of  nature. 

II.    THE  LAW  OF  GOD  IN  PABTICTJIJAB. 

The  law  of  God  is  a  general  expression  of  the  divine  will  enforced  by 
power.  It  has  two  forms  :  Elemental  Law  and  Positive  Enactment. 

1.  Elemental  Law,  or  law  inwrought  into  the  elements,  substances, 
and  forces  of  the  rational  and  irrational  creation.  This  is  twofold : 

A.  The  expression  of  the  divine  will  in  the  constitution  of  the  material 
universe;  —  this  we  call  physical,  or  natural  law.     Physical  law  is  not 
necessary.     Another  order  of  things  is  conceivable.     Physical  order  is  not 
an  end  in  itself  ;  it  exists  for  the  sake  of  moral  order.     Physical  order  has 
therefore  only  a  relative  constancy,  and  God  supplements  it  at  times  by 
miracle. 

B.  The  expression  of  the  divine  will  in  the  constitution  of  rational  and 
free  agents ; — this  we  call  moral  law.     This  elemental  law  of  our  moral 
nature,  with  which  only  we  are  now  concerned,  has  all  the  characteristics 
mentioned  as  belonging  to  law  in  general.     It  implies  :  (a  )  A  divine  Law- 
giver, or  ordaining  Will.     (  6  )  Subjects,  or  moral  beings  upon  whom  the 
law  terminates.     (  c  )  General  command,  or  expression  of  this  will  in  the 
moral  constitution  of  the  subjects.     (  d )  Power,  enforcing  the  command. 
( e )  Duty,  or  obligation  to  obey.     (/)  Sanctions,  or  pains  and  penalties 
for  disobedience. 

All  these  are  of  a  loftier  sort  than  are  found  in  human  law.  But  we  need 
especially  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  this  law  (g)  Is  an  expression  of  the 
moral  nature  of  God,  and  therefore  of  God's  holiness,  the  fundamental 
attribute  of  that  nature  ;  and  that  it  ( h  )  Sets  forth  absolute  conformity  to 
that  holiness,  as  the  normal  condition  of  man.  This  law  is  inwrought  into 
man's  rational  and  moral  being.  Man  fulfills  it,  only  when  in  his  moral  as 
well  as  his  rational  being  he  is  the  image  of  God. 

The  law  of  God,  then,  is  simply  an  expression  of  the  nature  of  God  in  the 
form  of  moral  requirement,  and  a  necessary  expression  of  that  nature  in 
view  of  the  existence  of  moral  beings  (  Ps.  19  : 7  ;  c/.  1 ).  To  the  existence 
of  this  law  all  men  bear  witness.  The  consciences  even  of  the  heathen  tes- 
tify to  it  (  Horn.  2  : 14, 15 ).  Those  who  have  the  written  law  recognize  this 
elemental  law  as  of  greater  compass  and  penetration  ( Rom.  7  :  14 ;  8  :  4 ). 
The  perfect  embodiment  and  fulfillment  of  this  law  is  seen  only  in  Christ 
(Eom.  10  :4;  Phil.  3  : 8,  9). 

Each  of  the  two  last-mentioned  characteristics  of  God's  law  is  important 
in  its  implications.  We  treat  of  these  in  their  order. 

First,  the  law  of  God  as  a  transcript  of  the  divine  nature.— If  this  be  the 


THE  LAW   OF  GOD   IN"   PARTICULAR.  143 

nature  of  the  law,  then  certain  common  misconceptions  of  it  are  excluded. 
The  law  of  God  is 

(  a )  Not  arbitrary,  or  the  product  of  arbitrary  will.  Since  the  will  from 
which  the  law  springs  is  a  revelation  of  God's  nature,  there  can  be  no 
rashness  or  unwisdom  in  the  law  itself. 

(  6 )  Not  temporary,  or  ordained  simply  to  meet  an  exigency.  The  law 
is  a  manifestation,  not  of  temporary  moods  or  desires,  but  of  the  essential 
nature  of  God. 

( c  )  Not  merely  negative,  or  a  law  of  mere  prohibition,  —  since  positive 
conformity  to  God  is  the  inmost  requisition  of  law. 

( d )  Not  partial,  or  addressed  to  one  part  only  of  man's  being,  —  since 
likeness  to  God  requires  purity  of  substance  in  man's  soul  and  body,  as 
well  as  purity  in  all  the  thoughts  and  acts  that  proceed  therefrom.    As  law 
proceeds  from  the  nature  of  God,  so  it  requires  conformity  to  that  nature 
in  the  nature  of  man. 

( e )  Not  outwardly  published,  —  since  all  positive  enactment  is  only  the 
imperfect  expression  of  this  underlying  and  unwritten  law  of  being. 

(/)  Not  inwardly  conscious,  or  limited  in  its  scope  by  men's  conscious- 
ness of  it.  Like  the  laws  of  our  physical  being,  the  moral  law  exists 
whether  we  recognize  it  or  not. 

(g )  Not  local,  or  confined  to  place,  — since  no  moral  creature  can  escape 
from  God,  from  his  own  being,  or  from  the  natural  necessity  that  unlike- 
ness  to  God  should  involve  misery  and  ruin. 

( h )  Not  changeable,  or  capable  of  modification.  Since  law  represents 
the  unchangeable  nature  of  God,  it  is  not  a  sliding  scale  of  requirements 
which  adapts  itself  to  the  ability  of  the  subjects.  God  himself  cannot 
change  it  without  ceasing  to  be  God. 

Secondly,  the  law  of  God  as  the  ideal  of  human  nature. — A  law  thus 
identical  with  the  eternal  and  necessary  relations  of  the  creature  to  the 
Creator,  and  demanding  of  the  creature  nothing  less  than  perfect  holiness, 
as  the  condition  of  harmony  with  the  infinite  holiness  of  God,  is  adapted 
to  man's  finite  nature,  as  needing  law  ;  to  man's  free  nature,  as  needing 
moral  law  ;  and  to  man's  progressive  nature,  as  needing  ideal  law. 

The  law  of  God  is  therefore  characterized  by : 

(a)  All-comprehensiveness. — It  is  over  us  at  all  times;  it  respects  our 
past,  our  present,  our  future.  It  forbids  every  conceivable  sin ;  it  requires 
every  conceivable  virtue  ;  omissions  as  well  as  commissions  are  condemned 
by  it. 

(6)  Spirituality. —  It  demands  not  only  right  acts  and  words,  but  also 
right  dispositions  and  states.  Perfect  obedience  requires  not  only  the 
intense  and  unremitting  reign  of  love  toward  God  and  man,  but  conformity 
of  the  whole  inward  and  outward  nature  of  man  to  the  holiness  of  God. 

fc)  Solidarity.— It  exhibits  in  all  its  parts  the  nature  of  the  one 


144  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  MAN. 

Law-giver,  and  it  expresses,  in  its  least  command,  the  one  requirement  of 
harmony  with  him. 

Only  to  the  first  man,  then,  was  the  law  proposed  as  a  method  of  salva- 
tion. With  the  first  sin,  all  hope  of  obtaining  the  divine  favor  by  perfect 
obedience  is  lost.  To  sinners  the  law  remains  as  a  means  of  discovering 
and  developing  sin  in  its  true  nature,  and  of  compelling  a  recourse  to  the 
mercy  provided  in  Jesus  Christ. 

2.  Positive  Enactment,  or  the  expression  of  the  will  of  God  in  pub- 
lished ordinances.  This  is  also  two-fold  : 

A.  General  moral  precepts.  —  These  are  written  summaries  of  the  ele- 
mental law  (  Mat.  5  :  48  ;  22  :  37-40  ),  or  authorized  applications  of  it  to 
special  human  conditions  (Ex.  20  :  1-17  ;  Mat.  chap.  5-8). 

B.  Ceremonial  or  special  injunctions.  —  These  are  illustrations  of  the 
elemental  law,  or  approximate  revelations  of  it,  suited  to  lower  degrees  of 
capacity  and  to  earlier  stages  of  spiritual  training  (  Ez.  20  :  25  ;  Mat.  19  :  8  ; 
Mark  10  :  5  ).    Though  temporary,  only  God  can  say  when  they  cease  to 
be  binding  upon  us  in  their  outward  form. 

All  positive  enactments,  therefore,  whether  they  be  moral  or  ceremonial, 
are  republications  of  elemental  law.  Their  forms  may  change,  but  the  sub- 
stance is  eternal.  Certain  modes  of  expression,  like  the  Mosaic  system, 
may  be  abolished,  but  the  essential  demands  are  unchanging  (  Mat.  5  :  17, 
18  ;  c/.  Eph.  2  :  15  ).  From  the  imperfection  of  human  language,  no  posi- 
tive enactments  are  able  to  express  in  themselves  the  whole  content  and 
meaning  of  the  elemental  law.  "It  is  not  the  purpose  of  revelation  to 
disclose  the  whole  of  our  duties.  "  Scripture  is  not  a  complete  code  of  rules 
for  practical  action,  but  an  enunciation  of  principles,  with  occasional  pre- 
cepts by  way  of  illustration.  Hence  we  must  supplement  the  positive 
enactment  by  the  law  of  being  —  the  moral  ideal  found  in  the  nature  of  God. 


EELATION  OF  THE  LAW  TO  THE  GRACE  OF  GOD. 

In  human  government,  while  law  is  an  expression  of  the  will  of  the 
governing  power,  and  so  of  the  nature  lying  behind  the  will,  it  is  by  no 
means  an  exhaustive  expression  of  that  will  and  nature,  since  it  consists 
only  of  general  ordinances,  and  leaves  room  for  particular  acts  of  command 
through  the  executive,  as  well  as  for  "  the  institution  of  equity,  the  faculty 
of  discretionary  punishment,  and  the  prerogative  of  pardon.  " 

Applying  now  to  the  divine  law  this  illustration  drawn  from  human  law, 
we  remark  : 

(  a  )  The  law  of  God  is  a  general  expression  of  God's  will,  applicable  to 
all  moral  beings.  It  therefore  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  special 
injunctions  to  individuals,  and  special  acts  of  wisdom  and  power  in  creation 
and  providence.  The  very  specialty  of  these  latter  expressions  of  will 
prevents  us  from  classing  them  under  the  category  of  law. 

(6)  The  law  of  God,  accordingly,  is  a  partial,  not  an  exhaustive, 
expression  of  God's  nature.  It  constitutes,  indeed,  a  manifestation  of  that 
attribute  of  holiness  which  is  fundamental  in  God,  and  which  man  must 


DEFINITION   OF   SIN.  145 

possess  in  order  to  be  in  harmony  with  God.     But  it  does  not  fully  express 
God's  nature  in  its  aspects  of  personality,  sovereignty,  helpfulness,  mercy. 

(c)  Mere  law,  therefore,  leaves  prod's  nature  in  these  aspects  of  person- 
ality, sovereignty,  helpfulness,  mercy,  to  be  expressed  toward  sinners  in 
another  way,  namely,  through  the  atoning,  regenerating,  pardoning,  sancti- 
fying work  of  the  gospel  of  Christ.  As  creation  does  not  exclude  miracles, 
so  law  does  not  exclude  grace  (Rom.  8:3  —  "what  the  law  could  not  do 
God"  did). 

(  d )  Grace  is  to  be  regarded,  however,  not  as  abrogating  law,  but  as 
republishing  and  enforcing  it  (Rom.  3  :31 — "we  establish  the  law").  By 
removing  obstacles  to  pardon  in  the  mind  of  God,  and  by  enabling  man  to 
obey,  grace  secures  the  perfect  fulfilment  of  law  (Rom.  8  :  4  —  "that  the 
ordinance  of  the  law  might  be  fulfilled  in  us " ).  Even  grace  has  its  law 
(Rom.  8  : 2  — "the  law  of  the  Spirit  of  life")  ;  another  higher  law  of 
grace,  the  operation  of  individualizing  mercy,  overbears  the  "law  of  sin 
and  of  death,"  —  this  last,  as  in  the  case  of  the  miracle,  not  being  sus- 
pended, annulled,  or  violated,  but  being  merged  in,  while  it  is  transcended 
by,  the  exertion  of  personal  divine  will. 

(e)  Thus  the  revelation  of  grace,  while  it  takes  up  and  includes  in  itself 
the  revelation  of  law,  adds  something  different  in  kind,  namely,  the  mani- 
festation of  the  personal  love  of  the  Lawgiver.  Without  grace,  law  has 
only  a  demanding  aspect.  Only  in  connection  with  grace  does  it  become 
"  the  perfect  law,  the  law  of  liberty"  (James  1  :25).  In  fine,  grace  is 
that  larger  and  completer  manifestation  of  the  divine  nature,  of  which  law 
constitutes  the  necessary  but  preparatory  stage. 

tf 


y 


SECTION  II. — NATURE  OF  SIN. 


I.     DEFINITION  OF  SIN. 


Sin  is  lack  of  conformity  to  the  moral  law  of  God,  either  in  act,  disposi- 
tion, or  state. 

In  explanation,  we  remark  that  ( a )  This  definition  regards  sin  as  pred- 
icable  only  of  rational  and  voluntary  agents.  ( b  )  It  assumes,  however, 
that  man  has  a  rational  nature  below  consciousness,  and  a  voluntary  nature 
apart  from  actual  volition.  (  c  )  It  holds  that  the  divine  law  requires  moral 
likeness  to  God  in  the  affections  and  tendencies  of  the  nature,  as  well  as  in 
its  outward  activities,  (d )  It  therefore  considers  lack  of  conformity  to  the 
divine  holiness  in  disposition  or  state  as  a  violation  of  law,  equally  with  the 
outward  act  of  transgression. 

Our  treatment  of  Holiness,  as  belonging  to  the  nature  of  God  ( pages  75, 79, 
80)  ;  of  Will,  as  not  only  the  faculty  of  volitions,  but  also  a  permanent  state 
of  the  soul  (pages  132-134) ;  and  of  Law  as  requiring  the  conformity  of 
man's  nature  to  God's  holiness  ( pages  142-144 )  ;  has  prepared  us  for  the 
definition  of  sin  as  a  state.  The  chief  psychological  defect  of  New  School 
theology,  next  to  its  making  holiness  to  be  a  mere  form  of  love,  is  its  ignor- 


146  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  MAN. 

ing  of  the  unconscious  and  subconscious  elements  in  human  character.  To 
help  our  understanding  of  sin  as  an  underlying  and  permanent  state  of  the 
soul,  we  subjoin  references  to  recent  writers  of  note  upon  psychology  and 
its  relations  to  theology. 

In  adducing  our  Scriptural  and  rational  proof  of  the  definition  of  sin  as 
a  state,  we  desire  to  obviate  the  objection  that  this  view  leaves  the  soul 
wholly  given  over  to  the  power  of  evil.  While  we  maintain  that  this  is 
true  of  man  apart  from  God,  we  also  insist  that  side  by  side  with  the  evil 
bent  of  the  human  will  there  is  always  an  immanent  divine  power  which 
greatly  counteracts  the  force  of  evil,  and  if  not  resisted  leads  the  individ- 
ual soul —  even  when  resisted  leads  the  race  at  large — toward  truth  and 
salvation.  This  immanent  divine  power  is  none  other  than  Christ,  the 
eternal  Word,  the  Light  which  lighteth  every  man ;  see  John  1 : 4,  9. 

1.    Proof. 

As  it  is  readily  admitted  that  the  outward  act  of  transgression  is  properly 
denominated  sin,  we  here  attempt  to"sEbw  only  that  lack  of  conformity  to 
the  law  of  God  in  disposition  or  state  is  also  and  equally  to  be  so  denomi- 
nated. 

A.    From  Scripture. 

(a)  The  words  ordinarily  translated  *  sin,'  or  used  as  synonyms  for  it, 
are  as  applicable  to  dispositions  and  states  as  to  acts  (  HXDn  and  djuaprla  = 
a  missing,  failure,  coming  short  [  sc.  of  God's  will  ]  ). 

(  b  )  The  New  Testament  descriptions  of  sin  bring  more  distinctly  to 
view  the  states  and  dispositions  than  the  outward  acts  of  the  soul  ( 1  John 
3  :  4  —  qd/uapTia  eorlv  i}  dvo/uia,  where  dvojuia  =  ,  not  "transgression  of  the 
law,"  but,  as  both  context  and  etymology  show,  "lack  of  conformity  to 
law"  or  "lawlessness" — Rev.  Vers.). 

(  c  )  Moral  evil  is  ascribed  not  only  to  the  thoughts  and  affections,  but 
to  the  heart  from  which  they  spring  ( we  read  of  the  "  evil  thoughts  "  and 
of  the  "  evil  heart  "—  Mat.  15  : 19  and  Heb.  3  : 12 ). 

(  d )  The  state  or  condition  of  the  soul  which  gives  rise  to  wrong  desires 
and  acts  is  expressly  called  sin  (  Eom.  7  : 8 — "  Sin  .  .  .  wrought  in  me  .  .  . 
all  manner  of  coveting  "  ). 

(e)  Sin  is  represented  as  existing  in  the  soul,  prior  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  it,  and  as  only  discovered  and  awakened  by  the  law  (  Bom.  7:9,  10 
—  "when  the  commandment  came,  sin  revived,  and  I  died" — if  sin 
"revived,"  it  must  have  had  previous  existence  and  life,  even  though  it 
did  not  manifest  itself  in  acts  of  conscious  transgression  ). 

(/)  The  allusions  to  sin  as  a  permanent  power  or  reigning  principle,  not 
only  in  the  individual  but  in  humanity  at  large,  forbid  us  to  define  it  as  a 
momentary  act,  and  compel  us  to  regard  it  as  being  primarily  a  settled 
depravity  of  nature,  of  which  individual  sins  or  acts  of  transgression  are 
the  workings  and  fruits  (  Eom.  5  : 21  —  "  sin  reigned  in  death  "  ;  6  : 12  — 
"  let  not  therefore  sin  reign  in  your  mortal  body  "  ). 


DEFINITION  OF  SIN.  147 

(g)  The  Mosaic  sacrifices  for  sins  of  ignorance  and  of  omission,  and 
especially  for  general  sinfulness,  are  evidence  that  sin  is  not  to  be  limited 
to  mere  act,  but  that  it  includes  something  deeper  and  more  permanent  in 
the  heart  and  the  life  (Lev.  1  :  3  ;  5  : 11 ;  12  :  8  ;  cf.  Luke  2  :  24). 

B.  From  the  common  judgment  of  mankind. 

( a )  Men  universally  attribute  vice  as  well  as  virtue  not  only  to  con- 
scious and  deliberate  acts,  but  also  to  dispositions  and  states.     Belief  in 
something  more  permanently  evil  than  acts  of  transgression  is  indicated  in 
the  common  phrases,  "hateful  temper,"  "  wicked  pride,"  "bad  character." 

( b )  Outward  acts,  indeed,  are  condemned  only  when  they  are  regarded 
as  originating  in,  and  as  symptomatic  of,  evil  dispositions.     Civil  law  pro- 
ceeds upon  this  principle  in  holding  crime  to  consist,  not  alone  in  the 
external  act,  but  also  in  the  evil  motive  or  intent  with  which  it  is  per- 
formed. 

(  c  )  The  stronger  an  evil  disposition,  or  in  other  words,  the  more  it 
connects  itself  with,  or  resolves  itself  into,  a  settled  state  or  condition  of 
the  soul,  the  more  blameworthy  is  it  felt  to  be.  This  is  shown  by  the 
distinction  drawn  between  crimes  of  passion  and  crimes  of  deliberation. 

(  d )  This  condemning  sentence  remains  the  same,  even  although  the 
origin  of  the  evil  disposition  or  state  cannot  be  traced  back  to  any  conscious 
act  of  the  individual.  Neither  the  general  sense  of  mankind,  nor  the  civil 
law  in  which  this  general  sense  is  expressed,  goes  behind  the  fact  of  an 
existing  evil  will.  Whether  this  evil  will  is  the  result  of  personal  trans- 
gression or  is  a  hereditary  bias  derived  from  generations  passed,  this  evil 
will  is  the  man  himself,  and  upon  him  terminates  the  blame.  We  do  not 
excuse  arrogance  or  sensuality  upon  the  ground  that  they  are  family  traits. 

(  6  )  When  any  evil  disposition  has  such  strength  in  itself,  or  is  so  com- 
bined with  others,  as  to  indicate  a  settled  moral  corruption  in  which  no 
power  to  do  good  remains,  this  state  is  regarded  with  the  deepest  disappro- 
bation of  all.  Sin  weakens  man's  power  of  obedience,  but  the  can-not  is  a 
will-not,  and  is  therefore  condemnable.  The  opposite  principle  would 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that,  the  more  a  man  weakened  his  powers  by  trans- 
gression, the  less  guilty  he  would  be,  until  absolute  depravity  became 
absolute  innocence. 

C.  From  the  experience  of  the  Christian. 

Christian  experience  is  a  testing  of  Scripture  truth,  and  therefore  is  not 
an  independent  source  of  knowledge.  It  may,  however,  corroborate  con- 
clusions drawn  from  the  word  of  God.  Since  the  judgment  of  the  Christian 
is  formed  under  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  we  may  trust  this  more 
implicitly  than  the  general  sense  of  the  world.  We  affirm,  then,  that  just 
in  proportion  to  his  spiritual  enlightenment  and  self-knowledge,  the  Chris- 
tian 

( a  )  Regards  his  outward  deviations  from  God's  law,  and  his  evil  incli- 
nations and  desires,  as  outgrowths  and  revelations  of  a  depravity  of  nature 
which  lies  below  his  consciousness  ;  and 


148  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF   MAN. 

(  6  )  Eepents  more  deeply  for  this  depravity  of  nature,  which  constitutes 
his  inmost  character  and  is  inseparable  from  himself,  than  for  what  he 
merely  feels  or  does. 

In  proof  of  these  statements  we  appeal  to  the  biographies  and  writings 
of  those  in  all  ages  who  have  been  by  general  consent  regarded  as  most 
advanced  in  spiritual  culture  and  discernment. 

2.     Inferences. 

In  the  light  of  the  preceding  discussion,  we  may  properly  estimate  the 
elements  of  truth  and  of  error  in  the  common  definition  of  sin  as  '  the 
voluntary  transgression  of  known  law. ' 

(a)  Not  all  sin  is  voluntary  as  being  a  distinct  and  conscious  volition  ; 
for  evil  disposition  and  state  often  precede  and  occasion  evil  volition,  and 
evil  disposition  and  state  are  themselves  sin.  All  sin,  however,  is  voluntary 
as  springing  either  directly  from  will,  or  indirectly  from  those  perverse 
affections  and  desires  which  have  themselves  originated  in  will.  *  Volun- 
tary '  is  a  term  broader  than  '  volitional, '  and  includes  all  those  permanent 
states  of  intellect  and  affection  which  the  will  has  made  what  they  are.  Will, 
moreover,  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  simply  the  faculty  of  volitions,  but  as 
primarily  the  underlying  determination  of  the  being  to  a  supreme  end. 

(  6  )  Deliberate  intention  to  sin  is  an  aggravation  of  transgression,  but  it 
is  not  essential  to  constitute  any  given  act  or  feeling  a  sin.  Those  evil 
inclinations  and  impulses  which  rise  unbidden  and  master  the  soul  before 
it  is  well  aware  of  their  nature,  are  themselves  violations  of  the  divine  law, 
and  indications  of  an  inward  depravity  which  in  the  case  of  each  descen- 
dant of  Adam  is  the  chief  and  fontal  transgression. 

( c  )  Knowledge  of  the  sinf ulness  of  an  act  or  feeling  is  also  an  aggrava- 
tion of  transgression,  but  it  is  not  essential  to  constitute  it  a  sin.  Moral 
blindness  is  the  effect  of  transgression,  and,  as  inseparable  from  corrupt 
affections  and  desires,  is  itself  condemned  by  the  divine  law. 

(  d  )  Ability  to  fulfill  the  law  is  not  essential  to  constitute  the  non-fulfil- 
ment sin.  Inability  to  fulfill  the  law  is  a  result  of  transgression,  and,  as 
consisting  not  in  an  original  deficiency  of  faculty  but  in  a  settled  state  of 
the  affections  and  will,  it  is  itself  condenmable.  Since  the  law  presents 
the  holiness  of  God  as  the  only  standard  for  the  creature,  ability  to  obey 
can  never  be  the  measure  of  obligation  or  the  test  of  sin. 

II.     THE  ESSENTIAL  PRINCIPLE  OP  SIN. 

The  definition  of  sin  as  lack  of  conformity  to  the  divine  law  does  not 
exclude,  but  rather  necessitates,  an  inquiry  into  the  characterizing  motive 
or  impelling  power  which  explains  its  existence  and  constitutes  its  guilt. 
Only  three  views  require  extended  examination.  Of  these  the  first  two 
constitute  the  most  common  excuses  for  sin,  although  not  propounded  for 
this  purpose  by  their  authors  :  Sin  is  due  ( 1 )  to  the  human  body,  or  (  2  ) 
to  finite  weakness.  The  third,  which  we  regard  as  the  Scriptural  view, 
considers  sin  as  ( 3  )  the  supreme  choice  of  self,  or  selfishness. 

In  the  preceding  section  on  the  Definition  of  Sin,  we  showed  that  sin  is 


THE   ESSENTIAL   PRINCIPLE   OF  SIN.  149 

a  state,  and  a  state  of  the  will.     We  now  ask  :  What  is  the  nature  of  this 
state  ?  and  we  expect  to  show  that  it  is  essentially  a  selfish  state  of  the  will. 

1.  Sin  as  Sensuousness. 

This  view  regards  sin  as  the  necessary  product  of  man's  sensuous  nature 
— a  result  of  the  soul's  connection  with  a  physical  organism.  This  is  the 
view  of  Schleiermacher  and  of  Eothe.  More  recent  writers,  with  John 
Fiske,  regard  moral  evil  as  man's  inheritance  from  a  brute  ancestry. 

In  refutation  of  this  view,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  urge  the  following  con- 
siderations : 

(  a  )  It  involves  an  assumption  of  the  inherent  evil  of  matter,  at  least  so 
far  as  regards  the  substance  of  man's  body.  But  this  is  either  a  form  of 
dualism,  and  may  be  met  with  the  objections  already  brought  against  that 
system,  or  it  implies  that  God,  in  being  the  author  of  man's  physical 
organism,  is  also  the  responsible  originator  of  human  sin. 

(6)  In  explaining  sin  as  an  inheritance  from  the  brute,  this  theory 
ignores  the  fact  that  man,  even  though  derived  from  a  brute  ancestry,  is  no 
longer  brute,  but  man,  with  power  to  recognize  and  to  realize  moral  ideals, 
and  under  no  necessity  to  violate  the  law  of  his  being. 

( c)  It  rests  upon  an  incomplete  induction  of  facts,  taking  account  of  sin 
solely  in  its  aspect  of  self -degradation,  but  ignoring  the  worst  aspect  of  it  as 
self-exaltation.  Avarice,  envy,  pride,  ambition,  malice,  cruelty,  revenge, 
self -righteousness,  unbelief,  enmity  to  God,  are  none  of  them  fleshly  sins, 
and  upon  this  principle  are  incapable  of  explanation. 

(c?)  It  leads  to  absurd  conclusions, — as,  for  example,  that  asceticism,  by 
weakening  the  power  of  sense,  must  weaken  the  power  of  sin  ;  that  man 
becomes  less  sinful  as  his  senses  fail  with  age  ;  that  disembodied  spirits  are 
necessarily  holy  ;  that  death  is  the  only  Eedeemer. 

(e)  It  interprets  Scripture  erroneously.  In  passages  like  Bom.  7  : 18  — 
OVK.  olnei  EV  k[jLoit  Tovr'  eoTiv  ev  Ty  aapKi  /J<ovt  ayaftdv  —  ffflpf,  or  flesh,  signifies,  not 
man's  body,  but  man's  whole  being  when  destitute  of  the  Spirit  of  God. 
The  Scriptures  distinctly  recognize  the  seat  of  sin  as  being  in  the  soul 
i|selij_  not  in  its  physical  organism.  God  does  not  tempt  man,  nor  has  he 
made  manVoajauce  to  tempt  him  (  James  1 : 13,  14). 

(/)  Instead  of  explaining  sin,  this  theory  virtually  denies  its  existence, 
—  for  if  sin  arises  from  the  original  constitution  of  our  being,  reason  may 
recognize  it  as  misfortune,  but  conscience  cannot  attribute  to  it  guilt. 

2.  Sin  as  Finiteness. 

This  view  explains  sin  as  a  necessary  result  of  the  limitations  of  man's 
finite  being.  As  an  incident  of  imperfect  development,  the  fruit  of  igno- 
rance and  impotence,  sin  is  not  absolutely  but  only  relatively  evil  —  an 
element  in  human  education  and  a  means  of  progress.  This  is  the  view  of 
Leibnitz  and  of  Spinoza.  Modern  writers,  as  Schurman  and  Boyce,  have 
maintained  that  moral  evil  is  the  necessary  background  and  condition  of 
moral  good. 


150  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OE  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

We  object  to  this  theory  that 

( a )  It  rests  upon  a  pantheistic  basis,  as  the  sense-theory  rests  upon 
dualism.  The  moral  is  confounded  with  the  physical ;  might  is  identified 
with  right.  Since  sin  is  a  necessary  incident  of  finiteness,  and  creatures 
can  never  be  infinite,  it  follows  that  sin  must  be  everlasting,  not  only  in 
the  universe,  but  in  each  individual  souL 

(  b  )  So  far  as  this  theory  regards  moral  evil  as  a  necessary  presupposition 
and  condition  of  moral  good,  it  commits  the  serious  error  of  confounding 
the  possible  with  the  actual.  What  is  necessary  to  goodness  is  not  the 
actuality  of  evil,  but  only  the  possibility  of  evil. 

(c)  It  is  inconsistent  with  known  facts, —  as  for  example,  the  follow- 
ing :  Not  all  sins  are  negative  sins  of  ignorance  and  infirmity  ;  there  are  acts 
of  positive  malignity,  conscious  transgressions,  wilful  and  presumptuous 
choices  of  evil.  Increased  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  sin  does  not  of  itself 
give  strength  to  overcome  it ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  repeated  acts  of  con- 
scious transgression  harden  the  heart  in  evil.  Men  of  greatest  mental 
powers  are  not  of  necessity  the  greatest  saints,  nor  are  the  greatest  sinners 
men  of  least  strength  of  will  and  understanding. 

( d  )  Like  the  sense-theory  of  sin,  it  contradicts  both  conscience  and 
Scripture  by  denying  human  responsibility  and  by  transferring  the  blame 
of  sin  from  the  creature  to  the  Creator.  This  is  to  explain  sin,  again,  by 
denying  its  existence. 

3.     Sin  as  Selfishness. 

We  hold  the  essential  principle  of  sin  to  be  selfishness.  By  selfishness 
we  mean  not  simply  the  exaggerated  self-love  which  constitutes  the  antith- 
esis of  benevolence,  but  that  choice  of  self  as  the  supreme  end  which 
constitutes  the  antithesis  of  supreme  love  to  God.  That  selfishness  is  the 
essence  of  sin  may  be  shown  as  follows  : 

A.  Love  to  God  is  the  essence  of  all  virtue.     The  opposite  to  this,  the 
choice  of  self  as  the  supreme  end,  must  therefore  be  the  essence  of  sin. 

We  are  to  remember,  however,  that  the  love  to  God  in  which  virtue  con- 
sists is  love  for  that  which  is  most  characteristic  and  fundamental  in  God, 
namely,  his  holiness.  It  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  supreme  regard  for 
God's  interests  or  for  the  good  of  being  in  general.  Not  mere  benevolence, 
but  love  for  God  as  holy,  is  the  principle  and  source  of  holiness  in  man. 
Since  the  love  of  God  required  by  the  law  is  of  this  sort,  it  not  only  does 
not  imply  that  love,  in  the  sense  of  benevolence,  is  the  essence  of  holiness 
in  God, —  it  implies  rather  that  holiness,  or  self -loving  and  self-affirming 
purity,  is  fundamental  in  the  divine  nature.  From  this  self-loving  and 
self-affirming  purity,  love  properly  so-called,  or  the  self-communicating 
attribute,  is  to  be  carefully  distinguished  ( see  pages  74,  75  ). 

B.  All  the  different  forms  of  sin  can  be  shown  to  have  their  root  in 
selfishness,  while  selfishness  itself,  considered  as  the  choice  of  self  as  a 
supreme  end,  cannot  be  resolved  into  any  simpler  elements. 

(  a )  Selfishness  may  reveal  itself  in  the  elevation  to  supreme  dominion 


THE   ESSENTIAL   PRINCIPLE   OF   SIN.  151 

of  any  one  of  man's  natural  appetites,  desires,  or  affections.  Sensuality  is 
selfishness  in  the  form  of  inordinate  appetite.  Selfish  desire  takes  the  forms 
respectively  of  avarice,  ambition,  vanity,  pride,  according  as  it  is  set  upon 
property,  power,  esteem,  independence.  Selfish  affection  is  falsehood  or 
malice,  according  as  it  hopes  to  make  others  its  voluntary  servants,  or 
regards  them  as  standing  in  its  way  ;  it  is  unbelief  or  enmity  to  God,  accord- 
ing as  it  simply  turns  away  from  the  truth  and  love  of  God,  or  conceives 
of  God's  holiness  as  positively  resisting  and  punishing  it. 

(  b  )  Even  in  the  nobler  forms  of  unregenerate  life,  the  principle  of  self- 
ishness is  to  be  regarded  as  manifesting  itself  in  the  preference  of  lower 
ends  to  that  of  God's  proposing.  Others  are  loved  with  idolatrous  affection 
because  these  others  are  regarded  as  a  part  of  self.  That  the  selfish  ele- 
ment is  present  even  here,  is  evident  upon  considering  that  such  affection 
does  not  seek  the  highest  interest  of  its  object,  that  it  often  ceases  when 
unreturned,  and  that  it  sacrifices  to  its  own  gratification  the  claims  of  God 
and  his  law. 

(  c  )  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  side  by  side  with  the  selfish 
will,  and  striving  against  it,  is  the  power  of  Christ,  the  immanent  God, 
imparting  aspirations  and  impulses  foreign  to  unregenerate  humanity,  and 
preparing  the  way  for  the  soul's  surrender  to  truth  and  righteousness. 

C.     This  view  accords  best  with  Scripture. 

,(  a  )  The  law  requires  love  to  God  as  its  all-embracing  requirement.  (  6 ) 
The  holiness  of  Christ  consisted  in  this,  that  he  sought  not  his  own  will  or 
glory,  but  made  God  his  supreme  end.  (  c )  The  Christian  is  one  who  has 
ceased  to  live  for  self,  (d)  The  tempter's  promise  is  a  promise  of  selfish 
independence,  (e)  The  prodigal  separates  himself  from  his  father,  and 
seeks  his  own  interest  and  pleasure.  (/)  The  "man  of  sin"  illustrates 
the  nature  of  sin,  in  "opposing  and  exalting  himself  against  all  that  is 
called  God." 

Sin,  therefore,  is  not  merely  a  negative  thing,  or  an  absence  of  love  to 
God.  It  is  a  fundamental  and  positive  choice  or  preference  of  self  instead 
of  God,  as  the  object  of  affection  and  the  supreme  end  of  being.  Instead 
of  making  God  the  centre  of  his  life,  surrendering  himself  unconditionally 
to  God  and  possessing  himself  only  in  subordination  to  God's  will,  the  sin- 
ner makes  self  the  centre  of  his  life,  sets  himself  directly  against  God,  and 
constitutes  his  own  interest  the  supreme  motive  and  his  own  will  the 
supreme  rule. 

We  may  follow  Dr.  E.  G.  Robinson  in  saying  that,  while  sin  as  a  state 
is  unlikeness  to  God,  as  a  principle  is  opposition  to  God,  and  as  an  act  is 
transgression  of  God's  law,  the  essence  of  it  always  and  everywhere  is 
selfishness.  It  is  therefore  not  something  external,  or  the  result  of  compul- 
sion from  without ;  it  is  a  depravity  of  the  affections  and  a  perversion  of  the 
will,  which  constitutes  man's  inmost  character. 


152  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   MAN. 

SECTION   III. — UNIVERSALITY  OF   SIN. 

We  have  shown  that  sin  is  a  state,  a  state  of  the  will,  a  selfish  state  of 
the  will.  We  now  proceed  to  show  that  this  selfish  state  of  the  will  is 
universal.  We  divide  our  proof  into  two  parts.  In  the  first,  we  regard 
sin  in  its  aspect  as  conscious  violation  of  law  ;  in  the  second,  in  its  aspect 
as  a  bias  of  the  nature  to  evil,  prior  to  or  underlying  consciousness. 

I.     EVERY  HUMAN  BEING  WHO  HAS  ARRIVED  AT  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS 

HAS    COMMITTED    ACTS,      OR     CHERISHED     DISPOSITIONS,     CONTRARY     TO     THE 
DIVINE   LAW. 

1.  Proof  from  Scripture. 

The  universality  of  transgression  is  : 

( a  )  Set  forth  in  direct  statements  of  Scripture. 

(  6 )  Implied  in  declarations  of  the  universal  need  of  atonement,  regen- 
eration, and  repentance. 

(c)  Shown  from  the  condemnation  resting  upon  all  who  do  not  accept 
Christ. 

(d)  Consistent  with  those  passages  which  at  first  sight  seem  to  ascribe 
to  certain  men  a  goodness  which  renders  them  acceptable  to  God,  where  a 
closer  examination  will  show  that  in  each  case  the  goodness  supposed  is  a 
merely  imperfect  and  fancied  goodness,  a  goodness  of  mere  aspiration  and 
impulse  due  to  preliminary  workings  of  God's  Spirit,  or  a  goodness  result- 
ing from  the  trust  of  a  conscious  sinner  in  God's  method  of  salvation. 

2.  Proof  from  history,  observation,  and  the  common  judgment  of 
mankind. 

(  a )  History  witnesses  to  the  universality  of  sin,  in  its  accounts  of  the 
universal  prevalence  of  priesthood  and  sacrifice. 

( b )  Every  man  knows  himself  to  have  come  short  of  moral  perfection, 
and,  in  proportion  to  his  experience  of  the  world,  recognizes  the  fact  that 
every  other  man  has  come  short  of  it  also. 

( c)  The  common  judgment  of  mankind  declares  that  there  is  an  element 
of  selfishness  in  every  human  heart,  and  that  every  man  is  prone  to  some 
form  of  sin.     This  common  judgment  is  expressed  in  the  maxims:    "No 
man  is  perfect"  ;  "Every  man  has  his  weak  side",  or  "his  price"  ;  and 
every  great  name  in  literature  has  attested  its  truth. 

3.  Proof  from  Christian  experience. 

(  a )  In  proportion  to  his  spiritual  progress  does  the  Christian  recognize 
evil  dispositions  within  him,  which  but  for  divine  grace  might  germinate 
and  bring  forth  the  most  various  forms  of  outward  transgression. 

( 6 )  Since  those  most  enlightened  by  the  Holy  Spirit  recognize  them- 
selves as  guilty  of  unnumbered  violations  of  the  divine  law,  the  absence 
of  any  consciousness  of  sin  on  the  part  of  unregenerate  men  must  be 
regarded  as  proof  that  they  are  blinded  by  persistent  transgression. 


THE   UNIVERSALITY   OF   SIN.  153 

II.  EVERY  MEMBER  OF  THE  HUMAN  RACE,  WITHOUT  EXCEPTION,  POSSES- 
SES A  CORRUPTED  NATURE,  WHICH  IS  A  SOURCE  OF  ACTUAL  SIN,  AND  IS  ITSELF 
SIN. 

1.  Proof  from  Scripture. 

A.  The  sinful  acts  and  dispositions  of  men  are  referred  to,  and  explained 
by,  a  corrupt  nature. 

This  corrupt  nature  (  a )  belongs  to  man  from  the  first  moment  of  his 
being  ;  ( b )  underlies  man's  consciousness  ;  ( c  )  cannot  be  changed  by 
man's  own  power  ;  (  d )  first  constitutes  him  a  sinner  before  God  ;  ( e )  is 
the  common  heritage  of  the  race. 

B.  All  men  are  declared  to  be  by  nature  children  of  wrath  ( Eph.  2:3). 
Here  '  nature '  signifies  something  inborn  and  original,  as  distinguished 
from  that  which  is  subsequently  acquired.     The  text  implies  that :  ( a )  Sin 
is  a  nature,  in  the  sense  of  a  congenital  depravity  of  the  will.     (  6  )  This 
nature  is  guilty  and  condemnable, —  since  God's  wrath  rests  only  upon  that 
which  deserves  it.     (  c )  All  men  participate  in  this  nature  and  in  this  con- 
sequent guilt  and  condemnation. 

C.  Death,  the  penalty  of  sin,  is  visited  even  upon  those  who  have  never 
exercised  a  personal  and  conscious  choice  (  Bom.  5  : 12-14  ).     This  text 
implies  that  (  a  )  Sin  exists  in  the  case  of  infants  prior  to  moral  conscious- 
ness, and  therefore  in  the  nature,   as  distinguished  from  the  personal 
activity.     ( b )  Since  infants  die,  this  visitation  of  the  penalty  of  sin  upon 
them  marks  the  ill-desert  of  that  nature  which  contains  in  itself,  though 
undeveloped,  the  germs  of  actual  transgression.     (  c )  It  is  therefore  certain 
that  a  sinful,  guilty,  and  condemnable  nature  belongs  to  all  mankind. 

2.  Proof  from  Reason. 

Three  facts  demand  explanation  :  ( a )  The  universal  existence  of  sinful 
dispositions  in  every  mind,  and  of  sinful  acts  in  every  life.  ( 6 )  The  pre- 
ponderating tendencies  to  evil,  which  necessitate  the  constant  education  of 
good  impulses,  while  the  bad  grow  of  themselves.  ( c )  The  yielding  of  the 
will  to  temptation,  and  the  actual  violation  of  the  divine  law,  in  the  case  of 
every  human  being  so  soon  as  he  reaches  moral  consciousness. 

Reason  seeks  an  underlying  principle  which  will  reduce  these  multitudi- 
nous phenomena  to  unity.  As  we  are  compelled  to  refer  common  physical 
and  intellectual  phenomena  to  a  common  physical  and  intellectual  nature, 
so  we  are  compelled  to  refer  these  common  moral  phenomena  to  a  common 
moral  nature,  and  to  find  in  it  the  cause  of  this  universal,  spontaneous,  and 
all-controlling  opposition  to  God  and  his  law.  The  only  possible  solution 
of  the  problem  is  this,  that  the  common  nature  of  mankind  is  corrupt,  or, 
in  other  words,  that  the  human  will,  prior  to  the  single  volitions  of  the 
individual,  is  turned  away  from  God  and  supremely  set  upon  self-gratifi- 
cation. This  unconscious  and  fundamental  direction  of  the  will,  as  the 
source  of  actual  sin,  must  itself  be  sin ;  and  of  this  sin  all  mankind  are 
partakers. 


154  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   MAN. 

SECTION  IV.— ORIGIN   OF  SIN   IN  THE   PERSONAL  ACT  OF   ADAM. 

With  regard  to  the  origin  of  this  sinful  nature  which  is  common  to  the 
race,  and  which  is  the  occasion  of  all  actual  trangressions,  reason  affords 
no  light.  The  Scriptures,  however,  refer  the  origin  of  this  nature  to  that 
free  act  of  our  first  parents  by  which  they  turned  away  from  God,  cor- 
rupted themselves,  and  brought  themselves  under  the  penalties  of  the  law. 

I.  THE  SOBIPTUBAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  TEMPTATION  AND  FALL  IN  GEN- 
ESIS 3  : 1-7. 

1.  Its  general  character  not  mythical  or  allegorical,  but  historical. 

We  adopt  this  view  for  the  following  reasons  :  —  (  a  )  There  is  no  inti- 
mation in  the  account  itself  that  it  is  not  historical.  (  b )  As  a  part  of  a 
historical  book,  the  presumption  is  that  it  is  itself  historical.  ( c  )  The 
later  Scripture  writers  refer  to  it  as  a  veritable  history  even  in  its  details. 
(  d }  Particular  features  of  the  narrative,  such  as  the  placing  of  our  first 
parents  in  a  garden  and  the  speaking  of  the  tempter  through  a  serpent- 
form,  are  incidents  suitable  to  man's  condition  of  innocent  but  untried 
childhood.  (  e )  This  view  that  the  narrative  is  historical  does  not  forbid 
our  assuming  that  the  trees  of  life  and  of  knowledge  were  symbols  of 
spiritual  truths,  while  at  the  same  time  they  were  outward  realities. 

2.  The  course  of  the  temptation,  and  the  resulting  fall. 
The  stages  of  the  temptation  appear  to  have  been  as  follows : 

(  a )  An  appeal  on  the  part  of  Satan  to  innocent  appetites,  together  with 
an  implied  suggestion  that  God  was  arbitrarily  withholding  the  means  of 
their  gratification  (  Gen.  3:1).  The  first  sin  was  in  Eve's  isolating  herself 
and  choosing  to  seek  her  own  pleasure  without  regard  to  God's  will.  This 
initial  selfishness  it  was,  which  led  her  to  listen  to  the  tempter  instead  of 
rebuking  him  or  flying  from  him,  and  to  exaggerate  the  divine  command 
in  her  response  (  Gen.  3:3). 

(  b  )  A  denial  of  the  veracity  of  God,  on  the  part  of  the  tempter,  with  a 
charge  against  the  Almighty  of  jealousy  and  fraud  in  keeping  his  creatures 
in  a  position  of  ignorance  and  dependence  (  Gen.  3  :  4,  5 ).  This  was  fol- 
lowed, on  the  part  of  the  woman,  by  positive  unbelief,  and  by  a  conscious 
and  presumptuous  cherishing  of  desire  for  the  forbidden  fruit,  as  a  means 
of  independence  and  knowledge.  Thus  unbelief,  pride,  and  lust  all  sprang 
from  the  self-isolating,  self-seeking  spirit,  and  fastened  upon  the  means 
of  gratifying  it  (  Gen.  3:6). 

( c  )  The  tempter  needed  no  longer  to  urge  his  suit.  Having  poisoned 
the  fountain,  the  stream  would  naturally  be  evil.  Since  the  heart  and  its 
desires  had  become  corrupt,  the  inward  disposition  manifested  itself  in  act 
(  Gen.  3:6  —  '  did  eat ;  and  she  gave  also  unto  her  husband  with  her  '=  who 
had  been  with  her,  and  had  shared  her  choice  and  longing ).  Thus  man 
fell  inwardly,  before  the  outward  act  of  eating  the  forbidden  fruit, — fell  in 
that  one  fundamental  determination  whereby  he  made  supreme  choice  of 
self  instead  of  God.  This  sin  of  the  inmost  nature  gave  rise  to  sins  of  the 


DIFFICULTIES   CONNECTED   WITH  THE   FALL.  155 

desires,   and  sins  of  the  desires  led  to  the  outward  act  of  transgression 
(  James  1  : 15  ). 

II.  DIFFICULTIES  CONNECTED  WITH  THE  FALL  CONSIDERED  AS  THE  PER- 
SONAL ACT  OF  ADAM. 

1.  How  could  a  holy  being  fall  f 

Here  we  must  acknowledge  that  we  cannot  understand  how  the  first 
unholy  emotion  could  have  found  lodgment  in  a  mind  that  was  set 
supremely  upon  God,  nor  how  temptation  could  have  overcome  a  soul  in 
which  there  were  no  unholy  propensities  to  which  it  could  appeal.  The 
mere  power  of  choice  does  not  explain  the  fact  of  an  unholy  choice.  The 
fact  of  natural  desire  for  sensuous  and  intellectual  gratification  does  not 
explain  how  this  desire  came  to  be  inordinate.  Nor  does  it  throw  light 
upon  the  matter,  to  resolve  this  fall  into  a  deception  of  our  first  parents  by 
Satan.  Their  yielding  to  such  deception  presupposes  distrust  of  God  and 
alienation  from  him.  Satan's  fall,  moreover,  since  it  must  have  been 
uncaused  by  temptation  from  without,  is  more  difficult  to  explain  than 
Adam's  fall. 

But  sin  is  an  existing  fact.  God  cannot  be  its  author,  either  by  creating 
man's  nature  so  that  sin  was  a  necessary  incident  of  its  development,  or  by 
withdrawing  a  supernatural  grace  which  was  necessary  to  keep  man  holy. 
Eeason,  therefore,  has  no  other  recourse  than  to  accept  the  Scripture  doc- 
trine that  sin  originated  in  man's  free  act  of  revolt  from  God  —  the  act  of 
a  will  which,  though  inclined  toward  God,  was  not  yet  confirmed  in  virtue 
and  was  still  capable  of  a  contrary  choice.  The  original  possession  of  such 
power  to  the  contrary  seems  to  be  the  necessary  condition  of  probation 
and  moral  development.  Yet  the  exercise  of  this  power  in  a  sinful  direction 
can  never  be  explained  upon  grounds  of  reason,  since  sin  is  essentially 
unreason.  It  is  an  act  of  wicked  arbitrariness,  the  only  motive  of  which 
is  the  desire  to  depart  from  God  and  to  render  self  supreme. 

2.  How  could  God  justly  permit  /Satanic  temptation  $ 
We  see  in  this  permission  not  justice  but  benevolence. 

(a)  Since  Satan  fell  without  external  temptation,  it  is  probable  tha 
man's  trial  would  have  been  substantially  the  same,  even  though  there  had 
been  no  Satan  to  tempt  him. 

( 6  )  In  this  case,  however,  man's  fall  would  perhaps  have  been  without 
what  now  constitutes  its  single  mitigating  circumstance.  Self-originated 
sin  would  have  made  man  himself  a  Satan. 

( c )  As,  in  the  conflict  with  temptation,  it  is  an  advantage  to  objectify 
evil  under  the  image  of  corruptible  flesh,  so  it  is  an  advantage  to  meet  it 
as  embodied  in  a  personal  and  seducing  spirit. 

(  b  )  Such  temptation  has  in  itself  no  tendency  to  lead  the  soul  astray.  If 
the  soul  be  holy,  temptation  may  only  confirm  it  in  virtue.  Only  the  evil  will, 
self-determined  against  God,  can  turn  temptation  into  an  occasion  of  ruin. 

3.  How  could  a  penalty  so  great  be  justly  connected  with  disobedi- 
ence to  so  slight  a  command  ? 


156  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  MAN". 

To  this  question  we  may  reply : 

(a)  So  slight  a  command  presented  the  best  test  of  the  spirit  of 
obedience. 

(  6 )  The  external  command  was  not  arbitrary  or  insignificant  in  its  sub- 
stance. It  was  a  concrete  presentation  to  the  human  will  of  God's  claim 
to  eminent  domain  or  absolute  ownership. 

( c  )  The  sanction  attached  to  the  command  shows  that  man  was  not  left 
ignorant  of  its  meaning  or  importance. 

(  d  )  The  act  of  disobedience  was  therefore  the  revelation  of  a  will  thor- 
oughly corrupted  and  alienated  from  God  —  a  will  given  over  to  ingratitude, 
unbelief,  ambition,  and  rebellion. 

in.     CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  FALL,  so  FAB  AS  RESPECTS  ADAM. 

1.  Death.  —  This  death  was  twofold.     It  was  partly  : 

A.  Physical  death,  or  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  the  body.  —  The 
seeds  of  death,  naturally  implanted  in  man's  constitution,  began  to  develop 
themselves  the  moment  that  access  to  the  tree  of  life  was  denied  him.    Man 
from  that  moment  was  a  dying  creature. 

But  this  death  was  also,  and  chiefly, 

B.  Spiritual  death,  or  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  God.  —  In  this 
are  included  :  ( a )  Negatively,  the  loss  of  man's  moral  likeness  to  God,  or 
that  underlying  tendency  of  his  whole  nature  toward  God  which  constituted 
his  original  righteousness.       (6)   Positively,  the  depraving  of  all  those 
powers  which,  in  their  united  action  with  reference  to  moral  and  religious 
truth,  we  call  man's  moral  and  religious  nature ;  or,  in  other  words,  the 
blinding  of  his  intellect,  the  corruption  of  his  affections,  and  the  enslave- 
ment of  his  will. 

In  fine,  man  no  longer  made  God  the  end  of  his  life,  but  chose  self 
instead.  While  he  retained  the  power  of  self-determination  in  subordinate 
things,  he  lost  that  freedom  which  consisted  in  the  power  of  choosing  God 
as  his  ultimate  aim,  and  became  fettered  by  a  fundamental  inclination  of 
his  will  toward  evil.  The  intuitions  of  the  reason  were  abnormally 
obscured,  since  these  intuitions,  so  far  as  they  are  concerned  with  moral  and 
religious  truth,  are  conditioned  upon  a  right  state  of  the  affections ;  and  — 
as  a  necessary  result  of  this  obscuring  of  reason  —  conscience,  which,  as 
the  normal  judiciary  of  the  soul,  decides  upon  the  basis  of  the  law  given  to 
it  by  reason,  became  perverse  in  its  deliverances.  Yet  this  inability  to  judge 
or  act  aright,  since  it  was  a  moral  inability  springing  ultimately  from  will, 
was  itself  hateful  and  condemnable. 

2.  Positive  and  formal  exclusion  from  God's  presence.  —  This  included : 

(  a  )  The  cessation  of  man's  former  familiar  intercourse  with  God,  and 
the  setting  up  of  outward  barriers  between  man  and  his  Maker  (  cherubim 
and  sacrifice ). 

(  6  )  Banishment  from  the  garden,  where  God  had  specially  manifested 
his  presence. — Eden  was  perhaps  a  spot  reserved,  as  Adam's  body  had 


IMPUTATION  OF  ADAM'S  SIN  TO  HIS  POSTEKITY.  157 

been,  to  show  what  a  sinless  world  would  be.  This  positive  exclusion  from 
God's  presence,  with  the  sorrow  and  pain  which  it  involved,  may  have  been 
intended  to  illustrate  to  man  the  nature  of  that  eternal  death  from  which 
he  now  needed  to  seek  deliverance. 


SECTION  Y.  —  IMPUTATION   OF  ADAM'S   SIN  TO   HIS   POSTERITY. 

We  have  seen  that  all  mankind  are  sinners  ;  that  all  men  are  by  nature 
depraved,  guilty,  and  condemnable  ;  and  that  the  transgression  of  our  first 
parents,  so  far  as  respects  the  human  race,  was  the  first  sin.  We  have  still 
to  consider  the  connection  between  Adam's  sin  and  the  depravity,  guilt, 
and  condemnation  of  the  race. 

(  a  )  The  Scriptures  teach  that  the  transgression  of  our  first  parents  con- 
stituted their  posterity  sinners  (Kom.  5:19 — "through  the  one  man's 
disobedience  the  many  were  made  sinners  "),  so  that  Adam's  sin  is  imputed, 
reckoned,  or  charged  to  every  member  of  the  race  of  which  he  was  the  germ 
and  head  (  Eom.  5 : 16 —  "the  judgment  came  of  one  [  offence  ]  unto  con- 
demnation "  ).  It  is  because  of  Adam's  sin  that  we  are  born  depraved  and 
subject  to  God's  penal  inflictions  (Horn.  5  :12 —  "through  one  man  sin 
entered  into  the  world,  and  death  through  sin  "  ;  Eph.  2:3 —  "by  nature 
children  of  wrath  " ).  Two  questions  demand  answer,  — first,  how  we  can 
be  responsible  for  a  depraved  nature  which  we  did  not  personally  and  con- 
sciously originate  ;  and,  secondly,  how  God  can  justly  charge  to  our 
account  the  sin  of  the  first  father  of  the  race.  These  questions  are  sub- 
stantially the  same,  and  the  Scriptures  intimate  the  true  answer  to  the 
problem  when  they  declare  that  "in  Adam  all  die"  (1  Cor.  15:22)  and 
"  that  death  passed  unto  all  men,  for  that  all  sinned  "  when  "through  one 
man  sin  entered  into  the  world  "  (  Eom.  5:12).  In  other  words,  Adam's 
sin  is  the  cause  and  ground  of  the  depravity,  guilt,  and  condemnation 
of  all  his  posterity,  simply  because  Adam  and  his  posterity  are  one,  and,  by 
virtue  of  their  organic  unity,  the  sin  of  Adam  is  the  sin  of  the  race. 

(  b  )  According  as  we  regard  this  twofold  problem  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  abnormal  human  condition,  or  of  the  divine  treatment  of  it,  we  may 
call  it  the  problem  of  original  sin,  or  the  problem  of  imputation.  Neither 
of  these  terms  is  objectionable  when  its  meaning  is  defined.  By  imputa- 
tion of  sin  we  mean,  not  the  arbitrary  and  mechanical  charging  to  a  man 
of  that  for  which  he  is  not  naturally  responsible,  but  the  reckoning  to  a 
man  of  a  guilt  which  is  properly  his  own,  whether  by  virtue  of  his  individ- 
ual acts,  or  by  virtue  of  his  connection  with  the  race.  By  original  sin  we 
mean  that  participation  in  the  common  sin  of  the  race  with  which  God 
charges  us,  in  virtue  of  our  descent  from  Adam,  its  first  father  and  head. 

( c  )  There  are  two  fundamental  principles  which  the  Scriptures  already 
cited  »eem  clearly  to  substantiate,  and  which  other  Scriptures  corroborate. 
The  first  is  that  man's  relations  to  moral  law  extend  beyond  the  sphere  of 
conscious  and  actual  transgression,  and  embrace  those  moral  tendencies 
and  qualities  of  his  being  which  he  has  in  common  with  every  other  member 


158  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   MAN. 

of  the  race.  The  second  is,  that  God's  moral  government  is  a  government 
which  not  only  takes  account  of  persons  and  personal  acts,  but  also  recog- 
nizes race  responsibilities  and  inflicts  race-penalties ;  or,  in  other  words, 
judges  mankind,  not  simply  as  a  collection  of  separate  individuals,  but  also 
as  an  organic  whole,  which  can  collectively  revolt  from  God  and  incur  the 
curse  of  the  violated  law. 

( d)  In  recognizing  the  guilt  of  race-sin,  we  are  to  bear  in  mind  :  ( 1 )  that 
actual  sin,  in  which  the  personal  agent  reaffirms  the  underlying  determina- 
tion of  his  will,  is  more  guilty  than  original  sin  alone ;  (  2  )  that  no  human 
being  is  finally  condemned  solely  on  account  of  original  sin  ;  but  that  all 
who,  like  infants,  do  not  commit  personal  transgressions,  are  saved  through 
the  application  of  Christ's  atonement ;  ( 3 )  that  our  responsibility  for 
inborn  evil  dispositions,  or  for  the  depravity  common  to  the  race,  can  be 
maintained  only  upon  the  ground  that  this  depravity  was  caused  by  an 
original  and  conscious  act  of  free  will,  when  the  race  revolted  from  God  in 
Adam  ;  (  4  )  that  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  only  the  ethical  interpreta- 
tion of  biological  facts  —  the  facts  of  heredity  and  of  universal  congenital 
ills,  which  demand  an  ethical  ground  and  explanation ;  and  (  5  )  that  the 
idea  of  original  sin  has  for  its  correlate  the  idea  of  original  grace,  or  the 
abiding  presence  and  operation  of  Christ,  the  immanent  God,  in  every 
member  of  the  race,  in  spite  of  his  sin,  to  counteract  the  evil  and  to  prepare 
the  way,  so  far  as  man  will  permit,  for  individual  and  collective  salvation. 

(e)  There  is  a  race-sin,  therefore,  as  well  as  a  personal  sin ;  and  that 
race-sin  was  committed  by  the  first  father  of  the  race,  when  he  comprised 
the  whole  race  in  himself.     All  mankind  since  that  time  have  been  born  in 
the  state  into  which  he  fell — a  state  of  depravity,  guilt,  and  condemnation. 
To  vindicate  God's  justice  in  imputing  to  us  the  sin  of  our  first  father, 
many  theories  have  been  devised,  a  part  of  which  must  be  regarded  as  only 
attempts  to  evade  the  problem  by  denying  the  facts  set  before  us  in  the 
Scriptures.     Among  these  attempted  explanations  of  the  Scripture  state- 
ments, we  proceed  to  examine  the  six  theories  which  seem  most  worthy  of 
attention. 

I.     THEORIES  OF  IMPUTATION. 

1.     The  Pelagian  Theory,  or  Theory  of  Man's  natural  Innocence. 

Pelagius,  a  British  monk,  propounded  his  doctrines  at  Home,  409.  They 
were  condemned  by  the  Council  of  Carthage,  418.  Pelagianisra,  however, 
as  opposed  to  Augustinianism,  designates  a  complete  scheme  of  doctrine 
with  regard  to  sin,  of  which  Pelagius  was  the  most  thorough  representative, 
although  every  feature  of  it  cannot  be  ascribed  to  his  authorship.  Socinians 
and  Unitarians  are  the  more  modern  advocates  of  this  general  scheme. 

According  to  this  theory,  every  human  soul  is  immediately  created  by 
God,  and  created  as  innocent,  as  free  from  depraved  tendencies,  and  as 
perfectly  able  to  obey  God,  as  Adam  was  at  his  creation.  The  only  effect 
of  Adam's  sin  upon  his  posterity  is  the  effect  of  evil  example  ;  it  has  in  no 
way  corrupted  human  nature ;  the  only  corruption  of  human  nature  is  that 
habit  of  sinning  which  each  individual  contracts  by  persistent  transgression 
of  known  law. 


ABMLNIAN   THEORY   OF   IMPUTATION".  159 

Adam's  sin  therefore  injured  only  himself  ;  the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed 
only  to  Adam, — it  is  imputed  in  no  sense  to  his  descendants ;  God  imputes 
to  each  of  Adam's  descendants  only  those  acts  of  sin  which  he  has  person- 
ally and  consciously  committed.  Men  can  be  saved  by  the  law  as  well  as 
by  the  gospel ;  and  some  have  actually  obeyed  God  perfectly,  and  have 
thus  been  saved.  Physical  death  is  therefore  not  the  penalty  of  sin,  but 
an  original  law  of  nature  ;  Adam  would  have  died  whether  he  had  sinned 
or  not ;  in  Rom.  5  : 12,  "  death  passed  unto  all  men^  for  that  all  sinned," 
signifies:  "  all  incurred  eternal  death  by  sinning  after  Adam's  example." 

Of  the  Pelagian  theory  of  sin,  we  may  say  : 

A.  It  has  never  been  recognized  as  Scriptural,  nor  has  it  been  formu- 
lated in  confessions,  by  any  branch  of  the  Christian  church.     Held  only 
sporadically  and  by  individuals,  it  has  ever  been  regarded  by  the  church  at 
large  as  heresy.     This  constitutes  at  least  a  presumption  against  its  truth. 

B.  It  contradicts  Scripture  in  denying  :   (  a )  that  evil  disposition  and 
state,  as  well  as  evil  acts,  are  sin  ;   ( 6  )  that  such  evil  disposition  and  state 
are  inborn  in  all  mankind  ;   ( c )  that  men  universally  are  guilty  of  overt 
transgression  so  soon  as  they  come  to  moral  consciousness  ;   ( d  )  that  no 
man  is  able  without  divine  help  to  fulfil  the  law ;   ( e )  that  all  men,  with- 
out exception,  are  dependent  for  salvation  upon  God's  atoning,  regenerat- 
ing,  sanctifying    grace ;     (/)    that   man's  present  state  of  corruption, 
condemnation,  and  death,  is  the  direct  effect  of  Adam's  transgression. 

C.  It  rests  upon  false  philosophical  principles  ;  as,  for  example  :   (  a ) 
that  the  human  will  is  simply  the  faculty  of  volitions  ;  whereas  it  is  also, 
and  chiefly,  the  faculty  of  self-determination  to  an  ultimate  end  ;  (  6  )  that 
the  power  of  a  contrary  choice  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  will ;  wnereas 
the  will  fundamentally  determined  to  self -gratification  has  this  power  only 
with  respect  to  subordinate  choices,  and  cannot  by  a  single  volition  reverse 
its  moral  state  ;  (c)  that  ability  is  the  measure  of  obligation, — a  principle 
which  would  diminish  the  sinner's  responsibility,  just  in  proportion  to  his 
progress  in  sin ;  (  d  )  that  law  consists  only  in  positive  enactment ;  whereas  it 
is  the  demand  of  perfect  harmony  with  God,  inwrought  into  man's  moral 
nature ;  (  e )  that  each  human  soul  is  immediately  created  by  God,  and 
holds  no  other  relations  to  moral  law  than  those  which  are  individual ; 
whereas  all  human  souls  are  organically  connected  with  each  other,  and 
together  have  a  corporate  relation  to  God's  law,  by  virtue  of  their  deriva- 
tion from  one  common  stock. 

2.  The  Arminian  Theory,  or  Theory  of  voluntarily  appropriated 
Depravity. 

Arminius  (1560-1609),  professor  in  the  University  of  Leyden,  in  South 
Holland,  while  formally  accepting  the  doctrine  of  the  Adamic  unity  of  the 
race  propounded  both  by  Luther  and  Calvin,  gave  a  very  different  inter- 
pretation to  it — an  interpretation  which  verged  toward  Semi-Pelagianism 
and  the  anthropology  of  the  Greek  Church.  The  Methodist  body  is  the 
modern  representative  of  this  view. 


160  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF 

According  to  this  theory,  all  men,  as  a  divinely  appointed  sequence  of 
Adam's  transgression,  are  naturally  destitute  of  original  righteousness,  and 
are  exposed  to  misery  and  death.  By  virtue  of  the  infirmity  propagated 
from  Adam  to  all  his  descendants,  mankind  are  wholly  unable  without 
divine  help  perfectly  to  obey  God  or  to  attain  eternal  life.  This  inability, 
however,  is  physical  and  intellectual,  but  not  voluntary.  As  matter  of  jus- 
tice, therefore,  God  bestows  upon  each  individual  from  the  first  dawn  of 
consciousness  a  special  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  is  sufficient  to 
counteract  the  effect  of  the  inherited  depravity  and  to  make  obedience 
possible,  provided  the  human  will  cooperates,  which  it  still  has  power  to  do. 

The  evil  tendency  and  state  may  be  called  sin  ;  but  they  do  not  in  them- 
selves involve  guilt  or  punishment ;  still  less  are  mankind  accounted  guilty 
of  Adam's  sin.  God  imputes  to  each  man  his  inborn  tendencies  to  evil, 
only  when  he  consciously  and  voluntarily  appropriates  and  ratifies  these  in 
spite  of  the  power  to  the  contrary,  which,  in  justice  to  man,  God  has 
specially  communicated.  In  Eom.  5  : 12,  "death  passed  unto  all  men,  for 
that  all  sinned,"  signifies  that  physical  and  spiritual  death  is  inflicted  upon 
all  men,  not  as  the  penalty  of  a  common  sin  in  Adam,  but  because,  by 
divine  decree,  all  suffer  the  consequences  of  that  sin,  and  because  all 
personally  consent  to  their  inborn  sinfulness  by  acts  of  transgression. 

With  regard  to  the  Arminian  theory  we  remark  : 

A.  We  grant  that  there  is  a  universal  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  if  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  meant  the  natural  light  of  reason  and  conscience,  and  the 
manifold  impulses  to  good  which  struggle  against  the  evil  of  man's  nature. 
But  we  regard  as  wholly  unscriptural  the  assumptions  :  ( a )  that  this  gift 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  of  itself  removes  the  depravity  or  condemnation  derived 
from  Adam's  fall ;  (  b  )  that  without  this  gift  man  would  not  be  responsible 
for  being  morally  imperfect ;  and  ( c )  that  at  the  beginning  of  moral  life 
men  consciously  appropriate  their  inborn  tendencies  to  evil. 

B.  It  contradicts  Scripture  in  maintaining :     (a)  that  inherited  moral 
evil  does  not  involve  guilt ;  (  b  )  that  the  gift  of  the  Spirit,  and  the  regen- 
eration of  infants,  are  matters  of  justice ;  (c)  that  the  effect  of  grace  is 
simply  to  restore  man's  natural  ability,  instead  of  disposing  him  to  use  that 
ability  aright ;  (  d )  that  election  is  God's  choice  of  certain  men  to  be  saved 
upon  the  ground  of  their  foreseen  faith,  instead  of  being  God's  choice  to 
make  certain  men  believers  ;  ( e  )  that  physical  death  is  not  the  just  pen- 
alty of  sin,  but  is  a  matter  of  arbitrary  decree. 

C.  It  rests  upon  false  philosophical  principles,  as  for  example  :  (  a)  That 
the  will  is  simply  the  faculty  of  volitions.    (  6  )  That  the  power  of  contrary 
choice,  in  the  sense  of  power  by  a  single  act  to  reverse  one's  moral  state,  is 
essential  to  will.     ( c  )  That  previous  certainty  of  any  given  moral  act  is 
incompatible  with  its  freedom.     (  d )  That  ability  is  the  measure  of  obli- 
gation,    (e)  That  law  condemns  only  volitional  transgression.     (/)  That 
man  has  no  organic  moral  connection  with  the  race. 

D.  It  renders  uncertain  either  the  universality  of  sin  or  man's  responsi- 
bility for  it.     If  man  has  full  power  to  refuse  consent  to  inborn  depravity, 
then  the  universality  of  sin  and  the  universal  need  of  a  Savior  are  merely 


NEW   SCHOOL  THEORY   OP  IMPUTATION.  161 

hypothetical.  If  sin,  however,  be  universal,  there  must  have  been  an  absence 
of  free  consent ;  and  the  objective  certainty  of  man's  sinning,  according  to 
the  theory,  destroys  his  responsibility. 

3.     The  New  School  Theory,  or  Theory  of  uncondemnable  Vitiosity. 

This  theory  is  called  New  School,  because  of  its  recession  from  the  old 
Puritan  anthropology  of  which  Edwards  and  Bellamy  in  the  last  century 
were  the  expounders.  The  New  School  theory  is  a  general  scheme  built 
up  by  the  successive  labors  of  Hopkins,  Emmons,  Dwight,  Taylor,  and 
Finney.  It  is  held  at  present  by  New  School  Presbyterians,  and  by  the 
larger  part  of  the  Congregational  body. 

According  to  this  theory,  all  men  are  born  with  a  physical  and  moral  con- 
stitution which  predisposes  them  to  sin,  and  all  men  do  actually  sin  so  soon 
as  they  come  to  moral  consciousness.  This  vitiosity  of  nature  may  be 
called  sinful,  because  it  uniformly  leads  to  sin  ;  but  it  is  not  itself  sin,  since 
nothing  is  to  be  properly  denominated  sin  but  the  voluntary  act  of  trans- 
gressing known  law. 

God  imputes  to  men  only  their  own  acts  of  personal  transgression ;  he 
does  not  impute  to  them  Adam's  sin  ;  neither  original  vitiosity  nor  physi- 
cal death  are  penal  inflictions ;  they  are  simply  consequences  which  God 
has  in  his  sovereignty  ordained  to  mark  his  displeasure  at  Adam's  trans- 
gression, and  subject  to  which  evils  God  immediately  creates  each  human 
soul.  In  Horn.  5  : 12,  "death  passed  unto  all  men,  for  that  all  sinned," 
signifies  :  "  spiritual  death  passed  on  all  men,  because  all  men  have  actu- 
ally and  personally  sinned." 

To  the  New  School  theory  we  object  as  follows  : 

A.  It  contradicts  Scripture  in  maintaining  or  implying:  (a)  That  sin 
consists  solely  in  acts,  and  in  the  dispositions  caused  in  each  case  by  man's 
individual  acts,  and  that  the  state  which  predisposes  to  acts  of  sin  is  not 
itself  sin.     (  b  )  That  the  vitiosity  which  predisposes  to  sin  is  apart  of  each 
man's  nature  as  it  proceeds  from  the  creative  hand  of  God.    (c)  That 
physical  death  in  the  human  race  is  not  a  penal  consequence  of  Adam's 
transgression.     (  d )  That  infants,  before  moral  consciousness,  do  not  need 
Christ's  sacrifice  to  save  them.    Since  they  are  innocent,  no  penalty  rests 
upon  them,  and  none  needs  to  be  removed,      (e)  That  we  are  neither 
condemned  upon  the  ground  of  actual  inbeing  in  Adam,  nor  justified  upon 
the  ground  of  actual  inbeing  in  Christ. 

B.  It  rests  upon  false  philosophical  principles,  as  for  example :  (  a  )  That 
the  soul  is  immediately  created  by  God.     (  b  )  That  the  law  of  God  consists 
wholly  in  outward  command.     (  c  )  That  present  natural  ability  to  obey  the 
law  is  the  measure  of  obligation.     (  d  )  That  man's  relations  to  moral  law 
are  exclusively  individual,     (e)  That  the  will  is  merely  the  faculty  of  indi- 
vidual and  personal  choices.     (/)  That  the  will,  at  man's  birth,  has  no 
moral  state  or  character. 

C.  It  impugns  the  justice  of  God  . 

(  a  )    By  regarding  him  as  the  direct  creator  of  a  vicious  nature  which 
infallibly  leads  every  human  being  into  actual  transgression.    To  maintain 
11 


162  ANTHROPOLOGY,   OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

that,  in  consequence  of  Adam's  act,  God  brings  it  about  that  all  men 
become  sinners,  and  this,  not  by  virtue  of  inherent  laws  of  propagation, 
but  by  the  direct  creation  in  each  case  of  a  vicious  nature,  is  to  make  God 
indirectly  the  author  of  sin. 

( b  )  By  representing  him  as  the  inflicter  of  suffering  and  death  upon 
millions  of  human  beings  who  in  the  present  life  do  not  come  to  moral 
consciousness,  and  who  are  therefore,  according  to  the  theory,  perfectly 
innocent.  This  is  to  make  him  visit  Adam's  sin  on  his  posterity,  while  at 
the  same  time  it  denies  that  moral  connection  between  Adam  and  his  pos- 
terity which  alone  could  make  such  visitation  just. 

(  c )  By  holding  that  the  probation  which  God  appoints  to  men  is  a  sepa- 
rate probation  of  each  soul,  when  it  first  comes  to  moral  consciousness  and 
is  least  qualified  to  decide  aright.  It  is  much  more  consonant  with  our 
ideas  of  the  divine  justice,  that  the  decision  should  have  been  made  by  the 
whole  race,  in  one  whose  nature  was  pure  and  who  perfectly  understood 
God's  law,  than  that  heaven  and  hell  should  have  been  determined  for  each 
of  us  by  a  decision  made  in  our  own  inexperienced  childhood,  under  the 
influence  of  a  vitiated  nature. 

D.  Its  limitation  of  responsibility  to  the  evil  choices  of  the  individual 
and  the  dispositions  caused  thereby  is  inconsistent  with  the  following  facts : 

( a  )  The  first  moral  choice  of  each  individual  is  so  undeliberate  as  not 
to  be  remembered.  Put  forth  at  birth,  as  the  chief  advocates  of  the  New 
School  theory  maintain,  it  does  not  answer  to  their  definition  of  sin  as  a 
voluntary  transgression  of  known  law.  Eesponsibility  for  such  choice  does 
not  differ  from  responsibility  for  the  inborn  evil  state  of  the  will  which 
manifests  itself  in  that  choice. 

( b  )  The  uniformity  of  sinful  action  among  men  cannot  be  explained 
by  the  existence  of  a  mere  faculty  of  choices.  That  men  should  uniformly 
choose  may  be  thus  explained  ;  but  that  men  should  uniformly  choose  evil 
requires  us  to  postulate  an  evil  tendency  or  state  of  the  will  itself,  prior  to 
these  separate  acts  of  choice.  This  evil  tendency  or  inborn  determination 
to  evil,  since  it  is  the  real  cause  of  actual  sins,  must  itself  be  sin,  and  as 
such  must  be  guilty  and  condemnable. 

( c )  Power  in  the  will  to  prevent  the  inborn  vitiosity  from  developing 
itself  is  upon  this  theory  a  necessary  condition  of  responsibility  for  actual 
sins.  But  the  absolute  uniformity  of  actual  transgression  is  evidence  that  the 
will  is  practically  impotent.  If  responsibility  diminishes  as  the  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  free  decision  increase,  the  fact  that  these  difficulties  are  insu- 
perable shows  that  there  can  be  no  responsibility  at  all.  To  deny  the  guilt 
of  inborn  sin  is  therefore  virtually  to  deny  the  guilt  of  the  actual  sin  which 
springs  therefrom. 

4.     The  Federal  Theory,  or  Theory  of  Condemnation  by  Covenant. 

The  Federal  theory,  or  theory  of  the  Covenants,  had  its  origin  with 
Cocceius  (1603-1669),  professor  at  Leyden,  but  was  more  fully  elaborated 
by  Turretin  (1623-1687).  It  has  become  a  tenet  of  the  Eeformed  as 
distinguished  from  the  Lutheran  church,  and  in  this  country  it  has  its  main 


FEDERAL  THEORY  OF  IMPUTATION.  163 

advocates  in  the  Princeton  school  of  theologians,  of  whom  Dr.  Charles 
Hodge  was  the  representative. 

According  to  this  view,  Adam  was  constituted  by  God's  sovereign  appoint- 
ment the  representative  of  the  whole  htunan  race.  With  Adam  as  their 
representative,  God  entered  into  covenant,  agreeing  to  bestow  upon  them 
eternal  life  on  condition  of  his  obedience,  but  making  the  penalty  of  his 
disobedience  to  be  the  corruption  and  death  of  all  his  posterity.  In  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  of  this  covenant,  since  Adam  sinned,  God  accounts  all 
his  descendants  as  sinners,  and  condemns  them  because  of  Adam's  trans- 
gression. 

In  execution  of  this  sentence  of  condemnation,  God  immediately  creates 
each  soul  of  Adam's  posterity  with  a  corrupt  and  depraved  nature,  which 
infallibly  leads  to  sin,  and  which  is  itself  sin.  The  theory  is  therefore  a 
theory  of  the  immediate  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity,  their 
corruption  of  nature  not  being  the  cause  of  that  imputation,  but  the  effect 
of  it.  In  Bom.  5  :  12,  "  death  passed  unto  all  men,  for  that  all  sinned," 
signifies :  "physical,  spiritual,  and  eternal  death  came  to  all,  because  all 
were  regarded  and  treated  as  sinners." 

To  the  Federal  theory  we  object : 

A.  It  is  extra-Scriptural,  there  being  no  mention  of  such  a  covenant 
with  Adam  in  the  account  of  man's  trial.     The  assumed  allusion  to  Adam's 
apostasy  in  Hosea  6  :  7,  where  the  word  "  covenant "  is  used,  is  too  preca- 
rious and  too  obviously  metaphorical  to  afford  the  basis  for  a  scheme  of 
imputation  (see  Henderson,  Com.  on  Minor  Prophets,  in  loco).    In  Heb. 
8:8 — "new  covenant" — there  is  suggested  a  contrast,    not  with  an 
Adamic,  but  with  the  Mosaic,  covenant  (c/.  verse  9 ). 

B.  It  contradicts  Scripture,  in  making  the  first  result  of  Adam's  sin  to 
be  God's  regarding  and  treating  the  race  as  sinners.     The  Scriptnre,  on 
the  contrary,  declares  that  Adam's  offense  constituted  us  sinners  ( Bom.  5 : 
19 ).     We  are  not  sinners  simply  because  God  regards  and  treats  us  as 
such,  but  God  regards  us  as  sinners  because  we  are  sinners.     Death  is  said 
to  have  "  passed  unto  all  men,"  not  because  all  were  regarded  and  treated 
as  sinners,  but  "because  all  sinned  "  (  Bom.  5  : 12  ). 

C.  It  impugns  the  justice  of  God  by  implying : 

( a )  That  God  holds  men  responsible  for  the  violation  of  a  covenant 
which  they  had  no  part  in  establishing.  The  assumed  covenant  is  only  a 
sovereign  decree ;  the  assumed  justice,  only  arbitrary  will. 

(  b )  That  upon  the  basis  of  this  covenant  God  accounts  men  as  sinners 
who  are  not  sinners.  But  God  judges  according  to  truth.  His  condemna- 
tions do  not  proceed  upon  a  basis  of  legal  fiction.  He  can  regard  as 
responsible  for  Adam's  transgression  only  those  who  in  some  real  sense 
have  been  concerned,  and  have  had  part,  in  that  transgression. 

(  c )  That,  after  accounting  men  to  be  sinners  who  are  not  sinners,  God 
makes  them  sinners  by  immediately  creating  each  human  soul  with  a  cor- 
rupt nature  such  as  will  correspond  to  his  decree.  This  is  not  only  to 
assume  a  false  view  of  the  origin  of  the  soul,  but  also  to  make  God  directly 


164:  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE  DOCTRIKE   OF   MAtf. 

the  author  of  sin.  Imputation  of  sin  cannot  precede  and  account  for  cor- 
ruption ;  on  the  contrary,  corruption  must  precede  and  account  for  impu- 
tation. 

5.  Theory  of  Mediate  Imputation,  or  Theory  of  Condemnation  for 
Depravity. 

This  theory  was  first  maintained  by  Placeus  (1606-1655),  professor  of 
Theology  at  Saumur  in  France.  Placeus  originally  denied  that  Adam's  sin 
was  in  any  sense  imputed  to  his  posterity,  but  after  his  doctrine  was  con- 
demned by  the  Synod  of  the  French  Beformed  Church  at  Charenton  in 
1644,  he  published  the  view  which  now  bears  his  name. 

According  to  this  view,  all  men  are  born  physically  and  morally  depraved  ; 
this  native  depravity  is  the  source  of  all  actual  sin,  and  is  itself  sin ;  in 
strictness  of  speech,  it  is  this  native  depravity,  and  this  only,  which  God 
imputes  to  men.  So  far  as  man's  physical  nature  is  concerned,  this  inborn 
sinfulness  has  descended  by  natural  laws  of  propagation  from  Adam  to  all 
his  posterity.  The  soul  is  immediately  created  by  God,  but  it  becomes 
actively  corrupt  so  soon  as  it  is  united  to  the  body.  Inborn  sinfulness  is 
the  consequence,  though  not  the  penalty,  of  Adam's  transgression. 

There  is  a  sense,  therefore,  in  which  Adam's  sin  may  be  said  to  be  im- 
puted to  his  descendants, — it  is  imputed,  not  immediately,  as  if  they  had 
been  in  Adam  or  were  so  represented  in  him  that  it  could  be  charged 
directly  to  them,  corruption  not  intervening, — but  it  is  imputed  mediately, 
through  and  on  account  of  the  intervening  corruption  which  resulted  from 
Adam's  sin.  As  on  the  Federal  theory  imputation  in  the  cause  of  depravity, 
so  on  this  theory  depravity  is  the  cause  of  imputation.  In  Bom.  5  :  12, 
"  death  passed  unto  all  men,  for  that  all  sinned,"  signifies :  "death  physi- 
cal, spiritual,  and  eternal  passed  upon  all  men,  because  all  sinned  by  pos- 
sessing a  depraved  nature. " 

The  theory  of  Mediate  Imputation  is  exposed  to  the  following  objections  : 

A.  It  gives  no    explanation  of  man's  responsibility  for  his  inborn 
depravity.    No  explanation  of  this  is  possible,  which  does  not  regard  man's 
depravity  as  having  had  its  origin  in  a  free  personal  act,  either  of  the 
individual,  or  of  collective  human  nature  in  its  first  father  and  head.     But 
this  participation  of  all  men  in  Adam's  sin  the  theory  expressly  denies. 

B.  Since  the  origination  of  this  corrupt  nature  cannot  be  charged  to  the 
account  of  man,  man's  inheritance  of  it  must  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  an 
arbitrary  divine  infliction — a  conclusion  which  reflects  upon  the  justice  of 
God.     Man  is  not  only  condemned  for  a  sinfulness  of  which  God  is  the 
author,  but  is  condemned  without  any  real  probation,  either  individual  or 
collective. 

C.  It  contradicts  those  passages  of  Scripture  which  refer  the  origin  of 
human  condemnation,  as  well  as  of  human  depravity,  to  the  sin  of  our  first 
parents,  and  which  represent  universal  death,  not  as  a  matter  of  divine 
sovereignty,  but  as  a  judicial  infliction  of  penalty  upon  all  men  for  the  sin 
of  the  race  in  Adam  (Bom.  5  :  16,  18).     It  moreover  does  violence  to  the 
Scripture  in  its  unnatural  interpretation  of  "all  sinned,"  in  Bom.  5  :  12  — 


AUGUSTINIAtf  THEORY   OF   IMPUTATION.  165 

words  which  imply  the  oneness  of  the  race  with  Adam,  and  the  causative 
relation  of  Adam's  sin  to  our  guilt. 

6.   The  Augustinian  Theory,  or  Theory  of  Adam's  Natural  Headship. 

This  theory  was  first  elaborated  by  Augustine  (354-430),  the  great 
opponent  of  Pelagius  ;  although  its  central  feature  appears  in  the  writings 
of  TertuUian  (died  about  220),  Hilary  (350),  and  Ambrose  (374).  It  is 
frequently  designated  as  the  Augustinian  view  of  sin.  It  was  the  view  held 
by  the  Beformers,  Zwingle  excepted.  Its  principal  advocates  in  this 
country  are  Dr.  Shedd  and  Dr.  Baird. 

It  holds  that  God  imputes  the  sin  of  Adam  immediately  to  all  his  poster- 
ity, in  virtue  of  that  organic  unity  of  mankind  by  which  the  whole  race  at 
the  time  of  Adam's  transgression  existed,  not  individually,  but  seminally, 
in  him  as  its  head.  The  total  life  of  humanity  was  then  in  Adam  ;  the  race 
as  yet  had  its  being  only  in  him.  Its  essence  was  not  yet  individualized  ; 
its  forces  were  not  yet  distributed  ;  the  powers  which  now  exist  in  sepa- 
rate men  were  then  unified  and  localized  in  Adam ;  Adam's  will  was  yet  the 
will  of  the  species.  In  Adam's  free  act,  the  will  of  the  race  revolted  from 
God  and  the  nature  of  the  race  corrupted  itself.  The  nature  which  we  now 
possess  is  the  same  nature  that  corrupted  itself  in  Adam —  "  not  the  same 
in  kind  merely,  but  the  same  as  flowing  to  us  continuously  from  him."  , 

Adam's  sin  is  imputed  to  us  immediately,  therefore,  not  as  something 
foreign  to  us,  but  because  it  is  ours  —  we  and  all  other  men  having  existed 
as  one  moral  person  or  one  moral  whole,  in  him,  and,  as  the  result  of  that 
transgression,  possessing  a  nature  destitute  of  love  to  God  and  prone  to 
evil.  In  Bom.  5  :  12  —  "  death  passed  unto  all  men,  for  that  all  sinned," 
signifies:  "death  physical,  spiritual,  and  eternal  passed  unto  all  men, 
because  all  sinned  in  Adam  their  natural  head. " 

We  regard  this  theory  of  the  Natural  Headship  of  Adam  as  the  most  sat- 
isfactory of  the  theories  mentioned,  and  as  furnishing  the  most  important 
help  towards  the  understanding  of  the  great  problem  of  original  sin.  In 
its  favor  may  be  urged  the  following  considerations : 

A.  It  puts  the  most  natural  interpretation  upon  Bom.  5  : 12-21.  In 
verse  12  of  this  passage  —  "  death  passed  unto  all  men,  for  that  all  sinned" 
—  the  great  majority  of  commentators  regard  the  word  "  sinned  "  as  describ- 
ing a  common  transgression  of  the  race  in  Adam.  The  death  spoken  of 
is,  as  the  whole  context  shows,  mainly  though  not  exclusively  physical. 
It  has  passed  upon  all  —  even  upon  those  who  have  committed  no  conscious 
and  personal  transgression  whereby  to  explain  its  infliction  (verse  14). 
The  legal  phraseology  of  the  passage  shows  that  this  infliction  is  not  a 
matter  of  sovereign  decree,  but  of  judicial  penalty  (verses  13,  14,  15,  16, 
18 — "law,"  "transgression,"  "trespass,"  "judgment  ....  of  one  unto 
condemnation,"  "act  of  righteousness,"  "justification").  As  the  expla- 
nation of  this  universal  subjection  to  penalty,  we  are  referred  to  Adam's 
sin.  By  that  one  act  (  " so,"  verse  12 )  —  the  "trespass  of  the  one  "  man 
(  v.  15,  17 ),  the  "  one  trespass"  (  v.  18 )  — death  came  to  all  men,  because 
all  [  not  *  have  sinned ',  but  ]  sinned  ( Trdvref  tf/j.apTov  —  aorist  of  instantaneous 


166  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   MAN. 

past  action )  — that  is,  all  sinned  in  "  the  one  trespass  "  of  "the  one  "  man. 
Compare  1  Cor.  15  :  22 —  "As  in  Adam  all  die" — where  the  contrast  with 
physical  resurrection  shows  that  physical  death  is  meant ;  2  Cor.  5:14  — 
"one  died  for  all,  therefore  all  died."  See  Commentaries  of  Meyer, 
Bengel,  Olshausen,  Philippi,  Wordsworth,  Lange,  Godet,  Shedd.  This  is 
also  recognized  as  the  correct  interpretation  of  Paul's  words  by  Beyschlag, 
Bitschl,  and  Pfleiderer,  although  no  one  of  these  three  accepts  Paul's  doc- 
trine as  authoritative. 

B.  It  permits  whatever  of  truth  there  may  be  in  the  Federal  theory  and 
in  the  theory  of  Mediate  Imputation  to  be  combined  with  it,  while  neither 
of  these  latter  theories  can  be  justified  to  reason  unless  they  are  regarded 
as  corollaries  or  accessories  of  the  truth  of  Adam's  Natural  Headship.    Only 
on  this  supposition  of  Natural  Headship  could  God  justly  constitute  Adam 
our  representative,  or  hold  us  responsible  for  the  depraved  nature  we  have 
received  from  him.     It  moreover  justifies  God's  ways,  in  postulating  a  real 
and  a  fair  probation  of  our  common  nature  as  preliminary  to  imputation  of 
sin  —  a  truth  which  the  theories  just  mentioned,  in  common  with  that  of 
the  New  School,  virtually  deny, — while  it  rests  upon  correct  philosophical 
principles  with  regard  to  will,  ability,  law,  and  accepts  the  Scriptural 
representations  of  the  nature  of  sin,  the  penal  character  of  death,  the 
origin  of  the  soul,  and  the  oneness  of  the  race  in  the  transgression. 

C.  While  its  fundamental  presupposition  — a  determination  of  the  will 
of  each  member  of  the  race  prior  to  his  individual  consciousness  —  is  an 
hypothesis  difficult  in  itself,  it  is  an  hypothesis  which  furnishes  the  key  to 
many  more  difficulties  than  it  suggests.     Once  allow  that  the  race  was  one 
in  its  first  ancestor  and  fell  in  him,  and  light  is  thrown  on  a  problem 
otherwise  insoluble  —  the  problem  of  our  accountability  for  a  sinful  nature 
which  we  have  not  personally  and  consciously  originated.     Since  we  can- 
not, with  the  three  theories  first  mentioned,  deny  either  of  the  terms  of 
this  problem  —  inborn  depravity  or  accountability  for  it, —  we  accept  this 
solution  as  the  best  attainable. 

D.  This  theory  finds  support  in  the  conclusions  of  modern  science  : 
with  regard  to  the  moral  law,  as  requiring  right  states  as  well  as  right  acts ; 
with  regard  to  the  human  will,  as  including  subconscious  and  unconscious 
bent  and  determination ;  with  regard  to  heredity,  and  the  transmission  of 
evil  character  ;  with  regard  to  the  unity  and  solidarity  of  the  human  race. 
The  Augustinian  theory  may  therefore  be  called  an  ethical  or  theological 
interpretation  of  certain  incontestable  and  acknowledged  biological  facts. 

E.  We  are  to  remember,  however,  that  while  this  theory  of  the  method 
of  our  union  with  Adam  is  merely  a  valuable  hypothesis,  the  problem 
which  it  seeks  to  explain  is,  in  both  its  terms,  presented  to  us  both  by 
conscience  and  by  Scripture.     In  connection  with  this  problem  a  central 
fact  is  announced  in  Scripture,  which  we  feel  compelled  to  believe  upon 
divine  testimony,  even  though  every  attempted  explanation  should  prove 
unsatisfactory.     That  central  fact,  which  constitutes  the  substance  of  the 
Scripture  doctrine  of  original  sin,  is  simply  this :  that  the  sin  of  Adam  is 
the  immediate  cause  and  ground  of  inborn  depravity,  guilt  and  condemna- 
tion to  the  whole  human  race. 


OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  AUGUSTINIAN  THEORY.  167 

n.— OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  AUGUSTINIAN  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

The  doctrine  of  Imputation,  to  which  we  have  thus  arrived,  is  met  by  its 
opponents  with  the  following  objections.  In  discussing  them,  we  are  to 
remember  that  a  truth  revealed  in  Scripture  may  have  claims  to  our  belief, 
in  spite  of  difficulties  to  us  insoluble.  Yet  it  is  hoped  that  examination 
will  show  the  objections  in  question  to  rest  either  upon  false  philosophical 
principles  or  upon  misconceptions  of  the  doctrine  assailed. 

A.  That  there  can  be  no  sin  apart  from  and  prior  to  consciousness. 
This  we  deny.     The  larger  part  of  men's  evil  dispositions  and  acts  are 

imperfectly  conscious,  and  of  many  such  dispositions  and  acts  the  evil  qual- 
ity is  not  discerned  at  all.  The  objection  rests  upon  the  assumption  that 
law  is  confined  to  published  statutes  or  to  standards  formally  recognized 
by  its  subjects.  A  profounder  view  of  law  as  identical  with  the  constitu- 
ent principles  of  being,  as  binding  the  nature  to  conformity  with  the  nature 
of  God,  as  demanding  right  volitions  only  because  these  are  manifestations 
of  a  right  state,  as  having  claims  upon  men  in  their  corporate  capacity, 
deprives  this  objection  of  all  its  force. 

B.  That  man  cannot  be  responsible  for  a  sinful  nature  which  he  did  not 
personally  originate. 

We  reply  that  the  objection  ignores  the  testimony  of  conscience  and  of 
Scripture.  These  assert  that  we  are  responsible  for  what  we  are.  The  sin- 
ful nature  is  not  something  external  to  us,  but  is  our  inmost  selves.  If 
man's  original  righteousness  and  the  new  affection  implanted  in  regener- 
ation have  moral  character,  then  the  inborn  tendency  to  evil  has  moral 
character ;  as  the  former  are  commendable,  so  the  latter  is  condemnable. 

C.  That  Adam's  sin  cannot  be  imputed  to  us,  since  we  cannot  repent 
of  it. 

The  objection  has  plausibility  only  so  long  as  we  fail  to  distinguish 
between  Adam's  sin  as  the  inward  apostasy  of  the  nature  from  God,  and 
Adam's  sin  as  the  outward  act  of  transgression  which  followed  and  mani- 
fested that  apostasy.  We  cannot  indeed  repent  of  Adam's  sin  as  our  per- 
sonal act  or  as  Adam's  personal  act,  but  regarding  his  sin  as  the  apostasy 
of  our  common  nature — an  apostasy  which  manifests  itself  in  our  personal 
transgressions  as  it  did  in  his,  we  can  repent  of  it  and  do  repent  of  it.  In 
truth  it  is  this  nature,  as  self -corrupted  and  averse  to  God,  for  which  the 
Christian  most  deeply  repents. 

D.  That,  if  we  be  responsible  for  Adam's  first  sin,  we  must  also  be 
responsible  not  only  for  every  other  sin  of  Adam,  but  for  the  sins  of  our 
immediate  ancestors. 

We  reply  that  the  apostasy  of  human  nature  could  occur  but  once.  It 
occurred  in  Adam  before  the  eating  of  the  forbidden  fruit,  and  revealed 
itself  in  that  eating.  The  subsequent  sins  of  Adam  and  of  our  immediate 
ancestors  are  no  longer  acts  which  determine  or  change  the  nature,  — they 
only  show  what  the  nature  is.  Here  is  the  truth  and  the  limitation  of  the 
Scripture  declaration  that  * '  the  son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father  " 
(Ez.  18  :  20 ;  c/.  Luke  13  :  2,  3  ;  John  9  :  2,  3 ).  Man  is  not  responsible 


168  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

for  the  specifically  evil  tendencies  communicated  to  him  from  his  immedi- 
ate ancestors,  as  distinct  from  the  nature  he  possesses  ;  nor  is  he  respons- 
ible for  the  sins  of  those  ancestors  which  originated  these  tendencies.  But 
he  is  responsible  for  that  original  apostasy  which  constituted  the  one  and 
final  revolt  of  the  race  from  God,  and  for  the  personal  depravity  and  dis- 
obedience which  in  his  own  case  has  resulted  therefrom. 

E.  That  if  Adam's  sin  and  condemnation  can  be  ours  by  propagation, 
the  righteousness  and  faith  of  the  believer  should  be  propagable  also. 

We  reply  that  no  merely  personal  qualities,  whether  of  sin  or  righteous- 
ness, are  communicated  by  propagation.  Ordinary  generation  does  not 
transmit  personal  guilt,  but  only  that  guilt  which  belongs  to  the  whole 
species.  So  personal  faith  and  righteousness  are  not  propagable.  "  Origi- 
nal sin  is  the  consequent  of  man's  nature,  whereas  the  parents'  grace  is  a 
personal  excellence,  and  cannot  be  transmitted  "  (  Burgesse  ). 

F.  That,  if  all  moral  consequences  are  properly  penalties,  sin,  considered 
as  a  sinful  nature,  must  be  the  punishment  of  sin,  considered  as  the  act  of 
our  first  parents. 

But  we  reply  that  the  impropriety  of  punishing  sin  with  sin  vanishes 
when  we  consider  that  the  sin  which  is  punished  is  our  own,  equally  with 
the  sin  with  which  we  are  punished.  The  objection  is  valid  as  against  the 
Federal  theory  or  the  theory  of  Mediate  Imputation,  but  not  as  against  the 
theory  of  Adam's  Natural  Headship.  To  deny  that  God,  through  the  opera- 
tion of  second  causes,  may  punish  the  act  of  transgression  by  the  habit  and 
tendency  which  result  from  it,  is  to  ignore  the  facts  of  every-day  life,  as  well 
as  the  statements  of  Scripture  in  which  sin  is  represented  as  ever  repro- 
ducing itself,  and  with  each  reproduction  increasing  its  guilt  and  punish- 
ment (Eom.  6  : 19  ;  James  1 : 15.  ) 

G.  That  the  doctrine  excludes  all  separate  probation  of  individuals  since 
Adam,  by  making  their  moral  life  a  mere  manifestation  of  tendencies 
received  from  him. 

We  reply  that  the  objection  takes  into  view  only  our  connection  with  the 
race,  and  ignores  the  complementary  and  equally  important  fact  of  each 
man's  personal  will.  That  personal  will  does  more  than  simply  express  the 
nature  ;  it  may  to  a  certain  extent  curb  the  nature,  or  it  may,  on  the  other 
hand,  add  a  sinful  character  and  influence  of  its  own.  There  is,  in  other 
words,  a  remainder  of  freedom,  which  leaves  room  for  personal  probation, 
in  addition  to  the  race-probation  in  Adam. 

H.  That  the  organic  unity  of  the  race  in  the  transgression  is  a  thing  so 
remote  from  common  experience  that  the  preaching  of  it  neutralizes  all 
appeals  to  the  conscience. 

But  whatever  of  truth  there  is  in  this  objection  is  due  to  the  self -isolating 
nature  of  sin.  Men  feel  the  unity  of  the  family,  the  profession,  the  nation 
to  which  they  belong,  and,  just  in  proportion  to  the  breadth  of  their  sym- 
pathies and  their  experience  of  divine  grace,  do  they  enter  into  Christ's 
feeling  of  unity  with  the  race  ( cf.  Is.  6  :  5  ;  Lam.  3  :  39-45 ;  Ezra  9:6; 
Neh.  1:6).  The  fact  that  the  self -contained  and  self-seeking  recognize 


CON-SEQUENCES  OF  SIN  TO   ADAM'S   POSTERITY.  169 

themselves  as  responsible  only  for  their  personal  acts  should  not  prevent 
our  pressing  upon  men's  attention  the  more  searching  standards  of  the 
Scriptures.  Only  thus  can  the  Christian  find  a  solution  for  the  dark  prob- 
lem of  a  corruption  which  is  inborn  yet  condemnable  ;  only  thus  can  the 
unregenerate  man  be  led  to  a  full  knowledge  of  the  depth  of  his  ruin  and 
of  his  absolute  dependence  upon  God  for  salvation. 

I.  That  a  constitution  by  which  the  sin  of  one  individual  involves  in 
guilt  and  condemnation  the  nature  of  all  men  who  descend  from  him  is 
contrary  to  God's  justice. 

We  acknowledge  that  no  human  theory  can  fully  solve  the  mystery  of 
imputation.  But  we  prefer  to  attribute  God's  dealings  to  justice  rather 
than  to  sovereignty.  The  following  considerations,  though  partly  hypo- 
thetical, may  throw  light  upon  the  subject :  (a)  A  probation  of  our  com- 
mon nature  in  Adam,  sinless  as  he  was  and  with  full  knowledge  of  God's 
law,  is  more  consistent  with  divine  justice  than  a  separate  probation  of  each 
individual,  with  inexperience,  inborn  depravity,  and  evil  example,  all  favor- 
ing a  decision  against  God.  (  b  )  A  constitution  which  made  a  common 
fall  possible  may  have  been  indispensable  to  any  provision  of  a  common  sal- 
vation. ( c  )  Our  chance  for  salvation  as  sinners  under  grace  may  be  better 
than  it  would  have  been  as  sinless  Adams  under  law.  (  d )  A  constitution 
which  permitted  oneness  with  the  first  Adam  in  the  transgression  cannot 
be  unjust,  since  a  like  principle  of  oneness  with  Christ,  the  second  Adam, 
secures  our  salvation.  (  e  )  There  is  also  a  physical  and  natural  union 
with  Christ  which  antedates  the  fall  and  which  is  incident  to  man's  creation. 
The  immanence  of  Christ  in  humanity  guarantees  a  continuous  divine 
effort  to  remedy  the  disaster  caused  by  man's  free  will,  and  to  restore  the 
moral  union  with  God  which  the  race  has  lost  by  the  fall. 

Thus  our  ruin  and  our  redemption  were  alike  wrought  out  without  per- 
sonal act  of  ours.  As  all  the  natural  life  of  humanity  was  in  Adam,  so  all 
the  spiritual  life  of  humanity  was  in  Christ.  As  our  old  nature  was  cor- 
rupted in  Adam  and  propagated  to  us  by  physical  generation,  so  our  new 
nature  was  restored  in  Christ  and  communicated  to  us  by  the  regenerating 
work  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  If  then  we  are  justified  upon  the  ground  of  our 
inbeing  in  Christ,  we  may  in  like  manner  be  condemned  on  the  ground  of 
our  inbeing  in  Adam. 


SECTION"  VI.  —  CONSEQUENCES  OF  SIN  TO  ADAM'S  POSTERITY. 

As  the  result  of  Adam's  transgression,  all  his  posterity  are  born  in  the 
same  state  into  which  he  fell.  But  since  law  is  the  all-comprehending 
demand  of  harmony  with  God,  all  moral  consequences  flowing  from  trans- 
gression are  to  be  regarded  as  sanctions  of  law,  or  expressions  of  the  divine 
displeasure  through  the  constitution  of  things  which  he  has  established. 
Certain  of  these  consequences,  however,  are  earlier  recognized  than  others 
and  are  of  minor  scope  ;  it  will  therefore  be  useful  to  consider  them  under 
the  three  aspects  of  depravity,  guilt,  and  penalty. 


170  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OE  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

I.    DEPRAVITY. 

By  this  we  mean,  on  the  one  hand,  the  lack  of  original  righteousness  or 
of  holy  affection  toward  God,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  corruption  of  the 
moral  nature,  or  bias  toward  evil.  That  such  depravity  exists  has  been 
abundantly  shown,  both  from  Scripture  and  from  reason,  in  our  considera- 
tion of  the  universality  of  sin. 

1.  Depravity  partial  or  total  f 

The  Scriptures  represent  human  nature  as  totally  depraved.  The  phrase 
"total  depravity,"  however,  is  liable  to  misinterpretation,  and  should  not 
be  used  without  explanation.  By  the  total  depravity  of  universal  humanity 
we  mean : 

A.  Negatively, — not  that  every  sinner  is :    ( a  )  Destitute  of  conscience, 
—  for  the  existence  of  strong  impulses  to  right,  and  of  remorse  for  wrong- 
doing, show  that  conscience  is  often  keen ;  ( b )  devoid  of  all  qualities 
pleasing  to  men,  and  useful  when  judged  by  a  human  standard, —  for  the 
existence  of  such  qualities  is  recognized  by  Christ ;  ( c )  prone  to  every 
form  of  sin,  — for  certain  forms  of  sin  exclude  certain  others  ;  (  d)  intense 
as  he  can  be  in  his  selfishness  and  opposition  to  God, —  for  he  becomes 
worse  every  day. 

B.  Positively,—  that  every  sinner  is :  (  a )  totally  destitute  of  that  love 
to  God  which  constitutes  the  fundamental  and  all-inclusive  demand  of  the 
law  ;   (  b )  chargeable  with  elevating  some  lower  affection  or  desire  above 
regard  for  God  and  his  law  ;  (  c  )  supremely  determined,  in  his  whole 
inward  and  outward  life,  by  a  preference  of  self  to  God  ;  (  d )  possessed  of 
an  aversion  to  God  which,  though  sometimes  latent,  becomes  active  enmity, 
so  soon  as  God's  will  comes  into  manifest  conflict  with  his  own  ;  (  e  )  dis- 
ordered and  corrupted  in  every  faculty,  through  this  substitution  of  self- 
ishness for  supreme  affection  toward  God ;   (/)  credited  with  no  thought, 
emotion,  or  act  of  which  divine  holiness  can  fully  approve ;  ( g  )  subject 
to  a  law  of  constant  progress  in  depravity,  which  he  has  no  recuperative 
energy  to  enable  him  successfully  to  resist. 

2.  Ability  or  inability? 

In  opposition  to  the  plenary  ability  taught  by  the  Pelagians,  the  gracious 
ability  of  the  Arminians,  and  the  natural  ability  of  the  New  School  theolo- 
gians, the  Scriptures  declare  the  total  inability  of  the  sinner  to  turn  him- 
self to  God  or  to  do  that  which  is  truly  good  in  God's  sight  ( see  Scripture 
proof  below).  A  proper  conception  also  of  the  law,  as  reflecting  the  holi- 
ness of  God  and  as  expressing  the  ideal  of  human  nature,  leads  us  to  the 
conclusion  that  no  man  whose  powers  are  weakened  by  either  original  or 
actual  sin  can  of  himself  come  up  to  that  perfect  standard.  Yet  there  is  a 
certain  remnant  of  freedom  left  to  man.  The  sinner  can  ( a  )  avoid  the  sin 
against  the  Holy  Ghost ;  ( b  )  choose  the  less  sin  rather  than  the  greater  ; 
(c)  refuse  altogether  to  yield  to  certain  temptations;  {d)  do  outwardly 
good  acts,  though  with  imperfect  motives ;  ( e  )  seek  God  from  motives  of 
self-interest. 

But  on  the  other  hand  the  sinner  cannot  (a)  by  a  single  volition  bring 
his  character  and  life  into  complete  conformity  to  God's  law  ;  (  b )  change 


CONSEQUENCES   OF   SIN   TO   ADAM'S   POSTERITY.  171 

his  fundamental  preference  for  self  and  sin  to  supreme  love  for  God  ;  nor 
(  c )  do  any  act,  however  insignificant,  which  shall  meet  with  God's  approval 
or  answer  fully  to  the  demands  of  law. 

To  the  use  of  the  term  "  natural  ability  "  to  designate  merely  the  sinner's 
possession  of  all  the  constituent  faculties  of  human  nature,  we  object  upon 
the  following  grounds  : 

A.  Quantitative  lack. —  The  phrase  "natural  ability"  is  misleading, 
since  it  seems  to  imply  that  the  existence  of  the  mere  powers  of  intellect, 
affection,  and  will  is  a  sufficient  quantitative  qualification  for  obedience  to 
God's  law,  whereas  these  powers  have  been  weakened  by  sin,  and  are  nat- 
urally unable,  instead  of  naturally  able,  to  render  back  to  God  with  interest 
the  talent  first  bestowed.     Even  if  the  moral  direction  of  man's  faculties 
were  a  normal  one,  the  effect  of  hereditary  and  of  personal  sin  would 
render  naturally  impossible  that  large  likeness  to  God  which  the  law  of 
absolute  perfection  demands.     Man  has  not  therefore  the  natural  ability 
perfectly  to  obey  God.     He  had  it  once,  but  he  lost  it  with  the  first  sin. 

B.  Qualitative  lack. —  Since  the  law  of  God  requires  of  men  not  so  much 
right  single  volitions  as  conformity  to  God  in  the  whole  inward  state  of  the 
affections  and  will,  the  power  of  contrary  choice  in  single  volitions  does 
not  constitute  a  natural  ability  to  obey  God,  unless  man  can  by  those  single 
volitions  change  the  underlying  state  of  the  affections  and  will.     But  this 
power  man  does  not  possess.    Since  God  judges  all  moral  action  in  connec- 
tion with  the  general  state  of  the  heart  and  life,  natural  ability  to  good 
involves  not  only  a  full  complement  of  faculties  but  also  a  bias  of  the  affec- 
tions and  will  toward  God.     Without  this  bias  there  is  no  possibility  of  right 
moral  action,  and  where  there  is  no  such  possibility,  there  can  be  no  ability 
either  natural  or  moral. 

C.  No  such  ability  known.  —  In  addition  to  the  psychological  argu- 
ment just  mentioned,  we  may  urge  another  from  experience  and  observa- 
tion.    These  testify  that  man  is  cognizant  of  no  such  ability.     Since  no 
man  has  ever  yet,  by  the  exercise  of  his  natural  powers,  turned  himself  to 
God  or  done  an  act  truly  good  in  God's  sight,  the  existence  of  a  natural 
ability  to  do  good  is  a  pure  assumption.     There  is  no  scientific  warrant 
for  inferring  the  existence  of  an  ability  which  has  never  manifested  itself 
in  a  single  instance  since  history  began. 

D.  Practical  evil  of  the  belief. —  The  practical  evil  attending  the  preach- 
ing of  natural  ability  furnishes  a  strong  argument  against  it.     The  Script- 
ures, in  their  declarations  of  the  sinner's  inability  and  helplessness,  aim  to 
shut  him  up  to  sole  dependence  upon  God  for  salvation.     The  doctrine  of 
natural  ability,  assuring  him  that  he  is  able  at  once  to  repent  and  turn  to 
God,  encourages  delay  by  putting  salvation  at  all  times  within  his  reach. 
If  a  single  volition  will  secure  it,  he  may  be  saved  as  easily  to-morrow  as 
to-day.     The  doctrine  of  inability  presses  men  to  immediate  acceptance  of 
God's  offers,  lest  the  day  of  grace  for  them  pass  by. 

Let  us  repeat,  however,  that  the  denial  to  man  of  all  ability,  whether 
natural  or  moral,  to  turn  himself  to  God  or  to  do  that  which  is  truly  good 
in  God's  sight,  does  not  imply  a  denial  of  man's  power  to  order  his 


172  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  MAN. 

external  life  in  many  particulars  conformably  to  moral  rules,  or  even  to 
attain  the  praise  of  men  for  virtue.  Man  has  still  a  range  of  freedom  in 
acting  out  his  nature,  and  he  may  to  a  certain  limited  extent  act  down  upon 
that  nature,  and  modify  it,  by  isolated  volitions  externally  conformed  to 
God's  law.  He  may  choose  higher  or  lower  forms  of  selfish  action,  and 
may  pursue  these  chosen  courses  with  various  degrees  of  selfish  energy. 
Freedom  of  choice,  within  this  limit,  is  by  no  means  incompatible  with 
complete  bondage  of  the  will  in  spiritual  things. 

IL    GUILT. 

1.    Nature  of  guilt. 

By  guilt  we  mean  desert  of  punishment,  or  obligation  to  render  satis- 
faction to  God's  justice  for  self-determined  violation  of  law.  There  is  a 
reaction  of  holiness  against  sin,  which  the  Scripture  denominates  "the 
wrath  of  God  "  (  Eom.  1  :  18  ).  Sin  is  in  us,  either  as  act  or  state  ;  God's 
punitive  righteousness  is  over  against  the  sinner,  as  something  to  be  feared; 
guilt  is  a  relation  of  the  sinner  to  that  righteousness,  namely,  the  sinner's 
desert  of  punishment 

The  following  remarks  may  serve  both  for  proof  and  for  explanation : 

A.  Guilt  is  incurred  only  through  self-determined  transgression  either 
on  the  part  of  man's  nature  or  person.     We  are  guilty  only  of  that  sin 
which  we  have  originated  or  have  had  part  in  originating.     Guilt  is  not, 
therefore,  mere  liability  to  punishment,  without  participation  in  the  trans- 
gression for  which  the  punishment  is  inflicted, — in  other  words,  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  constructive  guilt  under  the  divine  government.     We  are 
accounted  guilty  only  for  what  we  have  done,  either  personally  or  in  our 
first  parents,  and  for  what  we  are,  in  consequence  of  such  doing. 

B.  Guilt  is  an  objective  result  of  sin,  and  is  not  to  be  confounded  with 
subjective  pollution,  or  depravity.     Every  sin,  whether  of  nature  or  per- 
son, is  an  offense  against  God  (Ps.  51  :  4-6),  an  act  or  state  of  opposition 
to  his  will,  which  has  for  its  effect  God's  personal  wrath  (  Ps.  7  : 11 ;  John 
3  : 18,  36  ),  and  which  must  be  expiated  either  by  punishment  or  by  atone- 
ment (  Heb.  9  :  22 ).     Not  only  does  sin,  as  unlikeness  to  the  divine  purity, 
involve  pollution, — it  also,  as  antagonism  to  God's  holy  will,  involves  guilt. 
This  guilt,  or  obligation  to  satisfy  the  outraged  holiness  of  God,  is  explained 
in  the  New  Testament  by  the  terms  " debtor"  and  "debt "  (  Mat.  6  : 12  ; 
Luke  13  : 4  ;  Mat.  5  :  21  ;  Bom.  3  : 19 ;  6  :  23  ;  Eph.  2:3).     Since  guilt, 
the  objective  result  of  sin,  is  entirely  distinct  from  depravity,  the  subjective 
result,  human  nature  may,  as  in  Christ,  have  the  guilt  without  the  deprav- 
ity (  2  Cor.  5  :  21 ),  or  may,  as  in  the  Christian,  have  the  depravity  without 
the  guilt  ( Uohn  1  :  7,  8). 

C.  Guilt,  moreover,  as  an  objective  result  of  sin,  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  the  subjective  consciousness  of  guilt  (Lev.  5  : 17).     In  the  condem- 
nation of  conscience,  God's  condemnation  partially  and  prophetically  mani- 
fests itself  (  1  John  3  :  20  ).     But  guilt  is  primarily  a  relation  to  God,  and 
only  secondarily  a  relation  to  conscience.     Progress  in  sin  is  marked  by 
diminished  sensitiveness  of  moral  insight  and  feeling.     As  "  the  greatest  of 
sins  is  to  be  conscious  of  none,"  so  guilt  may  be  great,  just  in  proportion 


CONSEQUENCES  OF  SIN  TO  ADAM'S  POSTEKITY.  173 

to  the  absence  of  consciousness  of  it  ( Ps.  19  : 12  ;  51  :  6  ;  Eph.  4  : 18,  19 
—  dTny/lyjy/cdrcf ).  There  is  no  evidence,  however,  that  the  voice  of  conscience 
can  be  completely  or  finally  silenced.  The  time  for  repentance  may  pass, 
but  not  the  time  for  remorse.  Progress  in  holiness  on  the  other  hand,  is 
marked  by  increasing  apprehension  of  the  depth  and  extent  of  our  sinful- 
ness,  while  with  this  apprehension  is  combined,  in  a  normal  Christian  expe- 
rience, the  assurance  that  the  guilt  of  our  sin  has  been  taken,  and  taken 
away,  by  Christ  (John  1  :  29  ). 

2.    Degrees  of  guilt. 

The  Scriptures  recognize  different  degrees  of  guilt  as  attaching  to  differ- 
ent kinds  of  sin.  The  variety  of  sacrifices  under  the  Mosaic  law,  and  the 
variety  of  awards  in  the  judgment,  are  to  be  explained  upon  this  principle* 

Casuistry,  however,  has  drawn  many  distinctions  which  lack  Scriptural 
foundation.  Such  is  the  distinction  between  venial  sins  and  mortal  sins  in 
the  Boman  Catholic  Church, —  every  sin  unpardoned  being  mortal,  and  all 
sins  being  venial,  since  Christ  has  died  for  all.  Nor  is  the  common  distinc- 
tion between  sins  of  omission  and  sins  of  commission  more  valid,  since  the 
very  omission  is  an  act  of  commission. 

The  following  distinctions  are  indicated  in  Scripture  as  involving  differ- 
ent degrees  of  guilt : 

A.  Sin  of  nature,  and  personal  transgression. 

Sin  of  nature  involves  guilt,  yet  there  is  greater  guilt  when  this  sin  of 
nature  reasserts  itself  in  personal  transgression ;  for,  while  this  latter 
includes  in  itself  the  former,  it  also  adds  to  the  former  a  new  element, 
namely,  the  conscious  exercise  of  the  individual  and  personal  will,  by  virtue 
of  which  a  new  decision  is  made  against  God,  special  evil  habit  is  induced, 
and  the  total  condition  of  the  soul  is  made  more  depraved.  Although  we 
have  emphasized  the  guilt  of  inborn  sin,  because  this  truth  is  most  con- 
tested, it  is  to  be  remembered  that  men  reach  a  conviction  of  their  native 
depravity  only  through  a  conviction  of  their  personal  transgressions.  For 
this  reason,  by  far  the  larger  part  of  our  preaching  upon  sin  should  con- 
sist in  applications  of  the  law  of  God  to  the  acts  and  dispositions  of  men's 
lives. 

B.  Sins  of  ignorance,  and  sins  of  knowledge. 

Here  guilt  is  measured  by  the  degree  of  light  possessed,  or  in  other  words, 
by  the  opportunities  of  knowledge  men  have  enjoyed,  and  the  powers  with 
which  they  have  been  naturally  endowed.  Genius  and  privilege  increase 
responsibility.  The  heathen  are  guilty,  but  those  to  whom  the  oracles  of 
God  have  been  committed  are  more  guilty  than  they. 

C.  Sins  of  infirmity,  and  sins  of  presumption. 

Here  the  guilt  is  measured  by  the  energy  of  the  evil  will.  Sin  may  be 
known  to  be  sin,  yet  may  be  committed  in  haste  or  weakness.  Though 
haste  and  weakness  constitute  a  palliation  of  the  offence  which  springs 
therefrom,  yet  they  are  themselves  sins,  as  revealing  an  unbelieving  and 
disordered  heart.  But  of  far  greater  guilt  are  those  presumptuous  choices 
of  evil  in  which  not  weakness,  but  strength  of  will,  is  manifest. 


174  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  MAN. 

D.     Sin  of  incomplete,  and  sin  of  final,  obduracy. 

Here  the  guilt  is  measured,  not  by  the  objective  sufficiency  or  insuf- 
ficiency of  divine  grace,  but  by  the  degree  of  unreceptiveness  into  which 
sin  has  brought  the  soul.  As  the  only  sin  unto  death  which  is  described 
in  Scripture  is  the  sin  against  the  Holy  Spirit,  we  here  consider  the  nature 
of  that  sin. 

The  sin  against  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  to  be  regarded  simply  as  an  isolated 
act,  but  also  as  the  external  symptom  of  a  heart  so  radically  and  finally  set 
against  God  that  no  power  which  God  can  consistently  use  will  ever  save 
it.  This  sin,  therefore,  can  be  only  the  culmination  of  a  long  course  of 
self-hardening  and  self-depraving.  He  who  has  committed  it  must  be 
either  profoundly  indifferent  to  his  own  condition,  or  actively  and  bitterly 
hostile  to  God ;  so  that  anxiety  or  fear  on  account  of  one's  condition  is 
evidence  that  it  has  not  been  committed.  The  sin  against  the  Holy  Spirit 
cannot  be  forgiven,  simply  because  the  soul  that  has  committed  it  has 
ceased  to  be  receptive  of  divine  influences,  even  when  those  influences  are 
exerted  in  the  utmost  strength  which  God  has  seen  fit  to  employ  in  his 
spiritual  administration. 

HL    PENALTY. 

1.    Idea  of  penalty. 

By  penalty,  we  mean  that  pain  or  loss  which  is  directly  or  indirectly 
inflicted  by  the  Lawgiver,  in  vindication  of  his  justice  outraged  by  the 
violation  of  law. 

In  this  definition  it  is  implied  that : 

A.  The  natural  consequences  of  transgression,  although  they  constitute 
a  part  of  the  penalty  of  sin,  do  not  exhaust  that  penalty.     In  all  penalty 
there  is  a  personal  element — the  holy  wrath  of  the  Lawgiver, —  which  nat- 
ural consequences  but  partially  express. 

B.  The  object  of  penalty  is  not  the  reformation  of  the  offender  or  the 
ensuring  of  social  or  governmental  safety.     These  ends  may  be  incidentally 
secured  through  its  infliction,  but  the  great  end  of  penalty  is  the  vindica- 
tion of  the  character  of  the  Lawgiver.     Penalty  is  essentially  a  necessary 
reaction  of  the  divine  holiness  against  sin.     Inasmuch,  however,  as  wrong 
views  of  the  object  of  penalty  have  so  important  a  bearing  upon  our  future 
studies  of  doctrine,  we  make  fuller  mention  of  the  two  erroneous  theories 
which  have  greatest  currency. 

(  a  )  Penalty  is  not  essentially  reformatory. — By  this  we  mean  that  the 
reformation  of  the  offender  is  not  its  primary  design, —  as  penalty,  it  is  not 
intended  to  reform.  Penalty,  in  itself,  proceeds  not  from  the  love  and 
mercy  of  the  Lawgiver,  but  from  his  justice.  Whatever  reforming  influ- 
ences may  in  any  given  instance  be  connected  with  it  are  not  parts  of  the 
penalty,  but  are  mitigations  of  it,  and  they  are  added  not  in  justice  but  in 
grace.  If  reformation  follows  the  infliction  of  penalty,  it  is  not  the  effect 
of  the  penalty,  but  the  effect  of  certain  benevolent  agencies  which  have 
been  provided  to  turn  into  a  means  of  good  what  naturally  would  be  to  the 
offender  only  a  source  of  harm. 


CONSEQUENCES  OP  SIN  TO  ADAM'S  POSTERITY.  175 

That  the  object  of  penalty  is  not  reformation  appears  from  Scripture, 
where  punishment  is  often  referred  to  God's  justice,  but  never  to  God's 
love  ;  from  the  intrinsic  ill-desert  of  sin,  to  which  penalty  is  correlative  ; 
from  the  fact  that  punishment  must  be  vindicative,  in  order  to  be  disciplin- 
ary, and  just,  in  order  to  be  reformatory ;  from  the  fact  that  upon  this 
theory  punishment  would  not  be  just  when  the  sinner  was  already  reformed 
or  could  not  be  reformed,  so  that  the  greater  the  sin  the  less  the  punish- 
ment must  be. 

(6)  Penalty  is  not  essentially  deterrent  and  preventive. — By  this  we 
mean  that  its  primary  design  is  not  to  protect  society,  by  deterring  men 
from  the  commission  of  like  offences.  We  grant  that  this  end  is  often 
secured  in  connection  with  punishment,  both  in  family  and  civil  govern- 
ment and  under  the  government  of  God.  But  we  claim  that  this  is  a 
merely  incidental  result,  which  God's  wisdom  and  goodness  have  connected 
with  the  infliction  of  penalty,  —  it  cannot  be  the  reason  and  ground  for 
penalty  itself.  Some  of  the  objections  to  the  preceding  theory  apply  also 
to  this.  But  in  addition  to  what  has  been  said,  we  urge  : 

Penalty  cannot  be  primarily  designed  to  secure  social  and  governmental 
safety,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  never  right  to  punish  the  individual  simply 
for  the  good  of  society.  No  punishment,  moreover,  will  or  can  do  good  to 
others  that  is  not  just  and  right  in  itself.  Punishment  does  good,  only 
when  the  person  punished  deserves  punishment ;  and  that  desert  of  pun- 
ishment, and  not  the  good  effects  that  will  follow  it,  must  be  the  ground 
and  reason  why  it  is  inflicted.  The  contrary  theory  would  imply  that  the 
criminal  might  go  free  but  for  the  effect  of  his  punishment  on  others,  and 
that  man  might  rightly  commit  crime  if  only  he  were  willing  to  bear  the 
penalty. 

2.     The  actual  penalty  of  sin. 

The  one  word  in  Scripture  which  designates  the  total  penalty  of  sin  is 
"death."  Death,  however,  is  twofold  : 

A.  Physical  death, —  or  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  the  body, 
including  all  those  temporal  evils  and  sufferings  which  result  from  dis- 
turbance of  the  original  harmony  between  body  and  soul,  and  which  are 
the  working  of  death  in  us.  That  physical  death  is  a  part  of  the  penalty 
of  sin,  appears : 

(  a )    From  Scripture. 

This  is  the  most  obvious  import  of  the  threatening  in  Gen.  2  : 17 — "  thou 
shalt  surely  die  "  ;  cf.  3  : 19— " unto  dust  shalt  thou  return."  Allusions  to 
this  threat  in  the  O.  T.  confirm  this  interpretation  :  Num.  16  : 29 — "  visited 
after  the  visitation  of  all  men,"  where  Hp3  =  judicial  visitation,  or  punish- 
ment ;  27  :  3  (  LXX.  —  3i'  djuapriav  airov  ).  The  prayer  of  Moses  in  Ps.  90  : 
7-9,  11,  and  the  prayer  of  Hezekiah  in  Is.  38  : 17,  18,  recognize  plainly  the 
penal  nature  of  death.  The  same  doctrine  is  taught  in  the  N.  T.,  as  for 
example,  John  8  : 44 ;  Kom.  5  : 12,  14,  16,  17,  where  the  judicial  phrase- 
ology is  to  be  noted  (  cf.  1  :  32 )  ;  see  6  :  23  also.  In  1  Pet.  4  :  6,  physical 
death  is  spoken  of  as  God's  judgment  against  sin.  In  1  Cor.  15  :  21,  22, 
the  bodily  resurrection  of  all  believers,  in  Christ,  is  contrasted  with  the 


176  ANTHROPOLOGY,   OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  MAN. 

bodily  death  of  all  men,  in  Adam.  Bom.  4  :  24,  25  ;  6  :  9,  10  ;  8  : 3,  10, 
11  ;  Gal.  3  : 13,  show  that  Christ  submitted  to  physical  death  as  the  pen- 
alty of  sin,  and  by  his  resurrection  from  the  grave  gave  proof  that  the 
penalty  of  sin  was  exhausted  and  that  humanity  in  him  was  justified.  "As 
the  resurrection  of  the  body  is  a  part  of  the  redemption,  so  the  death  of 
the  body  is  a  part  of  the  penalty. " 

( b )    From  reason. 

The  universal  prevalence  of  suffering  and  death  among  rational  creatures 
cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  divine  justice,  except  upon  the  supposition 
that  it  is  a  judicial  infliction  on  account  of  a  common  sinfulness  of  nature 
belonging  even  to  those  who  have  not  reached  moral  consciousness. 

The  objection  that  death  existed  in  the  animal  creation  before  the  Fall 
may  be  answered  by  saying  that,  but  for  the  fact  of  man's  sin,  it  would  not 
have  existed.  We  may  believe  that  God  arranged  even  the  geologic  his- 
tory to  correspond  with  the  foreseen  fact  of  human  apostasy  ( c/.  Rom.  8  : 
20-23  —  where  the  creation  is  said  to  have  been  made  subject  to  vanity  by 
reason  of  man's  sin  ). 

The  translation  of  Enoch  and  Elijah,  and  of  the  saints  that  remain  at 
Christ's  second  coming,  seems  intended  to  teach  us  that  death  is  not  a 
necessary  law  of  organized  being,  and  to  show  what  would  have  happened 
to  Adam  if  he  had  been  obedient.  He  was  created  a  "natural,"  "  earthly  " 
body,  but  might  have  attained  a  higher  being,  the  "spiritual,"  "heavenly" 
body,  without  the  intervention  of  death.  Sin,  however,  has  turned  the 
normal  condition  of  things  into  the  rare  exception  (  c/.  1  Cor.  15  :  42-50 ). 
Since  Christ  endured  death  as  the  penalty  of  sin,  death  to  the  Christian 
becomes  the  gateway  through  which  he  enters  into  full  communion  with  his 
Lord. 

B.  Spiritual  death,— or  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  God,  including 
all  that  pain  of  conscience,  loss  of  peace,  and  sorrow  of  spirit,  which  result 
from  disturbance  of  the  normal  relation  between  the  soul  and  God. 

( a )  Although  physical  death  is  a  part  of  the  penalty  of  sin,  it  is  by  no 
means  the  chief  part.  The  term  *  death '  is  frequently  used  in  Scripture 
in  a  moral  and  spiritual  sense,  as  denoting  the  absence  of  that  which  con- 
stitutes the  true  life  of  the  soul,  namely,  the  presence  and  favor  of  God. 

(  b  )  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  penalty  denounced  in  the  garden  and 
fallen  upon  the  race  is  primarily  and  mainly  that  death  of  the  soul  which 
consists  in  its  separation  from  God.  In  this  sense  only,  death  was  fully 
visited  upon  Adam  in  the  day  on  which  he  ate  the  forbidden  fruit  (  Gen.  2 : 
17 ).  In  this  sense  only,  death  is  escaped  by  the  Christian  (  John  11  :26). 
For  this  reason,  in  the  parallel  between  Adam  and  Christ  (  Bom.  5  : 12-21), 
the  apostle  passes  from  the  thought  of  mere  physical  death  in  the  early 
part  of  the  passage  to  that  of  both  physical  and  spiritual  death  at  its  close 
(verse  21  —  "as  sin  reigned  in  death,  even  so  might  grace  reign  through 
righteousness  unto  eternal  life  through  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord  " —  where 
"  eternal  life  "  is  more  than  endless  physical  existence,  and  "  death  "  is 
more  than  death  of  the  body  ). 


THE  SALVATION  OF  INFANTS.  177 

(  c)  Eternal  death  may  be  regarded  as  the  culmination  and  completion  of 
spiritual  death,  and  as  essentially  consisting  in  the  correspondence  of  the 
outward  condition  with  the  inward  state  of  the  evil  soul  (  Acts  1  :  25  ).  It 
would  seem  to  be  inaugurated  by  some  peculiar  repellent  energy  of  the 
divine  holiness  ( Mat.  25  :  41 ;  2  Thess.  1:9),  and  to  involve  positive  retri- 
bution visited  by  a  personal  God  upon  both  the  body  and  the  soul  of  the 
evil-doer  (Mat.  10  :28 ;  Heb.  10  :  31 ;  Rev.  14  : 11). 


SECTION  VII. — THE  SALVATION  OF  INTANTS. 

The  views  which  have  been  presented  with  regard  to  inborn  depravity 
and  the  reaction  of  divine  holiness  against  it  suggest  the  question  whether 
infants  dying  before  arriving  at  moral  consciousness  are  saved,  and  if  so, 
in  what  way.  To  this  question  we  reply  as  follows  : 

( a )  Infants  are  in  a  state  of  sin,  need  to  be  regenerated,  and  can  be 
saved  only  through  Christ. 

(  6 )  Yet  as  compared  with  those  who  have  personally  transgressed,  they 
are  recognized  as  possessed  of  a  relative  innocence,  and  of  a  submissiveness 
and  trustfulness,  which  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  graces  of  Christian  char- 
acter. 

(  c )  For  this  reason,  they  are  the  objects  of  special  divine  compassion 
and  care,  and  through  the  grace  of  Christ  are  certain  of  salvation. 

(  d  )  The  descriptions  of  God's  merciful  provision  as  coextensive  with 
the  ruin  of  the  Fall  also  lead  us  to  believe  that  those  who  die  in  infancy 
receive  salvation  through  Christ  as  certainly  as  they  inherit  sin  from  Adam. 

(  e  )  The  condition  of  salvation  for  adults  is  personal  faith.  Infants  are 
incapable  of  fulfilling  this  condition.  Since  Christ  has  died  for  all,  we 
have  reason  to  believe  that  provision  is  made  for  their  reception  of  Christ 
in  some  other  way. 

(/)  At  the  final  judgment,  personal  conduct  is  made  the  test  of  charac- 
ter. But  infants  are  incapable  of  personal  transgression.  We  have  reason, 
therefore,  to  believe  that  they  will  be  among  the  saved,  since  this  rule  of 
decision  will  not  apply  to  them. 

(g)  Since  there  is  no  evidence  that  children  dying  in  infancy  are  regen- 
erated prior  to  death,  either  with  or  without  the  use  of  external  means,  it 
seems  most  probable  that  the  work  of  regeneration  may  be  performed  by 
the  Spirit  in  connection  with  the  infant  soul's  first  view  of  Christ  in  the 
other  world.  As  the  remains  of  natural  depravity  in  the  Christian  are 
eradicated,  not  by  death,  but  at  death,  through  the  sight  of  Christ  and 
union  with  him,  so  the  first  moment  of  consciousness  for  the  infant  may  be 
coincident  with  a  view  of  Christ  the  Savior  which  accomplishes  the  entire 
sanctification  of  its  nature. 

While,  in  the  nature  of  things  and  by  the  express  declarations  of  Script- 
ure, we  are  precluded  from  extending  this  doctrine  of  regeneration  at  death 

12 


178  ANTHROPOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF   MAN. 

to  any  who  have  committed  personal  sins,  we  are  nevertheless  warranted  in 
the  conclusion  that,  certain  and  great  as  is  the  guilt  of  original  sin,  no 
human  soul  is  eternally  condemned  solely  for  this  sin  of  nature,  but  that, 
on  the  other  hand,  all  who  have  not  consciously  and  wilfully  transgressed 
are  made  partakers  of  Christ's  salvation. 


PAET   VI. 

SOTEBIOLOGY,  OB  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SALVATION  THROUGH 
THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST  AND  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT. 


CHAPTER  I. 
CHRISTOLOGY,  OR  THE  REDEMPTION  WROUGHT  BY  CHRIST. 


SECTION   I.—  HISTORICAL  PREPARATION   FOR   REDEMPTION. 

Since  God  had  from  eternity  determined  to  redeem  mankind,  the  history 
of  the  race  from  the  time  of  the  Fall  to  the  coming  of  Christ  was  providen- 
tially arranged  to  prepare  the  way  for  this  redemption.  The  preparation 
was  two-fold : 

L    NEGATIVE  PREPARATION, — in  the  history  of  the  heathen  world. 

This  showed  ( 1 )  the  true  nature  of  sin,  and  the  depth  of  spiritual  igno- 
rance and  of  moral  depravity  to  which  the  race,  left  to  itself,  must  fall ;  and 
(  2  )  the  powerlessness  of  human  nature  to  preserve  or  regain  an  adequate 
knowledge  of  God,  or  to  deliver  itself  from  sin  by  philosophy  or  art. 

II.    POSITIVE  PREPARATION, —  in  the  history  of  Israel. 

A  single  people  was  separated  from  all  others,  from  the  time  of  Abraham, 
and  was  educated  in  three  great  truths  :  ( 1 )  the  majesty  of  God,  in  his 
unity,  omnipotence,  and  holiness ;  ( 2 )  the  sinfulness  of  man,  and  his  moral 
helplessness  ;  ( 3 )  the  certainty  of  a  coming  salvation.  This  education 
from  the  time  of  Moses  was  conducted  by  the  use  of  three  principal 
agencies : 

A.  Law. — The  Mosaic  legislation,  (a)  by  its  theophanies  and  miracles, 
cultivated  faith  in  a  personal  and  almighty  God  and  Judge  ;  (  b  )  by  its 
commands  and  threatenings,  wakened  the  sense  of  sin  ;  (  c  )  by  its  priestly 
and  sacrificial  system,  inspired  hope  of  some  way  of  pardon  and  access  to 
God. 

B.  Prophecy.  —  This  was  of  two  kinds  :  (  a )  verbal,  —  beginning  with 
the  protevangelium  in  the  garden,  and  extending  to  within  four  hundred 
years  of  the  coming  of  Christ ;  ( 6  )  typical,  — in  persons,  as  Adam,  Mel- 
chisedek,  Joseph,  Moses,  Joshua,  David,  Solomon,  Jonah  ;  and  in  acts,  as 
Isaac's  sacrifice,  and  Moses'  lifting  up  the  serpent  in  the  wilderness. 

179 


180  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALVATION. 

C.  Judgment. — Repeated  divine  chastisements  for  idolatry  culminated 
in  the  overthrow  of  the  kingdom,  and  the  captivity  of  the  Jews.  The  exile 
had  two  principal  effects  :  (a)  religious, — in  giving  monotheism  firm  root 
in  the  heart  of  the  people,  and  in  leading  to  the  establishment  of  the  syna- 
gogue-system, by  which  monotheism  was  thereafter  preserved  and  propa- 
gated ;  (6)  civil, — in  converting  the  Jews  from  an  agricultural  to  a  trading 
people,  scattering  them  among  all  nations,  and  finally  imbuing  them  with 
the  spirit  of  Roman  law  and  organization. 

Thus  a  people  was  made  ready  to  receive  the  gospel  and  to  propagate 
it  throughout  the  world,  at  the  very  time  when  the  world  had  become 
conscious  of  its  needs,  and,  through  its  greatest  philosophers  and  poets, 
was  expressing  its  longings  for  deliverance. 


SECTION    II.—  THE    PERSON    OF    CHRIST. 

The  redemption  of  mankind  from  sin  was  to  be  effected  through  a  Medi- 
ator who  should  unite  in  himself  both  the  human  nature  and  the  divine,  in 
order  that  he  might  reconcile  God  to  man  and  man  to  God.  To  facilitate 
an  understanding  of  the  Scriptural  doctrine  under  consideration,  it  will  be 
desirable  at  the  outset  to  present  a  brief  historical  survey  of  views  respect- 
ing the  Person  of  Christ. 

L    HISTORICAL  SURVEY  OF  VIEWS  RESPECTING  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST. 

1.  The  EUonites    (  pN:r  =  '  poor ' ;  A.  D.  107  ? )  denied  the  reality  of 
Christ's  divine  nature,  and  held  him  to  be  merely  man,  whether  naturally 
or  supernaturally  conceived.     This  man,  however,  held  a  peculiar  relation 
to  God,  in  that,  from  the  time  of  his  baptism,  an  unmeasured  fulness  of  the 
div'ne  Spirit  rested  upon  him.     Ebionism  was  simply  Judaism  within  the 
pale  of  the  Christian  church,  and  its  denial  of  Christ's  godhood  was  occa- 
sioned by  the  apparent  incompatibility  of  this  doctrine  with  monotheism. 

2.  The  Docetce  (<to«&> — 'to  seem,'  'to appear';  A.  D.  70-170  ),  like 
most  of  the  Gnostics  in  the  second  century  and  the  Manichees  in  the  third, 
denied  the  reality  of  Christ's  human  body.      This  view  was  the  logical 
sequence  of  their  assumption  of  the  inherent  evil  of  matter.     If  matter  is 
evil  and  Christ  was  pure,  then  Christ's  human  body  must  have  been  merely 
phantasmal.     Docetism  was  simply  pagan  philosophy  introduced  into  the 
church. 

3.  The  Arians  (  Arms,  condemned  at  Nice,  325)  denied  the  integrity 
of  the  divine  nature  in  Christ.     They  regarded  the  Logos  who  united  him- 
self to  humanity  in  Jesus  Christ,  not  as  possessed  of  absolute  godhood,  but 
as  the  first  and  highest  of  created  beings.      This  view  originated  in  a  mis- 
interpretation of  the  Scriptural  accounts  of  Christ's  state  of  humiliation, 
and  in  mistaking  temporary  subordination  for  original  and  permanent 
inequality. 

4.  The  Apollinarians  (  Apollinaris,  condemned  at  Constantinople,  381) 
denied  the  integrity  of  Christ's  human  nature.     According  to  this  view, 


THE   TWO   MATURES   OF   CHKIST.  181 

Christ  had  no  human  vov<;  or  irvevpa,  other  than  that  which  was  furnished  by 
the  divine  nature.  Christ  had  only  the  human  aufta  and  "fyvxh  \  the  place 
of  the  human  vovf  or  irvevrfa  was  filled  by  the  divine  Logos.  ApolKnarism 
is  an  attempt  to  construe  the  doctrine  of  Christ's  person  in  the  forms  of  the 
Platonic  trichotomy. 

5.  The  Nestorians  (  Nestorius,  removed  from  the  Patriarchate  of  Con- 
stantinople, 431 )  denied  the  real  union  between  the  divine  and  the  human 
natures  in  Christ,  making  it  rather  a  moral  than  an  organic  one.     They 
refused  therefore  to  attribute  to  the  resultant  unity  the  attributes  of  each 
nature,  and  regarded  Christ  as  a  man  in  very  near  relation  to  God.     Thus 
they  virtually  held  to  two  natures  and  two  persons,  instead  of  two  natures 
in  one  person. 

6.  The  Eutychians  ( condemned  at  Chalcedon,  451 )  denied  the  dis- 
tinction and  coexistence  of  the  two  natures,  and  held  to  a  mingling  of  both 
into  one,  which  constituted  a  tertium  quid,  or  third  nature.     Since  in  this 
case  the  divine  must  overpower  the  human,  it  follows  that  the  human  was 
really  absorbed  into  or  transmuted  into  the  divine,  although  the  divine  was 
not  in  all  respects  the  same,  after  the  union,  that  it  was  before.    Hence  the 
Eutychians  were  often  called  Monophysites,  because  they  virtually  reduced 
the  two  natures  to  one. 

The  foregoing  survey  would  seem  to  show  that  history  had  exhausted  the 
possibilities  of  heresy,  and  that  the  future  denials  of  the  doctrine  of  Christ's 
person  must  be,  in  essence,  forms  of  the  views  already  mentioned.  All 
controversies  with  regard  to  the  person  of  Christ  must,  of  necessity,  hinge 
upon  one  of  three  points  :  first,  the  reality  of  the  two  natures  ;  secondly, 
the  integrity  of  the  two  natures ;  thirdly,  the  union  of  the  two  natures  in 
one  person^  Of  these  points,  Ebionism  and  Docetism  deny  the  reality  of 
the  natures;  Arianism  and  Apollinarianism  deny  their  integrity;  while 
Nestorianism  and  Eutychianism  deny  their  proper  union.  In  opposition 
to  all  these  errors,  the  orthodox  doctrine  held  its  ground  and  maintains  it 
to  this  day. 

7.  The  Orthodox  doctrine  ( promulgated  at  Chalcedon,  451 )  holds  that 
in  the  one  person  Jesus  Christ  there  are  two  natures,  a  human  nature  and 
a  divine  nature,  each  in  its  completeness  and  integrity,  and  that  these  two 
natures  are  organically  and  indissolubly  united,  yet  so  that  no  third  nature 
is  formed  thereby.     In  brief,  to  use  the  antiquated  dictum,  orthodox  doc- 
trine forbids  us  either  to  divide  the  person  or  to  confound  the  natures. 

That  this  doctrine  is  Scriptural  and  rational,  we  have  yet  to  show.  We 
may  most  easily  arrange  our  proofs  by  reducing  the  three  points  mentioned 
to  two,  namely  :  first,  the  reality  and  integrity  of  the  two  natures ;  sec- 
ondly, the  union  of  the  two  natures  in  one  person. 

II.    THE  TWO  NATURES  OF  CHRIST,  -—THEIR  REALITY  AND  INTEGRITY. 

1.     The  Humanity  of  Christ. 

A.     Its  Reality.  —  This  may  be  shown  as  follows  : 

(  a )  He  expressly  called  himself,  and  was  called,  "  man." 


182  SOTERIOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATION. 

( 6 )  He  possessed  the  essential  elements  of  human  nature  as  at  present 
constituted  —  a  material  body  and  a  rational  soul. 

( c )  He  was  moved  by  the  instinctive  principles,  and  he  exercised  the 
active  powers,  which  belong  to  a  normal  and  developed  humanity  (hunger, 
thirst,  weariness,  sleep,  love,  compassion,  anger,  anxiety,  fear,  groaning, 
weeping,  prayer  ). 

(cZ)  He  was  subject  to  the  ordinary  laws  of  human  development,  both  in 
body  and  soul  ( grew  and  waxed  strong  in  spirit ;  asked  questions  ;  grew  in 
wisdom  and  stature  ;  learned  obedience  ;  suffered  being  tempted  ;  was 
made  perfect  through  sufferings ). 

(e)  He  suffered  and  died  ( bloody  sweat ;  gave  up  his  spirit ;  his  side 
pierced,  and  straightway  there  came  out  blood  and  water). 

B.  Its  Integrity.  We  here  tise  the  term  'integrity '  to  signify,  not 
merely  completeness,  but  perfection.  That  which  is  perfect  is,  a  fortiori, 
complete  in  all  its  parts.  Christ's  human  nature  was : 

(  a )  Supernaturally  conceived  ;  since  the  denial  of  his  supernatural  con- 
ception involves  either  a  denial  of  the  purity  of  Mary,  his  mother,  or  a  denial 
of  the  truthfulness  of  Matthew's  and  Luke's  narratives. 

(6)  Free,  both  from  hereditary  depravity,  and  from  actual  sin;  as  is 
shown  by  his  never  offering  sacrifice,  never  praying  for  forgiveness,  teach- 
ing that  all  but  he  needed  the  new  birth,  challenging  all  to  convict  him  of 
a  single  sin. 

(  c )  Ideal  human  nature,  —  furnishing  the  moral  pattern  which  man  is 
progressively  to  realize,  although  within  limitations  of  knowledge  and  of 
activity  required  by  his  vocation  as  the  world's  Redeemer. 

(d)  A  human  nature  that  found  its  personality  only  in  union  with  the 
divine  nature, —  in  other  words,  a  human  nature  impersonal,  in  the  sense 
that  it  had  no  personality  separate  from  the  divine  nature,  and  prior  to  its 
union  therewith. 

(  e )  A  human  nature  germinal,  and  capable  of  self-communication,  — 
so  constituting  him  the  spiritual  head  and  beginning  of  a  new  race,  the 
second  Adam  from  whom  fallen  man  individually  and  collectively  derives 
new  and  holy  life. 

The  passages  here  alluded  to  abundantly  confute  the  Docetic  denial  of 
Christ's  veritable  human  body,  and  the  Apollinarian  denial  of  Christ's  ver- 
itable human  soul.  More  than  this,  they  establish  the  reality  and  integrity 
of  Christ's  human  nature,  as  possessed  of  all  the  elements,  faculties,  and 
powers  essential  to  humanity. 

2.     The  Deity  of  Christ. 

The  reality  and  integrity  of  Christ's  divine  nature  have  been  sufficiently 
proved  in  a  former  chapter  (  see  pages  82-89  ).  We  need  only  refer  to  the 
evidence  there  given,  that,  during  his  earthly  ministry,  Christ : 

( a  )  Possessed  a  knowledge  of  his  own  deity. 


THE  TWO   NATURES   IN   ONE   PERSON.  183 

(  6 )  Exercised  divine  powers  and  prerogatives. 

But  this  is  to  say,  in  other  words,  that  there  were,  in  Christ,  a  knowl- 
edge and  a  power  such  as  belong  only  to  God.  The  passages  cited  furnish 
a  refutation  of  both  the  Ebionite  denial  of  the  reality,  and  the  Arian  denial 
of  the  integrity,  of  the  divine  nature  in  Christ 

in.    THE  UNION  OP  THE  TWO  NATURES  IN  ONE  PERSON. 

Distinctly  as  the  Scriptures  represent  Jesus  Christ  to  have  been  possessed 
of  a  divine  nature  and  of  a  human  nature,  each  unaltered  in  essence  and 
undivested  of  its  normal  attributes  and  powers,  they  with  equal  distinctness 
represent  Jesus  Christ  as  a  single  undivided  personality  in  whom  these  two 
natures  are  vitally  and  inseparably  united,  so  that  he  is  properly,  not  God 
and  man,  but  the  God-man.  The  two  natures  are  bound  together,  not  by 
the  moral  tie  of  friendship,  nor  by  the  spiritual  tie  which  links  the  believer 
to  his  Lord,  but  by  a  bond  unique  and  inscrutable,  which  constitutes  them 
one  person  with  a  single  consciousness  and  will,  —  this  consciousness  and 
will  including  within  their  possible  range  both  the  human  nature  and  the 
divine. 

1.     Proof  of  this   Union. 

(a)  Christ  uniformly  speaks  of  himself,  and  is  spoken  of,  as  a  single 
person.  There  is  no  interchange  of  'I'  and  'thou*  between  the  human 
and  the  divine  natures,  such  as  we  find  between  the  persons  of  the  Trinity 
(  John  17  :  23  ).  Christ  never  uses  the  plural  number  in  referring  to  him- 
self, unless  it  be  in  John  3  : 11  —  "  we  speak  that  we  do  know," — and  even 
here  "we"  is  more  probably  used  as  inclusive  of  the  disciples.  1  John 
4  : 2  —  "is  come  in  the  flesh"  —  is  supplemented  by  John  1 : 14 —  "  became 
flesh "  ;  and  these  texts  together  assure  us  that  Christ  so  came  in  human 
nature  as  to  make  that  nature  an  element  in  his  single  personality. 

(  b )  The  attributes  and  powers  of  both  natures  are  ascribed  to  the  one 
Christ,  and  conversely  the  works  and  dignities  of  the  one  Christ  are 
ascribed  to  either  of  the  natures,  in  a  way  inexplicable,  except  upon  the 
principle  that  these  two  natures  are  organically  and  indissolubly  united  in 
a  single  person  ( examples  of  the  former  usage  are  Eom.  1  :  3  and  1  Pet. 
3  : 18  ;  of  the  latter,  1  Tim.  2  :  5  and  Heb.  1  :  2,  3 ).  Hence  we  can  say, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  God-man  existed  before  Abraham,  yet  was  born 
in  the  reign  of  Augustus  Caesar,  and  that  Jesus  Christ  wept,  was  weary, 
suffered,  died,  yet  is  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever  ;  on  the  other 
hand,  that  a  divine  Savior  redeemed  us  upon  the  cross,  and  that  the  human 
Christ  is  present  with  his  people  even  to  the  end  of  the  world  ( Eph.  1 : 23  ; 
4:10;  Mat.  28:20). 

(c)  The  constant  Scriptural  representations  of  the  infinite  value  of 
Christ's  atonement  and  of  the  union  of  the  human  race  with  God  which 
has  been  secured  in  him  are  intelligible  only  when  Christ  is  regarded,  not 
as  a  man  of  God,  but  as  the  God-man,  in  whom  the  two  natures  are  so 
united  that  what  each  does  has  the  value  of  both. 

( d )  It  corroborates  this  view  to  remember  that  the  universal  Christian 


184  SOTEEIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATION. 

consciousness  recognizes  in  Christ  a  single  and  undivided  personality,  and 
expresses  this  recognition  in  its  services  of  song  and  prayer. 

The  foregoing  proof  of  the  union  of  a  perfect  human  nature  and  of  a 
perfect  divine  nature  in  the  single  person  of  Jesus  Christ  suffices  to  refute 
both  the  Nestorian  separation  of  the  natures  and  the  Eutychian  confound- 
ing of  them.  Certain  modern  forms  of  stating  the  doctrine  of  this  union, 
however  —  forms  of  statement  into  which  there  enter  some  of  the  miscon- 
ceptions already  noticed  —  need  a  brief  examination,  before  we  proceed  to 
our  own  attempt  at  elucidation. 

2.    Modern  misrepresentations  of  this  Union. 

A.  Theory  of  an  incomplete  humanity. —  Gess  and  Beecher  hold  that 
the  immaterial  part  in  Christ's  humanity  is  only  contracted  and  meta- 
morphosed deity. 

The  advocates  of  this  view  maintain  that  the  divine  Logos  reduced  him- 
self to  the  condition  and  limits  of  human  nature,  and  thus  literally  became 
a  human  soul.  The  theory  differs  from  Apollinarianism,  in  that  it  does  not 
necessarily  presuppose  a  trichotomous  view  of  man's  nature.  While 
Apollinarianism,  however,  denied  the  human  origin  only  of  Christ's  TrvEv/ua, 
this  theory  extends  the  denial  to  his  entire  immaterial  being, — his  body 
alone  being  derived  from  the  Virgin.  It  is  held,  in  slightly  varying  forms, 
by  the  Germans,  Hof mann  and  Ebrard,  as  well  as  by  Gess ;  and  Henry 
Ward  Beecher  was  its  chief  representative  in  America. 

Against  this  theory  we  urge  the  following  objections  : 

(a)  It  rests  upon  a  false  interpretation  of  the  passage  John  1  : 14 — 
6  2.6-yos  oapi-  iyevero.  The  word  oapg  here  has  its  common  New  Testament 
meaning.  It  designates  neither  soul  nor  body  alone,  but  human  nature  in 
its  totality  (C/.  John  3  :  6 — TO  yeyevv^fuvov  kn  rrjs  aapitif  odpi;  eonv  ;  Bom.  7  : 
18  —  OVK  O'IKEI  kv  spot,  TOVT*  iaTiv  ev  Ty  aapKi  [J.OV,  aycf&dv).  That  iyevsTo  does  not 
imply  a  transmutation  of  the  Myot  into  human  nature,  or  into  a  human 
soul,  is  evident  from  iaK^vuaev  which  follows  —  an  allusion  to  the  Shechinah 
of  the  Mosaic  tabernacle  ;  and  from  the  parallel  passage  1  John  4  :  2  —  h 
oapid  cAtfAvtfdra — where  we  are  taught  not  only  the  oneness  of  Christ's 
person,  but  the  distinctness  of  the  constituent  natures. 

(6)  It  contradicts  the  two  great  classes  of  Scripture  passages  already 
referred  to,  which  assert  on  the  one  hand  the  divine  knowledge  and  power 
of  Christ  and  his  consciousness  of  oneness  with  the  Father,  and  on  the 
other  hand  the  completeness  of  his  human  nature  and  its  derivation  from 
the  stock  of  Israel  and  the  seed  of  Abraham  (Mat.  1  : 1-16  ;  Heb.  2  : 16). 
Thus  it  denies  both  the  true  humanity,  and  the  true  deity,  of  Christ. 

(  c)  It  is  inconsistent  with  the  Scriptural  representations  of  God's  immu- 
tability, in  maintaining  that  the  Logos  gives  up  the  attributes  of  Godhead, 
and  his  place  and  office  as  second  person  of  the  Trinity,  in  order  to  contract 
himself  into  the  limits  of  humanity.  Since  attributes  and  substance  are 
correlative  terms,  it  is  impossible  to  hold  that  the  substance  of  God  is  in 
Christ,  so  long  as  he  does  not  possess  divine  attributes.  As  we  shall  see 
hereafter,  however,  the  possession  of  divine  attributes  by  Christ  does  not 


THE  TWO   NATURES  IN  ONE   PERSON.  185 

necessarily  imply  his  constant  exercise  of  them.     His  humiliation  indeed 
consisted  in  his  giving  up  their  independent  exercise. 

( d )  It  is  destructive  of  the  whole  Scriptural  scheme  of  salvation,  in  that 
it  renders  impossible  any  experience  of  human  nature  on  the  part  of  the 
divine, — for  when  God  becomes  man  he  ceases  to  be  God ;  in  that  it  renders 
impossible  any  sufficient  atonement  on  the  part  of  human  nature, —  for 
mere  humanity,  even  though  its  essence  be  a  contracted  and  dormant  deity, 
is  not  capable  of  a  suffering  which  shall  have  infinite  value ;  in  that  it 
renders  impossible  any  proper  union  of  the  human  race  with  God  in  the 
person  of  Jesus  Christ, — for  where  true  deity  and  true  humanity  are  both 
absent,  there  can  be  no  union  between  the  two. 

B.  Theory  of  a  gradual  incarnation  —  Dorner  and  Eothe  hold  that  the 
union  between  the  divine  and  the  human  natures  is  not  completed  by  the 
incarnating  act. 

The  advocates  of  this  view  maintain  that  the  union  between  the  two 
natures  is  accomplished  by  a  gradual  communication  of  the  fulness  of  the 
divine  Logos  to  the  man  Christ  Jesus.  This  communication  is  mediated 
by  the  human  consciousness  of  Jesus.  Before  the  human  consciousness 
begins,  the  personality  of  the  Logos  is  not  yet  divine-human.  The  per- 
sonal union  completes  itself  only  gradually,  as  the  human  consciousness  is 
sufficiently  developed  to  appropriate  the  divine. 

It  is  objectionable  for  the  following  reasons  : 

(a)  The  Scripture  plainly  teaches  that  that  which  was  born  of  Mary 
was  as  completely  Son  of  God  as  Son  of  man  ( Luke  1  :  35 )  ;  and  that  in 
the  incarnating  act,  and  not  at  his  resurrection,  Jesus  Christ  became  the 
God-man  (Phil.  2:7).  But  this  theory  virtually  teaches  the  birth  of  a 
man  who  subsequently  and  gradually  became  the  God-man,  by  consciously 
appropriating  the  Logos  to  whom  he  sustained  ethical  relations — relations 
with  regard  to  which  the  Scripture  is  entirely  silent.  Its  radical  error  is  that 
of  mistaking  an  incomplete  consciousness  of  the  union  for  an  incomplete 
union. 

(  6  )  Since  consciousness  and  will  belong  to  personality,  as  distinguished 
from  nature,  the  hypothesis  of  a  mutual,  conscious,  and  voluntary  appro- 
priation of  divinity  by  humanity  and  of  humanity  by  divinity,  during  the 
earthly  life  of  Christ,  is  but  a  more  subtle  form  of  the  Nestorian  doctrine 
of  a  double  personality.  It  follows,  moreover,  that  as  these  two  personal- 
ities do  not  become  absolutely  one  until  the  resurrection,  the  death  of  the 
man  Jesus  Christ,  to  whom  the  Logos  has  not  yet  fully  united  himself, 
cannot  possess  an  infinite  atoning  efficacy. 

(  c  )  While  this  theory  asserts  a  final  complete  union  of  God  and  man  in 
Jesus  Christ,  it  renders  this  union  far  more  difficult  to  reason,  by  involving 
the  merging  of  two  persons  in  one,  rather  than  the  union  of  two  natures 
in  one  person.  We  have  seen,  moreover,  that  the  Scripture  gives  no  coun- 
tenance to  the  doctrine  of  a  double  personality  during  the  earthly  life  of 
Christ.  The  God-man  never  says  :  "I  and  the  Logos  are  one  "  ;  "  he  that 
hath  seen  me  hath  seen  the  Logos  " ;  "  the  Logos  is  greater  than  I "  ;  "I 


186  SOTEKIOLOGY,    OE  THE   DOCTRINE  OF   SALVATION. 

go  to  the  Logos."  In  the  absence  of  all  Scripture  evidence  in  favor  of  this 
theory,  we  must  regard  the  rational  and  dogmatic  arguments  against  it  as 
conclusive. 

3.     The  real  nature  of  this  Union. 

(a)  Its  great  importance. — While  the  Scriptures  represent  the  person 
of  Christ  as  the  crowning  mystery  of  the  Christian  scheme  ( Matt.  11 : 27  ; 
Col.  1 : 27;  2  :2  ;  1  Tim.  3:16),  they  also  incite  us  to  its  study  (John 
17  : 3 ;  20  : 27  ;  Luke  24 : 39  ;  Phil.  3 : 8,  10 ).  This  is  the  more  needful, 
since  Christ  is  not  only  the  central  point  of  Christianity,  but  is  Christianity 
itself  —  the  embodied  reconciliation  and  union  between  man  and  God. 
The  following  remarks  are  offered,  not  as  fully  explaining,  but  only  as  in 
some  respects  relieving,  the  difficulties  of  the  subject. 

(  b )  The  chief  problems.  —  These  problems  are  the  following  :  1.  one 
personality  and  two  natures  ;  2.  human  nature  without  personality  ;  3. 
relation  of  the  Logos  to  the  humanity  during  the  earthly  life  of  Christ ;  4. 
relation  of  the  humanity  to  the  Logos  during  the  heavenly  life  of  Christ. 
We  may  throw  light  on  1,  by  the  figure  of  two  concentric  circles ;  on  2, 
by  remembering  that  two  earthly  parents  unite  in  producing  a  single  child  ; 
on  3,  by  the  illustration  of  latent  memory,  which  contains  so  much  more 
than  present  recollection ;  on  4,  by  the  thought  that  body  is  the  manifes- 
tation of  spirit,  and  that  Christ  in  his  heavenly  state  is  not  confined  to 
place. 

(  c )  Eeason  for  mystery. — The  union  of  the  two  natures  in  Christ's  person 
is  necessarily  inscrutable,  because  there  are  no  analogies  to  it  in  our  experi- 
ence. Attempts  to  illustrate  it  on  the  one  hand  from  the  union  and  yet 
the  distinctness  of  soul  and  body,  of  iron  and  heat,  and  on  the  other  hand 
from  the  union  and  yet  the  distinctness  of  Christ  and  the  believer,  of  the 
divine  Son  and  the  Father,  are  one-sided  and  become  utterly  misleading,  if 
they  are  regarded  as  furnishing  a  rationale  of  the  union  and  not  simply  a 
means  of  repelling  objection.  The  first  two  illustrations  mentioned  above 
lack  the  essential  element  of  two  natures  to  make  them  complete  :  soul  and 
body  are  not  two  natures,  but  one,  nor  are  iron  and  heat  two  substances. 
The  last  two  illustrations  mentioned  above  lack  the  element  of  single  per- 
sonality :  Christ  and  the  believer  are  two  persons,  not  one,  even  as  the  Son 
and  the  Father  are  not  one  person,  but  two. 

(d)  Ground  of  possibility. —  The  possibility  of  the  union  of  deity  and 
humanity  in  one  person  is  grounded  in  the  original  creation  of  man  in 
the  divine  image.  Man's  kinship  to  God,  in  other  words,  his  possession  of 
a  rational  and  spiritual  nature,  is  the  condition  of  incarnation.  Brute-life 
is  incapable  of  union  with  God.  But  human  nature  is  capable  of  the  divine, 
in  the  sense  not  only  that  it  lives,  moves,  and  has  its  being  in  God,  but  that 
God  may  unite  himself  indissolubly  to  it  and  endue  it  with  divine  powers, 
while  yet  it  remains  all  the  more  truly  human.  Since  the  moral  image  of 
God  in  human  nature  has  been  lost  by  sin,  Christ,  the  perfect  image  of 
God  after  which  man  was  originally  made,  restores  that  lost  image  by 
uniting  himself  to  humanity  and  filling  it  with  his  divine  life  and  love. 

(  e  )    No  double  personality. —  This  possession  of  two  natures  does  not 


THE  TWO   NATURES   IN  ONE   PERSON.  18? 

involve  a  double  personality  in  the  God-man,  for  the  reason  that  the  Logos 
takes  into  union  with  himself,  not  an  individual  man  with  already  devel- 
oped personality,  but  human  nature  which  has  had  no  separate  existence 
before  its  union  with  the  divine.  Christ's  human  nature  is  impersonal,  in 
the  sense  that  it  attains  self-consciousness  and  self-determination  only  in 
the  personality  of  the  God-man.  Here  it  is  important  to  mark  the  dis- 
tinction between  nature  and  person.  Nature  is  substance  possessed  in 
common  ;  the  persons  of  the  Trinity  have  one  nature  ;  there  is  a  common 
nature  of  mankind.  Person  is  nature  separately  subsisting,  with  powers 
of  consciousness  and  will.  Since  the  human  nature  of  Christ  has  not  and 
never  had  a  separate  subsistence,  it  is  impersonal,  and  in  the  God-man 
the  Logos  furnishes  the  principle  of  personality.  It  is  equally  important 
to  observe  that  self  -consciousness  and  self-determination  do  not  belong  to 
nature  as  such,  but  only  to  personality.  For  this  reason,  Christ  has  not 
two  consciousnesses  and  two  wills,  but  a  single  consciousness  and  a  single 
will.  This  consciousness  and  will,  moreover,  is  never  simply  human,  but 
is  always  theanthropic  —  an  activity  of  the  one  personality  which  unites  in 
itself  the  human  and  the  divine  (  Mark  13  :  32  ;  Luke  22  :  42  ). 

(/)  Effect  upon  the  human.  —  The  union  of  the  divine  and  the  human 
natures  makes  the  latter  possessed  of  the  powers  belonging  to  the  former  ; 
in  other  words,  the  attributes  of  the  divine  nature  are  imparted  to  the 
human  without  passing  over  into  its  essence,  —  so  that  the  human  Christ 
even  on  earth  had  power  to  be,  to  know,  and  to  do,  as  God.  That  this 
power  was  latent,  or  was  only  rarely  manifested,  was  the  result  of  the  self- 
chosen  state  of  humiliation  upon  which  the  God-man  had  entered.  In 
this  state  of  humiliation,  the  communication  of  the  contents  of  his  divine 
nature  to  the  human  was  mediated  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  God-man,  in 
his  servant-form,  knew  and  taught  and  performed  only  what  the  Spirit 
permitted  and  directed  (Mat.  3  :  16  ;  John  3  :  34  ;  Acts  1:2;  10  :  38  ;  Heb. 
9  :  14  ).  But  when  thus  permitted,  he  knew,  taught,  and  performed,  not, 
like  the  prophets,  by  power  communicated  from  without,  but  by  virtue  of 
his  own  inner  divine  energy  (Mat.  17:2;  Mark  5  :  41  ;  Luke  5  :  20,  21  ; 
6:19;  John  2  :  11,  24,  25  ;  3:13;  20:19). 


Effect  upon  the  divine.  —  This  communion  of  the  natures  was  such 
that,  although  the  divine  nature  in  itself  is  incapable  of  ignorance,  weak- 
ness, temptation,  suffering,  or  death,  the  one  person  Jesus  Christ  was 
capable  of  these  by  virtue  of  the  union  of  the  divine  nature  with  a  human 
nature  in  him.  As  the  human  Savior  can  exercise  divine  attributes,  not  in 
virtue  of  his  humanity  alone,  but  derivatively,  by  virtue  of  his  possession 
of  a  divine  nature,  so  the  divine  Savior  can  suffer  and  be  ignorant  as  man, 
not  in  his  divine  nature,  but  derivatively,  by  virtue  of  his  possession  of  a 
human  nature.  We  may  illustrate  this  from  the  connection  between  body 
and  soul.  The  soul  suffers  pain  from  its  union  with  the  body,  of  which 
apart  from  the  body  it  would  be  incapable.  So  the  God-man,  although  in 
his  divine  nature  impassible,  was  capable,  through  his  union  with  human- 
ity, of  absolutely  infinite  suffering. 

(h)  Necessity  of  the  union.  —  The  union  of  two  natures  in  one  person 
is  necessary  to  constitute  Jesus  Christ  a  proper  mediator  between  man  and 


188  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SALVATION. 

God.  His  two-fold  nature  gives  him  fellowship  with  both  parties,  since  it 
involves  an  equal  dignity  with  God,  and  at  the  same  time  a  perfect  sympathy 
with  man  (Heb.  2  : 17,  18  ;  4  : 15,  16).  This  two-fold  nature,  moreover, 
enables  him  to  present  to  both  God  and  man  proper  terms  of  reconcilia- 
tion :  being  man,  he  can  make  atonement  for  man ;  being  God,  his  atone- 
ment has  infinite  value  ;  while  both  his  divinity  and  his  humanity  combine 
to  move  the  hearts  of  offenders  and  constrain  them  to  submission  and  love 
(ITim.  2:5;  Heb.  7  :25). 

(  i )  The  union  eternal. — The  union  of  humanity  with  deity  in  the  person 
of  Christ  is  indissoluble  and  eternal.  Unlike  the  avatars  of  the  East,  the 
incarnation  was  a  permanent  assumption  of  human  nature  by  the  second 
person  of  the  Trinity.  In  the  ascension  of  Christ,  glorified  humanity  has 
attained  the  throne  of  the  universe.  By  his  Spirit,  this  same  divine-human 
Savior  is  omnipresent  to  secure  the  progress  of  his  kingdom.  The  final 
subjection  of  the  Son  to  the  Father,  alluded  to  in  1  Cor.  15  :  28,  cannot  be 
other  than  the  complete  return  of  the  Son  to  his  original  relation  to  the 
Father ;  since,  according  to  John  17  : 5,  Christ  is  again  to  possess  the 
glory  which  he  had  with  the  Father  before  the  world  was  (cf.  Heb.  1:8; 
7:24,25). 

(j)  Infinite  and  finite  in  Christ. —  Our  investigation  of  the  Scripture 
teaching  with  regard  to  the  Person  of  Christ  leads  us  to  three  important 
conclusions  :  1.  that  deity  and  humanity,  the  infinite  and  the  finite,  in  him 
are  not  mutually  exclusive  ;  2.  that  the  humanity  in  Christ  differs  from  his 
deity  not  merely  in  degree  but  also  in  kind  ;  and  3.  that  this  difference 
in  kind  is  the  difference  between  the  infinite  original  and  the  finite  deriva- 
tive, so  that  Christ  is  the  source  of  life,  both  physical  and  spiritual,  for  all 
men. 


SECTION  III. — THE  TWO   STATES  OF   CHRIST. 

L    THE  STATE  OP  HUMILIATION. 
1.     The  nature  of  this  humiliation. 

We  may  dismiss,  as  unworthy  of  serious  notice,  the  views  that  it  consisted 
essentially  either  in  the  union  of  the  Logos  with  human  nature, —  for  this 
union  with  human  nature  continues  in  the  state  of  exaltation ;  or  in  the 
outward  trials  and  privations  of  Christ's  human  life, —  for  this  view  casts 
reproach  upon  poverty,  and  ignores  the  power  of  the  soul  to  rise  superior 
to  its  outward  circumstances. 

We  may  devote  more  attention  to  the 

A.  Theory  of  Thomasius,  Delitzsch,  and  Crosby,  that  the  humiliation 
consisted  in  the  surrender  of  the  relative  divine  attributes. 

This  theory  holds  that  the  Logos,  although  retaining  his  divine  self- 
consciousness  and  his  immanent  attributes  of  holiness,  love,  and  truth, 
surrendered  his  relative  attributes  of  omniscience,  omnipotence,  and  omni- 


THE   STATE  OF  HUMILIATION.  189 

presence,  in  order  to  take  to  himself  veritable  human  nature.  According 
to  this  view,  there  are,  indeed,  two  natures  in  Christ,  but  neither  of  these 
natures  is  infinite.  Thomasius  and  Delitzsch  are  the  chief  advocates  of 
this  theory  in  Germany.  Dr.  Howard  Crosby  has  maintained  a  similar 
view  in  America. 

We  object  to  this  view  that : 

(  a  )  It  contradicts  the  Scriptures  already  referred  to,  in  which  Christ 
asserts  his  divine  knowledge  and  power.  Divinity,  it  is  said,  can  give  up 
its  world-functions,  for  it  existed  without  these  before  creation.  But  to 
give  up  divine  attributes  is  to  give  up  the  substance  of  Godhead.  Nor  is 
it  a  sufficient  reply  to  say  that  only  the  relative  attributes  are  given  up, 
while  the  immanent  attributes,  which  chiefly  characterize  the  Godhead,  are 
retained  ;  for  the  immanent  necessarily  involve  the  relative,  as  the  greater 
involve  the  less. 

( 6  )  Since  the  Logos,  in  uniting  himself  to  a  human  soul,  reduces  him- 
self to  the  condition  and  limitations  of  a  human  soul,  the  theory  is  virtually 
a  theory  of  the  coexistence  of  two  human  souls  in  Christ.  But  the  union 
of  two  finite  souls  is  more  difficult  to  explain  than  the  union  of  a  finite  and 
an  infinite, — since  there  can  be  in  the  former  case  no  intelligent  guidance 
and  control  of  the  human  element  by  the  divine. 

(c)  This  theory  fails  to  secure  its  end,  that  of  making  comprehensible 
the  human  development  of  Jesus, —  for  even  though  divested  of  the  relative 
attributes  of  Godhood,  the  Logos  still  retains  his  divine  self-consciousness, 
together  with  his  immanent  attributes  of  holiness,  love,  and  truth.  This 
is  as  difficult  to  reconcile  with  a  purely  natural  human  development  as  the 
possession  of  the  relative  divine  attributes  would  be.  The  theory  logically 
leads  to  a  further  denial  of  the  possession  of  any  divine  attributes,  or  of 
any  divine  consciousness  at  all,  on  the  part  of  Christ,  and  merges  itself  in 
the  view  of  Gess  and  Beecher,  that  the  Godhead  of  the  Logos  is  actually 
transformed  into  a  human  soul. 

B.  Theory  that  the  humiliation  consisted  in  the  surrender  of  the  inde- 
pendent exercise  of  the  divine  attributes. 

This  theory,  which  we  regard  as  the  most  satisfactory  of  all,  may  be  more 
fully  set  forth  as  follows.  The  humiliation,  as  the  Scriptures  seem  to 
show,  consisted : 

( a  )  In  that  act  of  the  preexistent  Logos  by  which  he  gave  up  his  divine 
glory  with  the  Father,  in  order  to  take  a  servant-form.  In  this  act,  he 
resigned  not  the  possession,  nor  yet  entirely  the  use,  but  rather  the  inde- 
pendent exercise,  of  the  divine  attributes. 

( 6  )  In  the  submission  of  the  Logos  to  the  control  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and 
the  limitations  of  his  Messianic  mission,  in  his  communication  of  the 
divine  fulness  of  the  human  nature  which  he  had  taken  into  union  with 
himself. 

( c )  In  the  continuous  surrender,  on  the  part  of  the  God-man,  so  far  as 
his  human  nature  was  concerned,  of  the  exercise  of  those  divine  powers 
with  which  it  was  endowed  by  virtue  of  its  union  with  the  divine,  and  in 


190  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALVATIOK. 

the  voluntary  acceptance,  which  followed  upon  this,  of  temptation,  suffer- 
ing, and  death. 

Each  of  these  elements  of  the  doctrine  has  its  own  Scriptural  support. 
We  must  therefore  regard  the  humiliation  of  Christ,  not  as  consisting  in  a 
single  act,  but  as  involving  a  continuous  self-renunciation,  which  began 
with  the  Kenosis  of  the  Logos  in  becoming  man,  and  which  culminated  in 
the  self-subjection  of  the  God-man  to  the  death  of  the  cross. 

2.     The  stages  of  Christ's  humiliation. 

We  may  distinguish  :  (a)  That  act  of  the  preincarnate  Logos  by  which, 
in  becoming  man,  he  gave  up  the  independent  exercise  of  the  divine  attri- 
butes. ( 6  )  His  submission  to  the  common  laws  which  regulate  the  origin 
of  souls  from  a  preexisting  sinful  stock,  in  taking  his  human  nature  from 
the  Virgin, — a  human  nature  which  only  the  miraculous  conception  ren- 
dered pure.  (  c  )  His  subjection  to  the  limitations  involved  in  a  human 
growth  and  development, — reaching  the  consciousness  of  hissonship  at  his 
twelfth  year,  and  working  no  miracles  till  after  the  baptism,  (d)  The 
subordination  of  himself,  in  state,  knowledge,  teaching,  and  acts,  to  the 
control  of  the  Holy  Spirit, — so  living,  not  independently,  but  as  a  servant. 
( e )  His  subjection,  as  connected  with  a  sinful  race,  to  temptation  and  suf- 
fering, and  finally  to  the  death  which  constituted  the  penalty  of  the  law. 

II.    THE  STATE  OF  EXALTATION. 

1.  The  nature  of  this  exaltation. 

It  consisted  essentially  in :  (  a  )  A  resumption,  on  the  part  of  the  Logos, 
of  his  independent  exercise  of  divine  attributes.  (  b )  The  withdrawal,  on 
the  part  of  the  Logos,  of  all  limitations  in  his  communication  of  the  divine 
fulness  to  the  human  nature  of  Christ.  ( c  )  The  corresponding  exercise, 
on  the  part  of  the  human  nature,  of  those  powers  which  belonged  to  it  by 
virtue  of  its  union  with  the  divine. 

2.  The  stages  of  Christ's  exaltation. 
(a)    The  quickening  and  resurrection. 

Both  Lutherans  and  Romanists  distinguish  between  these  two,  making 
the  former  precede,  and  the  latter  follow,  Christ's  "preaching  to  the  spir- 
its in  prison. "  These  views  rest  upon  a  misinterpretation  of  1  Pet.  3  : 18- 
20.  Lutherans  teach  that  Christ  descended  into  hell,  to  proclaim  his 
triumph  to  evil  spirits.  But  this  is  to  give  e^pv^ev  the  unusual  sense  of 
proclaiming  his  triumph,  instead  of  his  gospel.  Romanists  teach  that 
Christ  entered  the  underworld  to  preach  to  Old  Testament  saints,  that  they 
might  be  saved.  But  the  passage  speaks  only  of  the  disobedient ;  it  can- 
not be  pressed  into  the  support  of  a  sacramental  theory  of  the  salvation  of 
Old  Testament  believers.  The  passage  does  not  assert  the  descent  of  Christ 
into  the  world  of  spirits,  but  only  a  work  of  the  preincarnate  Logos  in 
offering  salvation,  through  Noah,  to  the  world  then  about  to  perish. 

( 6 )    The  ascension  and  sitting  at  the  right  hand  of  God. 
As  the  resurrection  proclaimed  Christ  to  men  as  the  perfected  and  glori- 
fied man,  the  conqueror  of  sin  and  lord  of  death,  the  ascension  proclaimed 


THE   PROPHETIC   OFFICE   OF   CHRIST.  191 

him  to  the  universe  as  the  reinstated  God,  the  possessor  of  universal 
dominion,  the  omnipresent  object  of  worship  and  hearer  of  prayer.  Dex- 
tra  Dei  ubique  est. 


SECTION  IV.— THE   OFFICES   OF    CHRIST. 

The  Scriptures  represent  Christ's  offices  as  three  in  number,— prophetic, 
priestly,  and  kingly.  Although  these  terms  are  derived  from  concrete 
human  relations,  they  express  perfectly  distinct  ideas.  The  prophet,  the 
priest,  and  the  king,  of  the  Old  Testament,  were  detached  but  designed 
prefigurations  of  him  who  should  combine  all  these  various  activities  in 
himself,  and  should  furnish  the  ideal  reality,  of  which  they  were  the 
imperfect  symbols. 

I.    THE  PBOPHETIO  OFFICE  OF  CHBIST. 

1.  The  nature  of  Christ's  prophetic  work. 

(a)  Here  we  must  avoid  the  narrow  interpretation  which  would  make 
the  prophet  a  mere  foreteller  of  future  events.  He  was  rather  an  inspired 
interpreter  or  revealer  of  the  divine  will,  a  medium  of  communication 
between  God  and  men  ( irpofr/Tw  =  not  foreteller,  but  forteller,  or  f  orth- 
teller.  Cf.  Gen.  20  :  7,—  of  Abraham  ;  Ps.  105  : 15,— of  the  patriarchs  ; 
Mat.  11 :  9,— of  John  the  Baptist ;  1  Cor.  12  :  28,  Eph.  2  :  20,  and  3  :  5,— 
of  N.  T.  expounders  of  Scripture). 

(  6  )  The  prophet  commonly  united  three  methods  of  fulfilling  his  office, 
— those  of  teaching,  predicting,  and  miracle-working.  In  all  these  respects, 
Jesus  Christ  did  the  work  of  a  prophet  (  Deut.  18  : 15  ;  cf.  Acts  3  :  22  ; 
Mat.  13  :57;  Luke  13  : 33 ;  John  6  :14).  He  taught  (Mat.  5-7),  he 
uttered  predictions  (Mat.  24  and  25  ),  he  wrought  miracles  (  Mat.  8  and  9  ), 
while  in  his  person,  his  life,  his  work,  and  his  death,  he  revealed  the  Father 
(JohnS  :26;  14  :9;  17  :  8  ). 

2.  The  stages  of  Christ's  prophetic  work. 
These  are  four,  namely: 

(  a )  The  preparatory  work  of  the  Logos,  in  enlightening  mankind  before 
the  time  of  Christ's  advent  in  the  flesh.  —  All  preliminary  religious  knowl- 
edge, whether  within  or  without  the  bounds  of  the  chosen  people,  is  from 
Christ,  the  revealer  of  God. 

(  b  )  The  earthly  ministry  of  Christ  incarnate.  —  In  his  earthly  ministry, 
Christ  showed  himself  the  prophet  par  excellence.  While  he  submitted, 
like  the  Old  Testament  prophets,  to  the  direction  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  unlike 
them,  he  found  the  sources  of  all  knowledge  and  power  within  himself. 
The  word  of  God  did  not  come  to  him,  —  he  was  himself  the  Word. 

(  c )  The  guidance  and  teaching  of  his  church  on  earth,  since  his  ascen- 
sion.—  Christ's  prophetic  activity  is  continued  through  the  preaching  of 
his  apostles  and  ministers,  and  by  the  enlightening  influences  of  his  Holy 


192  SOTEEIOLOGY,   OE  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SALVATION. 

Spirit  (  John  16  : 12-14  ;  Acts  1:1).  The  apostles  unfolded  the  germs  of 
doctrine  put  into  their  hands  by  Christ.  The  church  is,  in  a  derivative 
sense,  a  prophetic  institution,  established  to  teach  the  world  by  its  preach- 
ing and  its  ordinances.  But  Christians  are  prophets,  only  as  being  pro- 
claimers  of  Christ's  teaching  ( Num.  11  :  29  ;  Joel  2  : 28  ). 

( d  )  Christ's  final  revelation  of  the  Father  to  his  saints  in  glory  (  John 
16 : 25 ;  17  : 24,  26  ;  cf.  Is.  64  : 4  ;  1  Cor.  13  : 12 ).— Thus  Christ's  prophetic 
work  will  be  an  endless  one,  as  the  Father  whom  he  reveals  is  infinite. 

II.    THE  PBIESTLY  OFFICE  OF  CHRIST. 

The  priest  was  a  person  divinely  appointed  to  transact  with  God  on 
man's  behalf.  He  fulfilled  his  office,  first  by  offering  sacrifice,  and  secondly 
by  making  intercession.  In  both  these  respects  Christ  is  priest. 

1.     Christ's  Sacrificial  Work,  or  the  Doctrine  of  the  Atonement. 

The  Scriptures  teach  that  Christ  obeyed  and  suffered  in  our  stead,  to 
satisfy  an  immanent  demand  of  the  divine  holiness,  and  thus  remove  an 
obstacle  in  the  divine  mind  to  the  pardon  and  restoration  of  the  guilty. 
This  statement  may  be  expanded  and  explained  in  a  preliminary  way  as 
follows :  — 

(  a )  The  fundamental  attribute  of  God  is  holiness,  and  holiness  is  not 
self-communicating  love,  but  self -affirming  righteousness.  Holiness  limits 
and  conditions  love,  for  love  can  will  happiness  only  as  happiness  results 
from  or  consists  with  righteousness,  that  is,  with  conformity  to  God. 

(  b )  The  universe  is  a  reflection  of  God,  and  Christ  the  Logos  is  its  life. 
God  has  constituted  the  universe,  and  humanity  as  a  part  of  it,  so  as  to 
express  his  holiness,  positively  by  connecting  happiness  with  righteous- 
ness, negatively  by  attaching  unhappiness  or  suffering  to  sin. 

(c)  Christ  the  Logos,  as  the  Bevealer  of  God  in  the  universe  and  in 
humanity,  must  condemn  sin  by  visiting  upon  it  the  suffering  which  is  its 
penalty  ;  while  at  the  same  time,  as  the  Life  of  humanity,  he  must  endure 
the  reaction  of  God's  holiness  against  sin  which  constitutes  that  penalty. 

( d )  Our  personality  is  not  self-contained.     We  live,  move,  and  have  our 
being  naturally  in  Christ  the  Logos.     Our  reason,  affection,  conscience, 
and  will  are  complete  only  in  him.     He  is  generic  humanity,  of  which  we 
are  the  offshoots.     When  his  righteousness  condemns  sin,  and  his  love  vol- 
untarily endures  the  suffering  which  is  sin's  penalty,  humanity  ratifies  the 
judgment  of  God,  makes  full  propitiation  for  sin,  and  satisfies  the  demands 
of  holiness. 

(  e  )  While  Christ's  love  explains  his  willingness  to  endure  suffering  for 
us,  only  his  holiness  furnishes  the  reason  for  that  constitution  of  the  uni- 
verse and  of  human  nature  which  makes  this  suffering  necessary.  As 
respects  us,  his  sufferings  are  substitutionary,  since  his  divinity  and  his 
sinlessness  enable  him  to  do  for  us  what  we  could  never  do  for  ourselves. 
Yet  this  substitution  is  also  a  sharing  —  not  the  work  of  one  external  to  us, 
but  of  one  who  is  the  life  of  humanity,  the  soul  of  our  soul  and  the  life  of 
our  life,  and  so  responsible  with  us  for  the  sins  of  the  race. 


THE   PRIESTLY   OFFICE   OF  CHRIST.  193 

(/)  The  historical  work  of  the  incarnate  Christ  is  not  itself  the  atone- 
ment,—  it  is  rather  the  revelation  of  the  atonement.  The  suffering  of  the 
incarnate  Christ  is  the  manifestation  in  space  and  time  of  the  eternal  suf- 
fering of  God  on  account  of  human  sin.  Yet  without  the  historical 
work  which  was  finished  on  Calvary,  the  age-long  suffering  of  God  could 
never  have  been  made  comprehensible  to  men. 

( g )  The  historical  sacrifice  of  our  Lord  is  not  only  the  final  revelation 
of  the  heart  of  God,  but  also  the  manifestation  of  the  law  of  universal  life 
—  the  law  that  sin  brings  suffering  to  all  connected  with  it,  and  that  we 
can  overcome  sin  in  ourselves  and  in  the  world  only  by  entering  into  the 
fellowship  of  Christ's  sufferings  and  Christ's  victory,  or,  in  other  words, 
only  by  union  with  him  through  faith. 

A.     Scripture  Methods  of  Representing  the  Atonement. 
We  may  classify  the  Scripture  representations  according  as  they  conform 
to  moral,  commercial,  legal  or  sacrificial  analogies. 

( a  )    MORAL.  —  The  atonement  is  described  as 

A  provision  originating  in  God's  love,  and  manifesting  this  love  to  the 
universe ;  but  also  as  an  example  of  disinterested  love,  to  secure  our 
deliverance  from  selfishness. — In  these  latter  passages,  Christ's  death  is 
referred  to  as  a  source  of  moral  stimulus  to  men. 

(  6  )    COMMERCIAL.  —  The  atonement  is  described  as 

A  ransom,  paid  to  free  us  from  the  bondage  of  sin  (  note  in  these  pas- 
sages the  use  of  avrit  the  preposition  of  price,  bargain,  exchange). — In 
these  passages,  Christ's  death  is  represented  as  the  price  of  our  deliverance 
from  sin  and  death. 

(  c )    LEGAL.  —  The  atonement  is  described  as 

An  act  of  obedience  to  the  law  which  sinners  had  violated  ;  a  penalty, 
borne  in  order  to  rescue  the  guilty  ;  and  an  exhibition  of  God's  righteous- 
ness, necessary  to  the  vindication  of  his  procedure  in  the  pardon  and  resto- 
ration of  sinners. — In  these  passages  the  death  of  Christ  is  represented 
as  demanded  by  God's  law  and  government. 

(  d  )    SACRIFICIAL.  —  The  atonement  is  described  as 

A  work  of  priestly  mediation,  which  reconciles  God  to  men,  —  notice 
here  that  the  term  *  reconciliation '  has  its  usual  sense  of  removing  enmity, 
not  from  the  offending,  but  from  the  offended  party  ;  —  &  sin-offering,  pre- 
sented on  behalf  of  transgressors ;  —  a  propitiation,  which  satisfies  the 
demands  of  violated  holiness;  —  and  a  substitution,  of  Christ's  obedience 
and  sufferings  for  ours.  —  These  passages,  taken  together,  show  that 
Christ's  death  is  demanded  by  God's  attribute  of  justice,  or  holiness,  if  sin- 
ners are  to  be  saved. 

An  examination  of  the  passages  referred  to  shows  that,  while  the  forms 
in  which  the  atoning  work  ©f  Christ  is  described  are  in  part  derived  from 
moral,  commercial,  and  legal  relations,  the  prevailing  language  is  that  of 
sacrifice.  A  correct  view  of  the  atonement  must  therefore  be  grounded 
upon  a  proper  interpretation  of  the  institution  of  sacrifice,  especially  as 
found  in  the  Mosaic  system. 


194  SOTERIOLOGY,   OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALVATION. 

B.  The  Institution  of  Sacrifice,  more  especially  as  found  in  the  Mosaic 
system. 

(  a )  We  may  dismiss  as  untenable,  on  the  one  hand,  the  theory  that 
sacrifice  is  essentially  the  presentation  of  a  gift  (  Hofmann,  Baring-Gould ) 
or  a  feast  (  Spencer  )  to  the  Deity ;  and  on  the  other  hand  the  theory  that 
sacrifice  is  a  symbol  of  renewed  fellowship  (  Keil ),  or  of  the  grateful  offer- 
ing to  God  of  the  whole  life  and  being  of  the  worshiper  (  Bahr  ).  Neither 
of  these  theories  can  explain  the  fact  that  the  sacrifice  is  a  bloody  offering, 
involving  the  suffering  and  death  of  the  victim,  and  brought,  not  by  the 
simply  grateful,  but  by  the  conscience-stricken  soul. 

(  b  )  The  true  import  of  the  sacrifice,  as  is  abundantly  evident  from  both 
heathen  and  Jewish  sources,  embraced  three  elements, —  first,  that  of  satis- 
faction to  offended  Deity,  or  propitiation  offered  to  violated  holiness ;  sec- 
ondly, that  of  substitution  of  suffering  and  death  on  the  part  of  the  innocent, 
for  the  deserved  punishment  of  the  guilty  ;  and,  thirdly,  community  of  life 
between  the  offerer  and  the  victim.  Combining  these  three  ideas,  we  have 
as  the  total  import  of  the  sacrifice :  Satisfaction  by  substitution,  and 
substitution  by  incorporation.  The  bloody  sacrifice  among  the  heathen 
expressed  the  consciousness  that  sin  involves  guilt ;  that  guilt  exposes  man 
to  the  righteous  wrath  of  God ;  that  without  expiation  of  that  guilt  there 
is  no  forgiveness ;  and  that  through  the  suffering  of  another  who  shares  his 
life  the  sinner  may  expiate  his  sin. 

(  c )  In  considering  the  exact  purport  and  efficacy  of  the  Mosaic  sacri- 
fices, we  must  distinguish  between  their  theocratical,  and  their  spiritual, 
offices.  They  were,  on  the  one  hand,  the  appointed  means  whereby  the 
offender  could  be  restored  to  the  outward  place  and  privileges,  as  member 
of  the  theocracy,  which  he  had  forfeited  by  neglect  or  transgression  ;  and 
they  accomplished  this  purpose  irrespectively  of  the  temper  and  spirit 
with  which  they  were  offered.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were  symbolic  of 
the  vicarious  sufferings  and  death  of  Christ,  and  obtained  forgiveness  and 
acceptance  with  God  only  as  they  were  offered  in  true  penitence,  and 
with  faith  in  God's  method  of  salvation. 

(  d  )  Thus  the  Old  Testament  sacrifices,  when  rightly  offered,  involved  a 
consciousness  of  sin  on  the  part  of  the  worshiper,  the  bringing  of  a  victim 
to  atone  for  the  sin,  the  laying  of  the  hand  of  the  offerer  upon  the  victim's 
head,  the  confession  of  sin  by  the  offerer,  the  slaying  of  the  beast,  the 
sprinkling  or  pouring-out  of  the  blood  upon  the  altar,  and  the  consequent 
forgiveness  of  the  sin  and  acceptance  of  the  worshiper.  The  sin-offering 
and  the  scape-goat  of  the  great  day  of  atonement  symbolized  yet  more  dis- 
tinctly the  two  elementary  ideas  of  sacrifice,  namely,  satisfaction  and  sub- 
stitution, together  with  the  consequent  removal  of  guilt  from  those  on 
whose  behalf  the  sacrifice  was  offered. 

( e )  It  is  not  essential  to  this  view  to  maintain  that  a  formal  divine  insti- 
tution of  the  rite  of  sacrifice,  at  man's  expulsion  from  Eden,  can  be  proved 
from  Scripture.  Like  the  family  and  the  state,  sacrifice  may,  without  such 
formal  inculcation,  possess  divine  sanction,  and  be  ordained  of  God.  The 
well-nigh  universal  prevalence  of  sacrifice,  however,  together  with  the  fact 


SOCINIAN  THEORY  OF  THE  ATONEMENT.  195 

that  its  nature,  as  a  bloody  offering,  seems  to  preclude  man's  own  invention 
of  it,  combines  with  certain  Scripture  intimations  to  favor  the  view  that  it 
was  a  primitive  divine  appointment.  From  the  time  of  Moses,  there  can 
be  no  question  as  to  its  divine  authority. 

(/)  The  New  Testament  assumes  and  presupposes  the  Old  Testament 
doctrine  of  sacrifice.  The  sacrificial  language  in  which  its  descriptions  of 
Christ's  work  are  clothed  cannot  be  explained  as  an  accommodation  to 
Jewish  methods  of  thought,  since  this  terminology  was  in  large  part  in 
common  use  among  the  heathen,  and  Paul  used  it  more  than  any  other  of 
the  apostles  in  dealing  with  the  Gentiles.  To  deny  to  it  its  Old  Testament 
meaning,  when  used  by  New  Testament  writers  to  describe  the  work  of 
Christ,  is  to  deny  any  proper  inspiration  both  in  the  Mosaic  appointment 
of  sacrifices  and  in  the  apostolic  interpretations  of  them.  We  must  there- 
fore maintain,  as  the  result  of  a  simple  induction  of  Scripture  facts,  that 
the  death  of  Christ  is  a  vicarious  offering,  provided  by  God's  love  for  the 
purpose  of  satisfying  an  internal  demand  of  the  divine  holiness,  and  of 
removing  an  obstacle  in  the  divine  mind  to  the  renewal  and  pardon  of 
sinners. 

C.    Theories  of  the  Atonement. 

1st.    The  Socinian,  or  Example  Theory  of  the  Atonement. 

This  theory  holds  that  subjective  sinfulness  is  the  sole  barrier  between 
man  and  God.  Not  God,  but  only  man,  needs  to  be  reconciled.  The  only 
method  of  reconciliation  is  to  better  man's  moral  condition.  This  can  be 
effected  by  man's  own  will,  through  repentance  and  reformation.  The 
death  of  Christ  is  but  the  death  of  a  noble  martyr.  He  redeems  us,  only 
as  his  human  example  of  faithfulness  to  truth  and  duty  has  a  powerful 
influence  upon  our  moral  improvement.  This  fact  the  apostles,  either 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  clothed  in  the  language  of  the  Greek  and 
Jewish  sacrifices.  This  theory  was  fully  elaborated  by  Laelius  Socinus  and 
Faustus  Socinus  of  Poland,  in  the  16th  century.  Its  modern  advocates 
are  found  in  the  Unitarian  body. 

To  this  theory  we  make  the  following  objections : 

(a)  It  is  based  upon  false  philosophical  principles, —  as,  for  example,  that 
will  is  merely  the  faculty  of  volitions ;  that  the  foundation  of  virtue  is  in 
utility  ;  that  law  is  an  expression  of  arbitrary  will ;  that  penalty  is  a  means 
of  reforming  the  offender ;  that  righteousness,  in  either  God  or  man,  is 
only  a  manifestation  of  benevolence. 

( 6 )  It  is  a  natural  outgrowth  from  the  Pelagian  view  of  sin,  and  logi- 
cally necessitates  a  curtailment  or  surrender  of  every  other  characteristic 
doctrine  of  Christianity — inspiration,  sin,  the  deity  of  Christ,  justification, 
regeneration,  and  eternal  retribution. 

(  c  )  It  contradicts  the  Scripture  teachings,  that  sin  involves  objective 
guilt  as  well  as  subjective  defilement ;  that  the  holiness  of  God  must  punish 
sin  ;  that  the  atonement  was  a  bearing  of  the  punishment  of  sin  for  men  ; 
and  that  this  vicarious  bearing  of  punishment  was  necessary,  on  the  part  of 
God,  to  make  possible  the  showing  of  favor  to  the  guilty. 


196  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALVATION". 

(  d  )  It  furnishes  no  proper  explanation  of  the  sufferings  and  death  of 
Christ.  The  unmartyrlike  anguish  cannot  be  accounted  for,  and  the  for- 
saking by  the  Father  cannot  be  justified,  upon  the  hypothesis  that  Christ 
died  as  a  mere  witness  to  truth.  If  Christ's  sufferings  were  not  propitia- 
tory, they  neither  furnish  us  with  a  perfect  example,  nor  constitute  a  mani- 
festation of  the  love  of  God. 

(  e  )  The  influence  of  Christ's  example  is  neither  declared  in  Scripture, 
nor  found  in  Christian  experience,  to  be  the  chief  result  secured  by  his 
death.  Mere  example  is  but  a  new  preaching  of  the  law,  which  repels  and 
condemns.  The  cross  has  power  to  lead  men  to  holiness,  only  as  it  first 
shows  a  satisfaction  made  for  their  sins.  Accordingly,  most  of  the  passages 
which  represent  Christ  as  an  example  also  contain  references  to  his  propi- 
tiatory work. 

(/)  This  theory  contradicts  the  whole  tenor  of  the  New  Testament,  in 
making  the  life,  and  not  the  death,  of  Christ  the  most  significant  and 
important  feature  of  his  work.  The  constant  allusions  to  the  death  of 
Christ  as  the  source  of  our  salvation,  as  well  as  the  symbolism  of  the  ordi- 
nances, cannot  be  explained  upon  a  theory  which  regards  Christ  as  a  mere 
example,  and  considers  his  sufferings  as  incidents,  rather  than  essentials, 
of  his  work. 

4$ 

2nd.    The  Bushnellian,  or  Moral  Influence  Theory  of  the  Atonement. 

This  holds,  like  the  Socinian,  that  there  is  no  principle  of  the  divine 
nature  which  is  propitiated  by  Christ's  death;  but  that  this  death  is  a  mani- 
festation of  the  love  of  God,  suffering  in  and  with  the  sins  of  his  creatures. 
Christ's  atonement,  therefore,  is  the  merely  natural  consequence  of  his 
taking  human  nature  upon  him ;  and  is  a  suffering,  not  of  penalty  in  man's 
stead,  but  of  the  combined  woes  and  griefs  which  the  living  of  a  human 
life  involves.  This  atonement  has  effect,  not  to  satisfy  divine  justice,  but 
so  to  reveal  divine  love  as  to  soften  human  hearts  and  to  lead  them  to 
repentance  ;  in  other  words,  Christ's  sufferings  were  necessary,  not  in  order 
to  remove  an  obstacle  to  the  pardon  of  sinners  which  exists  in  the  mind  of 
God,  but  in  order  to  convince  sinners  that  there  exists  no  such  obsta- 
cle. This  theory,  for  substance,  has  been  advocated  by  Bushnell,  in 
America  ;  by  Robertson,  Maurice,  Campbell,  and  Young,  in  Great  Britain ; 
by  Schleiermacher  and  Bitschl,  in  Germany. 

To  this  theory  we  object  as  follows  : 

(a)  While  it  embraces  a  valuable  element  of  truth,  namely,  the  moral 
influence  upon  men  of  the  sufferings  of  the  God-man,  it  is  false  by  defect, 
in  that  it  substitutes  a  subordinate  effect  of  the  atonement  for  its  chief  aim, 
and  yet  unfairly  appropriates  the  name  'vicarious,'  which  belongs  only  to 
the  latter.  Suffering  with  the  sinner  is  by  no  means  suffering  in  his  stead. 

(6)  It  rests  upon  false  philosophical  principles,  — as,  that  righteousness 
is  identical  with  benevolence,  instead  of  conditioning  it ;  that  God  is  sub- 
ject to  an  eternal  law  of  love,  instead  of  being  himself  the  source  of  all  law; 
that  the  aim  of  penalty  is  the  reformation  of  the  offender. 

(  c )  The  theory  furnishes  no  proper  reason  for  Christ's  suffering.  While 
it  shows  that  the  Savior  necessarily  suffers  from  his  contact  with  human 


GROTIAN   THEORY   OF  THE   ATONEMENT.  197 

sin  and  sorrow,  it  gives  no  explanation  of  that  constitution  of  the  universe 
which  makes  suffering  the  consequence  of  sin,  not  only  to  the  sinner,  but 
also  to  the  innocent  being  who  comes  into  connection  with  sin.  The  holi- 
ness of  God,  which  is  manifested  in  this  constitution  of  things  and  which 
requires  this  atonement,  is  entirely  ignored. 

(  d )  It  contradicts  the  plain  teachings  of  Scripture,  that  the  atonement 
is  necessary,  not  simply  to  reveal  God's  love,  but  to  satisfy  his  justice  ; 
that  Christ's  sufferings  are  propitiatory  and  penal ;  and  that  the  human 
conscience  needs  to  be  propitiated  by  Christ's  sacrifice,  before  it  can  feel 
the  moral  influence  of  his  sufferings. 

(e  )  It  can  be  maintained,  only  by  wresting  from  their  obvious  meaning 
those  passages  of  Scripture  which  speak  of  Christ  as  suffering  for  our  sins  ; 
which  represent  his  blood  as  accomplishing  something  for  us  in  heaven, 
when  presented  there  by  our  intercessor  ;  which  declare  forgiveness  to  be  a 
remitting  of  past  offences  upon  the  ground  of  Christ's  death  ;  and  which 
describe  justification  as  a  pronouncing,  not  a  making,  just. 

(/)  This  theory  confounds  God's  method  of  saving  men  with  men's 
experience  of  being  saved.  It  makes  the  atonement  itself  consist  of  its 
effects  in  the  believer's  union  with  Christ  and  the  purifying  influence  of 
that  union  upon  the  character  and  life. 

(  g  )  This  theory  would  confine  the  influence  of  the  atonement  to  those 
who  have  heard  of  it, — thus  excluding  patriarchs  and  heathen.  But  the 
Scriptures  represent  Christ  as  being  the  Savior  of  all  men,  in  the  sense  of 
securing  them  grace,  which,  but  for  his  atoning  work,  could  never  have 
been  bestowed  consistently  with  the  divine  holiness. 

3d.     The  Grotian,  or  Governmental  Theory  of  the  Atonement. 

This  theory  holds  that  the  atonement  is  a  satisfaction,  not  to  any  inter- 
nal principle  of  the  divine  nature,  but  to  the  necessities  of  government. 
God's  government  of  the  universe  cannot  be  maintained,  nor  can  the 
divine  law  preserve  its  authority  over  its  subjects,  unless  the  pardon  of 
offenders  is  accompanied  by  some  exhibition  of  the  high  estimate  which 
God  sets  upon  his  law,  and  the  heinous  guilt  of  violating  it.  Such  an 
exhibition  of  divine  regard  for  the  law  is  furnished  in  the  sufferings  and 
death  of  Christ.  Christ  does  not  suffer  the  precise  penalty  of  the  law,  but 
God  graciously  accepts  his  suffering  as  a  substitute  for  the  penalty.  This 
bearing  of  substituted  suffering  on  the  part  of  Christ  gives  the  divine  law 
such  hold  upon  the  consciences  and  hearts  of  men,  that  God  can  pardon 
the  guilty  upon  their  repentance,  without  detriment  to  the  interests  of  his 
government.  The  author  of  this  theory  was  Hugo  Grotius,  the  Dutch  jur- 
ist and  theologian  (  1583-1645  ).  The  theory  is  characteristic  of  the  New 
England  theology,  and  is  generally  held  by  those  who  accept  the  New 
School  view  of  sin. 

To  this  theory  we  urge  the  following  objections  : 

(  a  )  While  it  contains  a  valuable  element  of  truth,  namely,  that  the  suf- 
ferings and  death  of  Christ  secure  the  interests  of  God's  government,  it  is 
false  by  defect,  in  substituting  for  the  chief  aim  of  the  atonement  one 
which  is  only  subordinate  and  incidental. 


198  SOTERIOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRIKE   OF   SALVATION. 

(  6 )  It  rests  upon  false  philosophical  principles,  —  as,  that  utility  is  the 
ground  of  moral  obligation  ;  that  law  is  an  expression  of  the  will,  rather 
than  of  the  nature,  of  God  ;  that  the  aim  of  penalty  is  to  deter  from  the  com- 
mission of  offences  ;  and  that  righteousness  is  resolvable  into  benevolence. 

(  c  )  It  ignores  and  virtually  denies  that  immanent  holiness  of  God  of 
which  the  law  with  its  threatened  penalties,  and  the  human  conscience 
with  its  demand  for  punishment,  are  only  finite  reflections.  There  is  some- 
thing back  of  government ;  if  the  atonement  satisfies  government,  it  must 
be  by  satisfying  that  justice  of  God  of  which  government  is  an  expression. 

(  e  )  The  intensity  of  Christ's  sufferings  in  the  garden  and  on  the  cros  s 
is  inexplicable  upon  the  theory  that  the  atonement  was  a  histrionic  exhibi- 
tion of  God's  regard  for  his  government,  and  can  be  explained  only  upon 
the  view  that  Christ  actually  endured  the  wrath  of  God  against  human  sin. 

(  d  )  It  makes  that  to  be  an  exhibition  of  justice  which  is  not  an  exercise 
of  justice  ;  the  atonement  being,  according  to  this  theory,  not  an  execution 
of  law,  but  an  exhibition  of  regard  for  law,  which  will  make  it  safe  to  par- 
don the  violators  of  law.  Such  a  merely  scenic  representation  can  inspire 
respect  for  law,  only  so  long  as  the  essential  unreality  of  it  is  unsuspected. 

(/)  The  actual  power  of  the  atonement  over  the  human  conscience  and 
heart  is  due,  not  to  its  exhibiting  God's  regard  for  law,  but  to  its  exhibit- 
ing an  actual  execution  of  law,  and  an  actual  satisfaction  of  violated 
holiness  made  by  Christ  in  the  sinner's  stead. 

(g)  The  theory  contradicts  all  those  passages  of  Scripture  which  repre- 
sent the  atonement  as  necessary ;  as  propitiating  God  himself  ;  as  being  a 
revelation  of  God's  righteousness  ;  as  being  an  execution  of  the  penalty  of 
the  law ;  as  making  salvation  a  matter  of  debt  to  the  believer,  on  the  ground 
of  what  Christ  has  done  ;  as  actually  purging  our  sins,  instead  of  making 
that  purging  possible ;  as  not  simply  assuring  the  sinner  that  God  may 
now  pardon  him  on  account  of  what  Christ  has  done,  but  that  Christ  has 
actually  wrought  out  a  complete  salvation,  and  will  bestow  it  upon  all  who 
come  to  him. 

4th.  The  Irvingian  Theory,  or  Theory  of  Gradually  Extirpated  De- 
pravity. 

This  holds  that,  in  his  incarnation,  Christ  took  human  nature  as  it  was 
in  Adam,  not  before  the  Fall,  but  after  the  Fall, — human  nature,  therefore, 
with  its  inborn  corruption  and  predisposition  to  moral  evil ;  that,  notwith- 
standing the  possession  of  this  tainted  and  depraved  nature,  Christ,  through 
the  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  or  of  his  divine  nature,  not  only  kept  his 
human  nature  from  manifesting  itself  in  any  actual  or  personal  sin,  but 
gradually  purified  it,  through  struggle  and  suffering,  until  in  his  death  he 
completely  extirpated  its  original  depravity,  and  reunited  it  to  God.  This 
subjective  purification  of  human  nature  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ  con- 
stitutes his  atonement,  and  men  are  saved,  not  by  any  objective  propitiation, 
but  only  by  becoming  through  faith  partakers  of  Christ's  new  humanity. 
This  theory  was  elaborated  by  Edward  Irving,  of  London  ( 1792-1834  ),  and 
it  has  been  held,  in  substance,  by  Menken  and  Dippel  in  Germany. 


ANSELMIC  THEORY  OF  THE  ATONEMENT.  199 

To  this  theory  we  offer  the  following  objections : 

(  a )  While  it  embraces  an  important  element  of  truth,  namely,  the  fact 
of  a  new  humanity  in  Christ  of  which  all  believers  become  partakers,  it  is 
chargeable  with  serious  error  in  denying  the  objective  atonement  which 
makes  the  subjective  application  possible. 

( b  )  It  rests  upon  false  fundamental  principles, —  as,  that  law  is  identical 
with  the  natural  order  of  the  universe,  and  as  such,  is  an  exhaustive  expres- 
sion of  the  will  and  nature  of  God ;  that  sin  is  merely  a  power  of  moral  evil 
within  the  soul,  instead  of  also  involving  an  objective  guilt  and  desert  of 
punishment ;  that  penalty  is  the  mere  reaction  of  law  against  the  trans- 
gressor, instead  of  being  also  the  revelation  of  a  personal  wrath  against 
sin  ;  that  the  evil  taint  of  human  nature  can  be  extirpated  by  suffering  its 
natural  consequences, — penalty  in  this  way  reforming  the  transgressor. 

( c  )  It  contradicts  the  express  and  implicit  representations  of  Scripture, 
with  regard  to  Christ's  freedom  from  all  taint  of  hereditary  depravity  ;  mis- 
represents his  life  as  a  growing  consciousness  of  the  underlying  corruption 
of  his  human  nature,  which  culminated  at  Gethsemane  and  Calvary  ;  and 
denies  the  truth  of  his  own  statements,  when  it  declares  that  he  must  have 
died  on  account  of  his  own  depravity,  even  though  none  were  to  be  saved 
thereby. 

(d)  It  makes  the  active  obedience  of  Christ,  and  the  subjective  purifi- 
cation of  his  human  nature,  to  be  the  chief  features  of  his  work,  while  the 
Scriptures  make  his  death  and  passive  bearing  of  penalty  the  centre  of 
all,  and  ever  regard  him  as  one  who  is  personally  pure  and  who  vicariously 
bears  the  punishment  of  the  guilty. 

(e)  It  necessitates  the  surrender  of  the  doctrine  of  justification  as  a 
merely  declaratory  act  of  God  ;  and  requires  such  a  view  of  the  divine  holi- 
ness, expressed  only  through  the  order  of  nature,  as  can  be  maintained 
only  upon  principles  of  pantheism. 

5th.    The  Anselmic,  or  Commercial  Theory  of  the  Atonement. 

This  theory  holds  that  sin  is  a  violation  of  the  divine  honor  or  majesty, 
and,  as  committed  against  an  infinite  being,  deserves  an  infinite  punish- 
ment ;  that  the  majesty  of  God  requires  him  to  execute  punishment,  while 
the  love  of  God  pleads  for  the  sparing  of  the  guilty  ;  that  this  conflict  of 
divine  attributes  is  eternally  reconciled  by  the  voluntary  sacrifice  of  the 
God-man,  who  bears  in  virtue  of  the  dignity  of  his  person  the  intensively 
infinite  punishment  of  sin,  which  must  otherwise  have  been  suffered  exten- 
sively and  eternally  by  sinners ;  that  this  suffering  of  the  God-man  presents 
to  the  divine  majesty  an  exact  equivalent  for  the  deserved  sufferings  of  the 
elect ;  and  that,  as  the  result  of  this  satisfaction  of  the  divine  claims,  the 
elect  sinners  are  pardoned  and  regenerated.  This  view  was  first  broached 
by  Anselm  of  Canterbury  ( 1033-1109)  as  a  substitute  for  the  earlier  patris- 
tic view  that  Christ's  death  was  a  ransom  paid  to  Satan,  to  deliver  sinners 
from  his  power.  It  is  held  by  many  Scotch  theologians,  and,  in  this 
country,  by  the  Princeton  School. 


200  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATIOK. 

To  this  theory  we  make  the  following  objections  : 

( a  )  While  it  contains  a  valuable  element  of  truth,  in  its  representation 
of  the  atonement  as  satisfying  a  principle  of  the  divine  nature,  it  conceives 
of  this  principle  in  too  formal  and  external  a  manner, — making  the  idea  of 
the  divine  honor  or  majesty  more  prominent  than  that  of  the  divine  holi- 
ness, in  which  the  divine  honor  and  majesty  are  grounded. 

(  b  )  In  its  eagerness  to  maintain  the  atoning  efficacy  of  Christ's  passive 
obedience,  the  active  obedience,  quite  as  clearly  expressed  in  Scripture,  is 
insufficiently  emphasized  and  well  nigh  lost  sight  of. 

(  c  )  It  allows  disproportionate  weight  to  those  passages  of  Scripture 
which  represent  the  atonement  under  commercial  analogies,  as  the  pay- 
ment of  a  debt  or  ransom,  to  the  exclusion  of  those  which  describe  it 
as  an  ethical  fact,  whose  value  is  to  be  estimated  not  quantitatively,  but 
qualitatively. 

(  d  )  It  represents  the  atonement  as  having  reference  only  to  the  elect, 
and  ignores  the  Scripture  declarations  that  Christ  died  for  all. 

(  e  )  It  is  defective  in  holding  to  a  merely  external  transfer  of  the  merit 
of  Christ's  work,  while  it  does  not  clearly  state  the  internal  ground  of  that 
transfer,  in  the  union  of  the  believer  with  Christ. 

6th.    The  Ethical  Theory  of  the  Atonement. 

In  propounding  what  we  conceive  to  be  the  true  theory  of  the  atone- 
ment, it  seems  desirable  to  divide  our  treatment  into  two  parts.  No  theory 
can  be  satisfactory  which  does  not  furnish  a  solution  of  the  two  problems  : 
1.  What  did  the  atonement  accomplish  ?  or,  in  other  words,  what  was  the 
object  of  Christ's  death  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  must  be  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  atonement  in  its  relation  to  holiness  in  God.  2.  What  were  the 
means  used  ?  or,  in  other  words,  how  could  Christ  justly  die  ?  The  answer 
to  this  question  must  be  a  description  of  the  atonement  as  arising  from 
Christ's  relation  to  humanity.  We  take  up  these  two  parts  of  the  subject 
in  order. 

First, —  the  Atonement  as  related  to  Holiness  in  God. 

The  Ethical  theory  holds  that  the  necessity  of  the  atonement  is  grounded 
in  the  holiness  of  God,  of  which  conscience  in  man  is  a  finite  reflection. 
There  is  an  ethical  principle  in  the  divine  nature,  which  demands  that  sin 
shall  be  punished.  Aside  from  its  results,  sin  is  essentially  ill-deserving. 
As  we  who  are  made  in  God's  image  mark  our  growth  in  purity  by  the 
increasing  quickness  with  which  we  detect  impurity,  and  the  increasing 
hatred  which  we  feel  toward  it,  so  infinite  purity  is  a  consuming  fire  to  all 
iniquity.  As  there  is  an  ethical  demand  in  our  natures  that  not  only 
others'  wickedness,  but  our  own  wickedness,  be  visited  with  punishment, 
and  a  keen  conscience  cannot  rest  till  it  has  made  satisfaction  to  justice 
for  its  misdeeds,  so  there  is  an  ethical  demand  of  God's  nature  that  penalty 
follow  sin. 

Punishment  is  the  constitutional  reaction  of  God's  being  against  moral 
evil  —  the  self-assertion  of  infinite  holiness  against  its  antagonist  and 


ETHICAL  THEOIIY   OF  THE   ATONEMENT.  201 

would-be  destroyer.  In  God  this  demand  is  devoid  of  all  passion,  and  is 
consistent  with  infinite  benevolence.  It  is  a  demand  that  cannot  be 
evaded,  since  the  holiness  from  which  it  springs  is  unchanging.  The 
atonement  is  therefore  a  satisfaction  of  the  ethical  demand  of  the  divine 
nature,  by  the  substitution  of  Christ's  penal  sufferings  for  the  punishment 
of  the  guilty. 

This  substitution  is  unknown  to  mere  law,  and  above  and  beyond  the 
powers  of  law.  It  is  an  operation  of  grace.  Grace,  however,  does  not 
violate  or  suspend  law,  but  takes  it  up  into  itself  and  fulfils  it.  The  right- 
eousness of  law  is  maintained,  in  that  the  source  of  all  law,  the  judge  and 
punisher,  himself  voluntarily  submits  to  bear  the  penalty,  and  bears  it  in 
the  human  nature  that  has  sinned. 

Thus  the  atonement  answers  the  ethical  demand  of  the  divine  nature 
that  sin  be  punished  if  the  offender  is  to  go  free.  The  interests  of  the 
divine  government  are  secured  as  a  first  subordinate  result  of  this  satisfac- 
tion to  God  himself,  of  whose  nature  the  government  is  an  expression ; 
while,  as  a  second  subordinate  result,  provision  is  made  for  the  needs  of 
human  nature,  —  on  the  one  hand  the  need  of  an  objective  satisfaction  to 
its  ethical  demand  of  punishment  for  sin,  and  on  the  other  the  need  of  a 
manifestation  of  divine  love  and  mercy  that  will  affect  the  heart  and  move 
it  to  repentance. 

Secondly,  —  the  Atonement  as  related  to  Humanity  in  Christ. 

The  Ethical  Theory  of  the  atonement  holds  that  Christ  stands  in  such 
relation  to  humanity,  that  what  God's  holiness  demands  Christ  is  under 
obligation  to  pay,  longs  to  pay,  inevitably  does  pay,  and  pays  so  fully,  in 
virtue  of  his  two-fold  nature,  that  every  claim  of  justice  is  satisfied,  and 
the  sinner  who  accepts  what  Christ  has  done  in  his  behalf  is  saved. 

We  have  seen  how  God  can  justly  demand  satisfaction ;  we  now  show 
how  Christ  can  justly  make  it ;  or,  in  other  words,  how  the  innocent  can 
justly  suffer  for  the  guilty.  The  solution  of  the  problem  lies  in  Christ's 
union  with  humanity.  The  first  result  of  that  union  is  obligation  to  suffer 
for  men ;  since,  being  one  with  the  race,  Christ  had  a  share  in  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  race  to  the  law  and  the  justice  of  God.  In  him  humanity 
was  created  ;  at  every  stage  of  its  existence  humanity  was  upheld  by  his 
power  ;  as  the  immanent  God  he  was  the  life  of  the  race  and  of  every 
member  of  it.  Christ's  sharing  of  man's  life  justly  and  inevitably  sub- 
jected him  to  man's  exposures  and  liabilities,  and  especially  to  God's 
condemnation  on  account  of  sin. 

Christ's  share  in  the  responsibility  of  the  race  to  the  law  and  justice  of 
God  was  not  destroyed  by  his  incarnation,  nor  by  his  purification  in  the 
womb  of  the  virgin.  In  virtue  of  the  organic  unity  of  the  race,  each  mem- 
ber of  the  race  since  Adam  has  been  born  into  the  same  state  into  which 
Adam  fell.  The  consequences  of  Adam's  sin,  both  to  himself  and  to  his 
posterity,  are  :  ( 1 )  depravity,  or  the  corruption  of  human  nature  ;  ( 2 ) 
guilt,  or  obligation  to  make  satisfaction  for  sin  to  the  divine  holiness ; 
( 3 )  penalty,  or  actual  endurance  of  loss  or  suffering  visited  by  that  holi- 
ness upon  the  guilty. 


202  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  SALVATION". 

If  Christ  had  been  born  into  the  world  by  ordinary  generation,  he  too 
would  have  had  depravity,  guilt,  penalty.  But  he  was  not  so  born.  In  the 
womb  of  the  Virgin,  the  human  nature  which  he  took  was  purged  from  its 
depravity.  But  this  purging  away  of  depravity  did  not  take  away  guilt,  or 
penalty.  There  was  still  left  the  just  exposure  to  the  penalty  of  violated 
law.  Although  Christ's  nature  was  purified,  his  obligation  to  suffer  yet 
remained.  He  might  have  declined  to  join  himself  to  humanity,  and  then 
he  need  not  have  suffered.  He  might  have  sundered  his  connection  with 
the  race,  and  then  he  need  not  have  suffered.  But  once  born  of  the  Virgin, 
once  possessed  of  the  human  nature  that  was  under  the  curse,  he  was  bound 
to  suffer.  The  whole  mass  and  weight  of  God's  displeasure  against  the  race 
fell  on  him,  when  once  he  became  a  member  of  the  race. 

Notice,  however,  that  this  guilt  which  Christ  took  upon  himself  by  his 
union  with  humanity  was :  (  1 )  not  the  guilt  of  personal  sin  —  such  guilt 
as  belongs  to  every  adult  member  of  the  race ;  (  2  )  not  even  the  guilt  of 
inherited  depravity  —  such  guilt  as  belongs  to  infants,  and  to  those  who 
have  not  come  to  moral  consciousness  ;  but  ( 3  )  solely  the  guilt  of  Adam's 
sin,  which  belongs,  prior  to  personal  transgression,  and  apart  from  inherited 
depravity,  to  every  member  of  the  race  who  has  derived  his  life  from  Adam. 
This  original  sin  and  inherited  guilt,  but  without  the  depravity  that  ordina- 
rily accompanies  them,  Christ  takes,  and  so  takes  away.  He  can  justly 
bear  penalty,  because  he  inherits  guilt.  And  since  this  guilt  is  not  his  per- 
sonal guilt,  but  the  guilt  of  that  one  sin  in  which  ' '  all  sinned  " —  the  guilt 
of  the  common  transgression  of  the  race  in  Adam,  the  guilt  of  the  root-sin 
from  which  all  other  sins  have  sprung  —  he  who  is  personally  pure  can 
vicariously  bear  the  penalty  due  to  the  sin  of  all 

If  it  be  asked  whether  this  is  not  simply  a  suffering  for  his  own  sin,  or 
rather  for  his  own  share  of  the  sin  of  the  race,  we  reply  that  his  own  share 
in  the  sin  of  the  race  is  not  the  sole  reason  why  he  suffers  ;  it  furnishes 
only  the  subjective  reason  and  ground  for  the  proper  laying  upon  him  of 
the  sin  of  all.  Christ's  union  with  the  race  in  his  incarnation  is  only  the 
outward  and  visible  expression  of  a  prior  union  with  the  race  which  began 
when  he  created  the  race.  As  "in  him  were  all  things  created,"  and  as 
"in  him  all  things  consist,"  or  hold  together  (Col.  1  : 16,  17),  it  follows 
that  he  who  is  the  life  of  humanity  must,  though  personally  pure,  be 
involved  in  responsibility  for  all  human  sin,  and  "it  was  necessary  that  the 
Christ  should  suffer  "  ( Acts  17:3).  This  suffering  was  an  enduring  of  the 
reaction  of  the  divine  holiness  against  sin  and  so  was  a  bearing  of  penalty 
( Is.  53  :  6  ;  Gal.  3  : 13 ),  but  it  was  also  the  voluntary  execution  of  a  plan 
that  antedated  creation  ( Phil.  2  : 6,  7 ),  and  Christ's  sacrifice  in  time  showed 
what  had  been  in  the  heart  of  God  from  eternity  ( Heb.  9  : 14  ;  Eev.  13  : 8 ). 

The  Atonement,  then,  on  the  part  of  God,  has  its  ground  ( 1 )  in  the 
holiness  of  God,  which  must  visit  sin  with  condemnation,  even  though  this 
condemnation  brings  death  to  his  Son ;  and  ( 2 )  in  the  love  of  God,  which 
itself  provides  the  sacrifice,  by  suffering  in  and  with  his  Son  for  the  sins  of 
men,  but  through  that  suffering  opening  a  way  and  means  of  salvation. 

The  Atonement,  on  the  part  of  man,  is  accomplished  through  (  1 )  the 
solidarity  of  the  race ;  of  which  (  2  )  Christ  is  the  life,  and  so  its  repre- 


ETHICAL  THEORY   OF  THE   ATONEMENT.  203 

sentative  and  surety;  (3)  justly  yet  voluntarily  bearing  its  guilt  and 
shame  and  condemnation  as  his  own. 

Christ  therefore,  as  incarnate,  rather  revealed  the  atonement  than  made 
it.  The  historical  work  of  atonement  was  finished  upon  the  Cross,  but 
that  historical  work  only  revealed  to  men  the  atonement  made  both  before 
and  since  by  the  extra-mundane  Logos.  The  eternal  Love  of  God  suffer- 
ing the  necessary  reaction  of  his  own  Holiness  against  the  sin  of  his 
creatures  and  with  a  view  to  their  salvation — this  is  the  essence  of  the 
Atonement. 

In  favor  of  the  Substitutionary  or  Ethical  view  of  the  atonement  we  may 
urge  the  following  considerations : 

(a)  It  rests  upon  correct  philosophical  principles  with  regard  to  the 
nature  of  will,  law,  sin,  penalty,  righteousness. 

(  b  )  It  combines  in  itself  all  the  valuable  elements  in  the  theories  before 
mentioned,  while  it  avoids  their  inconsistencies,  by  showing  the  deeper 
principle  upon  which  each  of  these  elements  is  based. 

( c  )  It  most  fully  meets  the  requirements  of  Scripture,  by  holding  that 
the  necessity  of  the  atonement  is  absolute,  since  it  rests  upon  the  demands 
of  immanent  holiness,  the  fundamental  attribute  of  God. 

(  d)  It  shows  most  satisfactorily  how  the  demands  of  holiness  are  met ; 
namely,  by  the  propitiatory  offering  of  one  who  is  personally  pure,  but 
who  by  union  with  the  human  race  has  inherited  its  guilt  and  penalty. 

(  e  )  It  furnishes  the  only  proper  explanation  of  the  sacrificial  language 
of  the  New  Testament,  and  of  the  sacrificial  rites  of  the  Old,  considered  as 
prophetic  of  Christ's  atoning  work. 

(/)  It  alone  gives  proper  place  to  the  death  of  Christ  as  the  central 
feature  of  his  work,  —  set  forth  in  the  ordinances,  and  of  chief  power  in 
Christian  experience. 

(g)  It  gives  us  the  only  means  of  understanding  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
in  the  garden  and  on  the  cross,  or  of  reconciling  them  with  the  divine 
justice. 

( h )  As  no  other  theory  does,  this  view  satisfies  the  ethical  demand  of 
human  nature  ;  pacifies  the  convicted  conscience  ;  assures  the  sinner  that 
he  may  find  instant  salvation  in  Christ ;  and  so  makes  possible  a  new  life 
of  holiness,  while  at  the  same  time  it  furnishes  the  highest  incentives  to 
such  a  life. 

D.     Objections  to  the  Ethical  Theory  of  the  Atonement. 

(  a  )  That  a  God  who  does  not  pardon  sin  without  atonement  must  lack 
either  omnipotence  or  love.  —  We  answer,  on  the  one  hand,  that  God's 
omnipotence  is  the  revelation  of  his  nature,  and  not  a  matter  of  arbitrary 
will  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  God's  love  is  ever  exercised  consistently 
with  his  fundamental  attribute  of  holiness,  so  that  while  holiness  demands 
the  sacrifice,  love  provides  it.  Mercy  is  shown,  not  by  trampling  upon 
the  claims  of  justice,  but  by  vicariously  satisfying  them. 


204  SOTERIOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE  OF   SALVATION. 

(6)  That  satisfaction  and  forgiveness  are  mutually  exclusive.  —  We 
answer  that,  since  it  is  not  a  third  party,  but  the  Judge  himself,  who  makes 
satisfaction  to  his  own  violated  holiness,  forgiveness  is  still  optional,  and 
may  be  offered  upon  terms  agreeable  to  himself.  Christ's  sacrifice  is  not 
a  pecuniary,  but  a  penal,  satisfaction.  The  objection  is  valid  against  the 
merely  commercial  view  of  the  atonement,  not  against  the  ethical  view  of  it. 

(c)  That  there  can  be  no  real  propitiation,  since  the  judge  and  the  sacri- 
fice are  one.  —  We  answer  that  this  objection  ignores  the  existence  of  per- 
sonal relations  within  the  divine  nature,  and  the  fact  that  the  God-man  is 
distinguishable  from  God.     The  satisfaction  is  grounded  in  the  distinction 
of  persons  in  the  Godhead  ;  while  the  love  in  which  it  originates  belongs 
to  the  unity  of  the  divine  essence. 

( d )  That  the  suffering  of  the  innocent  for  the  guilty  is  not  an  execution 
of  justice,  but  an  act  of  manifest  injustice.  — We  answer,  that  this  is  true 
only  upon  the  supposition  that  the  Son  bears  the  penalty  of  our  sins,  not 
voluntarily,  but  compulsorily ;  or  upon  the  supposition  that  one  who  is 
personally  innocent  can  in  no  way  become  involved  in  the  guilt  and  penalty 
of  others,  —  both  of  them  hypotheses  contrary  to  Scripture  and  to  fact. 

(  e  )  That  there  can  be  no  transfer  of  punishment  or  merit,  since  these 
are  personal. — We  answer  that  the  idea  of  representation  and  suretyship 
is  common  in  human  society  and  government ;  and  that  such  representa- 
tion and  suretyship  are  inevitable,  wherever  there  is  community  of  life 
between  the  innocent  and  the  guilty.  When  Christ  took  our  nature,  he 
could  not  do  otherwise  than  take  our  responsibilities  also. 

(/)  That  remorse,  as  a  part  of  the  penalty  of  sin,  could  not  have  been 
suffered  by  Christ. —  We  answer,  on  the  one  hand,  that  it  may  not  be  essen- 
tial to  the  idea  of  penalty  that  Christ  should  have  borne  the  identical 
pangs  which  the  lost  would  have  endured ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
we  do  not  know  how  completely  a  perfectly  holy  being,  possessed  of  super- 
human knowledge  and  love,  might  have  felt  even  the  pangs  of  remorse  for 
the  condition  of  that  humanity  of  which  he  was  the  central  conscience  and 
heart. 

(</)  That  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  as  finite  in  time,  do  not  constitute  a 
satisfaction  to  the  infinite  demands  of  the  law. — We  answer  that  the  infi- 
nite dignity  of  the  sufferer  constitutes  his  sufferings  a  full  equivalent,  in 
the  eye  of  infinite  justice.  Substitution  excludes  identity  of  suffering  ;  it 
does  not  exclude  equivalence.  Since  justice  aims  its  penalties  not  so  much 
0t  the  person  as  at  the  sin,  it  may  admit  equivalent  suffering,  when  this  is 
endured  in  the  very  nature  that  has  sinned. 

(  h  )  That  if  Christ's  passive  obedience  made  satisfaction  to  the  divine 
justice,  then  his  active  obedience  was  superfluous. — We  answer  that  the 
active  obedience  and  the  passive  obedience  are  inseparable.  The  latter  is 
essential  to  the  former ;  and  both  are  needed  to  secure  for  the  sinner,  on 
the  one  hand,  pardon,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  which  goes  beyond 
pardon,  namely,  restoration  to  the  divine  favor.  The  objection  holds  only 
against  a  superficial  and  external  view  of  the  atonement. 


EXTENT  OF  THE   ATONEMENT.  205 

(*)  That  the  doctrine  is  immoral  in  its  practical  tendencies,  since 
Christ's  obedience  takes  the  place  of  ours,  and  renders  ours  unnecessary.  — 
We  answer  that  the  objection  ignores  not  only  the  method  by  which  the 
benefits  of  the  atonement  are  appropriated,  namely,  repentance  and  faith, 
but  also  the  regenerating  and  sanctifying  power  bestowed  upon  all  who 
believe.  Faith  in  the  atonement  does  not  induce  license,  but  "works by 
love  "  (  Gal.  5:6)  and  "  cleanses  the  heart"  (Acts  15  : 9). 

(j  )  That  if  the  atonement  requires  faith  as  its  complement,  then  it  does 
not  in  itself  furnish  a  complete  satisfaction  to  God's  justice. — We  answer 
that  faith  is  not  the  ground  of  our  acceptance  with  God,  as  the  atonement 
is,  and  so  is  not  a  work  at  all ;  faith  is  only  the  medium  of  appropriation. 
We  are  saved  not  by  faith,  or  on  account  of  faith,  but  only  through  faith. 
It  is  not  faith,  but  the  atonement  which  faith  accepts,  that  satisfies  the 
justice  of  God. 

E.    The  Extent  of  the  Atonement. 

The  Scriptures  represent  the  atonement  as  having  been  made  for  all  men, 
and  as  sufficient  for  the  salvation  of  all.  Not  the  atonement  therefore  is 
limited,  but  the  application  of  the  atonement  through  the  work  of  the 
Holy  Spirit. 

Upon  this  principle  of  a  universal  atonement,  but  a  special  application 
of  it  to  the  elect,  we  must  interpret  such  passages  as  Eph.  1 :  4,  7 ;  2  Tim. 
1:9,  10;  John  17 :  9,  20,  24 —  asserting  a  special  efficacy  of  the  atone- 
ment in  the  case  of  the  elect ;  and  also  such  passages  as  2  Pet.  2  :  1 ;  1  John 
2:2;  Tim.  2  :  6  ;  4 :  10  ;  Tit.  2  :  11— asserting  that  the  death  of  Christ 
is  for  all. 

If  it  be  asked  in  what  sense  Christ  is  the  Savior  of  all  men,  we  reply : 
(  a )    That  the  atonement  of  Christ  secures  for  all  men  a  delay  in  the 
execution  of  the  sentence  against  sin,  and  a  space  for  repentance,  together 
with  a  continuance  of  the  common  blessings  of  life  which  have  been  for- 
feited by  transgression. 

(  6 )  That  the  atonement  of  Christ  has  made  objective  provision  for  the 
salvation  of  all,  by  removing  from  the  divine  mind  every  obstacle  to  the 
pardon  and  restoration  of  sinners,  except  their  wilful  opposition  to  God 
and  refusal  to  turn  to  him. 

(  c  )  That  the  atonement  of  Christ  has  procured  for  all  men  the  powerful 
incentives  to  repentance  presented  in  the  Cross,  and  the  combined  agency 
of  the  Christian  church  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  by  which  these  incentives 
are  brought  to  bear  upon  them. 

Christ  is  specially  the  Savior  of  those  who  believe,  in  that  he  exerts  a 
special  power  of  his  Spirit  to  procure  their  acceptance  of  his  salvation. 
This  is  not,  however,  a  part  of  his  work  of  atonement ;  it  is  the  application 
of  the  atonement,  and  as  such  is  hereafter  to  be  considered. 

2.     Christ's  Intercessory   Work. 

The  Priesthood  of  Christ  does  not  cease  with  his  work  of  atonement,  but 
continues  forever.  In  the  presence  of  God  he  fulfils  the  second  office  of 
the  priest,  namely  that  of  intercession. 


206  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATION. 

A.  Nature  of  Christ's  Intercession.  —  This  is  not  to  be  conceived  of 
either  as  an  external  and  vocal  petitioning,  nor  as  a  mere  figure  of  speech 
for  the  natural  and  continuous  influence  of  his  sacrifice ;  but  rather  as  a 
special  activity  of  Christ  in  securing,  upon  the  ground  of  that  sacrifice, 
whatever  of  blessing  comes  to  men,  whether  that  blessing  be  temporal  or 
spiritual. 

B.  Objects  of  Christ's  Intercession. — We  may  distinguish  (a)  that 
general  intercession  which  secures  to  all  men  certain  temporal  benefits  of 
his  atoning  work,  and  ( 6 )  that  special  intercession  which  secures  the 
divine  acceptance  of  the  persons  of  believers  and  the  divine  bestowment 
of  all  gifts  needful  for  their  salvation. 

C.  Relation  of  Christ's  Intercession  to  that  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  —  The 
Holy  Spirit  is  an  advocate  within  us,  teaching  us  how  to  pray  as  we  ought; 
Christ  is  an  advocate  in  heaven,  securing  from  the  Father  the  answer  of 
our  prayers.     Thus  the  work  of  Christ  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit  are  com- 
plements to  each  other,  and  parts  of  one  whole. 

D.  Relation  of  Christ's  Intercession  to  that  of  saints.  —  All  true  inter- 
cession is  either  directly  or  indirectly  the  intercession  of  Christ.     Chris- 
tians are  organs  of  Christ's  Spirit.    To  suppose  Christ  in  us  to  offer  prayer 
to  one  of  his  saints,  instead  of  directly  to  the  Father,  is  to  blaspheme 
Christ,  and  utterly  misconceive  the  nature  of  prayer. 

III.    THE  KINGLY  OFFICE  OF  CHRIST. 

This  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  sovereignty  which  Christ  originally 
possessed  in  virtue  of  his  divine  nature.  Christ's  kingship  is  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  divine-human  Redeemer,  which  belonged  to  him  of  right 
from  the  moment  of  his  birth,  but  which  was  fully  exercised  only  from  the 
time  of  his  entrance  upon  the  state  of  exaltation.  By  virtue  of  this  kingly 
office,  Christ  rules  all  things  in  heaven  and  earth,  for  the  glory  of  God  and 
the  execution  of  God's  purpose  of  salvation. 

( a )  With  respect  to  the  universe  at  large,  Christ's  kingdom  is  a  king- 
dom of  power  ;  he  upholds,  governs,  and  judges  the  world. 

( 6 )  With  respect  to  his  militant  church,  it  is  a  kingdom  of  grace ;  he 
founds,  legislates  for,  administers,  defends,  and  augments  his  church  on 
earth. 

(  c  )  With  respect  to  his  church  triumphant,  it  is  a  kingdom  of  glory  ; 
he  rewards  his  redeemed  people  with  the  full  revelation  of  himself,  upon 
the  completion  of  his  kingdom  in  the  resurrection  and  the  judgment. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  RECONCILIATION  OF  MAN  TO  GOD,  OR  THE 

APPLICATION  OF  REDEMPTION  THROUGH 

THE  WORK  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT. 

SECTION  I. —THE  APPLICATION  OP  CHRIST'S   REDEMPTION 
IN   ITS   PREPARATION. 

(  a )  In  this  Section  we  treat  of  Election  and  Calling  ;  Section  Second 
being  devoted  to  the  Application  of  Christ's  Redemption  in  its  Actual 
Beginning, —  namely,  in  Union  with  Christ,  Regeneration,  Conversion,  and 
Justification ;  while  Section  Third  has  for  its  subject  the  Application  of 
Christ's  Redemption  in  its  Continuation, — namely,  in  Sanctification  and 
Perseverance. 

(  6  )  In  treating  Election  and  Calling  as  applications  of  Christ's  redemp- 
tion, we  imply  that  they  are,  in  God's  decree,  logically  subsequent  to  that 
redemption.  In  this  we  hold  the  Sublapsarian  view,  as  distinguished  from 
the  Supralapsarianism  of  Beza  and  other  hyper-Calvinists,  which  regarded 
the  decree  of  individual  salvation  as  preceding,  in  the  order  of  thought,  the 
decree  to  permit  the  Fall.  In  this  latter  scheme,  the  order  of  decrees  is 
as  follows :  1.  the  decree  to  save  certain,  and  to  reprobate  others  ;  2.  the 
decree  to  create  both  those  who  are  to  be  saved  and  those  who  are  to  be 
reprobated  ;  3.  the  decree  to  permit  both  the  former  and  the  latter  to  fall ; 
4.  the  decree  to  provide  salvation  only  for  the  former,  that  is,  for  the  elect. 

(  c  )  But  the  Scriptures  teach  that  men  as  sinners,  and  not  men  irrespec- 
tive of  their  sins,  are  the  objects  of  God's  saving  grace  in  Christ  (  John  15  : 
9  ;  Rom.  11 :  5,  7  ;  Eph.  1  :  4-6  ;  1  Pet.  1:2).  Condemnation,  moreover, 
is  an  act,  not  of  sovereignty,  but  of  justice,  and  is  grounded  in  the  guilt  of 
the  condemned  (  Rom.  2 :  6-11 ;  2  Thess.  1 :  5-10 ).  The  true  order  of  the 
decrees  is  therefore  as  follows  :  1.  the  decree  to  create  ;  2.  the  decree  to 
permit  the  Fall ;  3.  the  decree  to  provide  a  salvation  in  Christ  sufficient  for 
the  needs  of  all ;  4.  the  decree  to  secure  the  actual  acceptance  of  this  sal- 
vation on  the  part  of  some, — or,  in  other  words,  the  decree  of  Election. 

(  d )  Those  Sublapsarians  who  hold  to  the  Anselmic  view  of  a  limited 
Atonement,  make  the  decrees  3.  and  4.,  just  mentioned,  exchange  places, — 
the  decree  of  election  thus  preceding  the  decree  to  provide  redemption. 
The  Scriptural  reasons  for  preferring  the  order  here  given  have  been 
already  indicated  in  our  treatment  of  the  extent  of  the  Atonement  (page 
205). 


208  CHRISTOLOGY,   OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF   REDEMPTION. 

I.    ELECTION. 

Election  is  that  eternal  act  of  God,  by  which  in  his  sovereign  pleasure, 
and  on  account  of  no  foreseen  merit  in  them,  he  chooses  certain  out  of  the 
number  of  sinful  men  to  be  the  recipients  of  the  special  grace  of  his  Spirit, 
and  so  to  be  made  voluntary  partakers  of  Christ's  salvation. 

1.     Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Election. 

A.     From  Scripture. 

We  here  adopt  the  words  of  Dr.  Hovey  :  "The  Scriptures  forbid  us  to 
find  the  reasons  for  election  in  the  moral  action  of  man  before  the  new 
birth,  and  refer  us  merely  to  the  sovereign  will  and  mercy  of  God ;  that  is, 
they  teach  the  doctrine  of  personal  election."  Before  advancing  to  the 
proof  of  the  doctrine  itself,  we  may  claim  Scriptural  warrant  for  three  pre- 
liminary statements  (which  we  also  quote  from  Dr.  Hovey),  namely  : 

First,  that  "God  has  a  sovereign  right  to  bestow  more  grace  upon  one 
subject  than  upon  another, —  grace  being  unmerited  favor  to  sinners." 

Secondly,  that  "  God  has  been  pleased  to  exercise  this  right  in  dealing 
with  men." 

Thirdly,  that  "God  has  some  other  reason  than  that  of  saving  as  many  as 
possible  for  the  way  in  which  he  distributes  his  grace. " 

The  Scripture  passages  which  directly  or  indirectly  support  the  doctrine 
of  a  particular  election  of  individual  men  to  salvation  may  be  arranged  as 
follows : 

( a  )    Direct  statements  of  God's  purpose  to  save  certain  individuals  : 

( b )  In  connection  with  the  declaration  of  God's  foreknowledge  of  these 
persons,  or  choice  to  make  them  objects  of  his  special  attention  and  care ; 

(  c  )  With  assertions  that  this  choice  is  matter  of  grace,  or  unmerited 
favor,  bestowed  in  eternity  past : 

( d}  That  the  Father  has  given  certain  persons  to  the  Son,  to  be  his 
peculiar  possession  : 

( e  )  That  the  fact  of  believers  being  united  thus  to  Christ  is  due  wholly 
to  God : 

(/)  That  those  who  are  written  in  the  Lamb's  book  of  life,  and  they 
only,  shall  be  saved  : 

(g)    That  these  are  allotted,  as  disciples,  to  certain  of  God's  servants  : 
( h )     Are  made  the  recipients  of  a  special  call  of  God  : 

(  i  )  Are  born  into  God's  kingdom,  not  by  virtue  of  man's  will,  but  of 
God's  will : 

(j  )     Receiving  repentance,  as  the  gift  of  God : 

(  k  )    Faith,  as  the  gift  of  God  : 

(  I )     Holiness  and  good  works,  as  the  gift  of  God. 

These  passages  furnish  an  abundant  and  conclusive  refutation,  on  the 
one  hand,  of  the  Lutheran  view  that  election  is  simply  God's  determina- 


ELECTION. 

tion  from  eternity  to  provide  an  objective  salvation  for  universal  humanity; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  of  the  Arminian  view  that  election  is  God's  deter- 
mination from  eternity  to  save  certain  individuals  upon  the  ground  of 
their  foreseen  faith. 

B.  From  Reason. 

( a )  What  God  does,  he  has  eternally  purposed  to  do.  Since  he  bestows 
special  regenerating  grace  on  some,  he  must  have  eternally  purposed  to 
bestow  it,  —  in  other  words,  must  have  chosen  them  to  eternal  life.  Thus 
the  doctrine  of  election  is  only  a  special  application  of  the  doctrine  of 
decrees. 

(  b  )  This  purpose  cannot  be  conditioned  upon  any  merit  or  faith  of 
those  who  are  chosen,  since  there  is  no  such  merit,  —  faith  itself  being 
God's  gift  and  foreordained  by  him.  Since  man's  faith  is  foreseen  only 
as  the  result  of  God's  work  of  grace,  election  proceeds  rather  upon  fore- 
seen unbelief.  Faith,  as  the  effect  of  election,  cannot  at  the  same  time  be 
the  cause  of  election. 

(  c )  The  depravity  of  the  human  will  is  such  that,  without  this  decree  to 
bestow  special  divine  influences  upon  some,  all,  without  exception,  would 
have  rejected  Christ's  salvation  after  it  was  offered  to  them ;  and  so  all, 
without  exception,  must  have  perished.  Election,  therefore,  may  be 
viewed  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  God's  decree  to  provide  an  objective 
redemption,  if  that  redemption  is  to  have  any  subjective  result  in  human 
salvation. 

(c?)  The  doctrine  of  election  becomes  more  acceptable  to  reason  when 
we  remember  :  first,  that  God's  decree  is  eternal,  and  in  a  certain  sense  is 
contemporaneous  with  man's  belief  in  Christ ;  secondly,  that  God's  decree 
to  create  involves  the  decree  of  all  that  in  the  exercise  of  man's  freedom 
will  follow ;  thirdly,  that  God's  decree  is  the  decree  of  him  who  is  all  in 
all,  so  that  our  willing  and  doing  is  at  the  same  time  the  working  of  him 
who  decrees  our  willing  and  doing.  The  whole  question  turns  upon  the 
initiative  in  human  salvation  :  if  this  belongs  to  God,  then  in  spite  of  dif- 
ficulties we  must  accept  the  doctrine  of  election. 

2.     Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Election. 

(a)  It  is  unjust  to  those  who  are  not  included  in  this  purpose  of  salva- 
tion.— Answer  :  Election  deals,  not  simply  with  creatures,  but  with  sinful, 
guilty,  and  condemned  creatures.     That  any  should  be  saved,  is  matter  of 
pure  grace,  and  those  who  are  not  included  in  this  purpose  of  salvation 
suffer  only  the  due  reward  of  their  deeds.     There  is,  therefore,  no  injustice 
in  God's  election.   We  may  better  praise  God  that  he  saves  any,  than  charge 
him  with  injustice  because  he  saves  so  few. 

( b )  It  represents  God  as  partial  in  his  dealings  aud  a  respecter  of  per- 
sons.— Answer  :  Since  there  is  nothing  in  men  that  determines  God's  choice 
of  one  rather  than  another,  the  objection  is  invalid.  It  would  equally  apply 
to  God's  selection  of  certain  nations,  as  Israel,  and  certain  individuals,  as 
Cyrus,  to  be  recipients  of  special  temporal  gifts.      If  God  is  not  to  be 


210  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR   THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATION. 

regarded  as  partial  in  not  providing  a  salvation  for  fallen  angels,  lie  cannot 
be  regarded  as  partial  in  not  providing  regenerating  influences  of  his  Spirit 
for  the  whole  race  of  fallen  men. 

(c)  It  represents  God  as  arbitrary. — Answer  :  It  represents  God,  not 
as  arbitrary,  but  as  exercising  the  free  choice  of  a  wise  and  sovereign  will,  in 
ways  and  for  reasons  which  are  inscrutable  to  us.     To  deny  the  possibility 
of  such  a  choice  is  to  deny  God's  personality.      To  deny  that  God  has 
reasons  for  his  choice  is  to  deny  his  wisdom.    The  doctrine  of  election  finds 
these  reasons,  not  in  men,  but  in  God. 

(d)  It  tends  to  immorality,  by  representing  men's  salvation  as  inde- 
pendent of  their  own  obedience. — Answer  :  The  objection  ignores  the  fact 
that  the  salvation  of  believers  is  ordained  only  in  connection  with  their 
regeneration  and  sanctification,  as  means  ;  and  that  the  certainty  of  final 
triumph  is  the  strongest  incentive  to  strenuous  conflict  with  sin. 

(e)  It  inspires  pride  in  those  who  think  themselves  elect. — Answer: 
This  is  possible  only  in  the  case  of  those  who  pervert  the  doctrine.      On 
the  contrary,  its  proper  influence  is  to  humble  men.      Those  who  exalt 
themselves  above  others,  upon  the  ground  that  they  are  special  favorites  of 
God,  have  reason  to  question  their  election. 

(/)  It  discourages  effort  for  the  salvation  of  the  impenitent,  whether  on 
their  own  part  or  on  the  part  of  others.  —  Answer  :  Since  it  is  a  secret 
decree,  it  cannot  hinder  or  discourage  such  effort.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  a  ground  of  encouragement,  and  so  a  stimulus  to  effort ;  for,  without 
election,  it  is  certain  that  all  would  be  lost  (  c/.  Acts  18  : 10 ).  While  it 
humbles  the  sinner,  so  that  he  is  willing  to  cry  for  mercy,  it  encourages 
him  also  by  showing  him  that  some  will  be  saved,  and  (  since  election  and 
faith  are  inseparably  connected)  that  he  will  be  saved,  if  he  will  only 
believe.  While  it  makes  the  Christian  feel  entirely  dependent  on  God's 
power,  in  his  efforts  for  the  impenitent,  it  leads  him  to  say  with  Paul  that 
he  "endures  all  things  for  the  elects'  sake,  that  they  also  may  attain  the 
salvation  that  is  in  Christ  Jesus  with  eternal  glory  "  ( 2  Tim.  2  : 10 ). 

( g )  The  decree  of  election  implies  a  decree  of  reprobation.  —  Answer  : 
The  decree  of  reprobation  is  not  a  positive  decree,  like  that  of  election, 
but  a  permissive  decree  to  l^ave  the  sinner  to  his  self -chosen  rebellion  and 
its  natural  consequences  of  punishment. 

II.    CALLING. 

Calling  is  that  act  of  God  by  which  men  are  invited  to  accept,  by  faith, 
the  salvation  provided  by  Christ.  —  The  Scriptures  distinguish  between  : 

(  a  )  The  general,  or  external,  call  to  all  men  through  God's  providence, 
word,  and  Spirit. 

(6)  The  special,  efficacious  call  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  the  elect. 

Two  questions  only  need  special  consideration  : 

A.     Is  God's  general  call  sincere  ? 

This  is  denied,  upon  the  ground  that  such  sincerity  is  incompatible, 
first,  with  the  inability  of  the  sinner  to  obey  ;  and  secondly,  with  the 


UNION   WITH   CHRIST.  211 

design  of  God  to  bestow  only  upon  the  elect  the  special  grace  without 
which  they  will  not  obey. 

(a)  To  the  first  objection  we  reply  that,  since  this  inability  is  not  a 
physical  but  a  moral  inability,  consisting  simply  in  the  settled  perversity 
of  an  evil  will,  there  can  be  no  insincerity  in  offering  salvation  to  all,  espe- 
cially when  the  offer  is  in  itself  a  proper  motive  to  obedience. 

(  b  )  To  the  second,  we  reply  that  the  objection,  if  true,  would  equally 
hold  against  God's  foreknowledge.  The  sincerity  of  God's  general  call  is 
no  more  inconsistent  with  his  determination  that  some  shall  be  permitted 
to  reject  it,  than  it  is  with  foreknowledge  that  some  will  reject  it. 

B.     Is  God's  special  call  irresistible  ? 

We  prefer  to  say  that  this  special  call  is  efficacious, —  that  is,  that  it  infal- 
libly accomplishes  its  purpose  of  leading  the  sinner  to  the  acceptance  of 
salvation.  This  implies  two  things : 

(  a  )  That  the  operation  of  God  is  not  an  outward  constraint  upon  the 
human  will,  but  that  it  accords  with  the  laws  of  our  mental  constitution. 
We  reject  the  term  'irresistible,'  as  implying  a  coercion  and  compulsion 
which  is  foreign  to  the  nature  of  God's  working  in  the  soul. 

(  6  )  That  the  operation  of  God  is  the  originating  cause  of  that  new  dis- 
position of  the  affections,  and  that  new  activity  of  the  will,  by  which  the 
sinner  accepts  Christ.  The  cause  is  not  in  the  response  of  the  will  to  the 
presentation  of  motives  by  God,  nor  in  any  mere  cooperation  of  the  will  of 
man  with  the  will  of  God,  but  is  an  almighty  act  of  God  in  the  will  of  man, 
by  which  its  freedom  to  choose  God  as  its  end  is  restored  and  rightly  exer- 
cised ( John  1  : 12,  13).  For  further  discussion  of  the  subject,  see,  in  the 
next  section,  the  remarks  on  Regeneration,  with  which  this  efficacious  call 
is  identical. 


SECTION   II. —  THE   APPLICATION  OF  CHRIST'S  REDEMPTION 
IN   ITS  ACTUAL  BEGINNING 

Under  this  head  we  treat  of  Union  with  Christ,  Eegeneration,  Conversion 
(embracing  Eepentance  and  Faith),  and  Justification.  Much  confusion 
and  error  have  arisen  from  conceiving  these  as  occurring  in  chronological 
order.  The  order  is  logical,  not  chronological.  As  it  is  only  "  in  Christ " 
that  man  is  "  a  new  creature  "  (  2  Cor.  5  : 17  )  or  is  "justified  "  (  Acts  13  : 39 ), 
union  with  Christ  logically  precedes  both  regeneration  and  justification  J 
and  yet,  chronologically,  the  moment  of  our  union  with  Christ  is  also  the 
moment  when  we  are  regenerated  and  justified.  So,  too,  regeneration  and 
conversion  are  but  the  divine  and  human  sides  or  aspects  of  the  same  fact, 
although  regeneration  has  logical  precedence,  and  man  turns  only  as  God 
turns  him. 

I.     UNION  WITH  CHRIST. 

The  Scriptures  declare  that,  through  the  operation  of  God,  there  is  con" 
stituted  a  union  of  the  soul  with  Christ  different  in  kind  from  God's  natural 


212  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALVATION. 

and  providential  concursus  with  all  spirits,  as  well  as  from  all  unions  of 
mere  association  or  sympathy,  moral  likeness,  or  moral  influence, — a  union 
of  life,  in  which  the  human  spirit,  while  then  most  truly  possessing  its  own 
individuality  and  personal  distinctness,  is  interpenetrated  and  energized  by 
the  Spirit  of  Christ,  is  made  inscrutably  but  indissolubly  one  with  him, 
and  so  becomes  a  member  and  partaker  of  that  regenerated,  believing,  and 
justified  humanity  of  which  he  is  the  head. 

1.  Scripture  Representations  of  this  Union. 

A.  Figurative  teaching.     It  is  illustrated  : 

(  a )  From  the  union  of  a  building  and  its  foundation. 

(  b  )  From  the  union  between  husband  and  wife. 

(  c  )  From  the  union  between  the  vine  and  its  branches. 

( d )  From  the  union  between  the  members  and  the  head  of  the  body. 

( e )  From  the  union  of  the  race  with  the  source  of  its  life  in  Adam. 

B.  Direct  statements. 

(  a  )  The  believer  is  said  to  be  in  Christ. 
(  6  )  Christ  is  said  to  be  in  the  believer. 
(  e  )  The  Father  and  the  Son  dwell  in  the  believer. 

(  d  )  The  believer  has  life  by  partaking  of  Christ,  as  Christ  has  life  by 
partaking  of  the  Father. 

(  e  )  All  believers  are  one  in  Christ. 

(/)  The  believer  is  made  partaker  of  the  divine  nature. 

(  g )  The  believer  is  made  one  spirit  with  the  Lord. 

2.  Nature  of  this  Union. 

We  have  here  to  do  not  only  with  a  fact  of  life,  but  with  a  unique  rela- 
tion between  the  finite  and  the  infinite.  Our  descriptions  must  therefore 
be  inadequate.  Yet  in  many  respects  we  kno  w  what  this  union  is  not ;  in 
certain  respects  we  can  positively  characterize  it. 

A.    Negatively.  —  It  is  not : 

( a )  A  merely  natural  union,  like  that  of  God  with  all  human  spirits,  — 
as  held  by  rationalists. 

( 6 )  A  merely  moral  union,  or  union  of  love  and  sympathy,  like  that 
between  teacher  and  scholar,  friend  and  friend,  —  as  held  by  Socinians 
and  Arminians. 

(  c  )  A  union  of  essence,  which  destroys  the  distinct  personality  and  sub- 
sistence of  either  Christ  or  the  human  spirit,  —  as  held  by  many  of  the 
mystics. 

(  d )  A  union  mediated  and  conditioned  by  participation  of  the  sacra- 
ments of  the  church, — as  held  by  Romanists,  Lutherans,  and  High-Church 
Episcopalians. 


TJNIOK   WITH   CHRIST.  213 

B.     Positively.— It  is  : 

(  a )  An  organic  union, —  in  which  we  become  members  of  Christ  and 
partakers  of  his  humanity. 

(  6  )  A  vital  union, — in  which  Christ's  life  becomes  the  dominating  prin- 
ciple within  us. 

( c )  A  spiritual  union, — that  is,  a  union  whose  source  and  author  is  the 
Holy  Spirit. 

(  d  )  An  indissoluble  union, —  that  is,  a  union  which,  consistently  with 
Christ's  promise  and  grace,  can  never  be  dissolved. 

( e )  An  inscrutable  union, — mystical,  however,  only  in  the  sense  of  sur- 
passing in  its  intimacy  and  value  any  other  union  of  souls  which  we  know. 

3.     Consequences  of  this  Union  as  respects  the  Believer. 

We  have  seen  that  Christ's  union  with  humanity,  at  the  incarnation, 
involved  him  in  all  the  legal  liabilities  of  the  race  to  which  he  united  him- 
self, and  enabled  him  so  to  assume  the  penalty  of  its  sin  as  to  make  for  all 
men  a  full  satisfaction  to  the  divine  justice,  and  to  remove  all  external 
obstacles  to  man's  return  to  God.  An  internal  obstacle,  however,  still 
remains  —  the  evil  affections  and  will,  and  the  consequent  guilt,  of  the 
individual  soul.  This  last  obstacle  also  Christ  removes,  in  the  case  of  all 
his  people,  by  uniting  himself  to  them  in  a  closer  and  more  perfect  manner 
than  that  in  which  he  is  united  to  humanity  at  large.  As  Christ's  union 
with  the  race  secures  the  objective  reconciliation  of  the  race  to  God,  so 
Christ's  union  with  believers  secures  the  subjective  reconciliation  of 
believers  to  God. 

The  consequences  of  union  with  Christ  may  be  summarily  stated  as 
follows  : 

(  a )  Union  with  Christ  involves  a  change  in  the  dominant  affection  of 
the  soul.  Christ's  entrance  into  the  soul  makes  it  a  new  creature,  in  the 
sense  that  the  ruling  disposition,  which  before  was  sinful,  now  becomes 
holy.  This  change  we  call  Regeneration. 

(  6  )  Union  with  Christ  involves  a  new  exercise  of  the  soul's  powers  in 
repentance  and  faith ;  faith,  indeed,  is  the  act  of  the  soul  by  which,  under 
the  operation  of  God,  Christ  is  received.  This  new  exercise  of  the  soul's 
powers  we  call  Conversion  (Eepentance  and  Faith).  It  is  the  obverse  or 
human  side  of  Regeneration. 

( c )  Union  with  Christ  gives  to  the  believer  the  legal  standing  and  rights 
of  Christ.  As  Christ's  union  with  the  race  involves  atonement,  so  the 
believer's  union  with  Christ  involves  Justification.  The  believer  is  enti- 
tled to  take  for  his  own  all  that  Christ  is,  and  all  that  Christ  has  done ;  and 
this  because  he  has  within  him  that  new  life  of  humanity  which  suffered  in 
Christ's  death  and  rose  from  the  grave  in  Christ's  resurrection, — in  other 
words,  because  he  is  virtually  one  person  with  the  Redeemer.  In  Christ 
the  believer  is  prophet,  priest,  and  king. 


214  SOTERIOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALVATION. 

(d)  Union  with  Christ  secures  to  the  believer  the  continuously  trans- 
forming, assimilating  power  of  Christ's  life,  —  first,  for  the  soul ;  secondly, 
for  the  body,  —  consecrating  it  in  the  present,  and  in  the  future  raising  it 
up  in  the  likeness  of  Christ's  glorified  body.     This  continuous  influence, 
so  far  as  it  is  exerted  in  the  present  life,  we  call  /Sanctiftcation,  the  human 
side  or  aspect  of  which  is  Perseverance. 

(e)  Union  with  Christ  brings  about  a  fellowship  of  Christ  with  the 
believer, —  Christ  takes  part  in  all  the  labors,  temptations,  and  sufferings 
of  his  people ;  a  fellowship  of  the  believer  with  Christ, —  so  that  Christ's 
whole  experience  on  earth  is  in  some  measure  reproduced  in  him  ;  a  fellow- 
ship of  all  believers  with  one  another, —  furnishing  a  basis  for  the  spiritual 
unity  of  Christ's  people  on  earth,  and  for  the  eternal  communion  of  heaven. 
The  doctrine  of  Union  with  Christ  is  therefore  the  indispensable  prepara- 
tion for  Ecclesiology,  and  for  Eschatology. 

II.    REGENERATION. 

Regeneration  is  that  act  of  God  by  which  the  governing  disposition  of 
the  soul  is  made  holy,  and  by  which,  through  the  truth  as  a  means,  the  first 
holy  exercise  of  this  disposition  is  secured. 

Regeneration,  or  the  new  birth,  is  the  divine  side  of  that  change  of  heart 
which,  viewed  from  the  human  side,  we  call  conversion.  It  is  God's  turn- 
ing the  soul  to  himself, —  conversion  being  the  soul's  turning  itself  to  God, 
of  which  God's  turning  it  is  both  the  accompaniment  and  cause.  It  will  be 
observed  from  the  above  definition,  that  there  are  two  aspects  of  regener- 
ation, in  the  first  of  which  the  soul  is  passive,  in  the  second  of  which  the 
soul  is  active.  God  changes  the  governing  disposition, —  in  this  change  the 
soul  is  simply  acted  upon.  God  secures  the  initial  exercise  of  this  disposi- 
tion in  view  of  the  truth, — in  this  change  the  soul  itself  acts.  Yet  these 
two  parts  of  God's  operation  are  simultaneous.  At  the  same  moment  that 
he  makes  the  soul  sensitive,  he  pours  in  the  light  of  his  truth  and  induces 
the  exercise  of  the  holy  disposition  he  has  imparted. 

1.     Scripture  Representations. 

(  a  )    Regeneration  is  a  change  indispensable  to  the  salvation  of  the  sinner. 

( 6  )    It  is  a  change  in  the  inmost  principle  of  life. 

(  c  )    It  is  a  change  in  the  heart,  or  governing  disposition. 

(  d)    It  is  a  change  in  the  moral  relations  of  the  soul. 

( e )  It  is  a  change  wrought  in  connection  with  the  use  of  truth  as  a 
means. 

(/)  It  is  a  change  instantaneous,  secretly  wrought,  and  known  only  in 
its  results. 

(g )    It  is  a  change  wrought  by  God. 

(  h )  It  is  a  change  accomplished  through  the  union  of  the  soul  with 
Christ. 


REGEtfEBATIOST.  215 

2.  Necessity  of  Regeneration. 

That  all  men  without  exception  need  to  be  changed  in  moral  character,  is 
manifest,  not  only  from  Scripture  passages  already  cited,  but  from  the  fol- 
lowing rational  considerations : 

( a  )  Holiness,  or  conformity  to  the  fundamental  moral  attribute  of  God, 
is  the  indispensable  condition  of  securing  the  divine  favor,  of  attaining 
peace  of  conscience,  and  of  preparing  the  soul  for  the  associations  and 
employments  of  the  blest. 

( b )  The  condition  of  universal  humanity  as  by  nature  depraved,  and, 
when  arrived  at  moral  consciousness,  as  guilty  of  actual  transgression,  is 
precisely  the  opposite  of  that  holiness  without  which  the  soul  cannot  exist 
in  normal  relation  to  God,  to  self,  or  to  holy  beings. 

(  c  )  A  radical  internal  change  is  therefore  requisite  in  every  human  soul 
—  a  change  in  that  which  constitutes  its  character.  Holiness  cannot  be 
attained,  as  the  pantheist  claims,  by  a  merely  natural  growth  or  develop- 
ment, since  man's  natural  tendencies  are  wholly  in  the  direction  of  selfish- 
ness. There  must  be  a  reversal  of  his  inmost  dispositions  and  principles 
of  action,  if  he  is  to  see  the  kingdom  of  God. 

3.  The  Efficient  Cause  of  Regeneration. 

Three  views  only  need  be  considered,  —  all  others  are  modifications  of 
these.  The  first  view  puts  the  efficient  cause  of  regeneration  in  the  human 
will ;  the  second,  in  the  truth  considered  as  a  system  of  motives ;  the  third, 
in  the  immediate  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

A.     The  human  will,  as  the  efficient  cause  of  regeneration. 

This  view  takes  two  forms,  according  as  the  will  is  regarded  as  acting 
apart  from,  or  in  conjunction  with,  special  influences  of  the  truth  applied 
by  God.  Pelagians  hold  the  former ;  Arminians  the  latter. 

( a )  To  the  Pelagian  view,  that  regeneration  is  solely  the  act  of  man,  and 
is  identical  with  self -reformation,  we  object  that  the  sinner's  depravity, 
since  it  consists  in  a  fixed  state  of  the  affections  which  determines  the 
settled  character  of  the  volitions,  amounts  to  a  moral  inability.  Without 
a  renewal  of  the  affections  from  which  all  moral  action  springs,  man  will 
not  choose  holiness  nor  accept  salvation. 

(  6  )  To  the  Arminian  view,  that  regeneration  is  the  act  of  man,  cooper- 
ating with  divine  influences  applied  through  the  truth  (synergistic  the- 
ory ),  we  object  that  no  beginning  of  holiness  is  in  this  way  conceivable. 
For,  so  long  as  man's  selfish  and  perverse  affections  are  unchanged,  no 
choosing  God  is  possible  but  such  as  proceeds  from  supreme  desire  for 
one's  own  interest  and  happiness.  But  the  man  thus  supremely  bent  on 
self -gratification  cannot  see  in  God,  or  his  service,  anything  productive  of 
happiness ;  or,  if  he  could  see  in  them  anything  of  advantage,  his  choice 
of  God  and  his  service  from  such  a  motive  would  not  be  a  holy  choice,  and 
therefore  could  not  be  a  beginning  of  holiness. 


216  SOTERIOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTEINE   OF  SALVATION. 

B.  The  truth,  as  the  efficient  cause  of  regeneration. 

According  to  this  view,  the  truth  as  a  system  of  motives  is  the  direct  and 
immediate  cause  of  the  change  from  unholiness  to  holiness.  This  view  is 
objectionable  for  two  reasons  : 

(  a )  It  erroneously  regards  motives  as  wholly  external  to  the  mind  that 
is  influenced  by  them.  This  is  to  conceive  of  them  as  mechanically  con- 
straining the  will,  and  is  indistinguishable  from  necessitarianism.  On  the 
contrary,  motives  are  compounded  of  external  presentations  and  internal 
dispositions.  It  is  the  soul's  affections  which  render  certain  suggestions 
attractive  and  others  repugnant  to  us.  In  brief,  the  heart  makes  the  motive. 

(  6 )  Only  as  truth  is  loved,  therefore,  can  it  be  a  motive  to  holiness. 
But  we  have  seen  that  the  aversion  of  the  sinner  to  God  is  such  that  the 
truth  is  hated  instead  of  loved,  and  a  thing  that  is  hated,  is  hated  more 
intensely,  the  more  distinctly  it  is  seen.  Hence  no  mere  power  of  the 
truth  can  be  regarded  as  the  efficient  cause  of  regeneration.  The  contrary 
view  implies  that  it  is  not  the  truth  which  the  sinner  hates,  but  rather  some 
element  of  error  which  is  mingled  with  it. 

C.  The  immediate  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  as  the  efficient  cause  of 
regeneration. 

In  ascribing  to  the  Holy  Spirit  the  authorship  of  regeneration,  we  do 
not  affirm  that  the  divine  Spirit  accomplishes  his  work  without  any  accom- 
panying instrumentality.  We  simply  assert  that  the  power  which  regen- 
erates is  the  power  of  God,  and  that  although  conjoined  with  the  use  of 
means,  there  is  a  direct  operation  of  this  power  upon  the  sinner's  heart 
which  changes  its  moral  character.  We  add  two  remarks  by  way  of  further 
explanation : 

( a  )  The  Scriptural  assertions  of  the  indwelling  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and 
of  his  mighty  power  in  the  soul  forbid  us  to  regard  the  divine  Spirit  in 
regeneration  as  coming  in  contact,  not  with  the  soul,  but  only  with  the 
truth.  The  phrases,  "to  energize  the  truth,"  "to  intensify  the  truth," 
"  to  illuminate  the  truth,"  have  no  proper  meaning  ;  since  even  God  cannot 
make  the  truth  more  true.  If  any  change  is  wrought,  it  must  be  wrought, 
not  in  the  truth,  but  in  the  soul. 

(  b  )  Even  if  truth  could  be  energized,  intensified,  illuminated,  there 
would  still  be  needed  a  change  in  the  moral  disposition,  before  the  soul 
could  recognize  its  beauty  or  be  affected  by  it.  No  mere  increase  of  light 
can  enable  a  blind  man  to  see ;  the  disease  of  the  eye  must  first  be  cured 
before  external  objects  are  visible.  So  God's  work  in  regeneration  must 
be  performed  within  the  soul  itself.  Over  and  above  all  influence  of  the 
truth,  there  must  be  a  direct  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  upon  the  heart. 
Although  wrought  in  conjunction  with  the  presentation  of  truth  to  the 
intellect,  regeneration  differs  from  moral  suasion  in  being  an  immediate 
act  of  God. 

4.     The  Instrumentality  used  in  Regeneration. 

A.  The  Roman,  English  and  Lutheran  churches  hold  that  regeneration 
is  accomplished  through  the  instrumentality  of  baptism.  The  Disciples, 
or  followers  of  Alexander  Campbell,  make  regeneration  include  baptism, 


REGENERATION.  217 

as  well  as  repentance  and  faith.     To  the  view  that  baptism  is  a  means  of 
regeneration  we  urge  the  following  objections : 

(  a  )  The  Scriptures  represent  baptism  to  be  not  the  means  but  only  the 
sign  of  regeneration,  and  therefore  to  presuppose  and  follow  regeneration. 
For  this  reason  only  believers  —  that  is,  persons  giving  credible  evidence 
of  being  regenerated — were  baptized  (Acts  8 : 12).  Not  external  baptism, 
but  the  conscientious  turning  of  the  soul  to  God  which  baptism  symbolizes, 
saves  US  ( 1  Pet.  3  :  21  —  oweidr/oeus  ayaftrjs  eTrepuTrjfj-a  ).  Texts  like  John 
3  : 5,  Acts  2  : 38,  Col.  2  : 12,  Tit.  3  : 5,  are  to  be  explained  upon  the  princi- 
ple that  regeneration,  the  inward  change,  and  baptism,  the  outward  sign 
of  that  change,  were  regarded  as  only  different  sides  or  aspects  of  the  same 
fact,  and  either  side  or  aspect  might  therefore  be  described  in  terms 
derived  from  the  other. 

(  6  )  Upon  this  view,  there  is  a  striking  incongruity  between  the  nature 
of  the  change  to  be  wrought  and  the  means  employed  to  produce  it.  The 
change  is  a  spiritual  one,  but  the  means  are  physical.  It  is  far  more 
rational  to  suppose  that,  in  changing  the  character  of  intelligent  beings, 
God  uses  means  which  have  relation  to  their  intelligence.  The  view  we 
are  considering  is  part  and  parcel  of  a  general  scheme  of  mechanical  rather 
than  moral  salvation,  and  is  more  consistent  with  a  materialistic  than  with 
a  spiritual  philosophy. 

B.  The  Scriptural  view  is  that  regeneration,  so  far  as  it  secures  an 
activity  of  man,  is  accomplished  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  truth. 
Although  the  Holy  Spirit  does  not  in  any  way  illuminate  the  truth,  he 
does  illuminate  the  mind,  so  that  it  can  perceive  the  truth.  In  conjunc- 
tion with  the  change  of  man's  inner  disposition,  there  is  an  appeal  to  man's 
rational  nature  through  the  truth.  Two  inferences  may  be  drawn  : 

(  a )  Man  is  not  wholly  passive  at  the  time  of  his  regeneration.  He  is 
passive  only  with  respect  to  the  change  of  his  ruling  disposition.  With 
respect  to  the  exercise  of  this  disposition,  he  is  active.  Although  the  effi- 
cient power  which  secures  this  exercise  of  the  new  disposition  is  the  power 
of  God,  yet  man  is  not  therefore  unconscious,  nor  is  he  a  mere  machine 
worked  by  God's  fingers.  On  the  other  hand,  his  whole  moral  nature 
under  God's  working  is  alive  and  active.  We  reject  the  "exercise-system," 
which  regards  God  as  the  direct  author  of  all  man's  thoughts,  feelings, 
and  volitions,  not  only  in  its  general  tenor,  but  in  its  special  application  to 
regeneration. 

(  b  )  The  activity  of  man's  mind  in  regeneration  is  activity  in  view  of 
the  truth.  God  secures  the  initial  exercise  of  the  new  disposition  which 
he  has  wrought  in  man's  heart  in  connection  with  the  use  of  truth  as  a 
means.  Here  we  perceive  the  link  between  the  efficiency  of  God  and  the 
activity  of  man.  Only  as  the  sinner's  mind  is  brought  into  contact  with 
the  truth,  does  God  complete  his  regenerating  work.  And  as  the  change 
of  inward  disposition  and  the  initial  exercise  of  it  are  never,  so  far  as  we 
know,  separated  by  any  interval  of  time,  we  can  say,  in  general,  that 
Christian  work  is  successful  only  as  it  commends  the  truth  to  every  man's 
conscience  in  the  sight  of  God  ( 2  Cor.  4:2). 


218  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATION". 

5.     The  Nature  of  the  Change  wrought  in  Regeneration. 

A.  It  is  a  change  in  which  the  governing  disposition  is  made  holy. 
This  implies  that : 

( a )  It  is  not  a  change  in  the  substance  of  either  body  or  soul.     Regen- 
eration  is  not  a  physical  change.     There  is  no  physical  seed  or  germ 
implanted  in  man's  nature.     Regeneration  does  not  add  to,  or  subtract 
from,  the  number  of  man's  intellectual,  emotional  or  voluntary  faculties. 
But  regeneration  is  the  giving  of  a  new  direction  or  tendency  to  powers 
of  affection  which  man  possessed  before.     Man  had  the  faculty  of  love 
before,  but  his  love  was  supremely  set  on  self.     In  regeneration  the  direc- 
tion of  that  faculty  is  changed,  and  his  love  is  now  set  supremely  upon 
God. 

( b )  Regeneration  involves  an  enlightenment  of  the  understanding  and 
a  rectification  of  the  volitions.   But  it  seems  most  consonant  with  Scripture 
and  with  a  correct  psychology  to  regard  these  changes  as  immediate  and 
necessary  consequences  of  the  change  of  disposition  already  mentioned, 
rather  than  as  the  primary  and  central  facts  in  regeneration.    The  taste  for 
truth  logically  precedes  perception  of  the  truth,  and  love  for  God  logically 
precedes  obedience  to  God;  indeed,  without  love  no  obedience  is  possible. 
Reverse  the  lever  of  affection,  and  this  moral  locomotive,  without  further 
change,  will  move  away  from  sin,  and  toward  truth  and  God. 

(c)  It  is  objected,  indeed,  that  we  know  only  of  mental  substance  and  of 
mental  acts,  and  that  the  new  disposition  or  state  just  mentioned,  since  it 
is  not  an  act,  must  be  regarded  as  a  new  substance,  and  so  lack  all  moral 
quality.     But  we  reply  that,  besides  substance  and  acts,  there  are  habits, 
tendencies,  proclivities,  some  of  them  native  and  some  of  them  acquired. 
They  are  voluntary,  and  have  moral  character.     If  we  can  by  repeated 
acts  originate  sinful  tendencies,  God  can  surely  originate  in  us  holy  ten- 
dencies.    Such  holy  tendencies  formed  a  part  of  the  nature  of  Adam,  as 
he  came  from  the  hand  of  God.     As  the  result  of  the  Fall,  we  are  born 
with  tendencies  toward  evil  for  which  we  are  responsible.     Regeneration 
is  a  restoration  of  the  original  tendencies  toward  God  which  were  lost  by 
the  Fall.     Such  holy  tendencies  ( tastes,  dispositions,  affections  )  are  not 
only  not  unmoral — they  are  the  only  possible  springs  of  right  moral  action. 
Only  in  the  restoration  of  them  does  man  become  truly  free. 

B.  It  is  an  instantaneous  change,  in  a  region  of  the  soul  below  con- 
sciousness, and  is  therefore  known  only  in  its  results. 

( a )  It  is  an  instantaneous  change.  —  Regeneration  is  not  a  gradual 
work.     Although  there  may  be  a  gradual  work  of  God's  providence  and 
Spirit,  preparing  the  change,  and  a  gradual  recognition  of  it  after  it  has 
taken  place,  there  must  be  an  instant  of  time  when,  under  the  influence  of 
God's  Spirit,  the  disposition  of  the  soul,  just  before  hostile  to  God,  is 
changed  to  love.     Any  other  view  assumes  an  intermediate  state  of  indeci- 
sion which  has  no  moral  character  at  all,  and  confounds  regeneration  either 
with  conviction  or  with  sanctification. 

( b )  This  change  takes  place  in  the  region  of  the  soul  below  conscious- 
ness. — It  is  by  no  means  true  that  God's  work  in  regeneration  is  always 


COKVEKSIOtf.  219 

recognized  by  the  subject  of  it.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  never  directly 
perceived  at  all.  The  working  of  God  in  the  human  soul,  since  it  contra- 
venes no  law  of  man's  being,  but  rather  puts  him  in  the  full  and  normal 
possession  of  his  own  powers,  is  secret  and  inscrutable.  Although  man  is 
conscious,  he  is  not  conscious  of  God's  regenerating  agency. 

(c)  This  change,  however,  is  recognized  indirectly  in  its  results. — At 
the  moment  of  regeneration,  the  soul  is  conscious  only  of  the  truth  and  of 
its  own  exercises  with  reference  to  it.  That  God  is  the  author  of  its  new 
affection  is  an  inference  from  the  new  character  of  the  exercises  which  it 
prompts.  The  human  side  or  aspect  of  regeneration  is  Conversion.  This, 
and  the  Sanctification  which  follows  it  ( including  the  special  gifts  of  the 
Holy  Spirit ),  are  the  sole  evidences  in  any  particular  case  that  regenera- 
tion is  an  accomplished  fact. 

III.     CONVERSION. 

Conversion  is  that  voluntary  change  in  the  mind  of  the  sinner,  in  which 
he  turns,  on  the  one  hand,  from  sin,  and  on  the  other  hand,  to  Christ. 
The  former  or  negative  element  in  conversion,  namely,  the  turning  from 
sin,  we  denominate  repentance.  The  latter  or  positive  element  in  conver- 
sion, namely,  the  turning  to  Christ,  we  denominate  faith. 

(  a )  Conversion  is  the  human  side  or  aspect  of  that  fundamental  spirit- 
ual change  which,  as  viewed  from  the  divine  side,  we  call  regeneration. 
It  is  simply  man's  turning.  The  Scriptures  recognize  the  voluntary  activ- 
ity of  the  human  soul  in  this  change  as  distinctly  as  they  recognize  the 
causative  agency  of  God.  While  God  turns  men  to  himself  ( Ps.  85  :  4 ; 
Song  1:4;  Jer.  31 : 18  ;  Lam.  5 : 21 ),  men  are  exhorted  to  turn  themselves 
to  God  (  Prov.  1 :  23  ;  Is.  31 :  6  ;  59  :  20 ;  Ez.  14  :  6  ;  18  :  32  ;  33  :  9,  11 ; 
Joel  2  : 12-14  ).  While  God  is  represented  as  the  author  of  the  new  heart 
and  the  new  spirit  (  Ps.  51  : 10  ;  Ez.  11 : 19  ;  36  :  26  ),  men  are  commanded 
to  make  for  themselves  a  new  heart  and  a  new  spirit  (  Ez.  18  :  31 ;  2  Cor. 
7 : 1 ;  c/.  PhiL  2  : 12,  13 ;  Eph.  5  : 14). 

( 6 )  This  twofold  method  of  representation  can  be  explained  only  when 
we  remember  that  man's  powers  may  be  interpenetrated  and  quickened  by 
the  divine,  not  only  without  destroying  man's  freedom,  but  with  the  result 
of  making  man  for  the  first  time  truly  free.  Since  the  relation  between 
the  divine  and  the  human  activity  is  not  one  of  chronological  succession, 
man  is  never  to  wait  for  God's  working.  If  he  is  ever  regenerated,  it  must 
be  in  and  through  a  movement  of  his  own  will,  in  which  he  turns  to  God 
as  unconstrainedly  and  with  as  little  consciousness  of  God's  operation  upon 
him,  as  if  no  such  operation  of  God  were  involved  in  the  change.  And  in 
preaching,  we  are  to  press  upon  men  the  claims  of  God  and  their  duty  of 
immediate  submission  to  Christ,  with  the  certainty  that  they  who  do  so 
submit  will  subsequently  recognize  this  new  and  holy  activity  of  their  own 
wills  as  due  to  a  working  within  them  of  divine  power. 

( c )  From  the  fact  that  the  word  '  conversion '  means  simply  '  a  turning,' 
every  turning  of  the  Christian  from  sin,  subsequent  to  the  first,  may,  in  a 
subordinate  sense,  be  denominated  a  conversion  ( Luke  22  :  32 ).  Since 


220  SOTERIOLOGT,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  SALVATION. 

regeneration  is  not  complete  sanctification,  and  the  change  of  governing 
disposition  is  not  identical  with  complete  purification  of  the  nature,  such 
subsequent  turnings  from  sin  are  necessary  consequences  and  evidences  of 
the  first  (c/.  John  13  : 10).  But  they  do  not,  like  the  first,  imply  a  change 
in  the  governing  disposition,  —  they  are  rather  new  manifestations  of  a 
disposition  already  changed.  For  this  reason,  conversion  proper,  like  the 
regeneration  of  which  it  is  the  obverse  side,  can  occur  but  once.  The 
phrase  '  second  conversion,'  even  if  it  does  not  imply  radical  misconception 
of  the  nature  of  conversion,  is  misleading.  We  prefer,  therefore,  to 
describe  these  subsequent  experiences,  not  by  the  term  *  conversion,*  but 
by  such  phrases  as  '  breaking  off,  forsaking,  returning  from,  neglects  or 
transgressions,'  and  'coming  back  to  Christ,  trusting  anew  in  him.'  It  is 
with  repentance  and  faith,  as  elements  in  that  first  and  radical  change  by 
which  the  soul  enters  upon  a  state  of  salvation,  that  we  have  now  to  do. 

1.    Repentance. 

Repentance  is  that  voluntary  change  in  the  mind  of  the  sinner  IA  which 
he  turns  from  sin.  Being  essentially  a  change  of  mind,  it  involves  a 
change  of  view,  a  change  of  feeling,  and  a  change  of  purpose.  We  may 
therefore  analyze  repentance  into  three  constituents,  each  succeeding  term 
of  which  includes  and  implies  the  one  preceding  : 

A.  An  intellectual  element,  —  change  of  view  —  recognition  of  sin  as 
involving  personal  guilt,  defilement,  and  helplessness  (Ps.  51 : 3,  7,  11). 
If  unaccompanied  by  the  following  elements,  this  recognition  may  mani- 
fest itself  in  fear  of  punishment,  although  as  yet  there  is  no  hatred  of  sin. 
This  element  is  indicated  in  the  Scripture  phrase  ivi'yvuatf  dfMpnag  (Bom. 
3:20;  c/.  1:32). 

B.  An  emotional  element,  —  change  of  feeling  —  sorrow  for  sin  as  com- 
mitted against  goodness  and  justice,  and  therefore  hateful  to  God,  and 
hateful  in  itself  ( Ps.  51 : 1,  2,  10,  14 ).     This  element  of  repentance  is  indi- 
cated in  the  Scripture  word  pera/jiifofuu.    If  accompanied  by  the  following 
element,  it  is  a  ^.v^t]  Kara  Qe6v.    If  not  so  accompanied,  it  is  a  ^vmj  TOV  Kdopov 
=  remorse  and  despair  ( Mat.  27 :  3 ;  Luke  18  :  23 ;  2  Cor.  7  :  9,  10  ). 

C.  A  voluntary  element, —  change  of  purpose  —  inward  turning  from 
sin  and  disposition  to  seek  pardon  and  cleansing  ( Ps.  51 : 5,  7,  10 ;  Jer. 
25  : 5 ).     This  includes  and  implies  the  two  preceding  elements,  and  is 
therefore  the  most  important  aspect  of  repentance.     It  is  indicated  in  the 
Scripture  term  ^erdvoia  ( Acts  2  :  38 ;  Bom.  2:1). 

In  broad  distinction  from  the  Scriptural  doctrine,  we  find  the  Romanist 
view,  which  regards  the  three  elements  of  repentance  as  the  following: 
( 1 )  contrition ;  ( 2 )  confession ;  ( 3 )  satisfaction.  Of  these,  contrition  is 
the  only  element  properly  belonging  to  repentance ;  yet  from  this  contri- 
tion the  Bomanist  excludes  all  sorrow  for  sin  of  nature.  Confession  is  con- 
fession to  the  priest ;  and  satisfaction  is  the  sinner's  own  doing  of  outward 
penance,  as  a  temporal  and  symbolic  submission  and  reparation  to  violated 
law.  This  view  is  false  and  pernicious,  in  that  it  confounds  repentance 
with  its  outward  fruits,  conceives  of  it  as  exercised  rather  toward  the  church 


CONVERSIONS  221 

than  toward  God,  and  regards  it  as  a  meritorious  ground,  instead  of  a  mere 
condition,  of  pardon. 

In  further  explanation  of  the  Scripture  representations,  we  remark : 

(  a )  That  repentance,  in  each  and  all  of  its  aspects,  is  wholly  an  inward 
act,  not  to  be  confounded  with  the  change  of  life  which  proceeds  from  it. 

True  repentance  is  indeed  manifested  and  evidenced  by  confession  of  sin 
before  God  ( Luke  18 : 13 ),  and  by  reparation  for  wrongs  done  to  men 
(Luke  19  :  8).  But  these  do  not  constitute  repentance ;  they  are  rather 
fruits  of  repentance.  Between  '  repentance '  and  *  fruit  worthy  of  repent- 
ance,' Scripture  plainly  distinguishes  (Mat.  3:8). 

(6)  That  repentance  is  only  a  negative  condition,  and  not  a  positive 
means  of  salvation. 

This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  repentance  is  no  more  than  the  sinner's 
present  duty,  and  can  furnish  no  offset  to  the  claims  of  the  law  on  account 
of  past  transgression.  The  truly  penitent  man  feels  that  his  repentance  has 
no  merit.  Apart  from  the  positive  element  of  conversion,  namely,  faith  in 
Christ,  it  would  be  only  sorrow  for  guilt  unremoved.  This  very  sorrow, 
moreover,  is  not  the  mere  product  of  human  will,  but  is  the  gift  of  God. 

( c )  That  true  repentance,  however,  never  exists  except  in  conjunction 
with  faith. 

Sorrow  for  sin,  not  simply  on  account  of  its  evil  consequences  to  the 
transgressor,  but  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  hatef  ulness  as  opposed  to  divine 
holiness  and  love,  is  practically  impossible  without  some  confidence  in 
God's  mercy.  It  is  the  Cross  which  first  makes  us  truly  penitent  (  cf.  John 
12  :  32,  33  ).  Hence  all  true  preaching  of  repentance  is  implicitly  a  preach- 
ing of  faith  (Mat.  3  : 1-12 ;  cf.  Acts  19  :  4),  and  repentance  toward  God 
involves  faith  in  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  (Acts  20 :  21 ;  Luke  15 :  10,  24; 
19:8,9;  cf.  Gal.  3:7). 

(d)  That,  conversely,  wherever  there  is  true  faith,  there  is  true  repent- 
ance also. 

Since  repentance  and  faith  are  but  different  sides  or  aspects  of  the  same 
act  of  turning,  faith  is  as  inseparable  from  repentance  as  repentance  is  from 
faith.  That  must  be  an  unreal  faith  where  there  is  no  repentance,  just  as 
that  must  be  an  unreal  repentance  where  there  is  no  faith.  Yet  because 
the  one  aspect  of  his  change  is  more  prominent  in  the  mind  of  the  convert 
than  the  other,  we  are  not  hastily  to  conclude  that  the  other  is  absent. 
Only  that  degree  of  conviction  of  sin  is  essential  to  salvation,  which  carries 
with  it  a  forsaking  of  sin  and  a  trustful  surrender  to  Christ. 

2.     Faith. 

Faith  is  that  voluntary  change  in  the  mind  of  the  sinner  in  which  he 
turns  to  Christ.  Being  essentially  a  change  of  mind,  it  involves  a  change 
of  view,  a  change  of  feeling,  and  a  change  of  purpose.  We  may  therefore 
analyze  faith  also  into  three  constituents,  each  succeeding  term  of  which 
includes  and  implies  the  preceding  : 

A.  An  intellectual  element  (notitia,  credere  Deum), — recognition  of 
the  truth  of  God's  revelation,  or  of  the  objective  reality  of  the  salvation 


SOTERIOLOGY,    OK  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATION. 

provided  by  Christ.  This  includes  not  only  a  historical  belief  in  the  facts 
of  the  Scripture,  but  an  intellectual  belief  in  the  doctrine  taught  therein 
as  to  man's  sinfulness  and  dependence  upon  Christ. 

B.  An  emotional  element  ( assensus,  credere  Deo  ),  —  assent  to  the 
revelation  of  God's  power  and  grace  in  Jesus  Christ,  as  applicable  to  the 
present  needs  of  the  soul.    Those  in  whom  this  awakening  of  the  sensibili- 
ties is  unaccompanied  by  the  fundamental  decision  of  the  will,  which  con- 
stitutes the  next  element  of  faith,  may  seem  to  themselves,  and  for  a  time 
may  appear  to  others,  to  have  accepted  Christ. 

Saving  faith,  however,  includes  also  : 

C.  A  voluntary  element  (fiducia,  credere  in  Deum  ),  —  trust  in  Christ 
as  Lord  and  Savior ;  or,  in  other  words — to  distinguish  its  two  aspects : 

(  a  )  Surrender  of  the  soul,  as  guilty  and  defiled,  to  Christ's  governance. 

( b )  Reception  and  appropriation  of  Christ,  as  the  source  of  pardon  and 
spiritual  life. 

The  passages  already  referred  to  refute  the  view  of  the  Eomanist,  that 
saving  faith  is  simply  implicit  assent  to  the  doctrines  of  the  church ;  and 
the  view  of  the  Disciple  or  Campbellite,  that  faith  is  merely  intellectual 
belief  in  the  truth,  on  the  presentation  of  evidence. 

In  further  explanation  of  the  Scripture  representations,  we  remark  : 

(  a )  That  faith  is  an  act  of  the  affections  and  will,  as  truly  as  it  is  an  act 
of  the  intellect. 

It  has  been  claimed  that  faith  and  unbelief  are  purely  intellectual  states, 
which  are  necessarily  determined  by  the  facts  at  any  given  time  presented 
to  the  mind ;  and  that  they  are,  for  this  reason,  as  destitute  of  moral  quality 
and  as  far  from  being  matters  of  obligation,  as  are  our  instinctive  feelings 
of  pleasure  and  pain.  But  this  view  unwarrantably  isolates  the  intellect, 
and  ignores  the  fact  that,  in  all  moral  subjects,  the  state  of  the  affections 
and  will  affects  the  judgment  of  the  mind  with  regard  to  truth.  In  the 
intellectual  act  the  whole  moral  nature  expresses  itself.  Since  the  tastes 
determine  the  opinions,  faith  is  a  moral  act,  and  men  are  responsible  for 
not  believing. 

(  b  )  That  the  object  of  saving  faith  is,  in  general,  the  whole  truth  of  God, 
so  far  as  it  is  objectively  revealed  or  made  known  to  the  soul ;  but,  in  par- 
ticular, the  person  and  work  of  Jesus  Christ,  which  constitutes  the  centre 
and  substance  of  God's  revelation  (Acts  17  : 18 ;  1  Cor.  1 : 23 ;  Col.  1 :  27  ; 
Eev.  19: 10). 

The  patriarchs,  though  they  had  no  knowledge  of  a  personal  Christ,  were 
saved  by  believing  in  God  so  far  as  God  had  revealed  himself  to  them ;  and 
whoever  among  the  heathen  are  saved,  must  in  like  manner  be  saved  by 
casting  themselves  as  helpless  sinners  upon  God's  plan  of  mercy,  diuily 
shadowed  forth  in  nature  and  providence.  But  such  faith,  even  among  the 
patriarchs  and  heathen,  is  implicitly  a  faith  in  Christ,  and  would  become 
explicit  and  conscious  trust  and  submission,  whenever  Christ  were  made 
known  to  them  ( Mat.  8 : 11,  12 ;  John  10  : 16 ;  Acts  4  : 12 ;  10  :  31,  34,  35, 
44;  16:31). 


CONVERSION-.  223 

(c)  That  the  ground  of  faith  is  the  external  word  of  promise.  The 
ground  of  assurance,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  inward  witness  of  the  Spirit 
that  we  fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  promise  ( Rom.  4  :  20,  21 ;  8  : 16 ;  Eph. 
1 :  13 ;  1  John  4  : 13  ;  5  : 10 ).  This  witness  of  the  Spirit  is  not  a  new  reve- 
lation from  God,  but  a  strengthening  of  faith  so  that  it  becomes  conscious 
and  indubitable. 

True  faith  is  possible  without  assurance  of  salvation.  But  if  Alexander's 
view  were  correct,  that  the  object  of  saving  faith  is  the  proposition  :  "God, 
for  Christ's  sake,  now  looks  with  reconciling  love  on  me,  a  sinner,"  no  one 
could  believe,  without  being  at  the  same  time  assured  that  he  was  a  saved 
person.  Upon  the  true  view,  that  the  object  of  saving  faith  is  not  a  propo- 
sition, but  a  person,  we  can  perceive  not  only  the  simplicity  of  faith,  but 
the  possibility  of  faith  even  where  the  soul  is  destitute  of  assurance  or  of 
joy.  Hence  those  who  already  believe  are  urged  to  seek  for  assurance 
(Heb.  6:11;  2  Peter  1:10). 

{d}  That  faith  necessarily  leads  to  good  works,  since  it  embraces  the 
whole  truth  of  God  so  far  as  made  known,  and  appropriates  Christ,  not  only 
as  an  external  Savior,  but  as  an  internal  sanctifying  power  (  Heb.  7 : 15,  16  ; 
Gal.  5  :  6). 

Good  works  are  the  proper  evidence  of  faith.  The  faith  which  does  not 
lead  men  to  act  upon  the  commands  and  promises  of  Christ,  or,  in  other 
words,  does  not  lead  to  obedience,  is  called  in  Scripture  a  "dead,"  that  is, 
an  unreal,  faith.  Such  faith  is  not  saving,  since  it  lacks  the  voluntary  ele- 
ment—  actual  appropriation  of  Christ  (James  2  : 14-26). 

( e  )  That  faith,  as  characteristically  the  inward  act  of  reception,  is  not  to 
be  confounded  with  love  or  obedience,  its  fruit. 

Faith  is,  in  the  Scriptures,  called  a  work,  only  in  the  sense  that  man's 
active  powers  are  engaged  in  it.  It  is  a  work  which  God  requires,  yet 
which  God  enables  man  to  perform  ( John  6  :  29 — Ipyov  TOV  Geoi).  Of.  Rom. 
1 : 17 — diKaiocvvrj  6foi;).  As  the  gift  of  God  and  as  the  mere  taking  of  unde- 
served mercy,  it  is  expressly  excluded  from  the  category  of  works  upon  the 
basis  of  which  man  may  claim  salvation  ( Rom.  3  :  28 ;  4  :  4,  5,  16 ).  It  is 
not  the  act  of  the  full  soul  bestowing,  but  the  act  of  an  empty  soul  receiv- 
ing. Although  this  reception  is  prompted  by  a  drawing  of  heart  toward 
God  inwrought  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  this  drawing  of  heart  is  not  yet  a  con- 
scious and  developed  love:  such  love  is  the  result  of  faith  (Gal.  5:6) 
What  precedes  faith  is  an  unconscious  and  undeveloped  tendency  or  dispo-- 
sition  toward  God.  Conscious  and  developed  affection  toward  God,  or  love 
proper,  must  always  follow  faith  and  be  the  product  of  faith.  So,  too, 
obedience  can  be  rendered  only  after  faith  has  laid  hold  of  Christ,  and  with 
him  has  obtained  the  spirit  of  obedience  (Rom.  1  :  5  —  viraao^v  Trmrfwf  = 
"obedience  resulting  from  faith  ").  Hence  faith  is  not  the  procuring  cause 
of  salvation,  but  is  only  the  instrumental  cause.  The  procuring  cause  is 
the  Christ,  whom  faith  embraces. 

(/)  That  faith  is  susceptible  of  increase. 

This  is  evident,  whether  we  consider  it  from  the  human  or  from  the  divine 
side.  As  an  act  of  man,  it  has  an  intellectual,  an  emotional,  and  a  voluntary 


224  80TERIOLOQY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATIOK. 

element,  each  of  which  is  capable  of  growth.  As  a  work  of  God  in  the  soul 
of  man,  it  can  receive,  through  the  presentation  of  the  truth  and  the  quick- 
ening agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  continually  new  accessions  of  knowledge, 
sensibility,  and  active  energy.  Such  increase  of  faith,  therefore,  we  are  to 
seek,  both  by  resolute  exercise  of  our  own  powers,  and  above  all,  by  direct 
application  to  the  source  of  faith  in  God  ( Luke  17  :  5  ). 

IV.    JUSTIFICATION. 

1.  Definition  of  Justification. 

By  justification  we  mean  that  judicial  act  of  God  by  which,  on  account  of 
Christ,  to  whom  the  sinner  is  united  by  faith,  he  declares  that  sinner  to  be 
no  longer  exposed  to  the  penalty  of  the  law,  but  to  be  restored  to  his  favor. 
Or,  to  give  an  alternative  definition  from  which  all  metaphor  is  excluded : 
Justification  is  the  reversal  of  God's  attitude  toward  the  sinner,  because  of 
the  sinner's  new  relation  to  Christ.  God  did  condemn ;  he  now  acquits. 
He  did  repel ;  he  now  admits  to  favor. 

Justification,  as  thus  defined,  is  therefore  a  declarative  act,  as  distin- 
guished from  an  efficient  act ;  an  act  of  God  external  to  the  sinner,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  an  act  within  the  sinner's  nature  and  changing  that  nature ; 
a  judicial  act,  as  distinguished  from  a  sovereign  act ;  an  act  based  upon  and 
logically  presupposing  the  sinner's  union  with  Christ,  as  distinguished  from 
an  act  which  causes  and  is  followed  by  that  union  with  Christ. 

2.  Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Justification. 

A.  Scripture  proofs  of  the  doctrine  as  a  whole  are  the  following  : 

B.  Scripture  use  of  the  special  words  translated  "justify  "  and  " justifi- 
cation" in  the  Septuagint  and  in  the  New  Testament. 

(  a )  diKaidu  —  uniformly,  or  with  only  a  single  exception,  signifies,  not  to 
make  righteous,  but  to  declare  just,  or  free  from  guilt  and  exposure  to  pun- 
ishment. The  only  O.  T.  passage  where  this  meaning  is  questionable  is 
Dan.  12  : 3.  But  even  here  the  proper  translation  is,  in  all  probability,  not 
'they  that  turn  many  to  righteousness,'  but  'they  that  justify  many,'  i.  e., 
cause  many  to  be  justified.  For  the  Hiphil  force  of  the  verb,  see  Girdle- 
stone,  O.  T.  Syn.,  257,  258,  and  Delitzsch  on  Is.  53  : 11 ;  cf.  James  5 : 19,  20. 

In  Rom.  6:7  —  b  yap  anofiavuv  6e?>iK.aiuTai  and  rf/c  d/napriac  =  'he  that  once 
died  with  Christ  was  acquitted  from  the  service  of  sin  considered  as  a  pen- 
ality.'  In  1  Cor.  4. :  4 —  ovdev  yap  ifiavry  cvvoida.  d/W  OVK.SV  Tointf  dt^maiufj.a 
=  '  I  am  conscious  of  no  fault,  but  that  does  not  in  itself  make  certain  God's 
acquittal  as  respects  this  particular  charge. '  The  usage  of  the  epistle  of 
James  does  not  contradict  this  ;  the  doctrine  of  James  is  that  we  are  justi- 
fied only  by  such  faith  as  makes  us  faithful  and  brings  forth  good  works. 
"  He  uses  the  word  exclusively  in  a  judicial  sense  ;  he  combats  a  mistaken 
view  of  TrtCTr^,  not  a  mistaken  view  of  &«o«k>";  see  James  2  : 21,  23,  24,  and 
Cremer,  N.  T.  Lexicon,  Eng.  trans.,  182,  183.  The  only  N.  T.  passage 
where  this  meaning  is  questionable  is  Rev.  22  :11 ;  but  here  Alford,  with 

K,  A  and  B,  reads  dtnaiocvvrjv  Troirjcaru. 

(6)  diKaiucis — is  the  act,  in  process,  of  declaring  a  man  just, —  that  is, 
acquitted  from  guilt  and  restored  to  the  divine  favor  ( Rom.  4 : 25 ;  5  : 18 . 


JUSTIFICATION.  £25 

(c)  <5iKaiufj.a — is  the  act,  as  already  accomplished,  of  declaring  a  man 
just,— that  is,  no  longer  exposed  to  penalty,  but  restored  to  God's  favor 
(Horn.  5 : 16,  18;  c/.  1  Tim.  3 : 16).     Hence,  in  other  connections,  dmaiufui 
has  the  meaning  of  statute,  legal  decision,  act  of  justice  (  Luke  1:6;  Eom. 
2  : 26  ;  Heb.  9:1). 

( d )  JtttaioavvTj  —  is  the  state  of  one  justified,  or  declared  just  (  Bom.  8  : 
10  ;  1  Cor.  1 : 30).     In  Eom.  10 : 3,  Paul  inveighs  against  ri)v  16 lav  diKaioovvyv 
as  insufficient  and  false,  and  in  its  place  would  put  rfjv  rov  Qeov  6iKaioovvr}v, — 
that  is,  a  diKatoavvr}  which  God  not  only  requires,  but  provides  ;  which  is  not 
only  acceptable  to  God,  but  proceeds  from  God,  and  is  appropriated  by 
faith, — hence  called  8iK.aioai>i/rj  nioTtus  or  £«•  Triarecj^.    *'The  primary  significa- 
tion of  the  word,  in  Paul's  writings,  is  therefore  that  state  of  the  believer 
which  is  called  forth  by  God's  act  of  acquittal,— the  state  of  the  believer  as 
justified,"  that  is,  freed  from  punishment  and  restored  to  the  divine  favor. 

Since  this  state  of  acquittal  is  accompanied  by  changes  in  the  character 
and  conduct,  diKaioovvq  comes  to  mean,  secondarily,  the  moral  condition  of 
the  believer  as  resulting  from  this  acquittal  and  inseparably  connected  with 
it  ( Bom.  14  : 17 ;  2  Cor.  5  :  21 ).  This  righteousness  arising  from  justifica- 
tion becomes  a  principle  of  action  (  Mat.  3 : 15  ;  Acts  10  : 35  ;  Bom.  6  : 13, 
18),  The  term,  however,  never  loses  its  implication  of  a  justifying  act 
upon  which  this  principle  of  action  is  based. 

It  is  worthy  of  special  observation  that,  in  the  passages  cited  above,  the 
terms  "justify"  and  "justification"  are  contrasted,  not  with  the  process  of 
depraving  or  corrupting,  but  with  the  outward  act  of  condemning  ;  and  that 
the  expressions  used  to  explain  and  illustrate  them  are  all  derived,  not  from 
the  in  ward  operation  of  purifying  the  soul  01  infusing  into  it  righteousness, 
but  from  the  procedure  of  courts  in  their  judgments,  or  of  offended  persons 
in  their  forgiveness  of  offenders.  We  conclude  that  these  terms,  wherever 
they  have  releience  to  the  sinner's  relation  to  God,  signify  a  declarative  and 
judicial  act  of  God,  external  to  the  sinner,  and  not  an  efficient  and  sovereign 
act  of  God  changing  the  sinner's  nature  and  making  him  subjectively 
righteous. 

3.     Elements  of  Justification. 

These  are  two  : 

A.     Bemission  of  punishment. 

(  a )  God  acquits  the  ungodly  who  believe  in  Christ,  and  declares  them 
just.  This  is  not  to  declare  them  innocent, — that  would  be  a  judgment 
contrary  to  truth.  It  declares  that  the  demands  of  the  law  have  been  satis- 
fied with  regard  to  them,  and  that  they  are  now  free  from  its  condemnation. 

(  b )  This  acquital,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  act  of  God  as  judge  or  executive, 
administering  law,  may  be  denominated  pardon.  In  so  far  as  it  is  the  act 
ol  God  as  a  father  personally  injured  and  grieved  by  sin,  yet  showing  grace 
to  the  sinner,  it  is  denominated  forgiveness. 

( c )  In  an  earthly  tribunal,  there  is  no  acquittal  for  those  who  are  proved 
to  be  transgessors, —  for  such  there  is  only  conviction  and  punishment. 
But  in  God's  government  there  is  remission  of  punishment  for  believers, 
even  though  they  are  confessedly  offenders ;  and,  in  justification,  God 
declares  this  remission. 


226  SOTERIOLOGY,    OK  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SALVATION". 

(  d  )  The  declaration  that  the  sinner  is  no  longer  exposed  to  the  penalty 
of  law,  has  its  ground,  not  in  any  satisfaction  of  the  law's  demand  on  the 
part  of  the  sinner  himself,  but  solely  in  the  bearing  of  the  penalty  by 
Christ,  to  whom  the  sinner  is  united  by  faith.  Justification,  in  its  first 
element,  is  therefore  that  act  by  which  God,  for  the  sake  of  Christ,  acquits 
the  transgressor  and  suffers  him  to  go  free. 

B.     Restoration  to  favor. 

(a)  Justification  is  more  than  remission  or  acquittal.  These  would 
leave  the  sinner  simply  in  the  position  of  a  discharged  criminal, —  law 
requires  a  positive  righteousness  also.  Besides  deliverance  from  punish- 
ment, justification  implies  God's  treatment  of  the  sinner  as  if  he  were,  and 
had  been,  personally  righteous.  The  justified  person  receives  not  only 
remission  of  penalty,  but  the  rewards  promised  to  obedience. 

( b  )  This  restoration  to  favor,  viewed  in  its  aspect  as  the  renewal  of  a 
broken  friendship,  is  denominated  reconciliation  ;  viewed  in  its  aspect  as  a 
renewal  of  the  soul's  true  relation  to  God  as  a  father,  it  is  denominated 
adoption. 

(  c )  In  an  earthly  pardon  there  are  no  special  helps  bestowed  upon  the 
pardoned.  There  are  no  penalties,  but  there  are  also  no  rewards  ;  law  can- 
not claim  anything  of  the  discharged,  but  then  they  also  can  claim  nothing 
of  the  law.  But  what,  though  greatly  needed,  is  left  unprovided  by  human 
government,  God  does  provide.  In  justification,  there  is  not  only  acquittal, 
but  approval ;  not  only  pardon,  but  promotion.  Remission  is  never  sepa- 
rated from  restoration. 

( d  )  The  declaration  that  the  sinner  is  restored  to  God's  favor,  has  its 
ground,  not  in  the  sinner's  personal  character  or  conduct,  but  solely  in  the 
obedience  and  righteousness  of  Christ,  to  whom  the  sinner  is  united  by 
faith.  Thus  Christ's  work  is  the  procuring  cause  of  our  justification,  in 
both  its  elements.  As  we  are  acquitted  on  account  of  Christ's  suffering  of 
the  penalty  of  the  law,  so  on  account  of  Christ's  obedience  we  receive  the 
rewards  of  law. 

4.     Relation  of  Justification  to  God's  Law  and  Holiness. 

A.  Justification  has  been  shown  to  be  a  forensic  term.  A  man  may, 
indeed,  be  conceived  of  as  just,  in  either  of  two  senses  :  ( a )  as  just  in 
moral  character, —  that  is,  absolutely  holy  in  nature,  disposition,  and  con- 
duct; (6)  as  Justin  relation  to  law, — or  as  free  from  all  obligation  to  suffer 
penalty,  and  as  entitled  to  the  rewards  of  obedience. 

So,  too,  a  man  may  be  conceived  of  as  justified,  in  either  of  two  senses  : 
(a)  made  just  in  moral  character  ;  or,  (  b  )  made  just  in  his  relation  to  law. 
But  the  Scriptures  declare  that  there  does  not  exist  on  earth  a  just  man,  in 
the  first  of  these  senses  (  Eccl.  7  :  20).  Even  in  those  who  are  renewed  in 
moral  character  and  united  to  Christ,  there  is  a  remnant  of  moral  depravity. 

If,  therefore,  there  be  any  such  thing  as  a  just  man,  he  must  be  just,  not 
in  the  sense  of  possessing  an  unspotted  holiness,  but  in  the  sense  of  being 
delivered  from  the  penalty  of  law,  and  made  partaker  of  its  rewards.  If 
there  be  any  such  thing  as  justification,  it  must  be,  not  an  act  of  God 


JUSTIFICATION.  227 

which  renders  the  sinner  absolutely  holy,  but  an  act  of  God  which  declares 
the  sinner  to  be  free  from  legal  penalties  and  entitled  to  legal  rewards. 

B.  The  difficult  feature  of  justification  is  the  declaration,  on  the  part  of 
God,  that  a  sinner  whose  remaining  sinfulness  seems  to  necessitate  the  vin- 
dicative reaction  of  God's  holiness  against  him,  is  yet  free  from  such  reaction 
of  holiness  as  is  expressed  in  the  penalties  of  the  law. 

The  fact  is  to  be  accepted  on  the  testimony  of  Scripture.  If  this  testimony 
be  not  accepted,  there  is  no  deliverance  from  the  condemnation  of  law.  But 
the  difficulty  of  conceiving  of  God's  declaring  the  sinner  no  longer  exposed 
to  legal  penalty  is  relieved,  if  not  removed,  by  the  three-fold  consideration : 

( a )  That  Christ  has  endured  the  penalty  of  the  law  in  the  sinner's  stead. 

(6)  That  the  sinner  is  so  united  to  Christ,  that  Christ's  life  already  con- 
stitutes the  dominating  principle  within  him. 

(c)  That  this  life  of  Christ  is  a  power  in  the  soul  which  will  gradually, 
but  infallibly,  extirpate  all  remaining  depravity,  until  the  whole  physical 
and  moral  nature  is  perfectly  conformed  to  the  divine  holiness. 

5.  Relation  of  Justification  to  Union  with  Christ  and  the  Work  of 
the  Spirit. 

A.  Since  the  sinner,  at  the  moment  of  justification,  is  not  yet  com- 
pletely transformed  in  character,  we  have  seen  that  God  can  declare  him 
just,  not  on  account  of  what  he  is  in  himself,  but  only  on  account  of  what 
Christ  is.  The  ground  of  justification  is  therefore  not,  (  a)  as  the  Romanists 
hold,  a  new  righteousness  and  love  infused  into  us,  and  now  constituting 
our  moral  character ;  nor,  (  b  )  as  Osiander  taught,  the  essential  righteous- 
ness of  Christ's  divine  nature,  which  has  become  ours  by  faith ;  but  (  c  )  the 
satisfaction  and  obedience  of  Christ,  as  the  head  of  a  new  humanity,  and 
as  embracing  in  himself  all  believers  as  his  members. 

As  Adam's  sin  is  imputed  to  us,  not  because  Adam  is  in  us,  but  because 
we  were  in  Adam ;  so  Christ's  righteousness  is  imputed  to  us,  not  because 
Christ  is  in  us,  but  because  we  are  in  Christ, — that  is,  joined  by  faith  to 
one  whose  righteousness  and  life  are  infinitely  greater  than  our  power  to 
appropriate  or  contain.  In  this  sense,  we  may  say  that  we  are  justified 
through  a  Christ  outside  of  us,  as  we  are  sanctified  through  a  Christ  within 
us.  Edwards :  "  The  justification  of  the  believer  is  no  other  than  his  being 
admitted  to  communion  in,  or  participation  of,  this  head  and  surety  of  all 
believers." 

B.  The  relation  of  justification  to  regeneration  and  sanctification,  more- 
over, delivers  it  from  the  charges  of  externality  and  immorality.   God  does 
not  justify  ungodly  men  in  their  ungodliness.     He  pronounces  them  just 
only  as  they  are  united  to  Christ,  who  is  absolutely  just,  and  who,  by  his 
Spirit,  can  make  them  just,  not  only  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  but  in  moral 
character.    The  very  faith  by  which  the  sinner  receives  Christ  is  an  act  in 
which  he  ratifies  all  that  Christ  has  done,  and  accepts  God's  judgment 
against  sin  as  his  own  (John  16  : 11). 

Justification  is  possible,  therefore,  because  it  is  always  accompanied  by 
regeneration  and  union  with  Christ,  and  is  followed  by  sanctification.  But 


228  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SALVATION. 

this  is  a  very  different  thing  from  the  Romanist  confounding  of  justification 
and  sanctification,  as  different  stages  of  the  same  process  of  making  the 
sinner  actually  holy.  It  holds  fast  to  the  Scripture  distinction  between 
justification  as  a  declarative  act  of  God,  and  rege  aeration  and  sanctification 
as  those  efficient  acts  of  God  by  which  justification  is  accompanied  and  fol- 
lowed. 

6.    Relation  of  Justification  to  Faith. 

A.  We  are  justified  by  faith,  rather  than  by  love  or  by  any  other  grace : 
(a)  not  because  faith  is  itself  a  work  of  obedience  by  which  we  merit 
justification, — for  this  would  be  a  doctrine  of  justification  by  works ;  (  6) 
nor  because  faith  is  accepted  as  an  equivalent  of  obedience,  —  for  there  is 
no  equivalent  except  the  perfect  obedience  of  Christ ;  (  c )  nor  because 
faith  is  the  germ  from  which  obedience  may  spring  hereafter, — for  it  is 
not  the  faith  which  accepts,  but  the  Christ  who  is  accepted,  that  renders 
such  obedience  possible ;  but  (  d )  because  faith,  and  not  repentance,  or 
love,  or  hope,  is  the  medium  or  instrument  by  which  we  receive  Christ  and 
are  united  to  him.    Hence  we  are  never  said  to  be  justified  &d  niartv,  =  on 
account  of  faith,  but  only  dia  Triorew,  =  through  faith,  or  f«  Tntrrcoc,  = 
by  faith.     Or,  to  express  the  same  truth  in  other  words,  while  the  grace 
of  God  is  the  efficient  cause  of  justification,  and  the  obedience  and  suffer- 
ings of  Christ  are  the  meritorious  or  procuring  cause,  faith  is  the  mediate 
or  instrumental  cause. 

B.  Since  the  ground  of  justification  is  only  Christ,  to  whom  we  are 
united  by  faith,  the  justified  person  has  peace.    If  it  were  anything  in 
ourselves,  our  peace  must  needs  be  proportioned  to  our  holiness.     The 
practical  effect  of  the  Komanist  mingling  of  works  with  faith,  as  a  joint 
ground  of  justification,  is  to  render  all  assurance  of  salvation  impossible. 
( Council  of  Trent,  9th  chap.:  "Every  man,  by  reason  of  his  own  weak- 
ness and  defects,  must  be  in  fear  and  anxiety  about  his  state  of  grace. 
Nor  can  any  one  know,   with  infallible  certainty  of  faith,  that  he  has 
received  forgiveness  of  God. " ).     But  since  justification  is  an  instantaneous 
act  of  God,  complete  at  the  moment  of  the  sinner's  first  believing,  it  has 
no  degrees.     Weak  faith  justifies  as  perfectly  as  strong  faith  ;  although, 
since  justification  is  a  secret  act  of  God,  weak  faith  does  not  give  so  strong 
assurance  of  salvation. 

C.  Justification  is  instantaneous,  complete,  and  final :   instantaneous, 
since  otherwise  there  would  be  an  interval   during  which  the  soul  was 
neither  approved  nor  condemned  by  God  (  Mat.  6  : 24  ) ;  complete,  since 
the  soul,  united  to  Christ  by  faith,  becomes  partaker  of  his  complete  satis- 
faction to  the  demands  of  law  (  Col.  2  :  9,  10  )  ;  and  final,  since  the  union 
with  Christ  is  indissoluble  (  John  10  :28,  29).     As  there  are  many  acts  of 
sin  in  the  life  of  the  Christian,  so  there  are  many  acts  of  pardon  following 
them.     But  all  these  acts  of  pardon  are  virtually  implied  in  that  first  act 
by  which  he  was  finally  and  forever  justified  ;  as  also  successive  acts  of 
repentance  and  faith,  after  such  sins,  are  virtually  implied  in  that  first 
repentance  and  faith  which  logically  preceded  justification. 


SANCTIFICATION.  229 

7.  Advice  to  Inquirers  demanded  by  a  Scriptural  View  of  Justification. 

(  a )  Where  conviction  of  sin  is  yet  lacking,  our  aim  should  be  to  show 
the  sinner  that  he  is  under  God's  condemnation  for  his  past  sins,  and  that 
no  future  obedience  can  ever  secure  his  justification,  since  this  obedience, 
even  though  perfect,  could  not  atone  for  the  past,  and  even  if  it  could,  he 
is  unable,  without  God's  help,  to  render  it. 

( b  )  Where  conviction  of  sin  already  exists,  our  aim  should  be,  not,  in 
the  first  instance,  to  secure  the  performance  of  external  religious  duties, 
such  as  prayer,  or  Scripture-reading,  or  uniting  with  the  church,  but  to 
induce  the  sinner,  as  his  first  and  all-inclusive  duty,  to  accept  Christ  as  his 
only  and  sufficient  sacrifice  and  Savior,  and,  committing  himself  and  the 
matter  of  his  salvation  entirely  to  the  hands  of  Christ,  to  manifest  this  trust 
and  submission  by  entering  at  once  upon  a  life  of  obedience  to  Christ's 
commands. 


SECTION  III. — THE   APPLICATION   OF   CHRIST'S  REDEMPTION 
IN   ITS   CONTINUATION. 

Under  this  head  we  treat  of  Sanctification  and  of  Perseverance.  These 
two  are  but  the  divine  and  the  human  sides  of  the  same  fact,  and  they  bear 
to  each  other  a  relation  similar  to  that  which  exists  between  Regeneration 
and  Conversion. 

I.    SANOTIFICATION. 

1.  Definition  of  /Sanctification. 

Sanctification  is  that  continuous  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  by  which 
the  holy  disposition  imparted  in  regeneration  is  maintained  and  strength- 
ened. 

This  definition  implies: 

(a)  That, although  in  regeneration  the  governing  disposition  of  the  soul 
is  made  holy,  there  still  remain  tendencies  to  evil  which  are  unsubdued. 

(  b )  That  the  existence  in  the  believer  of  these  two  opposing  principles 
gives  rise  to  a  conflict  which  lasts  through  life. 

(  c )  That  in  this  conflict  the  Holy  Spirit  enables  the  Christian,  through 
increasing  faith,  more  fully  and  consciously  to  appropriate  Christ,  and  thus 
progressively  to  make  conquest  of  the  remaining  sinfulness  of  his  nature. 

2.  Explanations  and  Scripture  Proof. 
(a)  Sanctification  is  the  work  of  God. 

(  b )  It  is  a  continuous  process. 

( c )  It  is  distinguished  from  regeneration  as  growth  from  birth,  or  as  the 
strengthening  of  a  holy  disposition  from  the  original  impartation  of  it. 

( d )  The  operation  of  God  reveals  itself  in,  and  is  accompanied  by,  intel- 
ligent and  voluntary  activity  of  the  believer  in  the  discovery  and  mortifica- 
tion of  sinful  desires,  and  in  the  bringing  of  the  whole  being  into  obedience 
to  Christ  and  conformity  to  the  standards  of  his  word. 


230  SOTERIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALVATION. 

(e)  The  agency  through  which  God  effects  the  sanctification  of  the 
believer  is  the  indwelling  Spirit  of  Christ. 

(/)  The  mediate  or  instrumental  cause  of  sanctification,  as  of  justifica- 
tion, is  faith. 

(g)  The  object  of  this  faith  is  Christ  himself,  as  the  head  of  a  new 
humanity  and  the  source  of  truth  and  life  to  those  united  to  him. 

(A)  Though  the  weakest  faith  perfectly  justifies,  the  degree  of  sanctifica- 
tion is  measured  by  the  strength  of  the  Christian's  faith,  and  the  persist- 
ence with  which  he  apprehends  Christ  in  the  various  relations  which  the 
Scriptures  declare  him  to  sustain  to  us. 

(*')  From  the  lack  of  persistence  in  using  the  means  appointed  for 
Christian  growth — such  as  the  word  of  God,  prayer,  association  with  other 
believers,  and  personal  effort  for  the  conversion  of  the  ungodly — sanctifi- 
cation does  not  always  proceed  in  regular  and  unbroken  course,  and  it  is 
never  completed  in  this  life. 

(j )  Sanctification,  both  of  the  soul  and  of  the  body  of  the  believer,  is 
completed  in  the  life  to  come, — that  of  the  former  at  death,  that  of  the 
latter  at  the  resurrection. 

3.  Erroneous  Views  refuted  by  these  Scripture  Passages. 

A.  The  Antinomian,  —  which  holds  that,  since  Christ's  obedience  and 
sufferings  have  satisfied  the  demands  of  the  law,  the  believer  is  free  from 
obligation  to  observe  it 

To  this  view  we  urge  the  following  objections  : 

(a)  That  since  the  law  is  a  transcript  of  the  holiness  of  God,  its  demands 
as  a  moral  rule  are  unchanging.     Only  as  a  system  of  penalty  and  a  method 
of  salvation  is  the  law  abolished  in  Christ's  death. 

( b )  That  the  union  between  Christ  and  the  believer  secures  not  only 
the  bearing  of  the  penalty  of  the  law  by  Christ,  but  also  the  importation 
of  Christ's  spirit  of  obedience  to  the  believer,  —  in  other  words,  brings 
him  into  communion  with  Christ's  work,  and  leads  him  to  ratify  it  in  his 
own  experience. 

(c)  That  the  freedom  from  the  law  of  which  the  Scriptures  speak,  is 
therefore  simply  that  freedom  from  the  constraint  and  bondage  of  the  law, 
•which  characterizes  those  who  have  become  one  with  Christ  by  faith. 

To  sum  up  the  doctrine  of  Christian  freedom  as  opposed  to  Antinomian- 
ism,  we  may  say  that  Christ  does  not  free  us,  as  the  Antinomian  believes, 
from  the  law  as  a  rule  of  life.  But  he  does  free  us  ( 1  )  from  the  law  as  a 
system  of  curse  and  penalty  ;  this  he  does  by  bearing  the  curse  and  penalty 
himself.  Christ  frees  us  ( 2  )  from  the  law  with  its  claims  as  a  method  of 
salvation  ;  this  he  does  by  making  his  obedience  and  merits  ours.  Christ 
frees  us  (  3  )  from  the  law  as  an  outward  and  foreign  compulsion  ;  this  he 
does  by  giving  to  us  the  spirit  of  obedience  and  sonship,  by  which  the 
law  is  progressively  realized  within. 


SANCTIFICATIOST.  231 

B.  The  Perfectionist,  —which  holds  that  the  Christian  may,  in  this 
life,  become  perfectly  free  from  sin.  This  view  was  held  by  John  Wesley 
in  England,  and  by  Mahan  and  Finney  in  America. 

In  reply,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  observe  : 

(  a  )  That  the  theory  rests  upon  false  conceptions  :  first,  of  the  law,  —  as 
a  sliding-scale  of  requirement  graduated  to  the  moral  condition  of  creatures, 
instead  of  being  the  unchangeable  reflection  of  God's  holiness  ;  secondly, 
of  sin,  —  as  consisting  only  in  voluntary  acts  instead  of  embracing  also  those 
dispositions  and  states  of  the  soul  which  are  not  conformed  to  the  divine 
holiness  ;  thirdly,  of  the  human  will,  —  as  able  to  choose  God  supremely 
and  persistently  at  every  moment  of  life,  and  to  fulfil  at  every  moment  the 
obligations  resting  upon  it,  instead  of  being  corrupted  and  enslaved  by  the 
Fall. 

(6)  That  the  theory  finds  no  support  in,  but  rather  is  distinctly  contra- 
dicted by,  Scripture. 

First,  the  Scriptures  never  assert  or  imply  that  the  Christian  may  in  this 
life  live  without  sin  ;  passages  like  1  John  3  :  6,  9,  if  interpreted  consist- 
ently with  the  context,  set  forth  either  the  ideal  standard  of  Corinthians 
living  or  the  actual  state  of  the  believer  so  far  as  respects  his  new  nature. 

Secondly,  the  apostolic  admonitions  to  the  Corinthians  and  Hebrews  show 
that  no  such  state  of  complete  sanctification  had  been  generally  attained  by 
the  Christians  of  the  first  century. 

Thirdly,  there  is  express  record  of  sin  committed  by  the  most  perfect 
characters  of  Scripture  —  as  Noah,  Abraham,  Job,  David,  Peter. 


Fourthly,  the  word  rttwoc,  as  applied  to  spiritual  conditions  already 
attained,  can  fairly  be  held  to  signify  only  a  relative  perfection,  equivalent. 
to  sincere  piety  or  maturity  of  Christian  judgment. 

Fifthly,  the  Scriptures  distinctly  deny  that  any  man  on  earth  lives  with- 
out sin. 

Sixthly,  the  declaration  :  "ye  were  sanctified  "  (  1  Cor.  6  :  11  ),  and  the 
designation  :  "  saints"  (  1  Cor.  1:2),  applied  to  early  believers,  are,  as  the 
whole  epistle  shows,  expressive  of  a  holiness  existing  in  germ  and  anticipa- 
tion ;  the  expressions  deriving  their  meaning  not  so  much  from  what  these 
early  believers  were,  as  from  what  Christ  was,  to  whom  they  were  united 
by  faith. 

(  c  )  That  the  theory  is  disapproved  by  the  testimony  of  Christian  expe- 
rience. —  In  exact  proportion  to  the  soul's  advance  in  holiness  does  it  shrink 
from  claiming  that  holiness  has  been  already  attained,  and  humble  itself 
before  God  for  its  remaining  apathy,  ingratitude,  and  unbelief. 

Perfectionism  is  best  met  by  proper  statements  of  the  nature  of  the  law 
and  of  sin  (  Ps.  119  :  96  ).  While  we  thus  rebuke  spiritual  pride,  however, 
we  should  be  equally  careful  to  point  out  the  inseparable  connection  between 
justification  and  sanctification,  and  their  equal  importance  as  together  mak- 


232  SOTEKIOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  SALTATION. 

ing  up  the  Biblical  idea  of  salvation.  While  we  show  no  favor  to  those  who 
would  make  sanctification  a  sudden  and  paroxysmal  act  of  the  human  will, 
we  should  hold  forth  the  holiness  of  God  as  the  standard  of  attainment,  and 
the  faith  in  a  Christ  of  infinite  fulness  as  the  medium  through  which  that 
standard  is  to  be  gradually  but  certainly  realized  in  us  ( 2  Cor.  3  : 18 ). 

II.    PEBSEVEBANOE. 

The  Scriptures  declare  that,  in  virtue  of  the  original  purpose  and  contin- 
uous operation  of  God,  all  who  are  united  to  Christ  by  faith  will  infallibly 
continue  in  a  state  of  grace  and  will  finally  attain  to  everlasting  life.  This 
voluntary  continuance,  on  the  part  of  the  Christian,  in  faith  and  well-doing 
we  call  perseverance.  Perseverance  is,  therefore,  the  human  side  or  aspect 
of  that  spiritual  process  which,  as  viewed  from  the  divine  side,  we  call  sanc- 
tification. It  is  not  a  mere  natural  consequence  of  conversion,  but  involves 
a  constant  activity  of  the  human  will  from  the  moment  of  conversion  to  the 
end  of  life. 

1.  Proof  of  the  Doctrine  of  Perseverance. 

A.  From  Scripture,—  as  John  10  :  28,  29  ;  Bom.  11 : 29 ;  PhiL  1:6; 
2  Thess.  3 :3 ;  2  Tim.  1 : 12  ;  1  Pet,  1:5;  Eev.  3  : 10. 

B.  From  Reason. 

(a)  It  is  a  necessary  inference  from  other  doctrines,  — such  as  election, 
union  with  Christ,  regeneration,  justification,  sanctification. 

(6)  It  accords  with  analogy,—  God's  preserving  care  being  needed  by, 
and  being  granted  to,  his  spiritual,  as  well  as  his  natural,  creation. 

( c  )  It  is  implied  in  all  assurance  of  salvation,  —  since  this  assurance  is 
given  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  is  based  not  upon  the  known  strength  of 
human  resolution,  but  upon  the  purpose  and  operation  of  God. 

2.  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Perseverance. 

These  objections  are  urged  chiefly  by  Arminians  and  by  Romanists. 

A.  That  it  is  inconsistent  with  human  freedom.  —  Answer  :  It  is  no 
more  so  than  is  the  doctrine  of  Election  or  the  doctrine  of  Decrees. 

B.  That  it  tends  to  immorality. — Answer  :  This  cannot  be,  since  the 
doctrine  declares  that  God  will  save  men  by  securing  their  perseverance  in 
holiness. 

C.  That  it  leads  to  indolence.  —  Answer :  This  is  a  perversion  of  the 
doctrine,  continuously  possible  only  to  the  unregenerate  ;  since,  to  the 
regenerate,  certainty  of  success  is  the  strongest  incentive  to  activity  in  the 
conflict  with  sin. 

D.  That  the  Scripture  commands  to  persevere  and  warnings  against 
apostasy  show  that  certain,   even  of  the  regenerate,  will  fall  away.  — 
Answer : 

( a )  They  show  that  some,  who  are  apparently  regenerate,  will  fall  away. 

(  b  )  They  show  that  the  truly  regenerate,  and  those  who  are  only  appar- 
ently so,  are  not  certainly  distinguishable  in  this  life. 


PERSEVERANCE.  233 

( c  )  They  show  the  fearful  consequences  of  rejecting  Christ,  to  those 
who  have  enjoyed  special  divine  influences,  but  who  are  only  apparently 
regenerate. 

(  d)  They  show  what  the  fate  of  the  truly  regenerate  would  be,  in  case 
they  should  not  persevere. 

(e)  They  show  that  the  perseverance  of  the  truly  regenerate  may  be 
secured  by  these  very  commands  and  warnings. 

(/)  They  do  not  show  that  it  is  certain,  or  possible,  that  any  truly 
regenerate  person  will  fall  away. 

E.    That  we  have  actual  examples  of  such  apostasy.  —  We  answer : 

(a)  Such  are  either  men  once  outwardly  reformed,  like  Judas  and 
Ananias,  but  never  renewed  in  heart ; 

(  6  )  Or  they  are  regenerate  men,  who,  like  David  and  Peter,  have  fallen 
into  temporary  sin,  from  which  they  will,  before  death,  be  reclaimed  by 
God's  discipline* 


PAET  VII. 

EOOLESIOLOGT,  OE  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH. 

CHAPTER  I. 
THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  CHURCH,   OR  CHURCH   POLITY. 

I.    DEFINITION  OF  THE  CHURCH. 

(  a  )  The  church  of  Christ,  in  its  largest  signification,  is  the  whole  com- 
pany of  regenerate  persons  in  all  times  and  ages,  in  heaven  and  on  earth 
(Mat.  16:18;Eph.  1  :22,  23  ;  3  :10  ;  5  :24,  25  ;  Col.  l:18;Heb.  12:23). 
In  this  sense,  the  church  is  identical  with  the  spiritual  ingdom  of  God  ; 
both  signify  that  redeemed  humanity  in  which  God  in  Christ  exercises 
actual  spiritual  dominion  (  John  3  : 3,  5  ). 

( b  )  The  church,  in  this  large  sense,  is  nothing  less  than  the  body  of 
Christ  —  the  organism  to  which  he  gives  spiritual  life,  and  through  which 
he  manifests  the  fulness  of  his  power  and  grace.  The  church  therefore 
cannot  be  defined  in  merely  human  terms,  as  an  aggregate  of  individuals 
associated  for  social,  benevolent,  or  even  spiritual  purposes.  There  is  a 
transcendent  element  in  the  church.  It  is  the  great  company  of  persons 
whom  Christ  has  saved,  in  whom  he  dwells,  to  whom  and  through  whom 
he  reveals  God  (Eph.  1  : 22,  23  ). 

( c  )  The  Scriptures,  however,  distinguish  between  this  invisible  or  uni- 
versal church,  and  the  individual  church,  in  which  the  universal  church 
takes  local  and  temporal  form,  and  in  which  the  idea  of  the  church  as  a 
whole  is  concretely  exhibited. 

( d )  The  individual  church  may  be  defined  as  that  smaller  company  of 
regenerate  persons,  who,  in  any  given  community,  unite  themselves  volun- 
tarily together,  in  accordance  with  Christ's  laws,  for  the  purpose  of  secur- 
ing the  complete  establishment  of  his  kingdom  in  themselves  and  in  the 
world. 

(e)  Besides  these  two  significations  of  the  term  *  church,' there  are 
properly  in  the  New  Testament  no  others.     The  word  kiu&rjcia  is  indeed 
used  in  Acts  7  :  38  ;  19  :  32,  39 ;  Heb.  2  :  12,  to  designate  a  popular  assem- 
bly ;  but  since  this  is  a  secular  use  of  the  term,  it  does  not  here  concern  us. 
In  certain  passages,  as  for  example  Acts  9  :  31   (kuKtyoia,   sing.,  N  ABO), 


ORGANIZATION   OF  THE   CHURCH.  235 


1  Cor.  12  :  28,  Phil.  3  :  6,  and  1  Tim.  3  :  15,  eKttArjoia  appears  to  be  used  either 
as  a  generic  or  as  a  collective  term,  to  denote  simply  the  body  of  indepen- 
dent local  churches  existing  in  a  given  region  or  at  a  given  epoch.  But 
since  there  is  no  evidence  that  these  churches  were  bound  together  in  any 
outward  organization,  this  use  of  the  term  tMtfyaia  cannot  be  regarded  as 
adding  any  new  sense  to  those  of  '  the  universal  church  *  and  *  the  local 
church  '  already  mentioned. 

The  prevailing  usage  of  the  N.  T.  gives  to  the  term  kuKhrjaia  the  second 
of  these  two  significations.  It  is  this  local  church  only  which  has  definite 
and  temporal  existence,  and  of  this  alone  we  henceforth  treat.  Our  defini- 
tion of  the  individual  church  implies  the  two  following  particulars  : 

A.  The  churchy  like  the  family  and  the  state,  is  an  institution  of 
divine  appointment.    This  is  plain  :  (a)  from  its  relation  to  the  church 
universal,  as  its  concrete  embodiment  ;  (  b  )  from  the  fact  that  its  necessity 
is  grounded  in  the  social  and  religious  nature  of  man  ;  (  c  )  from  the  Script- 
ure, —  as  for  example,  Christ's  command  in  Mat.  18  :  17,  and  the  designa- 
tion «  church  of  God,'  applied  to  individual  churches  (  1  Cor.  1:2). 

B.  The  church,  unlike  the  family  and  the  state,  is  a  voluntary  society. 
(a}  This  results  from  the  fact  that  the  local  church  is  the  outward  expres- 
sion of  that  rational  and  free  life  in  Christ  which  characterizes  the  church 
as  a  whole.     In  this  it  differs  from  those  other  organizations  of  divine 
appointment,  entrance  into  which  is  not  optional.     Membership  in  the 
church  is  not  hereditary  or  compulsory.     (  b  )  The  doctrine  of  the  church, 
as  thus  defined,  is  a  necessary  outgrowth  of  the  doctrine  of  regeneration. 
As  this  fundamental  spiritual  change  is  mediated  not  by  outward  appli- 
ances, but  by  inward  and  conscious  reception  of  Christ  and  his  truth,  union 
with  the  church  logically  follows,  not  precedes,  the  soul's  spiritual  union 
with  Christ. 

n.     ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CHURCH. 
1.     The  fact  of  organization. 

Organization  may  exist  without  knowledge  of  writing,  without  written 
records,  lists  of  members,  or  formal  choice  of  officers.  These  last  are  the 
proofs,  reminders,  and  helps  of  organization,  but  they  are  not  essential  to 
it.  It  is  however  not  merely  informal,  but  formal,  organization  in  the 
church,  to  which  the  New  Testament  bears  witness. 

That  there  was  such  organization  is  abundantly  shown  from  (  a  )  its  stated 
meetings,  (  b  )  elections,  and  (  c  )  officers  ;  (  d  )  from  the  designations  of  its 
ministers,  together  with  (  e  )  the  recognized  authority  of  the  minister  and 
of  the  church;  (/)  from  its  discipline,  (g)  contributions,  (h)  letters  of 
commendation,  (i)  registers  of  widows,  (j)  uniform  customs,  and  (k) 
ordinances  ;  (  I)  from  the  order  enjoined  and  observed,  (  m  )  the  qualifi- 
cations for  membership,  and  (  n  )  the  common  work  of  the  whole  body. 

As  indicative  of  a  developed  organization  in  the  N.  T.  church,  of  which 
only  the  germ  existed  before  Christ's  death,  it  is  important  to  notice  the 
progress  in  names  from  the  Gospels  to  the  Epistles.  In  the  Gospels,  the 
word  "  disciples  "  is  the  common  designation  of  Christ's  followers,  but  it  is 


236         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OR  THE  DOCTRINE   OF  THE   CHURCH. 

not  once  found  in  the  Epistles.  In  the  Epistles,  there  are  only  "  saints," 
" brethren,"  "  churches."  A  consideration  of  the  facts  here  referred  to  is 
sufficient  to  evince  the  unscriptural  nature  of  two  modern  theories  of  the 
church  : 

A.  The  theory  that  the  church  is  an  exclusively  spiritual  body,  destitute 
of  all  formal  organization,  and  bound  together  only  by  the  mutual  relation 
of  each  believer  to  his  indwelling  Lord. 

The  church,  upon  this  view,  so  far  as  outward  bonds  are  concerned,  is 
only  an  aggregation  of  isolated  units.  Those  believers  who  chance  to 
gather  at  a  particular  place,  or  to  live  at  a  particular  time,  constitute  the 
church  of  that  place  or  time.  This  view  is  held  by  the  Friends  and  by  the 
Plymouth  Brethren.  It  ignores  the  tendencies  to  organization  inherent  in 
human  nature ;  confounds  the  visible  with  the  invisible  church  ;  and  is 
directly  opposed  to  the  Scripture  representations  of  the  visible  church  as 
comprehending  some  who  are  not  true  believers. 

B.  The  theory  that  the  form  of  church  organization  is  not  definitely 
prescribed  in  the  New  Testament,  but  is  a  matter  of  expediency,  each  body 
of  believers  being  permitted  to  adopt  that  method  of  organization  which 
best  suits  its  circumstances  and  condition. 

The  view  under  consideration  seems  in  some  respects  to  be  favored  by 
Neander,  and  is  often  regarded  as  incidental  to  his  larger  conception  of 
church  history  as  a  progressive  development.  But  a  proper  theory  of 
development  does  not  exclude  the  idea  of  a  church  organization  already 
complete  in  all  essential  particulars  before  the  close  of  the  inspired  canon, 
so  that  the  record  of  it  may  constitute  a  providential  example  of  binding 
authority  upon  all  subsequent  ages.  The  view  mentioned  exaggerates  the 
differences  of  practice  among  the  N.  T.  churches  ;  underestimates  the  need 
of  divine  direction  as  to  methods  of  church  union  ;  and  admits  a  principle 
of  'church  powers,'  which  may  be  historically  shown  to  be  subversive  of 
the  very  existence  of  the  church  as  a  spiritual  body. 

2.     The  nature  of  this  organization. 

The  nature  of  any  organization  may  be  determined  by  asking,  first :  who 
constitute  its  members  ?  secondly  :  for  what  object  has  it  been  formed  ? 
and,  thirdly :  what  are  the  laws  which  regulate  its  operations  ? 

A.  They  only  can  properly  be  members  of  the  local  church,  who  have 
previously  become  members  of  the  church  universal,  — or,  in  other  words, 
have  become  regenerate  persons. 

From  this  limitation  of  membership  to  regenerate  persons,  certain 
results  follow : 

( a  )  Since  each  member  bears  supreme  allegiance  to  Christ,  the  church 
as  a  body  must  recognize  Christ  as  the  only  lawgiver.  The  relation  of  the 
individual  Christian  to  the  church  does  not  supersede,  but  furthers  and 
expresses,  his  relation  to  Christ. 

( 6 )  Since  each  regenerate  man  recognizes  in  every  other  a  brother  in 
Christ,  the  several  members  are  upon  a  footing  of  absolute  equality  (  Mat. 
23:8-10). 


ORGANIZATION   OP  THE   CHURCH.  237 

(c)  Since  each  local  church  is  directly  subject  to  Christ,  there  is  no 
jurisdiction  of  one  church  over  another,  but  all  are  on  an  equal  footing, 
and  all  are  independent  of  interference  or  control  by  the  civil  power. 

B.  The  sole  object  of  the  local  church  is  the  glory  of  God,  in  the  com- 
plete establishment  of  his  kingdom,  both  in  the  hearts  of  believers  and  in 
the  world.     This  object  is  to  be  promoted  : 

(a)  By  united  worship, — including  prayer  and  religious  instruction; 
(  b )  by  mutual  watchcare  and  exhortation  ;  (  c  )  by  common  labors  for  the 
reclamation  of  the  impenitent  world. 

C.  The  law  of  the  church  is  simply  the  will  of  Christ,  as  expressed  in 
the  Scriptures  and  interpreted  by  the  Holy  Spirit.     This  law  respects  : 

(a)  The  qualifications  for  membership. — These  are  regeneration  and 
baptism,  i.  e. ,  spiritual  new  birth  and  ritual  new  birth  ;  the  surrender  of 
the  inward  and  of  the  outward  life  to  Christ ;  the  spiritual  entrance  into 
communion  with  Christ's  death  and  resurrection,  and  the  formal  profession 
of  this  to  the  world  by  being  buried  with  Christ  and  rising  with  him  in 
baptism. 

( b )  The  duties  imposed  on  members. — In  discovering  the  will  of  Christ 
from  the  Scriptures,  each  member  has  the  right  of  private  judgment,  being 
directly  responsible  to  Christ  for  his  use  of  the  means  of  knowledge,  and 
for  his  obedience  to  Christ's  commands  when  these  are  known. 

3.     The  genesis  of  this  organization. 

(a)  The  church  existed  in  germ  before  the  day  of  Pentecost, — otherwise 
there  would  have  been  nothing  to  which  those  converted  upon  that  day 
could  have  been  "added"  (Acts  2  :  47).  Among  the  apostles,  regenerate 
as  they  were,  united  to  Christ  by  faith  and  in  that  faith  baptized  (Acts  19 : 
4 ),  under  Christ's  instruction  and  engaged  in  common  work  for  him,  there 
were  already  the  beginnings  of  organization.  There  was  a  treasurer  of  the 
body  ( John  13  :  29 ),  and  as  a  body  they  celebrated  for  the  first  time  the 
Lord's  Supper  (Mat.  26  :  26-29  ).  To  all  intents  and  purposes  they  consti- 
tuted a  church,  although  the  church  was  not  yet  fully  equipped  for  its  work 
by  the  outpouring  of  the  Spirit  (Acts  2 ),  and  by  the  appointment  of  pastors 
and  deacons.  The  church  existed  without  officers,  as  in  the  first  days  suc- 
ceeding Pentecost. 

( 6 )  That  provision  for  these  offices  was  made  gradually  as  exigencies 
arose,  is  natural  when  we  consider  that  the  church  immediately  after  Christ's 
ascension  was  under  the  tutelage  of  inspired  apostles,  and  was  to  be  pre- 
pared, by  a  process  of  education,  for  independence  and  self-government. 
As  doctrine  was  communicated  gradually  yet  infallibly,  through  the  oral 
and  written  teaching  of  the  apostles,  so  we  are  warranted  in  believing  that 
the  church  was  gradually  but  infallibly  guided  to  the  adoption  of  Christ's 
own  plan  of  church  organization  and  of  Christian  work.  The  same  promise 
of  the  Spirit  which  renders  the  New  Testament  an  unerring  and  sufficient 
rule  of  faith,  renders  it  also  an  unerring  and  sufficient  rule  of  practice,  for 
the  church  in  all  places  and  times. 


238         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  THE   CHURCH. 

(  c  )  Any  number  of  believers,  therefore,  may  constitute  themselves  into 
a  Christian  church,  by  adopting  for  their  rule  of  faith  and  practice  Christ's 
law  as  laid  down  in  the  New  Testament,  and  by  associating  themselves 
together,  in  accordance  with  it,  for  his  worship  and  service.  It  is  impor- 
tant, where  practicable,  that  a  council  of  churches  be  previously  called,  to 
advise  the  brethren  proposing  this  union  as  to  the  desirableness  of  consti- 
tuting a  new  and  distinct  local  body  ;  and,  if  it  be  found  desirable,  to 
recognize  them,  after  its  formation,  as  being  a  church  of  Christ.  But  such 
action  of  a  council,  however  valuable  as  affording  ground  for  the  fellowship 
of  other  churches,  is  not  constitutive,  but  is  simply  declaratory  ;  and, 
without  such  action,  the  body  of  believers  alluded  to,  if  formed  after  the 
N.  T.  example,  may  notwithstanding  be  a  true  church  of  Christ.  Still 
further,  a  band  of  converts,  among  the  heathen  or  providentially  precluded 
from  access  to  existing  churches,  might  rightfully  appoint  one  of  their 
number  to  baptize  the  rest,  and  then  might  organize,  de  novo,  a  New 
Testament  church. 


GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  CHUBOH. 
1.    Nature  of  this  government  in  general. 

It  is  evident  from  the  direct  relation  of  each  member  of  the  church,  and 
so  of  the  church  as  a  whole,  to  Christ  as  sovereign  and  lawgiver,  that  the 
government  of  the  church,  so  far  as  regards  the  source  of  authority,  is  an 
absolute  monarchy. 

In  ascertaining  the  will  of  Christ,  however,  and  in  applying  his  com 
mands  to  providential  exigencies,  the  Holy  Spirit  enlightens  one  member 
through  the  counsel  of  another,  and  as  the  result  of  combined  deliberation, 
guides  the  whole  body  to  right  conclusions.  This  work  of  the  Spirit  is 
the  foundation  of  the  Scripture  injunctions  to  unity.  This  unity,  since  it 
is  a  unity  of  the  Spirit,  is  not  an  enforced,  but  an  intelligent  and  willing- 
sunity.  While  Christ  is  sole  king,  therefore,  the  government  of  the  church 
so  far  as  regards  the  interpretation  and  execution  of  his  will  by  the  body, 
is  an  absolute  democracy,  in  which  the  whole  body  of  members  is  intrusted 
with  the  duty  and  responsibility  of  carrying  out  the  laws  of  Christ  a, 
expressed  in  his  word. 

A.  Proof  that  the  government  of  the  church  is  democratic  or  congre- 
gational. 

(  a  )  From  the  duty  of  the  whole  church  to  preserve  unity  in  its  action. 

(  6  )  From  the  responsibility  of  the  whole  church  for  maintaining  pure 
doctrine  and  practice. 

(  c  )  From  the  committing  of  the  ordinances  to  the  charge  of  the  whole 
church  to  observe  and  guard.  As  the  church  expresses  truth  in  her  teach- 
ing, so  she  is  to  express  it  in  symbol  through  the  ordinances. 

(  d  )  From  the  election  by  the  whole  church,  of  its  own  officers  and  dele- 
gates. In  Acts  14  :  23,  the  literal  interpretation  of  x£iPOT°vfaavT££  is  not  to 
be  pressed.  In  Titus  1:5,  "  when  Paul  empowers  Titus  to  set  presiding 
officers  over  the  communities,  this  circumstance  decides  nothing  as  to  the 


GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  CHUKCH.  239 

mode  of  choice,  nor  is  a  choice  by  the  community  itself  thereby  necessarily 
excluded." 

(e)  From  the  power  of  the  whole  church  to  exercise  discipline.  Pas- 
sages which  show  the  right  of  the  whole  body  to  exclude,  show  also  the 
right  of  the  whole  body  to  admit,  members. 

B.    Erroneous  views  as  to  church  government  refuted  by  the  foregoing 


(  a  )  The  world-church  theory,  or  the  Romanist  view.  —  This  holds  that 
all  local  churches  are  subject  to  the  supreme  authority  of  the  bishop  of 
Rome,  as  the  successor  of  Peter  and  the  infallible  vicegerent  of  Christ, 
and,  as  thus  united,  constitute  the  one  and  only  church  of  Christ  on  earth. 
We  reply : 

First, — Christ  gave  no  such  supreme  authority  to  Peter.  Mat.  16  : 18, 19, 
simply  refers  to  the  personal  position  of  Peter  as  first  confessor  of  Christ 
and  preacher  of  his  name  to  Jews  and  Gentiles.  Hence  other  apostles 
also  constituted  the  foundation  (  Eph.  2  :  20  ;  Rev.  21 : 14  ).  On  one  occa- 
sion, the  counsel  of  James  was  regarded  as  of  equal  weight  with  that  of 
Peter  (Acts  15  : 7-30),  while  on  another  occasion  Peter  was  rebuked  by  Paul 
(  Gal.  2 : 11 ),  and  Peter  calls  himself  only  a  fellow-elder  (1  Pet.  5:1). 

Secondly,  —  If  Peter  had  such  authority  given  him,  there  is  no  evidence 
that  he  had  power  to  transmit  it  to  others. 

Thirdly, — There  is  no  conclusive  evidence  that  Peter  ever  was  at  Rome, 
much  less  that  he  was  bishop  of  Rome. 

Fourthly, — There  is  no  evidence  that  he  really  did  so  appoint  the  bishops 
of  Rome  as  his  successors. 

Fifthly, — If  Peter  did  so  appoint  the  bishops  of  Rome,  the  evidence  of 
continuous  succession  since  that  time  is  lacking. 

Sixthly, — There  is  abundant  evidence  that  a  hierarchical  form  of  church 
government  is  corrupting  to  the  church  and  dishonoring  to  Christ. 

( 6  )  The  national-church  theory,  or  the  theory  of  provincial  or  national 
churches. — This  holds  that  all  members  of  the  church  in  any  province  or 
nation  are  bound  together  in  provincial  or  national  organization,  and  that 
this  organization  has  jurisdiction  over  the  local  churches.  We  reply : 

First, — the  theory  has  no  support  in  the  Scriptures.  There  is  no  evi- 
dence that  the  word  kuK^rjaia  in  the  New  Testament  ever  means  a  national 
church  organization.  1  Cor.  12  :  28,  Phil.  3  :  6,  and  1  Tim.  3  : 15,  may  be 
more  naturally  interpreted  as  referring  to  the  generic  church.  In  Acts  9  : 
31,  kKK.'Xriaia  is  a  mere  generalization  for  the  local  churches  then  and  there 
existing,  and  implies  no  sort  of  organization  among  them. 

Secondly, —  It  is  contradicted  by  the  intercourse  which  the  New  Testa- 
ment churches  held  with  each  other  as  independent  bodies, —  for  example 
at  the  Council  of  Jerusalem  (Acts.  15  : 1-35) 

Thirdly, —  It  has  no  practical  advantages  over  the  Congregational  polity, 
but  rather  tends  to  formality,  division,  and  the  extinction  of  the  principles 
of  self-government  and  direct  responsibility  to  Christ. 


240         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  THE   CHURCH. 

Fourthly,  —  It  is  inconsistent  with  itself,  in  binding  a  professedly  spiritual 
church  by  formal  and  geographical  lines. 

Fifthly,  —  It  logically  leads  to  the  theory  of  Romanism.  If  two  churches 
need  a  superior  authority  to  control  them  and  settle  their  differences,  then 
two  countries  and  two  hemispheres  need  a  common  ecclesiastical  govern- 
ment, —  and  a  world-church,  under  one  visible  head,  is  Eomanism. 

2.     Officers  of  the  Church. 

A.  The  number  of  offices  in  the  church  is  two  :  —  first,  the  office  of 
bishop,  presbyter,  or  pastor  ;  and,  secondly,  the  office  of  deacon. 

(a)  That  the  appellations  'bishop,'  'presbyter,'  and  'pastor'  designate 
the  same  office  and  order  of  persons,  may  be  shown  from  Acts  20  :  28  — 
£KtaK.6n-ovc  noinaiveiv  (  cf.  17  —  Kpeofivrepovg  )  ;  Phil.  1  :  1  ;  1  Tim.  3  :  1,  8  ;  Titus 
1  :  5,  7  J  1  Pet.  5:1,  2  —  Trpeofivrtpovs  ....  irapaKaAti  6  avpTrpeafivTepoc  .... 
Troifidvare  iroi/j,viov  ....  E7rioK07rovvT££.  Conybeare  and  Howson  :  "The  terms 
'bishop  '  and  '  elder  '  are  used  in  the  New  Testament  as  equivalent,  —  the 
former  denoting  (  as  its  meaning  of  overseer  implies  )  the  duties,  the  latter 
the  rank,  of  the  office.  "  See  passages  quoted  in  Gieseler,  Church  History, 
1  :  90,  note  1  —  as,  for  example,  Jerome  :  "  Apud  veteres  iidem  episcopi  et 
presbyteri,  quia  illud  nomen  dignitatis  est,  hoc  setatis.  Idem  est  ergo 
presbyter  qui  episcopus." 

(6)  The  only  plausible  objection  to  the  identity  of  the  presbyter  and  the 
bishop  is  that  first  suggested  by  Calvin,  on  the  ground  of  1  Tim.  5  :  17. 
But  this  text  only  shows  that  the  one  office  of  presbyter  or  bishop  involved 
two  kinds  of  labor,  and  that  certain  presbyters  or  bishops  were  more  suc- 
cessful in  one  kind  than  in  the  other.  That  gifts  of  teaching  and  ruling 
belonged  to  the  same  individual,  is  clear  from  Acts  20  :  28-31  ;  Eph.  4  :  11  ; 
Heb.  13  :  7  ;  1  Tim.  3  :  2  — 


(  c  )  In  certain  of  the  N.  T.  churches  there  appears  to  have  been  a  plu- 
rality of  elders  (  Acts  20  :  17  ;  Phil.  1:1;  Tit.  1:5).  There  is,  however, 
no  evidence  that  the  number  of  elders  was  uniform,  or  that  the  plurality 
which  frequently  existed  was  due  to  any  other  cause  than  the  size  of  the 
churches  for  which  these  elders  cared.  The  N.  T.  example,  while  it  per- 
mits the  multiplication  of  assistant  pastors  according  to  need,  does  not 
require  a  plural  eldership  in  every  case  ;  nor  does  it  render  this  eldership, 
where  it  exists,  of  coordinate  authority  with  the  church.  There  are  indica- 
tions, moreover,  that,  at  least  in  certain  churches,  the  pastor  was  one,  while 
the  deacons  were  more  than  one,  in  number. 

B.     The  duties  belonging  to  these  offices. 

(  a  )  The  pastor,  bishop,  or  elder  is  : 

First,  —  a  spiritual  teacher,  in  public  and  private  ; 

Secondly,  —  administrator  of  the  ordinances  ; 

Thirdly,  —  superintendent  of  the  discipline,  as  well  as  presiding  officer  at 
the  meetings,  of  the  church. 


GOVERNMENT  OF  THE   CHURCH.  241 

(  b )  The  deacon  is  helper  to  the  pastor  and  the  church,  in  both  spiritual 
and  temporal  things. 

First,  —  relieving  the  pastor  of  external  labors,  informing  him  of  the 
condition  and  wants  of  the  church,  and  forming  a  bond  of  union  between 
pastor  and  people. 

Secondly,  — helping  the  church,  by  relieving  the  poor  and  sick  and 
ministering  in  an  informal  way  to  the  church's  spiritual  needs,  and  by 
performing  certain  external  duties  connected  with  the  service  of  the 
sanctuary. 

C.     Ordination  of  officers. 
( a  )  What  is  ordination  ? 

Ordination  is  the  setting  apart  of  a  person  divinely  called  to  a  work  of 
special  ministration  in  the  church.  It  does  not  involve  the  communication 
of  power,  —  it  is  simply  a  recognition  of  powers  previously  conferred  by 
God,  and  a  consequent  formal  authorization,  on  the  part  of  the  church,  to 
exercise  the  gifts  already  bestowed.  This  recognition  and  authorization 
should  not  only  be  expressed  by  the  vote  in  which  the  candidate  is 
approved  by  the  church  or  the  council  which  represents  it,  but  should  also 
be  accompanied  by  a  special  service  of  admonition,  prayer,  and  the  laying- 
on  of  hands  (Acts  6: 5,  6;  13:2,  3;  14:23;  ITim.  4:14;  5:22). 

Licensure  simply  commends  a  man  to  the  churches  as  fitted  to  preach. 
Ordination  recognizes  him  as  set  apart  to  the  work  of  preaching  and 
administering  ordinances,  in  some  particular  church  or  in  some  designated 
field  of  labor,  as  representative  of  the  church. 

Of  his  call  to  the  ministry,  the  candidate  himself  is  to  be  first  persuaded 
( 1  Cor.  9  : 16  ;  1  Tim.  1  : 12  )  ;  but,  secondly,  the  church  must  be  per- 
suaded also,  before  he  can  have  authority  to  minister  among  them  ( 1  Tim. 
3:2-7;  4:14;  Titus  1 :  6-9. 

(  6  )  Who  are  to  ordain  ? 

Ordination  is  the  act  of  the  church,  not  the  act  of  a  privileged  class  in 
the  church,  as  the  eldership  has  sometimes  wrongly  been  regarded,  nor  yet 
the  act  of  other  churches,  assembled  by  their  representatives  in  council. 
No  ecclesiastical  authority  higher  than  that  of  the  local  church  is  recognized 
in  the  New  Testament.  This  authority,  however,  has  its  limits ;  and  since 
the  church  has  no  authority  outside  of  its  own  body,  the  candidate  for 
ordination  should  be  a  member  of  the  ordaining  church. 

Since  each  church  is  bound  to  recognize  the  presence  of  the  Spirit  in 
other  rightly  constituted  churches,  and  its  own  decisions,  in  like  manner, 
are  to  be  recognized  by  others,  it  is  desirable  in  ordination,  as  in  all 
important  steps  affecting  other  churches,  that  advice  be  taken  before  the 
candidate  is  inducted  into  office,  and  that  other  churches  be  called  to  sit 
with  it  in  council,  and  if  thought  best,  assist  in  setting  the  candidate  apart 
for  the  ministry. 

It  is  always  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  power  to  ordain  rests 
with  the  church,  and  that  the  church  may  proceed  without  a  Council,  or 


242         ECCLESIOLOGT,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  THE   CHURCH. 

even  against  the  decision  of  the  Council.  Such  ordination,  of  course,  would 
give  authority  only  within  the  bounds  of  the  individual  church.  Where  no 
immediate  exception  is  taken  to  the  decision  of  the  Council,  that  decision  is 
to  be  regarded  as  virtually  the  decision  of  the  church  by  which  it  was 
called.  The  same  rule  applies  to  a  Council's  decision  to  depose  from  the 
ministry.  In  the  absence  of  immediate  protest  from  the  church,  the  decis- 
ion of  the  Council  is  rightly  taken  as  virtually  the  decision  of  the  church. 

In  so  far  as  ordination  is  an  act  performed  by  the  local  church  with  the 
advice  and  assistance  of  other  rightly  constituted  churches,  it  is  justly 
regarded  as  giving  formal  permission  to  exercise  gifts  and  administer  ordi- 
nances within  the  bounds  of  such  churches.  Ordination  is  not,  therefore, 
to  be  repeated  upon  the  transfer  of  the  minister's  pastoral  relation  from 
one  church  to  another.  In  every  case,  however,  where  a  minister  from  a 
body  of  Christians  not  Scripturally  constituted  assumes  the  pastoral  rela- 
tion in  a  rightly  organized  church,  there  is  peculiar  propriety,  not  only  in 
the  examination,  by  a  Council,  of  his  Christian  experience,  call  to  the 
ministry,  and  views  of  doctrine,  but  also  in  that  act  of  formal  recognition 
and  authorization  which  is  called  ordination. 

3.    Discipline  of  the  Church. 

A.  Kinds  of  discipline. — Discipline  is  of  two  sorts,  according  as  offences 
are  private  or  public,     (a)   Private  offences  are  to  be  dealt  with  according 
to  the  rule  in  Mat.  5  :  23,  24;  18  : 15-17. 

(6)  Public  offences  are  to  be  dealt  with  according  to  the  rule  in  1  Cor. 
5  :  3-5,  13,  and  2  Thess.  3  :  6. 

B.  Eelation  of  the  pastor  to  discipline. —  ( a)  He  has  no  original  author- 
ity >  ( & )  but  is  *ne  organ  of  the  church,  and  ( c )  superintendent  of  its 
labors  for  its  own  purification  and  for  the  reclamation  of  offenders ;  and 
therefore  (  d )  may  best  do  the  work  of  discipline,  not  directly,  by  consti- 
tuting himself  a  special  policeman  or  detective,  but  indirectly,  by  securing 
proper  labor  on  the  part  of  the  deacons  or  brethren  of  the  church. 

IV.    BKLATION  OF  LOCAL  CHUBCHES  TO  ONE  ANOTHEE. 

1.  The  general  nature  of  this  relation  is  that  of  fellowship  between 
equals. — Notice  here  : 

(a)  The  absolute  equality  of  the  churches. — No  church  or  council  of 
churches,  no  association  or  convention  or  society,  can  relieve  any  single 
church  of  its  direct  responsibility  to  Christ,  or  assume  control  of  its  action. 

(6)  The  fraternal  fellowship  and  cooperation  of  the  churches. — No 
church  can  properly  ignore,  or  disregard,  the  existence  or  work  of  other 
churches  around  it.  Every  other  church  is  presumptively  possessed  of  the 
Spirit,  in  equal  measure  with  itself.  There  must  therefore  be  sympathy 
and  mutual  furtherance  of  each  other's  welfare  among  churches,  as  among 
individual  Christians.  Upon  this  principle  are  based  letters  of  dismission, 
recognition  of  the  pastors  of  other  churches,  and  all  associational  unions, 
or  unions  for  common  Christian  work. 


RELATION   OF   LOCAL  CHURCHES  TO   ONE   ANOTHER.          243 

2.  This  fellowship  involves  the  duty  of  special  consultation  with 
regard  to  matters  affecting  the  common  interest. 

(a)  The  duty  of  seeking  advice. — Since  the  order  and  good  repute  of 
each  is  valuable  to  all  the  others,  cases  of  grave  importance  and  difficulty  in 
internal  discipline,  as  well  as  the  question  of  ordaining  members  to  the  min- 
istry, should  be  submitted  to  a  council  of  churches  called  for  the  purpose. 

(6)  The  duty  of  taking  advice. — For  the  same  reason,  each  church 
should  show  readiness  to  receive  admonition  from  others.  So  long  as  this 
is  in  the  nature  of  friendly  reminder  that  the  church  is  guilty  of  defects 
from  the  doctrine  or  practice  enjoined  by  Christ,  the  mutual  acceptance  of 
whose  commands  is  the  basis  of  all  church  fellowship,  no  church  can  justly 
refuse  to  have  such  defects  pointed  out,  or  to  consider  the  Scripturalness  of 
its  own  proceeding.  Such  admonition  or  advice,  however,  whether  coming 
from  a  single  church  or  from  a  council  of  churches,  is  not  itself  of  bind- 
ing authority.  It  is  simply  in  the  nature  of  moral  suasion.  The  church 
receiving  it  has  still  to  compare  it  with  Christ's  laws.  The  ultimate  decis- 
ion rests  entirely  with  the  church  so  advised  or  asking  advice. 

3.  This  fellowship  may  be  broken  by  manifest  departures  from  the 
faith  or  practice  of  the  Scriptures,  on  the  part  of  any  church. 

In  such  case,  duty  to  Christ  requires  the  churches,  whose  labors  to  reclaim 
a  sister  church  from  error  have  proved  unavailing,  to  withdraw  their  fellow- 
ship from  it,  until  such  time  as  the  erring  church  shall  return  to  the  path 
of  duty.  In  this  regard,  the  law  which  applies  to  individuals  applies  to 
churches,  and  the  polity  of  the  New  Testament  is  congregational  rather 
than  independent. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  ORDINANCES  OF  THE   CHURCH. 

By  the  ordinances,  we  mean  those  outward  rites  which  Christ  has 
appointed  to  be  administered  in  his  church  as  visible  signs  of  the  saving 
truth  of  the  gospel.  They  are  signs,  in  that  they  vividly  express  this  truth 
and  confirm  it  to  the  believer. 

In  contrast  with  this  characteristically  Protestant  view,  the  Romanist 
regards  the  ordinances  as  actually  conferring  grace  and  producing  holiness. 
Instead  of  being  the  external  manifestation  of  a  preceding  union  with 
Christ,  they  are  the  physical  means  of  constituting  and  maintaining  this 
union.  With  the  Romanist,  in  this  particular,  sacramentalists  of  every 
name  substantially  agree.  The  Papal  Church  holds  to  seven  sacraments  or 
ordinances: — ordination,  confirmation,  matrimony,  extreme  unction,  pen- 
ance, baptism,  and  the  eucharist.  The  ordinances  prescribed  in  the  N.  T. , 
however,  are  two  and  only  two,  viz. : — Baptism  and  the  Lord's  Supper. 

I.    BAPTISM. 

Christian  Baptism  is  the  immersion  of  a  believer  in  water,  in  token  of  his 
previous  entrance  into  the  communion  of  Christ's  death  and  resurrection, — 
or,  in  other  words,  in  token  of  his  regeneration  through  union  with  Christ. 

1.    Baptism  an  Ordinance  of  Christ. 

A.  Proof  that  Christ  instituted  an  external  rite  called  baptism. 

(a)  From  the  words  of  the  great  commission ;  (  6)  from  the  injunctions 
of  the  apostles ;  (c)  from  the  fact  that  the  members  of  the  New  Testament 
churches  were  baptized  believers ;  (d)  from  the  universal  practice  of  such 
a  rite  in  Christian  churches  of  subsequent  times. 

B.  This  external  rite  intended  by  Christ  to  be  of  universal  and  per- 
petual obligation. 

(a)  Christ  recognized  John  the  Baptist's  commission  to  baptize  as 
derived  immediately  from  heaven. 

( 6 )  In  his  own  submission  to  John's  baptism,  Christ  gave  testimony  to 
the  binding  obligation  of  the  ordinance  (Mat.  3  : 13-17).  John's  baptism 
was  essentially  Christian  baptism  (Acts  19  :  4),  although  the  full  signifi- 
cance of  it  was  not  understood  until  after  Jesus'  death  and  resurrection 
( Mat.  20  : 17-23 ;  Luke  12  :  50 ;  Rom.  6  :  3-6 ). 

(c)  In  continuing  the  practice  of  baptism  through  his  disciples  ( John 
4  : 1,  2  ),  and  in  enjoining  it  upon  them  as  part  of  a  work  which  was  to  last 

244 


BAPTISM.  245 

to  the  end  of  the  world  (  Mat.  28  : 19,  20  ),  Christ  manifestly  adopted  and 
appointed  baptism  as  the  invariable  law  of  his  church. 

(d)  The  analogy  of  the  ordinance  of  the  Lord's  Sapper  also  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  baptism  is  to  be  observed  as  an  authoritative  memorial  of 
Christ  and  his  truth,  until  his  second  coming. 

(e)  There  is  no  intimation  whatever  that  the  command  of  baptism  is 
limited,  or  to  be  limited,  in  its  application,  —  that  it  has  been  or  ever  is  to 
be  repealed ;  and,  until  some  evidence  of  such  limitation  or  repeal  is  pro- 
duced, the  statute  must  be  regarded  as  universally  binding. 

2.     The  Mode  of  Baptism. 

This  is  immersion,  and  immersion  only.  This  appears  from  the  follow- 
ing considerations : 

A.    The  command  to  baptize  is  a  command  to  immerse. — We  show  this : 

(a)  From  the  meaning  of  the  original  word  pairrifa.  That  this  is  to 
immerse,  appears: 

First,— from  the  usage  of  Greek  writers — including  the  church  Fathers, 
when  they  do  not  speak  of  the  Christian  rite,  and  the  authors  of  the  Greek 
version  of  the  Old  Testament. 

Secondly, — every  passage  where  the  word  occurs  in  the  New  Testament 
either  requires  or  allows  the  meaning  'immerse.' 

Thirdly,  —  the  absence  of  any  use  of  the  word  in  the  passive  voice  with 
•water'  as  its  subject  confirms  our  conclusion  that  its  meaning  is  "to 
immerse."  Water  is  never  said  to  be  baptized  upon  a  man. 

(6  )  From  the  use  of  the  verb  /foTm'fw  with  prepositions  : 

First,  —  with  «c  ( Mark  1:9  —  where  'lopdavrjv  is  the  element  into  which 
the  person  passes  in  the  act  of  being  baptized ). 

Secondly,  —  with  kv  (  Mark  1 :5,  8  ;  cf.  Mat.  3 : 11.  John  1 : 26,  31,  33  ; 
cf.  Acts  2  :2,  4).  In  these  texts,  ev  is  to  be  taken,  not  instrumentally,  but 
as  indicating  the  element  in  which  the  immersion  takes  place. 

(  c  )  From  circumstances  attending  the  administration  of  the  ordinance 
(  Mark  1:10  —  dvaj3aivuv  EK  TUV  i)6aTo<; ;  John  3  : 23  —  vdara  irohM  ;  Acts  8  : 38, 
39  —  Karefirjaav  e<f  ™  vdup  ....  aviflrjaav  kn  rov  vdaroq  ). 

(  d  )  From  figurative  allusions  to  the  ordinance. 

( e )  From  the  testimony  of  church  history  as  to  the  practice  of  the  early 
church. 

(/)  From  the  doctrine  and  practice  of  the  Greek  church. 

The  prevailing  usage  of  any  word  determines  the  sense  it  bears,  when 
found  in  a  command  of  Christ.  We  have  seen,  not  only  that  the  prevail- 
ing usage  of  the  Greek  language  determines  the  meaning  of  the  word 
'  baptize  '  to  be  *  immerse,'  but  that  this  is  its  fundamental,  constant,  and 
only  meaning.  The  original  command  to  baptize  is  therefore  a  command 
to  immerse. 


246         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  THE   CHURCH. 

B.  No  church  has  the  right  to  modify  or  dispense  with  this  command 
of  Christ.  This  is  plain : 

( a )  From  the  nature  of  the  church.    Notice : 

First, — that,  besides  the  local  church,  no  other  visible  church  of  Christ 
is  known  to  the  New  Testament.  Secondly, — that  the  local  church  is  not 
a  legislative,  but  is  simply  an  executive,  body.  Only  the  authority  which 
originally  imposed  its  laws  can  amend  or  abrogate  them.  Thirdly, — that 
the  local  church  cannot  delegate  to  any  organization  or  council  of  churches 
any  power  which  it  does  not  itself  rightfully  possess.  Fourthly, — that  the 
opposite  principle  puts  the  church  above  the  Scriptures  and  above  Christ, 
and  would  sanction  all  the  usurpations  of  Rome. 

(6)  From  the  nature  of  God's  command : 

First, — as  forming  a  part,  not  only  of  the  law,  but  of  the  fundamental 
law,  of  the  church  of  Christ.  The  power  claimed  for  a  church  to  change 
it  is  not  only  legislative  but  constitutional.  Secondly, — as  expressing  the 
wisdom  of  the  Lawgiver.  Power  to  change  the  command  can  be  claimed 
for  the  church,  only  on  the  ground  that  Christ  has  failed  to  adapt  the 
ordinance  to  changing  circumstances,  and  has  made  obedience  to  it  unneces- 
sarily difficult  and  humiliating.  Thirdly, — as  providing  in  immersion  the 
only  adequate  symbol  of  those  saving  truths  of  the  gospel  which  both  of 
the  ordinances  have  it  for  their  office  to  set  forth,  and  without  which  they 
become  empty  ceremonies  and  forms.  In  other  words,  the  church  has  no 
right  to  change  the  method  of  administering  the  ordinance,  because  such  a 
change  vacates  the  ordinance  of  its  essential  meaning.  As  this  argument, 
however,  is  of  such  vital  importance,  we  present  it  more  fully  in  a  special 
discussion  of  the  Symbolism  of  Baptism. 

3.     The  Symbolism  of  Baptism. 

Baptism  symbolizes  the  previous  entrance  of  the  believer  into  the  com- 
munion of  Christ's  death  and  resurrection,— or,  in  other  words,  regenera- 
tion through  union  with  Christ. 

A.  Expansion  of  this  statement  as  to  the  symbolism  of  baptism.  Bap- 
tism, more  particularly,  is  a  symbol : 

(a)  Of  the  death  and  resurrection  of  Christ. 

(6)  Of  the  purpose  of  that  death  and  resurrection, — namely,  to  atone 
for  sin,  and  to  deliver  sinners  from  its  penalty  and  power. 

(c)  Of  the  accomplishment  of  that  purpose  in  the  person  baptized, — 
who  thus  professes  his  death  to  sin  and  resurrection  to  spiritual  life. 

(d)  Of  the  method  in  which  that  purpose  is  accomplished, — by  union 
with  Christ,  receiving  him  and  giving  one's  self  to  him  by  faith. 

(e)  Of  the  consequent  union  of  all  believers  in  Christ. 

(/)  Of  the  death  and  resurrection  of  the  body, — which  will  complete 
the  work  of  Christ  in  us,  and  which  Christ's  death  and  resurrection  assure 
to  all  his  members. 


BAPTISM.  247 

B.    Inferences  from  the  passages  referred  to  : 

(a)  The  central  truth  set  forth  by  baptism  is  the  death  and  resurrection 
of  Christ, — and  our  own  death  and  resurrection  only  as  connected  with  that. 

(6)  The  correlative  truth  of  the  believer's  death  and  resurrection,  set 
forth  in  baptism,  implies,  first, — confession  of  sin  and  humiliation  on 
account  of  it,  as  deserving  of  death;  secondly, — declaration  of  Christ's 
death  for  sin,  and  of  the  believer's  acceptance  of  Christ's  substitutionary 
work;  thirdly, — acknowledgment  that  the  soul  has  become  partaker  of 
Christ's  life,  and  now  lives  only  in  and  for  him. 

( c )  Baptism  symbolizes  purification,  but  purification  in  a  peculiar  and 
divine  way, — namely,  through  the  death  of  Christ  and  the  entrance  of  the 
soul  into  communion  with  that  death.     The  radical  defect  of  sprinkling  or 
pouring  as  a  mode  of  administering  the  ordinance,  is  that  it  does  not  point 
to  Christ's  death  as  the  procuring  cause  of  our  purification. 

( d)  In  baptism  we  show  forth  the  Lord's  death  as  the  original  sour  oecf 
holiness  and  life  in  our  souls,  just  as  in  the  Lord's  Supper  we  show  forth 
the  Lord's  death  as  the  source  of  all  nourishment  and  strength  after  this 
life  of  holiness  has  been  once  begun.     As  the  Lord's  Supper  symbolizes 
the  sanctifying  power  of  Jesus'  death,  so  baptism  symbolizes  its  regener- 
ating power. 

( e )  There  are  two  reasons,  therefore,  why  nothing  but  immersion  will 
satisfy  the  design  of  the  ordinance  :  first, — because  nothing  else  can  sym- 
bolize the  radical  nature  of  the  change  effected  in  regeneration — a  change 
from  spiritual  death  to  spiritual  life ;  secondly, — because  nothing  else  can 
set  forth  the  fact  that  this  change  is  due  to  the  entrance  of  the  soul  into 
communion  with  the  death  and  resurrection  of  Christ. 

(/)  To  substitute  for  baptism  anything  which  excludes  all  symbolic 
reference  to  the  death  of  Christ,  is  to  destroy  the  ordinance,  just  as  substi- 
tuting for  the  broken  bread  and  poured  out  wine  of  the  communion  some 
form  of  administration  which  leaves  out  all  reference  to  the  death  of  Christ 
would  be  to  destroy  the  Lord's  Supper,  and  to  celebrate  an  ordinance  of 
human  invention. 

4.     The  Subjects  of  Baptism. 

The  proper  subjects  of  baptism  are  those  only  who  give  credible  evidence 
that  they  have  been  regenerated  by  the  Holy  Spirit, — or,  in  other  words, 
have  entered  by  faith  into  the  communion  of  Christ's  death  and  resurrection. 

A.  Proof  that  only  persons  giving  evidence  of  being  regenerated  are 
proper  subjects  of  baptism : 

( a )  From  the  command  and  example  of  Christ  and  his  apostles,  which 
show : 

First,  that  those  only  are  to  be  baptized  who  have  previously  been  made 
disciples. 

Secondly,  that  those  only  are  to  be  baptized  who  have  previously 
repented  and  believed. 


248         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  THE   CHURCH. 

(  b  )  From  the  nature  of  the  church — as  a  company  of  regenerate  persons. 

(c)  From  the  symbolism  of  the  ordinance, — as  declaring  a  previous 
spiritual  change  in  him  who  submits  to  it. 

B.  Inferences  from  the  fact  that  only  persons  giving  evidence  of  being 
regenerate  are  proper  subjects  of  baptism  : 

(a)  Since  only  those  who  give  credible  evidence  of  regeneration  are 
proper  subjects  of  baptism,  baptism  cannot  be  the  means  of  regeneration. 
It  is  the  appointed  sign,  but  is  never  the  condition,  of  the  forgiveness  of 
sins. 

Passages  like  Mat.  3:11;  Markl:4;  16:16;  John3:5;  Acts2:38;  22: 
16 ;  Eph.  5  :  26 ;  Titus  3:5;  and  Heb.  10  :  22,  are  to  be  explained  as  par- 
ticular instances  "of  the  general  fact  that,  in  Scripture  language,  a  single 
part  of  a  complex  action,  and  even  that  part  of  it  which  is  most  obvious 
to  the  senses,  is  often  mentioned  for  the  whole  of  it,  and  thus,  in  this  case, 
the  whole  of  the  solemn  transaction  is  designated  by  the  external  symbol. " 
In  other  words,  the  entire  change,  internal  and  external,  spiritual  and 
ritual,  is  referred  to  in  language  belonging  strictly  only  to  the  outward 
aspect  of  it.  So  the  other  ordinance  is  referred  to  by  simply  naming  the 
visible  "breaking  of  bread,"  and  the  whole  transaction  of  the  ordination 
of  ministers  is  termed  the  "imposition  of  hands "  ( c/.  Acts  2  :  42 ;  1  Tim. 
4:14). 

( b )  As  the  profession  of  a  spiritual  change  already  wrought,  baptism  is 
primarily  the  act,  not  of  the  administrator,  but  of  the  person  baptized. 

Upon  the  person  newly  regenerate  the  command  of  Christ  first  ter- 
minates ;  only  upon  his  giving  evidence  of  the  change  within  him  does  it 
become  the  duty  of  the  church  to  see  that  he  has  opportunity  to  follow 
Christ  in  baptism.  Since  baptism  is  primarily  the  act  of  the  convert,  no 
lack  of  qualification  on  the  part  of  the  administrator  invalidates  the  bap- 
tism, so  long  as  the  proper  outward  act  is  performed,  with  intent  on  the 
part  of  the  person  baptized  to  express  the  fact  of  a  preceding  spiritual 
renewal  ( Acts  2  :  37,  38 ). 

( c )  As  intrusted  with  the  administration  of  the  ordinances,  however,  the 
church  is,  on  its  part,  to  require  of  all  candidates  for  baptism  credible  evi- 
dence of  regeneration. 

This  follows  from  the  nature  of  the  church  and  its  duty  to  maintain  its 
own  existence  as  an  institution  of  Christ.  The  church  which  cannot  restrict 
admission  into  its  membership  to  such  as  are  like  itself  in  character  and 
aims  must  soon  cease  to  be  a  church  by  becoming  indistinguishable  from 
the  world.  The  duty  of  the  church  to  gain  credible  evidence  of  regenera- 
tion in  the  case  of  every  person  admitted  into  the  body  involves  its  right  to 
require  of  candidates,  in  addition  to  a  profession  of  faith  with  the  lips, 
some  satisfactory  proof  that  this  profession  is  accompanied  by  change  in 
the  conduct.  The  kind  and  amount  of  evidence  which  would  have  justified 
the  reception  of  a  candidate  in  times  of  persecution  may  not  now  constitute 
a  sufficient  proof  of  change  of  heart. 


BAPTISM.  249 

(d)  As  the  outward  expression  of  the  inward  change  by  which  the 
believer  enters  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  baptism  is  the  first,  in  point  of 
time,  of  all  outward  duties. 

Regeneration  and  baptism,  although  not  holding  to  each  other  the  rela- 
tion of  effect  and  cause,  are  both  regarded  in  the  New  Testament  as  essen- 
tial to  the  restoration  of  man's  right  relations  to  God  and  to  his  people. 
They  properly  constitute  parts  of  one  whole,  and  are  not  to  be  unnecessarily 
separated.  Baptism  should  follow  regeneration  with  the  least  possible 
delay,  after  the  candidate  and  the  church  have  gained  evidence  that  a 
spiritual  change  has  been  accomplished  within  him.  No  other  duty  and  no 
other  ordinance  can  properly  precede  it. 

( e )  Since  regeneration  is  a  work  accomplished  once  for  all,  the  baptism 
which  symbolizes  this  regeneration  is  not  to  be  repeated. 

Even  where  the  persuasion  exists,  on  the  part  of  the  candidate,  that  at 
the  time  of  baptism  he  was  mistaken  in  thinking  himself  regenerated,  the 
ordinance  is  not  to  be  administered  again,  so  long  as  it  has  once  been  sub- 
mitted to,  with  honest  intent,  as  a  profession  of  faith  in  Christ.  We  argue 
this  from  the  absence  of  any  reference  to  second  baptisms  in  the  New  Tes- 
tament, and  from  the  grave  practical  difficulties  attending  the  opposite 
view.  In  Acts  19  : 1-5,  we  have  an  instance,  not  of  rebaptism,  but  of  the 
baptism  for  the  first  time  of  certain  persons  who  had  been  wrongly  taught 
with  regard  to  the  nature  of  John  the  Baptist's  doctrine,  and  so  had  igno- 
rantly  submitted  to  an  outward  rite  which  had  in  it  no  reference  to  Jesus 
Christ  and  expressed  no  faith  in  him  as  a  Savior.  This  was  not  John's 
baptism,  nor  was  it  in  any  sense  true  baptism.  For  this  reason  Paul  com- 
manded them  to  be  " baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Lord  Jesus." 

(/)  So  long  as  the  mode  and  the  subjects  are  such  as  Christ  has  enjoined, 
mere  accessories  are  matters  of  individual  judgment. 

The  use  of  natural  rather  than  of  artificial  baptisteries  is  not  to  be  elevated 
into  an  essential.  The  formula  of  baptism  prescribed  by  Christ  is  "into 
the  name  of  the  Father  and  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit." 

C.    Infant  Baptism. 

This  we  reject  and  reprehend,  for  the  following  reasons : 

(a)  Infant  baptism  is  without  warrant,  either  express  or  implied,  in  the 
Scripture. 

First, — there  is  no  express  command  that  infants  should  be  baptized. 
Secondly, — there  is  no  clear  example  of  the  baptism  of  infants.  Thirdly, — 
the  passages  held  to  imply  infant  baptism  contain,  when  fairly  interpreted, 
no  reference  to  such  a  practice.  In  Mat.  19 : 14,  none  would  have  *  forbid- 
den,' if  Jesus  and  his  disciples  had  been  in  the  habit  of  baptizing  infants. 
From  Acts  16 : 15,  cf.  40,  and  Acts  16  :  33,  cf.  34,  Neander  says  that  we 
cannot  infer  infant  baptism.  For  1  Cor.  16  : 15  shows  that  the  whole 
family  of  Stephanas,  baptized  by  Paul,  were  adults  (1  Cor.  1 : 16).  It  is 
impossible  to  suppose  a  whole  heathen  household  baptized  upon  the  faith 
of  its  head.  As  to  1  Cor.  7  :  14,  Jacobi  calls  this  text  "a  sure  testimony 
against  infant  baptism,  since  Paul  would  certainly  have  referred  to  the 


250         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OB  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  THE   CHURCH. 

baptism  of  children  as  a  proof  of  their  holiness,  if  infant  baptism  had  been 
practised. "  Moreover,  this  passage  would  in  that  case  equally  teach  the 
baptism  of  the  unconverted  husband  of  a  believing  wife.  It  plainly  proves 
that  the  children  of  Christian  parents  were  no  more  baptized  and  had  no 
closer  connection  with  the  Christian  church,  than  the  unbelieving  partners 
of  Christians. 

(6)  Infant  baptism  is  expressly  contradicted : 

First, — by  the  Scriptural  prerequisites  of  faith  and  repentance,  as  signs 
of  regeneration.  In  the  great  commission,  Matthew  speaks  of  baptizing 
disciples,  and  Mark  of  baptizing  believers ;  but  infants  are  neither  of  these. 
Secondly, — by  the  Scriptural  symbolism  of  the  ordinance.  As  we  should 
not  bury  a  person  before  his  death,  so  we  should  not  symbolically  bury  a 
person  by  baptism  until  he  has  in  spirit  died  to  sin.  Thirdly, — by  the 
Scriptural  constitution  of  the  church.  The  church  is  a  company  of  persons 
whose  union  with  one  another  presupposes  and  expresses  a  previous  con- 
scious and  voluntary  union  of  each  with  Jesus  Christ.  But  of  this  conscious 
and  voluntary  union  with  Christ  infants  are  not  capable.  Fourthly, — by 
the  Scriptural  prerequisites  for  participation  in  the  Lord's  Supper.  Parti- 
cipation in  the  Lord's  Supper  is  the  right  only  of  those  who  can  discern 
the  Lord's  body  ( 1  Cor.  11 :  29).  No  reason  can  be  assigned  for  restrict- 
ing to  intelligent  communicants  the  ordinance  of  the  Supper,  which  would 
not  equally  restrict  to  intelligent  believers  the  ordinance  of  Baptism. 

( c )  The  rise  of  infant  baptism  in  the  history  of  the  church  is  due  to 
sacramental  conceptions  of  Christianity,  so  that  all  arguments  in  its  favor 
from  the  writings  of  the  first  three  centuries  are  equally  arguments  for 
baptismal  regeneration. 

(d)  The  reasoning  by  which  it  is  supported  is unscriptural,  unsound, 
and  dangerous  in  its  tendency : 

First, — in  assuming  the  power  of  the  church  to  modify  or  abrogate  a 
command  of  Christ.  This  has  been  sufficiently  answered  above.  Secondly, 
— in  maintaining  that  infant  baptism  takes  the  place  of  circumcision  under 
the  Abrahamic  covenant.  To  this  we  reply  that  the  view  contradicts  the 
New  Testament  idea  of  the  church,  by  making  it  a  hereditary  body,  in 
which  fleshly  birth,  and  not  the  new  birth,  qualifies  for  membership.  "As 
the  national  Israel  typified  the  spiritual  Israel,  so  the  circumcision  which 
immediately  followed,  not  preceded,  natural  birth,  bids  us  baptize  children, 
not  before,  but  after  spiritual  birth."  Thirdly, — in  declaring  that  baptism 
belongs  to  the  infant  because  of  an  organic  connection  of  the  child  with 
the  parent,  which  permits  the  latter  to  stand  for  the  former  and  to  make 
profession  of  faith  for  it, — faith  already  existing  germinally  in  the  child  by 
virtue  of  this  organic  union,  and  certain  for  the  same  reason  to  be  developed 
as  the  child  grows  to  maturity.  "A  law  of  organic  connection  as  regards 
character  subsisting  between  the  parent  and  the  child, — such  a  connection 
as  induces  the  conviction  that  the  character  of  the  one  is  actually  included 
in  the  character  of  the  other,  as  the  seed  is  formed  in  the  capsule."  We 
object  to  this  view  that  it  unwarrantably  confounds  the  personality  of  the 
child  with  that  of  the  parent ;  practically  ignores  the  necessity  of  the  Holy 


THE   LORD'S   SUPPER.  251 

Spirit's  regenerating  influences  in  the  case  of  children  of  Christian  parents ; 
and  presumes  in  such  children  a  gracious  state  which  facts  conclusively 
show  not  to  exist. 

(e)  The  lack  of  agreement  among  pedobaptists  as  to  the  warrant  for 
infant  baptism  and  as  to  the  relation  of  baptized  infants  to  the  church, 
together  with  the  manifest  decline  of  the  practice  itself,  are  arguments 
against  it. 

The  propriety  of  infant  baptism  is  variously  argued,  says  Dr.  Bushnell, 
upon  the  ground  of  "natural  innocence,  inherited  depravity,  and  federal 
holiness  ;  because  of  the  infant's  own  character,  the  parent's  piety,  and  the 
church's  faith ;  for  the  reason  that  the  child  is  an  heir  of  salvation  already, 

and  in  order  to  make  it  such No  settled  opinion  on  infant  baptism 

and  on  Christian  nurture  has  ever  been  attained  to." 

(/)  The  evil  effects  of  infant  baptism  are  a  strong  argument  against  it : 

First, — in  forestalling  the  voluntary  act  of  the  child  baptized,  and  thus 
practically  preventing  his  personal  obedience  to  Christ's  commands. 

Secondly, — in  inducing  superstitious  confidence  in  an  outward  rite  as 
possessed  of  regenerating  efficacy. 

Thirdly, — in  obscuring  and  corrupting  Christian  truth  with  regard  to 
the  sufficiency  of  Scripture,  the  connection  of  the  ordinances,  and  the 
inconsistency  of  an  impenitent  life  with  church-membership. 

Fourthly, —  in  destroying  the  church  as  a  spiritual  body,  by  merging  it 
in  the  nation  and  the  world. 

Fifthly, — in  putting  into  the  place  of  Christ's  command  a  commandment 
of  men,  and  so  admitting  the  essential  principle  of  all  heresy,  schism,  and 
false  religion. 

H.    THE  LORD'S  SUPPER. 

The  Lord's  Supper  is  that  outward  rite  in  which  the  assembled  church 
eats  bread  broken  and  drinks  wine  poured  forth  by  its  appointed  represen- 
tative, in  token  of  its  constant  dependence  on  the  once  crucified,  now  risen 
Savior,  as  source  of  its  spiritual  life ;  or,  in  other  words,  in  token  of  that 
abiding  communion  of  Christ's  death  and  resurrection  through  which  the 
life  begun  in  regeneration  is  sustained  and  perfected. 

1.     The  Lord's  Supper  an  ordinance  instituted  by  Christ. 

(  a  )  Christ  appointed  an  outward  rite  to  be  observed  by  his  disciples  in 
remembrance  of  his  death.  It  was  to  be  observed  after  his  death ;  only 
after  his  death  could  it  completely  fulfil  its  purpose  as  a  feast  of  commem- 
oration. 

( b )  From  the  apostolic  injunction  with  regard  to  its  celebration  in  the 
church  until  Christ's  second  coming,  we  infer  that  it  was  the  original  inten- 
tion of  our  Lord  to  institute  a  rite  of  perpetual  and  universal  obligation. 

(c)  The  uniform  practice  of  the  N.  T.  churches,  and  the  celebration  of 
such  a  rite  in  subsequent  ages  by  almost  all  churches  professing  to  be 


252         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  THE   CHURCH. 

Christian,  is  best  explained  upon  the  supposition  that  the  Lord's  Supper  is 
an  ordinance  established  by  Christ  himself. 

2.  The  Mode  of  administering  the  Lord's  Supper. 

(a)  The  elements  are  bread  and  wine. 

(6)  The  communion  is  of  both  kinds, — that  is,  communicants  are  to 
partake  both  of  the  bread  and  of  the  wine. 

(c)  The  partaking  of  these  elements  is  of  a  festal  nature. 

( d)  The  communion  is  a  festival  of  commemoration, — not  simply  bring- 
ing Christ  to  our  remembrance,  but  making  proclamation  of  his  death  to 
the  world. 

( e )  It  is  to  be  celebrated  by  the  assembled  church.     It  is  not  a  solitary 
observance  on  the  part  of  individuals.     No  "showing  forth"  is  possible 
except  in  company. 

(/)  The  responsibility  of  seeing  that  the  ordinance  is  properly  adminis- 
tered rests  with  the  church  as  a  body ;  and  the  pastor  is,  in  this  matter,  the 
proper  representative  and  organ  of  the  church.  In  cases  of  extreme 
exigency,  however,  as  where  the  church  has  no  pastor  and  no  ordained 
minister  can  be  secured,  it  is  competent  for  the  church  to  appoint  one  from 
its  own  number  to  administer  the  ordinance. 

(g)  The  frequency  with  which  the  Lord's  Supper  is  to  be  administered 
is  not  indicated  either  by  the  N.  T.  precept  or  by  uniform  N.  T.  example. 
We  have  instances  both  of  its  daily  and  of  its  weekly  observance.  With 
respect  to  this,  as  well  as  with  respect  to  the  accessories  of  the  ordinance, 
the  church  is  to  exercise  a  sound  discretion. 

3.  The  Symbolism  of  the  Lord's  Supper. 

The  Lord's  Supper  sets  forth,  in  general,  the  death  of  Christ  as  the 
sustaining  power  of  the  believer's  life. 

A.    Expansion  of  this  statement. 

(  a  )  It  symbolizes  the  death  of  Christ  for  our  sins. 

( b )  It  symbolizes  our  personal  appropriation  of  the  benefits  of  that  death. 

( c )  It  symbolizes  the  method  of  this  appropriation,  through  union  with 
Christ  himself. 

(d)  It  symbolizes  the  continuous  dependence  of  the  believer  for  all 
spiritual  life  upon  the  once  crucified,  now  living,  Savior,  to  whom  he  is 
thus  united. 

(e)  It  symbolizes  the  sanctification  of  the  Christian  through  a  spiritual 
reproduction  in  him  of  the  death  and  resurrection  of  the  Lord. 

(/)  It  symbolizes  the  consequent  union  of  Christians  in  Christ,  their 
head. 

(g )  It  symbolizes  the  coming  joy  and  perfection  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 


THE   LORD'S   SUPPER. 

B.     Inferences  from  this  statement. 

( a )  The  connection  between  the  Lord's  Supper  and  Baptism  consists  in 
this,  that  they  both  and  equally  are  symbols  of  the  death  of  Christ.     In 
Baptism,  we  show  forth  the  death  of  Christ  as  the  procuring  cause  of  our 
new  birth  into  the  kingdom  of  God.    In  the  Lord's  Supper,  we  show  forth 
the  death  of  Christ  as  the  sustaining  power  of  our  spiritual  life  after  it  has 
once  begun.     In  the  one,  we  honor  the  sanctifying  power  of  the  death  of 
Christ,  as  in  the  other  we  honor  its  regenerating  power.     Thus  both  are 
parts  of  one  whole, — setting  before  us  Christ's  death  for  men  in  its  two 
great  purposes  and  results. 

( b )  The  Lord's  Supper  is  to  be  often  repeated,— as  symbolizing  Christ's 
constant  nourishment  of  the  soul,  whose  new  birth  was  signified  in  Baptism. 

(  G  )  The  Lord's  Supper,  like  Baptism,  is  the  symbol  of  a  previous  state 
of  grace.  It  has  in  itself  no  regenerating  and  no  sanctifying  power,  but  is 
the  symbol  by  which  the  relation  of  the  believer  to  Christ,  his  sanctifier,  is 
vividly  expressed  and  strongly  confirmed. 

(d)  The  blessing  received  from  participation  is  therefore  dependent 
upon,  and  proportioned  to,  the  faith  of  the  communicant. 

( e  )  The  Lord's  Supper  expresses  primarily  the  fellowship  of  the  believer, 
not  with  his  brethren,  but  with  Christ,  his  Lord. 

4.     Erroneous  views  of  the  Lord's  Supper. 

A.  The  Komanist  view, — that  the  bread  and  wine  are  changed  by 
priestly  consecration  into  the  very  body  and  blood  of  Christ ;  that  this  con- 
secration is  a  new  offering  of  Christ's  sacrifice ;  and  that,  by  a  physical 
partaking  of  the  elements,  the  communicant  receives  saving  grace  from 
God.  To  this  doctrine  of  "  transubstantiation"  we  reply : 

( a )  It  rests  upon  a  false  interpretation  of  Scripture.  In  Mat.  26  :  26, 
"this  is  my  body  "  means :  "this  is  a  symbol  of  my  body."  Since  Christ 
was  with  the  disciples  in  visible  form  at  the  institution  of  the  Supper,  he 
could  not  have  intended  them  to  recognize  the  bread  as  being  his  literal 
body.  "  The  body  of  Christ  is  present  in  the  bread,  just  as  it  had  been  in 
the  passover  lamb,  of  which  the  bread  took  the  place  "  (John  6  : 53  contains 
no  reference  to  the  Lord's  Supper,  although  it  describes  that  spiritual  union 
with  Christ  which  the  Supper  symbolizes ;  cf.  63.  In  1  Cor.  10 : 16,  17, 
KOLvuiav  TOV  cujxaroQ  TOV  Xptarov  is  a  figurative  expression  for  the  spiritual 
partaking  of  Christ.  In  Mark  8  :  33,  we  are  not  to  infer  that  Peter  was 
actually  "  Satan,"  nor  does  1  Cor.  12 : 12  prove  that  we  are  all  Christs.  Cf. 
Gen.  41:26;  1  Cor.  10:4). 

(&)  It  contradicts  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  as  well  as  of  all  scientific 
tests  that  can  be  applied.  If  we  cannot  trust  our  senses  as  to  the  unchanged 
material  qualities  of  bread  and  wine,  we  cannot  trust  them  when  they 
report  to  us  the  words  of  Christ. 

( c )  It  involves  the  denial  of  the  completeness  of  Christ's  past  sacrifice, 
and  the  assumption  that  a  human  priest  can  repeat  or  add  to  the  atonement 


254         ECCLESIOLOGY,    OB  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


made  by  Christ  once  for  all  (Heb.  9  :  28  —  anal-  Trpoaevex^^}.  The  Lord's 
Supper  is  never  called  a  sacrifice,  nor  are  altars,  priests,  or  consecrations 
ever  spoken  of,  in  the  New  Testament.  The  priests  of  the  old  dispensation 
are  expressly  contrasted  with  the  ministers  of  the  new.  The  former 
"ministered  about  sacred  things,"  i.  e.,  performed  sacred  rites  and  waited 
at  the  altar  ;  but  the  latter  "  preach  the  gospel  "  (  1  Cor.  9  :  13,  14). 

(d)  It  destroys  Christianity  by  externalizing  it.  Bomanists  make  all 
other  service  a  mere  appendage  to  the  communion.  Physical  and  magical 
salvation  is  not  Christianity,  but  is  essential  paganism. 

B.  The  Lutheran  and  High  Church  view,  —  that  the  communicant,  in 
partaking  of  the  consecrated  elements,  eats  the  veritable  body  and  drinks 
the  veritable  blood  of  Christ  in  and  with  the  bread  and  wine,  although  the 
elements  themselves  do  not  cease  to  be  material.  To  this  doctrine  of 
"  consubstantiation  "  we  object  : 

(a)  That  the  view  is  not  required  by  Scripture.  —  All  the  passages  cited 
in  its  support  may  be  better  interpreted  as  referring  to  a  partaking  of  the 
elements  as  symbols.  If  Christ's  body  be  ubiquitous,  as  this  theory  holds, 
we  partake  of  it  at  every  meal,  as  really  as  at  the  Lord's  Supper. 

(6)  That  the  view  is  inseparable  from  the  general  sacramental  system  of 
which  it  forms  a  part.  —  In  imposing  physical  and  material  conditions  of 
receiving  Christ,  it  contradicts  the  doctrine  of  justification  only  by  faith  ; 
changes  the  ordinance  from  a  sign,  into  a  means,  of  salvation  ;  involves  the 
necessity  of  a  sacerdotal  order  for  the  sake  of  properly  consecrating  the 
elements  ;  and  logically  tends  to  the  Romanist  conclusions  of  ritualism  and 
idolatry. 

(  c  )  That  it  holds  each  communicant  to  be  a  partaker  of  Christ's  veritable 
body  and  blood,  whether  he  be  a  believer  or  not,  —  the  result,  in  the  absence 
of  faith,  being  condemnation  instead  of  salvation.  Thus  the  whole  char- 
acter of  the  ordinance  is  changed  from  a  festival  occasion  to  one  of  mystery 
and  fear,  and  the  whole  gospel  method  of  salvation  is  obscured. 

5.     Prerequisites  to  Participation  in  the  Lord's  Supper. 

A.  There  are  prerequisites.     This  we  argue  from  the  fact  : 

(  a  )  That  Christ  enjoined  the  celebration  of  the  Supper,  not  upon  the 
world  at  large,  but  only  upon  his  disciples  ;  (  6  )  that  the  apostolic  injunc- 
tions to  Christians,  to  separate  themselves  from  certain  of  their  number, 
imply  a  limitation  of  the  Lord's  Supper  to  a  narrower  body,  even  among 
professed  believers  ;  (  c  )  that  the  analogy  of  Baptism,  as  belonging  only  to 
a  specified  class  of  persons,  leads  us  to  believe  that  the  same  is  true  of  the 
Lord's  Supper. 

B.  The  prerequisites  are  those  only  which  are  expressly  or  implicitly 
laid  down  by  Christ  and  his  apostles. 

(a)  The  church,  as  possessing  executive  but  not  legislative  power,  is 
charged  with  the  duty,  not  of  framing  rules  for  the  administering  and 
guarding  of  the  ordinance,  but  of  discovering  and  applying  the  rules  given 


THE  LORD'S  SUPPER.  255 

it  in  the  New  Testament.  No  church  has  a  right  to  establish  any  terms  of 
communion ;  it  is  responsible  only  for  making  known  the  terms  established 
by  Christ  and  his  apostles.  (6)  These  terms,  however,  are  to  be  ascer- 
tained not  only  from  the  injunctions,  but  also  from  the  precedents,  of  the 
New  Testament.  Since  the  apostles  were  inspired,  New  Testament  prece- 
dent is  the  "common  law "  of  the  church. 

C.  On  examining  the  New  Testament,  we  find  that  the  prerequisites  to 
participation  in  the  Lord's  Supper  are  four,  namely : 

First, — Regeneration. 

The  Lord's  Supper  is  the  outward  expression  of  a  life  in  the  believer, 
nourished  and  sustained  by  the  life  of  Christ.  It  cannot  therefore  be  par- 
taken of  by  one  who  is  "dead  through  ....  trespasses  and  sins."  We 
give  no  food  to  a  corpse.  The  Lord's  Supper  was  never  offered  by  the 
apostles  to  unbelievers.  On  the  contrary,  the  injunction  that  each  com- 
municant "examine  himself"  implies  that  faith  which  will  enable  the  com- 
municant to  "discern  the  Lord's  body"  is  a  prerequisite  to  participation. 

Secondly, — Baptism. 

In  proof  that  baptism  is  a  prerequisite  to  the  Lord's  Supper,  we  urge 
the  following  considerations  : 

(a)  The  ordinance  of  baptism  was  instituted  and  administered  long 
before  the  Supper. 

(6)  The  apostles  who  first  celebrated  it  had,  in  all  probability,  been 
baptized. 

(c)  The  command  of  Christ  fixes  the  place  of  baptism  as  first  in  order 
after  discipleship. 

(  d )  All  the  recorded  cases  show  this  to  have  been  the  order  observed  by 
the  first  Christians  and  sanctioned  by  the  apostles. 

(  e  )  The  symbolism  of  the  ordinances  requires  that  baptism  should  pre- 
cede the  Lord's  Supper.  The  order  of  the  facts  signified  must  be  expressed 

in  the  order  of  the  ordinances  which  signify  them  ;  else  the  world  is 
taught  that  sanctification  may  take  place  without  regeneration.  Birth  must 
come  before  sustenance — 'nascimur,  pascimur.'  To  enjoy  ceremonial 
privileges,  there  must  be  ceremonial  qualifications.  As  none  but  the 
circumcised  could  eat  the  passover,  so  before  eating  with  the  Christian 
family  must  come  adoption  into  the  Christian  family. 

(/)  The  standards  of  all  evangelical  denominations,  with  unimportant 
exceptions,  confirm  the  view  that  this  is  the  natural  interpretation  of  the 
Scripture  requirements  respecting  the  order  of  the  ordinances. 

( g  )  The  practical  results  of  the  opposite  view  are  convincing  proof 
that  the  order  here  insisted  on  is  the  order  of  nature  as  well  as  of  Scripture. 
The  admission  of  unbaptized  persons  to  the  communion  tends  always  to, 
and  has  frequently  resulted  in,  the  disuse  of  baptism  itself,  the  obscuring 
of  the  truth  which  it  symbolizes,  the  transformation  of  Scripturally  consti- 


256         ECCLE8IOLOGY,   OR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH. 

tuted  churches  into  bodies  organized  after  methods  of  human  invention, 
and  the  complete  destruction  of  both  church  and  ordinances  as  Christ 
originally  constituted  them. 

Thirdly, — Church  membership. 

(  a  )  The  Lord's  Supper  is  a  church  ordinance,  observed  by  churches  of 
Christ  as  such.  For  this  reason,  membership  in  the  church  naturally  pre- 
cedes communion.  Since  communion  is  a  family  rite,  the  participant 
should  first  be  a  member  of  the  family. 

(  b  )  The  Lord's  Supper  is  a  symbol  of  church  fellowship.  Excommu- 
nication implies  nothing,  if  it  does  not  imply  exclusion  from  the  commun- 
ion. If  the  Supper  is  simply  communion  of  the  individual  with  Christ, 
then  the  church  has  no  right  to  exclude  any  from  it. 

Fourthly, — An  orderly  walk. 

Disorderly  walking  designates  a  course  of  life  in  a  church  member  whi3h 
is  contrary  to  the  precepts  of  the  gospel.  It  is  a  bar  to  participation  in  the 
Lord's  Supper,  the  sign  of  church  fellowship.  With  Arnold,  we  may  class 
disorderly  walking  under  four  heads  :  — 

(a)  Immoral  conduct 

(  6  )  Disobedience  to  the  commands  of  Christ. 

( c  )   Heresy,  or  the  holding  and  teaching  of  false  doctrine. 

( d  )  Schism,  or  the  promotion  of  division  and  dissension  in  the  church. 
—  This  also  requires  exclusion  from  church  fellowship,  and  from  the  Lord's 
Supper  which  is  its  appointed  sign. 

D.  The  local  church  is  the  judge  whether  these  prerequisites  are  ful- 
filled in  the  case  of  persons  desiring  to  partake  of  the  Lord's  Supper. — 
This  is  evident  from  the  following  considerations  : 

( a  )  The  command  to  observe  the  ordinance  was  given,  not  to  individu- 
als, but  to  a  company. 

(  6  )  Obedience  to  this  command  is  not  an  individual  act,  but  is  the  joint 
act  of  many. 

(  c  )  The  regular  observance  of  the  Lord's  Supper  cannot  be  secured, 
nor  the  qualifications  of  persons  desiring  to  participate  in  it  be  scrutinized, 
unless  some  distinct  organized  body  is  charged  with  this  responsibility. 

(  d )  The  only  organized  body  known  to  the  New  Testament  is  the  local 
church,  and  this  is  the  only  body,  of  any  sort,  competent  to  have  charge  of 
the  ordinances.  The  invisible  church  has  no  officers. 

(  e )  The  New  Testament  accounts  indicate  that  the  Lord's  Supper  was 
observed  only  at  regular  appointed  meetings  of  local  churches,  and  was 
observed  by  these  churches  as  regularly  organized  bodies. 

(/)  Since  the  duty  of  examining  the  qualifications  of  candidates  for 
baptism  and  for  membership  is  vested  in  the  local  church  and  is  essential 
to  its  distinct  existence,  the  analogy  of  the  ordinances  would  lead  us  to 


THE  LORD'S  SUPPER.  257 

believe  that  the  scrutiny  of  qualifications  for  participation  in  the  Lord's 
Supper  rests  with  the  same  body. 

( g  )  This  care  that  only  proper  persons  are  admitted  to  the  ordinances 
should  be  shown,  not  by  open  or  forcible  debarring  of  the  unworthy  at  the 
time  of  the  celebration,  but  by  previous  public  instruction  of  the  congre- 
gation, and,  if  needful  in  the  case  of  persistent  offenders,  by  subsequent 
private  and  friendly  admonition. 

E.     Special  objections  to  open  communion. 

The  advocates  of  this  view  claim  that  baptism,  as  not  being  an  indispen- 
sable term  of  salvation,  cannot  properly  be  made  an  indispensable  term  of 
communion. 

In  addition  to  what  has  already  been  said,  we  reply  : 

(  a )  This  view  is  contrary  to  the  belief  and  practice  of  all  but  an  insig- 
nificant fragment  of  organized  Christendom. 

(  6 )  It  assumes  an  unscriptural  inequality  between  the  two  ordinances. 
The  Lord's  Supper  holds  no  higher  rank  in  Scripture  than  does  Baptism. 
The  obligation  to  commune  is  no  more  binding  than  the  obligation  to  pro- 
fess faith  by  being  baptized.  Open  communion,  however,  treats  baptism 
as  if  it  were  optional,  while  it  insists  upon  communion  as  indispensable. 

(c )  It  tends  to  do  away  with  baptism  altogether.    If  the  highest  privi- 
lege of  church  membership  may  be  enjoyed  without  baptism,  baptism  loses 
its  place  and  importance  as  the  initiatory  ordinance  of  the  church. 

( d )  It  tends  to  do  away  with  all  discipline.    When  Christians  offend, 
the  church  must  withdraw  its  fellowship  from  them.     But  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  open  communion,  such  withdrawal  is  impossible,  since  the  Lord's 
Supper,  the  highest  expression  of   church   fellowship,  is  open  to  every 
person  who  regards  himself  as  a  Christian. 

( e )  It  tends  to  do  away  with  the  visible  church  altogether.    For  no 
visible  church  is  possible,  unless  some  sign  of  membership  be  required,  in 
addition  to  the  signs  of  membership  in  the  invisible  church.     Open  c©m- 
munion  logically  leads  to  open  church  membership,  and  a  church  member- 
ship open  to  all,  without   reference   to   the  qualifications  required  in 
Scripture,  or  without  examination  on  the  part  of  the  church  as  to  the 
existence  of  these  qualifications  in  those  who  unite  with  it,  is  virtually 
an  identification  of  the  church  with  the  world,  and,  without  protest  from 
Scripturally  constituted  bodies,  would  finally  result  in  its  actual  extinction. 


PAET    YIII. 

ESCHATOLOGY,  OE   THE   DOCTRINE   OF  FINAL  THINGS. 

Neither  the  individual  Christian  character,  nor  the  Christian  church  as  a 
whole,  attains  its  destined  perfection  in  this  life  ( Eom.  8  : 24 ).  This  per- 
fection is  reached  in  the  world  to  come  ( 1  Cor.  13  : 10 ).  As  preparing  the 
way  for  the  kingdom  of  God  in  its  completeness,  certain  events  are  to  take 
place,  such  as  death,  Christ's  second  coming,  the  resurrection  of  the  body, 
the  general  judgment.  As  stages  in  the  future  condition  of  men,  there  is 
to  be  an  intermediate  and  an  ultimate  state,  both  for  the  righteous  and  for 
the  wicked.  We  discuss  these  events  and  states  in  what  appears  from 
Scripture  to  be  the  order  of  their  occurrence. 

I.    PHYSICAL  DEATH. 

Physical  death  is  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  the  body.  We  distin- 
guish it  from  spiritual  death,  or  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  God ;  and 
from  the  second  death,  or  the  banishment  from  God  and  final  misery  of  the 
reunited  soul  and  body  of  the  wicked. 

Although  physical  death  falls  upon  the  unbeliever  as  the  original  penalty 
of  sin,  to  all  who  are  united  in  Christ  it  loses  its  aspect  of  penalty,  and 
becomes  a  means  of  discipline  and  of  entrance  into  eternal  life. 

To  neither  saint  nor  sinner  is  death  a  cessation  of  being.  This  we  main- 
tain, against  the  advocates  of  annihilation  : 

1.     Upon  rational  grounds. 

(a)  The  metaphysical  argument.  —  The  soul  is  simple,  not  compounded. 
Death,  in  matter,  is  the  separation  of  parts.  But  in  the  soul  there  are  no 
parts  to  be  separated.  The  dissolution  of  the  body,  therefore,  does  not 
necessarily  work  a  dissolution  of  the  soul.  But,  since  there  is  an  immate- 
rial principle  in  the  brute,  and  this  argument  taken  by  itself  might  seem  to 
prove  the  immortality  of  the  animal  creation  equally  with  that  of  man,  we 
pass  to  consider  the  next  argument. 

(  6 )  The  teleological  argument.  —  Man,  as  an  intellectual,  moral,  and 
religious  being,  does  not  attain  the  end  of  his  existence  on  earth.  His 
development  is  imperfect  here.  Divine  wisdom  will  not  leave  its  work 
incomplete.  There  must  be  a  hereafter  for  the  full  growth  of  man's  powers, 
and  for  the  satisfaction  of  his  aspirations.  Created,  unlike  the  brute,  with 
infinite  capacities  for  moral  progress,  there  must  be  an  immortal  existence 
in  which  those  capacities  shall  be  brought  into  exercise.  Though  the 
wicked  forfeit  all  claim  to  this  future,  we  have  here  an  argument  from 
God's  love  and  wisdom  to  the  immortality  of  the  righteous. 
253 


PHYSICAL   DEATH.  259 

( c )  The  ethical  argument.  — Man  is  not,  in  this  world,  adequately  pun- 
ished for  his  evil  deeds.     Our  sense  of  justice  leads  us  to  believe  that  God's 
moral  administration  will  be  vindicated  in  a  life  to  come.     Mere  extinction 
of  being  would  not  be  a  sufficient  penalty,  nor  would  it  permit  degrees  of 
punishment  corresponding  to  degrees  of  guilt.     This  is  therefore  an  argu- 
ment from  God's  justice  to  the  immortality  of  the  wicked.     The  guilty  con- 
science demands  a  state  after  death  for  punishment. 

(d)  The  historical  argument. — The  popular  belief  of  all  nations  and 
ages  shows  that  the  idea  of  immortality  is  natural  to  the  human  mind.     It 
is  not  sufficient  to  say  that  this  indicates  only  such  desire  for  continued 
earthly  existence  as  is  necessary  to  self-preservation ;  for  multitudes  expect 
a  life  beyond  death  without  desiring  it,  and  multitudes  desire  a  heavenly 
i  f  e  without  caring  for  the  earthly.       This  testimony  of  man's  nature  to 
immortality  may  be  regarded  as  the  testimony  of  the  God  who  made  the 
nature. 

We  conclude  our  statement  of  these  rational  proofs  with  the  acknowledg- 
ment that  they  rest  upon  the  presupposition  that  there  exists  a  God  of  truth, 
wisdom,  justice,  and  love,  who  has  made  man  in  his  image,  and  who  desires 
to  commune  with  his  creatures.  We  acknowledge,  moreover,  that  these 
proofs  give  us,  not  an  absolute  demonstration,  but  only  a  balance  of  proba- 
bility, in  favor  of  man's  immortality.  We  turn  therefore  to  Scripture  for 
the  clear  revelation  of  a  fact  of  which  reason  furnishes  us  little  more  than 
a  presumption. 

2.      Upon  scriptural  grounds. 

(a)  The  account  of  man's  creation,  and  the  subsequent  allusions  to  it 
in  Scripture,  show  that,  while  the  body  was  made  corruptible  and  subject 
to  death,  the  soul  was  made  in  the  image  of  God,  incorruptible  and 
immortal. 

(  6 )  The  account  of  the  curse  in  Genesis,  and  the  subsequent  allusions  to 
it  in  Scripture,  show  that,  while  the  death  then  incurred  includes  the  dis- 
solution of  the  body,  it  does  not  include  cessation  of  being  on  the  part  of 
the  soul,  but  only  designates  that  state  of  the  soul  which  is  the  opposite 
of  true  life,  viz.,  a  state  of  banishment  from  God,  of  unholiness,  and  of 
misery. 

(  c  )  The  Scriptural  expressions,  held  by  annihilationists  to  imply  cessa- 
tion of  being  on  the  part  of  the  wicked,  are  used  not  only  in  connections 
where  they  cannot  bear  this  meaning  (Esther  4:16),  but  in  connections 
where  they  imply  the  opposite. 

(  d  )  The  passages  held  to  prove  the  annihilation  of  the  wicked  at  death 
cannot  have  this  meaning,  since  the  Scriptures  foretell  a  resurrection  of  the 
unjust  as  well  as  of  the  just ;  and  a  second  death,  or  a  misery  of  the  reunited 
soul  and  body,  in  the  case  of  the  wicked. 

( e )  The  words  used  in  Scripture  to  denote  the  place  of  departed  spirits 
have  in  them  no  implication  of  annihilation,  and  the  allusions  to  the  condi- 
tion of  the  departed  show  that  death,  to  the  writers  of  the  Old  and  the  New 


260       ESCHATOLOGY,    OR   THE   DOCTRINE   OF  FINAL  THINGS. 

Testaments,  although  it  was  the  termination  of  man's  earthly  existence 
was  not  an  extinction  of  his  being  or  his  consciousness. 

(/)  The  terms  and  phrases  which  have  been  held  to  declare  absolute 
cessation  of  existence  at  death  are  frequently  metaphorical,  and  an  exami- 
nation of  them  in  connection  with  the  context  and  with  other  Scriptures  is 
sufficient  to  show  the  untenableness  of  the  literal  interpretation  put  upon 
them  by  the  annihilationists,  and  to  prove  that  the  language  is  merely  the 
language  of  appearance. 

(g  )  The  Jewish  belief  in  a  conscious  existence  after  death  is  proof  that 
the  theory  of  annihilation  rests  upon  a  misinterpretation  of  Scripture. 
That  such  a  belief  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul  existed  among  the  Jews  is 
abundantly  evident :  from  the  knowledge  of  a  future  state  possessed  by  the 
Egyptians  ( Acts  7  : 22  )  ;  from  the  accounts  of  the  translation  of  Enoch  and 
of  Elijah  (  Gen.  5  :  24  ;  cf.  Heb.  11  :  5.  2  K.  2  : 11) ;  from  the  invocation 
of  the  dead  which  was  practised,  although  forbidden  by  the  law  ( 1  Sam. 
28  :  7-14  ;  cf.  Lev.  20  :  28  ;  Deut.  18  : 10,  11 )  ;  from  allusions  in  the  O.  T. 
to  resurrection,  future  retribution,  and  life  beyond  the  grave  ( Job 
19  : 25-27  ;  Ps.  16  : 9-11 ;  Is.  26  : 19  ;  Ez.  37  : 1-14 ;  Dan.  12  :  2,  3,  13 )  ; 
and  from  distinct  declarations  of  such  faith  by  Philo  and  Josephus,  as  well 
as  by  the  writers  of  the  N.  T.  (Mat.  22  :31,  32  ;  Acts  23  : 6  ;  26  :  6-8  ; 
Heb.  11:13-16). 

( h  )  The  most  impressive  and  conclusive  of  all  proofs  of  immortality, 
however,  is  afforded  in  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ,  —  a  work  accom- 
plished by  his  own  power,  and  demonstrating  that  the  spirit  lived  after  its 
separation  from  the  body  (  John  2  :  19,  21 ;  10  :  17,  18 ).  By  coming  back 
from  the  tomb,  he  proves  that  death  is  not  annihilation  (  2  Tim.  1  : 10). 

II.    THE  INTERMEDIATE  STATE. 

The  Scriptures  affirm  the  conscious  existence  of  both  the  righteous  and 
the  wicked,  after  death,  and  prior  to  the  resurrection.  In  the  intermediate 
state  the  soul  is  without  a  body,  yet  this  state  is  for  the  righteous  a  state 
of  conscious  joy,  and  for  the  wicked  a  state  of  conscious  suffering. 

That  the  righteous  do  not  receive  the  spiritual  body  at  death,  is  plain 
from  1  Thess.  4  : 16,  17  and  1  Cor.  15  : 52,  where  an  interval  is  intimated 
between  Paul's  time  and  the  rising  of  those  who  slept.  The  rising  was  to 
occur  in  the  future,  "at  the  last  trump."  So  the  resurrection  of  the 
wicked  had  not  yet  occurred  in  any  single  case  (  2  Tim.  2:18  —  it  was  an 
error  to  say  that  the  resurrection  was  "past  already")  ;  it  was  yet  future 
(John  5:28-30  —  "the  hour  cometh"  —  ep^erac  &pa,  not  tal  vvv  eariv — 
"  now  is,"  as  in  verse  25  ;  Acts  24  : 15  —  "  there  shall  be  a  resurrection  "  — 
avaaraaiv  peMetv  ew&ai ) .  Christ  was  the  firstfruits  ( 1  Cor.  15  :  20,  23  ).  If 
the  saints  had  received  the  spiritual  body  at  death,  the  patriarchs  would 
have  been  raised  before  Christ. 

1.     Of  the  righteous,  it  is  declared  : 

(a)  That  the  soul  of  the  believer,  at  its  separation  from  the  body, 
enters  the  presence  of  Christ. 

(  b )  That  the  spirits  of  departed  believers  are  with  God. 


THE   INTERMEDIATE   STATE.  261 

(  c )  That  believers  at  death  enter  paradise. 

(  d  )  That  their  state,  immediately  after  death,  is  greatly  to  be  preferred 
to  that  of  faithful  and  successful  laborers  for  Christ  here. 

(  e  )  That  departed  saints  are  truly  alive  and  conscious. 
(/)   That  they  are  at  rest  and  blessed. 
2.     Of  the  wicked,  it  is  declared  : 

(a)  That  they  are  in  prison,— that  is,  are  under  constraint  and  guard 
(1  Peter  3: 19— Hxwctf). 

(6)  That  they  are  in  torment,   or  conscious  suffering  (Luke  16:23  — 

tv  (3aadvoi<; ) . 

(  c  )    That  they  are  under  punishment  (  2  Pet.  2:9  —  Ko^o/nevovg ). 
The  passages  cited  enable  us  properly  to  estimate  two  opposite  errors. 

A.  They  refute,  on  the  one  hand,  the  view  that  the  souls  of  both  right- 
eous and  wicked  sleep  between  death  and  the  resurrection. 

This  view  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  possession  of  a  physical 
organism  is  indispensable  to  activity  and  consciousness  —  an  assumption 
which  the  existence  of  a  God  who  is  pure  spirit  ( John  4 : 24  ),  and  the 
existence  of  angels  who  are  probably  pure  spirits  (Heb.  1 : 14),  show  to  be 
erroneous.  Although  the  departed  are  characterized  as  '  spirits '  (  Eccl.  12  : 
7  ;  Acts  7  : 59  ;  Heb.  12  : 23  ;  1  Pet.  3  : 19  ),  there  is  nothing  in  this  '  absence 
from  the  body  '  (  2  Cor.  5:8)  inconsistent  with  the  activity  and  conscious- 
ness ascribed  to  them  in  the  Scriptures  above  referred  to.  "When  the  dead 
are  spoken  of  as  « sleeping  '  (  Dan.  12 :2  ;  Mat.  9  : 24  ;  John  11  : 11 ;  1  Cor. 
11  : 30  ;  15  : 51 ;  1  Thess.  4  : 14  ;  5  : 10  ),  we  are  to  regard  this  as  simply  the 
language  of  appearance,  and  as  literally  applicable  only  to  the  body. 

B.  The  passages  first  cited  refute,  on  the  other  hand,  the  view  that  the 
suffering  of  the  intermediate  state  is  purgatorial. 

According  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Roman  Catholic  church,  "all  who  die 
at  peace  with  the  church,  but  are  not  perfect,  pass  into  purgatory."  Here 
they  make  satisfaction  for  the  sins  committed  after  baptism  by  suffering  a 
longer  or  shorter  time,  according  to  the  degree  of  their  guilt.  The  church 
on  earth,  however,  has  power,  by  prayers  and  the  sacrifice  of  the  Mass,  to 
shorten  these  sufferings  or  to  remit  them  altogether.  But  we  urge,  in 
reply,  that  the  passages  referring  to  suffering  in  the  intermediate  state  give 
no  indication  that  any  true  believer  is  subject  to  this  suffering,  or  that  the 
church  has  any  power  to  relieve  from  the  consequences  of  sin,  either  in  this 
world  or  in  the  world  to  come.  Only  God  can  forgive,  and  the  church  is 
simply  empowered  to  declare  that,  upon  the  fulfilment  of  the  appointed 
conditions  of  repentance  and  faith,  he  does  actually  forgive.  This  theory, 
moreover,  is  inconsistent  with  any  proper  view  of  the  completeness  of 
Christ's  satisfaction  ( Gal.  2  :  21 ;  Heb.  9  :  28) ;  of  justification  through  faith 
alone  (Rom.  3  :28) ;  and  of  the  condition  after  death,  of  both  righteous 
and  wicked,  as  determined  in  this  life  (Eccl.  11 : 3  ;  Mat.  25  : 10  ;  Luke  16 : 
26;  Heb.  9:27;  Rev.  22: 11). 


ESCHATOLOQ  Y,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  FINAL  THINGS. 

We  close  our  discussion  of  this  subject  with  a  single,  but  an  important, 
remark, — this,  namely,  that  while  the  Scriptures  represent  the  intermediate 
state  to  be  one  of  conscious  joy  to  the  righteous,  and  of  conscious  pain  to 
the  wicked,  they  also  represent  this  state  to  be  one  of  incompleteness.  The 
perfect  joy  of  the  saints,  and  the  utter  misery  of  the  wicked,  begin  only 
with  the  resurrection  and  general  judgment. 

HI.     THE  SECOND  COMING  OF  OHEIST. 

While  the  Scriptures  represent  great  events  in  the  history  of  the  individ- 
ual Christian,  like  death,  and  great  events  in  the  history  of  the  church,  like 
the  outpouring  of  the  Spirit  at  Pentecost  and  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem, 
as  comings  of  Christ  for  deliverance  or  judgment,  they  also  declare  that 
these  partial  and  typical  comings  shall  be  concluded  by  a  final,  triumphant 
return  of  Christ,  to  punish  the  wicked  and  to  complete  the  salvation  of  his 
people. 

1.  The  nature  of  this  coming. 

Although  without  doubt  accompanied,  in  the  case  of  the  regenerate,  by 
inward  and  invisible  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  second  advent  is  to 
be  outward  and  visible.  This  we  argue  : 

(  a  )  From  the  objects  to  be  secured  by  Christ's  return.  These  are  partly 
external  (  Horn.  8  :  21,  23  ).  Nature  and  the  body  are  both  to  be  glorified. 
These  external  changes  may  well  be  accompanied  by  a  visible  manifestation 
of  him  who  *  makes  all  things  new  '  (  Eev.  21:5). 

( b  )  From  the  Scriptural  comparison  of  the  manner  of  Christ's  return 
with  the  manner  of  his  departure  (Acts  1:11) — see  Commentary  of 
Hackett,  in  loco  :  — "  &v  Tp6n-ov=  visibly,  and  in  the  air.  The  expression  is 
never  employed  to  affirm  merely  the  certainty  of  one  event  as  compared 
with  another.  The  assertion  that  the  meaning  is  simply  that,  as  Christ  had 
departed,  so  also  he  would  return,  is  contradicted  by  every  passage  in 
which  the  phrase  occurs." 

( c  )  From  the  analogy  of  Christ's  first  coming.  If  this  was  a  literal  and 
visible  coming,  we  may  expect  the  second  coming  to  be  literal  and  visible 
also. 

2.  The  time  of  Christ's  coming. 

(a)  Although  Christ's  prophecy  of  this  event,  in  the  twenty- fourth  chap- 
ter of  Matthew,  so  connects  it  with  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem  that  the 
apostles  and  the  early  Christians  seem  to  have  hoped  for  its  occurrence 
during  their  life-time,  yet  neither  Christ  nor  the  apostles  definitely  taught 
when  the  end  should  be,  but  rather  declared  the  knowledge  of  it  to  be 
reserved  in  the  counsels  of  God,  that  men  might  ever  recognize  it  as 
possibly  at  hand,  and  so  might  live  in  the  attitude  of  constant  expectation. 

(  6  )  Hence  we  find,  in  immediate  connection  with  many  of  these  predic- 
tions of  the  end,  a  reference  to  intervening  events  and  to  the  eternity  of 
God,  which  shows  that  the  prophecies  themselves  are  expressed  in  a  large 
way  which  befits  the  greatness  of  the  divine  plans. 


THE   SECOND   COMIKG  OF  CHRIST.  263 

( c )  In  this  we  discern  a  striking  parallel  between  the  predictions  of 
Christ's  first,  and  the  predictions  of  his  second,  advent.  In  both  cases  the 
event  was  more  distant  and  more  grand  than  those  imagined  to  whom  the 
prophecies  first  came.  Under  both  dispensations,  patient  waiting  for  Christ 
was  intended  to  discipline  the  faith,  and  to  enlarge  the  conceptions,  of  God's 
true  servants.  The  fact  that  every  age  since  Christ  ascended  has  had  its 
Chiliasts  and  Second  Adventists  should  turn  our  thoughts  away  from 
curious  and  fruitless  prying  into  the  time  of  Christ's  coming,  and  set  us  at 
immediate  and  constant  endeavor  to  be  ready,  at  whatsoever  hour  he  may 
appear. 

3.  The  precursors  of  Christ's  coming. 

( a )  Through  the  preaching  of  the  gospel  in  all  the  world,  the  kingdom 
of  Christ  is  steadily  to  enlarge  its  boundaries,  until  Jews  and  Gentiles  alike 
become  possessed  of  its  blessings,  and  a  millennial  period  is  introduced  in 
which  Christianity  generally  prevails  throughout  the  earth. 

(  b )  There  will  be  a  corresponding  development  of  evil,  either  extensive 
or  intensive,  whose  true  character  shall  be  manifest  not  only  in  deceiving 
many  professed  followers  of  Christ  and  in  persecuting  true  believers,  but  in 
constituting  a  personal  Antichrist  as  its  representative  and  object  of  worship. 
This  rapid  growth  shall  continue  until  the  millennium,  during  which  evil, 
in  the  person  of  its  chief,  shall  be  temporarily  restrained. 

( c  )  At  the  close  of  this  millennial  period,  evil  will  again  be  permitted 
to  exert  its  utmost  power  in  a  final  conflict  with  righteousness.  This  spir- 
itual struggle,  moreover,  will  be  accompanied  and  symbolized  by  political 
convulsions,  and  by  fearful  indications  of  desolation  in  the  natural  world. 

4.  Relation  of  Christ's  second  coming  to  the  millennium. 

The  Scripture  foretells  a  period,  called  in  the  language  of  prophecy  "a 
thousand  years,"  when  Satan  shall  be  restrained  and  the  saints  shall  reign 
with  Christ  on  the  earth.  A  comparison  of  the  passages  bearing  on  this 
subject  leads  us  to  the  conclusion  that  this  millennial  blessedness  and 
dominion  is  prior  to  the  second  advent.  One  passage  only  seems  at  first 
sight  to  teach  the  contrary,  viz.  :  Rev.  20  :4-10.  But  this  supports  the 
theory  of  a  premillennial  advent  only  when  the  passage  is  interpreted  with 
the  barest  literalness.  A  better  view  of  its  meaning  will  be  gained  by 
considering  : 

(a)  That  it  constitutes  a  part,  and  confessedly  an  obscure  part,  of  one 
of  the  most  figurative  books  of  Scripture,  and  therefore  ought  to  be  inter- 
preted by  the  plainer  statements  of  the  other  Scriptures. 

( b  )  That  the  other  Scriptures  contain  nothing  with  regard  to  a  resurrec- 
tion of  the  righteous  which  is  widely  separated  in  time  from  that  of  the 
wicked,  but  rather  declare  distinctly '  that  the  second  coming  of  Christ  is 
immediately  connected  both  with  the  resurrection  of  the  just  and  the 
unjust  and  with  the  general  judgment. 

(  c)  That  the  literal  interpretation  of  the  passage  —  holding,  as  it  does, 
to  a  resurrection  of  bodies  of  flesh  and  blood,  and  to  a  reign  of  the  risen 


264        ESCHATOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  FINAL  THINGS. 

saints  in  the  flesh,  and  in  the  world  as  at  present  constituted — is  inconsist- 
ent with  other  Scriptural  declarations  with  regard  to  the  spiritual  nature 
of  the  resurrection-body  and  of  the  coming  reign  of  Christ. 

(  d  )  That  the  literal  interpretation  is  generally  and  naturally  connected 
with  the  expectation  of  a  gradual  and  necessary  decline  of  Christ's  kingdom 
upon  earth,  until  Christ  comes  to  bind  Satan  and  to  introduce  the  millen- 
nium. This  view  not  only  contradicts  such  passages  as  Dan.  2  : 34,  35,  and 
Mat.  13  : 31,  32,  but  it  begets  a  passive  and  hopeless  endurance  of  evil, 
whereas  the  Scriptures  enjoin  a  constant  and  aggressive  warfare  against  it, 
upon  the  very  ground  that  God's  power  shall  assure  to  the  church  a 
gradual  but  constant  progress  in  the  face  of  it,  even  to  the  time  of  the  end. 

(  e )  We  may  therefore  best  interpret  Rev.  20  : 4-10  as  teaching  in  highly 
figurative  language,  not  a  preliminary  resurrection  of  the  body,  in  the  case 
of  departed  saints,  but  a  period  in  the  later  days  of  the  church  militant 
when,  under  special  influence  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  the  spirit  of  the  martyrs 
shall  appear  again,  true  religion  be  greatly  quickened  and  revived,  and  the 
members  of  Christ's  churches  become  so  conscious  of  their  strength  in 
Christ  that  they  shall,  to  an  extent  unknown  before,  triumph  over  the 
powers  of  evil  both  within  and  without.  So  the  spirit  of  Elijah  appeared 
again  in  John  the  Baptist  ( Mai.  4:5;  cf.  Mat.  11 : 13,  14 ).  The  fact  that 
only  the  spirit  of  sacrifice  and  faith  is  to  be  revived  is  figuratively  indicated 
in  the  phrase:  "The  rest  of  the  dead  lived  not  again  until  the  thousand 
years  should  be  finished  "  —  the  spirit  of  persecution  and  unbelief  shall  be, 
as  it  were,  laid  to  sleep.  Since  resurrection,  like  the  coming  of  Christ 
and  the  judgment,  is  twofold,  first,  spiritual  (the  raising  of  the  soul  to 
spiritual  life ),  and  secondly,  physical  ( the  raising  of  the  body  from  the 
grave ),  the  words  in  Rev.  20  :  5  —  "this  is  the  first  resurrection  "  —  seem 
intended  distinctly  to  preclude  the  literal  interpretation  we  are  combating. 
In  short,  we  hold  that  Rev.  20  :  4-10  does  not  describe  the  events  commonly 
called  the  second  advent  and  resurrection,  but  rather  describes  great  spirit- 
ual changes  in  the  later  history  of  the  church,  which  are  typical  of,  and 
preliminary  to,  the  second  advent  and  resurrection,  and  therefore,  after 
the  prophetic  method,  are  foretold  in  language  literally  applicable  only  to 
those  final  events  themselves  (cf.  Ez.  37  : 1-14  ;  Luke  15  :  32 ). 

IV.    THE  RESUEBECTION. 

While  the  Scriptures  describe  the  impartation  of  new  life  to  the  soul  in 
regeneration  as  a  spiritual  resurrection,  they  also  declare  that,  at  the  second 
coming  of  Christ,  there  shall  be  a  resurrection  of  the  body,  and  a  reunion 
of  the  body  to  the  soul  from  which,  during  the  intermediate  state,  it  has 
been  separated.  Both  the  just  and  the  unjust  shall  have  part  in  the  resur- 
rection. To  the  just,  it  shall  be  a  resurrection  unto  life  ;  and  the  body  shall 
be  a  body  like  Christ's — a  body  fitted  for  the  uses  of  the  sanctified  spirit. 
To  the  unjust,  it  shall  be  a  resurrection  unto  condemnation  ;  and  analogy 
would  seem  to  indicate  that,  here  also,  the  outward  form  will  fitly  represent 
the  inward  state  of  the  soul — being  corrupt  and  deformed  as  is  the  soul 
which  inhabits  it.  Those  who  are  living  at  Christ's  coming  shall  receive 
spiritual  bodies  without  passing  through  death.  As  the  body  after  corrup- 


THE   RESURRECTION.  265 

tion  and  dissolution,  so  the  outward  world  after  destruction  by  fire,  shall  be 
rehabilitated  and  fitted  for  the  abode  of  the  saints. 

Upon  the  subject  of  the  resurrection,  our  positive  information  is  derived 
wholly  from  the  word  of  God.  Further  discussion  of  it  may  be  most 
naturally  arranged  in  a  series  of  answers  to  objections.  The  objections 
commonly  urged  against  the  doctrine,  as  above  propounded,  may  be 
reduced  to  two  : 

1.  The  exegetical  objection, —  that  it  rests  upon  a  literalizing  of  meta- 
phorical language,  and  has  no  sufficient  support  in  Scripture.    To  this  we 
answer : 

( a)  That,  though  the  phrase  "  resurrection  of  the  body  "  does  not  occur 
in  the  New  Testament,  the  passages  which  describe  the  event  indicate  a 
physical,  as  distinguished  from  a  spiritual,   change  (  John  5  : 28,  29  ;  Phil. 
3  : 21 ;  1  Thess.  4  : 13-17 ).     The  phrase  "  spiritual  body  "  ( 1  Cor.  15  : 44 ) 
is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  if  it  be  understood  as  signifying  'a  body  which 
is  simple  spirit.'    It    can  only  be    interpreted  as  meaning  a   material 
organism,  perfectly  adapted  to  be  the  outward  expression  and  vehicle  of  the 
purified  soul.     The  purely  spiritual  interpretation  is,  moreover,  expressly 
excluded  by  the  apostolic  denial  that  "the  resurrection  is  past  already" 
(  2  Tim.  2  : 18  ),  and  by  the  fact  that  there  is  a  resurrection  of  the  unjust,  as 
well  as  of  the  just  (  Acts  24  : 15  ). 

( b )  That  the  redemption  of  Christ  is  declared  to  include  the  body  as 
well  as  the  soul  (Bom.  8:23;  1  Cor.  6:13-20).     The  indwelling  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  has  put  such  honor  upon  the  frail  mortal  tenement  which  he 
has  made  his  temple,  that  God  would  not  permit  even  this  wholly  to  perish 
( Bom.  8  : 11  —  &d  T6  ivomovv  avrov  trvEVfia  kv  v/j.2vt  i.  e.,  because  of  his  indwell- 
ing Spirit,  God  will  raise  up  the  mortal  body ).     It  is  this  belief  which 
forms  the  basis  of  Christian  care  for  the  dead  (Phil.  3 :21 ;  c/.  Mat.  22  :32). 

( c )  That  the  nature  of  Christ's  resurrection,  as  literal  and  physical, 
determines  the  nature  of  the  resurrection  in  the  case  of  believers  ( Luke 
24  : 36  ;  John  20  : 27 ).     As,  in  the  case  of  Christ,   the  same  body  that  was 
laid  in  the  tomb  was  raised  again,  although  possessed  of  new  and  surpris- 
ing powers,  so  the  Scriptures  intimate,   not  simply  that  the  saints  shall 
have  bodies,  but  that  these  bodies  shall  be  in  some  proper  sense  an  out- 
growth or  transformation  of  the  very  bodies  that  slept  in  the  dust  (  Dan. 
12  :2  ;  1  Cor.  15  :  53,  54).     The  denial  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  in 
the  case  of  believers,  leads  naturally  to  a  denial  of  the  reality  of  Christ's 
resurrection  (  1  Cor.  15  : 13  ). 

(  d  )  That  the  accompanying  events,  as  the  second  coming  and  the  judg- 
ment, since  they  are  themselves  literal,  imply  that  the  resurrection  is  also 
literal. 

2.  The  scientific  objection.— This  is  threefold  : 

( a )  That  a  resurrection  of  the  particles  which  compose  the  body  at 
death  is  impossible,  since  they  enter  into  new  combinations,  and  not  unfre- 
quently  become  parts  of  other  bodies  which  the  doctrine  holds  to  be  raised 
at  the  same  time. 


266        ESCHATOLOQY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  FINAL  THINGS. 

We  reply  that  the  Scripture  not  only  does  not  compel  us  to  hold,  but  it 
distinctly  denies,  that  all  the  particles  which  exist  in  the  body  at  death  are 
present  in  the  resurrection-body  ( 1  Cor.  15  :37 — ov  TO  cti/w  TO  yevrjco^vov  ; 
50  ).  The  Scripture  seems  only  to  indicate  a  certain  physical  connection 
between  the  new  and  the  old,  although  the  nature  of  this  connection  is  not 
revealed.  So  long  as  the  physical  connection  is  maintained,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  suppose  that  even  a  germ  or  particle  that  belonged  to  the  old  body 
exists  in  the  new. 

(  b )  That  a  resurrection-body,  having  such  a  remote  physical  connection 
with  the  present  body,  cannot  be  recognized  by  the  inhabiting  soul  or  by 
other  witnessing  spirits  as  the  same  with  that  which  was  laid  in  the  grave. 

To  this  we  reply  that  bodily  identity  does  not  consist  in  absolute  same- 
ness of  particles  during  the  whole  history  of  the  body,  but  in  the  organizing 
force,  which,  even  in  the  flux  and  displacement  of  physical  particles,  makes 
the  old  the  basis  of  the  new,  and  binds  both  together  in  the  unity  of  a 
single  consciousness.  In  our  recognition  of  friends,  moreover,  we  are  not 
wholly  dependent,  even  in  this  world,  upon  our  perception  of  bodily  form ; 
and  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  in  the  future  state  there  may  be  methods 
of  communication  far  more  direct  and  intuitive  than  those  with  which  we 
are  familiar  here. 

(  c )  That  a  material  organism  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  hindrance  to  the 
free  activity  of  the  spirit,  and  that  the  assumption  of  such  an  organism  by 
the  soul,  which,  during  the  intermediate  state,  had  been  separated  from  the 
body,  would  indicate  a  decline  in  dignity  and  power  rather  than  a  progress. 

We  reply  that  we  cannot  estimate  the  powers  and  capacities  of  matter, 
when  brought  by  God  into  complete  subjection  to  the  spirit.  The  bodies 
of  the  saints  may  be  more  ethereal  than  the  air,  and  capable  of  swifter 
motion  than  the  light,  and  yet  be  material  in  their  substance.  That  the 
soul,  clothed  with  its  spiritual  body,  will  have  more  exalted  powers  and 
enjoy  a  more  complete  felicity  than  would  be  possible  while  it  maintained 
a  purely  spiritual  existence,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  Paul  represents 
the  culmination  of  the  soul's  blessedness  as  occurring,  not  at  death,  but  at 
the  resurrection  of  the  body. 

We  may  sum  up  our  answers  to  objections,  and  may  at  the  same  time 
throw  light  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  by  suggesting  four  prin- 
ciples which  should  govern  our  thinking  with  regard  to  the  subject, — these 
namely  :  1.  Body  is  in  continual  flux ;  2.  Since  matter  is  but  the  manifesta- 
tion of  God's  mind  and  will,  body  is  plastic  in  God's  hands  ;  3.  The  soul  in 
complete  union  with  God  may  be  endowed  with  the  power  of  God ;  4.  Soul 
determines  body,  and  not  body  soul,  as  the  materialist  imagines. 

V.    THE  LAST  JUDGMENT. 

While  the  Scriptures  represent  all  punishment  of  individual  transgressors 
and  all  manifestations  of  God's  vindicatory  justice  in  the  history  of  nations 
as  acts  or  processes  of  judgment,  they  also  intimate  that  these  temporal 
judgments  are  only  partial  and  imperfect,  and  that  they  are  therefore  to  be 
concluded  with  a  final  and  complete  vindication  of  God's  righteousness. 


.       THE   LAST   JUDGMENT.  267 

This  will  be  accomplished  by  making  known  to  the  universe  the  characters 
of  all  men,  and  by  awarding  to  them  corresponding  destinies. 

1.  The  nature  of  the  final  judgment. 

The  final  judgment  is  not  a  spiritual,  invisible,  endless  process,  identical 
with  God's  providence  in  history,  but  is  an  outward  and  visible  event, 
occurring  at  a  definite  period  in  the  future.  This  we  argue  from  the  fol- 
lowing considerations  : 

(a)  The  judgment  is  something  for  which  the  evil  are  "reserved"  (2 
Peter  2  : 4,  9 ) ;  something  to  be  expected  in  the  future  (Acts  24 : 25  ;  Heb. 
10  : 27 )  ;  something  after  death  (  Heb.  9:27)  ;  something  for  which  the 
resurrection  is  a  preparation  (  John  5  : 29  ). 

( 6  )  The  accompaniments  of  the  judgment,  such  as  the  second  coming  of 
Christ,  the  resurrection,  and  the  outward  changes  of  the  earth,  are  events 
which  have  an  outward  and  visible,  as  well  as  an  inward  and  spiritual, 
aspect.  We  are  compelled  to  interpret  the  predictions  of  the  last  judgment 
upon  the  same  principle. 

(c)  God's  justice,  in  the  historical  and  imperfect  work  of  judgment, 
needs  a  final  outward  judgment  as  its  vindication.  "  A  perfect  justice  must 
judge,  not  only  moral  units,  but  moral  aggregates ;  not  only  the  particulars 
of  life,  but  the  life  as  a  whole. "  The  crime  that  is  hidden  and  triumphant 
here,  and  the  goodness  that  is  here  maligned  and  oppressed,  must  be 
brought  to  light  and  fitly  recompensed.  "Otherwise  man  is  a  Tantalus — 
longing  but  never  satisfied";  and  God's  justice,  of  which  his  outward 
administration  is  the  expression,  can  only  be  regarded  as  approximate. 

2.  The  object  of  the  final  judgment. 

The  object  of  the  final  judgment  is  not  the  ascertainment,  but  the  mani- 
festation, of  character,  and  the  assignment  of  outward  condition  corre- 
sponding to  it. 

(a)  To  the  omniscient  Judge,  the  condition  of  all  moral  creatures  is 
already  and  fully  known.  The  last  day  will  be  only  "the  revelation  of 
the  righteous  judgment  of  God." 

(  6  )  In  the  nature  of  man,  there  are  evidences'and  preparations  for  this 
final  disclosure.  Among  these  may  be  mentioned  the  law  of  memory,  by 
which  the  soul  preserves  the  records  of  its  acts,  both  good  and  evil  (  Luke 
16 : 25 )  ;  the  law  of  conscience,  by  which  men  involuntarily  anticipate 
punishment  for  their  own  sins  ( Eom.  2  : 15,  16  ;  Heb.  10  : 27  )  ;  the  law  of 
character,  by  which  every  thought  and  deed  makes  indelible  impress  upon 
the  moral  nature  ( Heb.  3:8,  15 ). 

(  c  )  Single  acts  and  words,  therefore,  are  to  be  brought  into  the  judg- 
ment only  as  indications  of  the  moral  condition  of  the  soul.  This  manifes- 
tation of  all  hearts  will  vindicate  not  only  God's  past  dealings,  but  his 
determination  of  future  destinies. 


268         ESCHATOLOGY,    OR   THE    DOCTRINE   OF   FINAL  THINGS. 

3.     The  Judge  in  the  final  judgment. 

God,  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  is  to  be  the  judge.  Though  God  is 
the  judge  of  all  (  Heb.  12  : 23  ),  yet  this  judicial  activity  is  exercised  through 
Christ,  at  the  last  day,  as  well  as  in  the  present  state  (  John  5 : 22,  27 ). 

This,  for  three  reasons  : 

( a  )  Christ's  human  nature  enables  men  to  understand  both  the  law  and 
the  love  of  God,  and  so  makes  intelligible  the  grounds  on  which  judgment 


(6)  The  perfect  human  nature  of  Christ,  united  as  it  is  to  the  divine, 
ensures  all  that  is  needful  in  true  judgment,  viz.:  that  it  be  both  merciful 
and  just. 

(c )  Human  nature,  sitting  upon  the  throne  of  judgment,  will  afford  con- 
vincing proof  that  Christ  has  received  the  reward  of  his  sufferings,  and 
that  humanity  has  been  perfectly  redeemed.  The  saints  shall  "  judge  the 
world  "  only  as  they  are  one  with  Christ. 

4.  The  subjects  of  the  final  judgment. 

The  persons  upon  whose  characters  and  conduct  this  judgment  shall  be 
passed  are  of  two  great  classes  : 

( a )  All  men  —  each  possessed  of  body  as  well  as  soul,  — the  dead  having 
been  raised,  and  the  living  having  been  changed. 

(6)  All  evil  angels, — good  angels  appearing  only  as  attendants  and 
ministers  of  the  Judge. 

5.  The  grounds  of  the  final  judgment. 
These  will  be  two  in  number : 

( a  )   The  law  of  God,  —  as  made  known  in  conscience  and  in  Scripture. 

(  6 )  The  grace  of  Christ  (Rev.  20 : 12 ), — those  whose  names  are  found 
"written  inthebook  of  life  "  being  approved,  simply  because  of  their  union 
with  Christ  and  participation  in  his  righteousness.  Their  good  works  shall 
be  brought  into  judgment  only  as  proofs  of  this  relation  to  the  Redeemer. 
Those  not  found  "  written  in  the  book  of  life  "  will  be  judged  by  the  law  of 
God,  as  God  has  made  it  known  to  each  individual. 

VI.    THE  FINAL  STATES  OF  THE  RIGHTEOUS  AND  OF  THE  WICKED. 
1.     Of  the  righteous. 

The  final  state  of  the  righteous  is  described  as  eternal  life  (Mat.  25  : 46 ), 
glory  (  2  Cor.  4  : 17 ),  rest  (  Heb.  4:9),  knowledge  ( 1  Cor.  13  :8-10  ),  holi- 
ness (Rev.  21  :27),  service  (Rev.  22  : 3),  worship  (Rev.  19:1),  society 
(Heb.  12  :23  ),  communion  with  God  ( Rev.  21 : 3 ). 

Summing  up  all  these,  we  may  say  that  it  is  the  fulness  and  perfection  of 
holy  life,  in  communion  with  God  and  with  sanctified  spirits.  Although 
there  will  be  degrees  of  blessedness  and  honor,  proportioned  to  the  capacity 


FINAL  STATES  OF  THE   RIGHTEOUS  AHD   OF  THE  WICKED.    269 

and  fidelity  of  each  soul  (Luke  19  :17,  19  ;  1  Cor.  3  :14,  15),  each  will 
receive  as  great  a  measure  of  reward  as  it  can  contain  (  1  Cor.  2:9),  and 
this  final  state,  once  entered  upon,  will  be  unchanging  in  kind  and  endless 
in  duration  ( Rev.  3  :12  ;  22  : 15 ). 

With  regard  to  heaven,  two  questions  present  themselves,  namely : 
( a  )  Is  heaven  a  place,  as  well  as  a  state  ? 

We  answer  that  this  is  probable,  for  the  reason  that  the  presence  of 
Christ's  human  body  is  essential  to  heaven,  and  that  this  body  must  be 
confined  to  place.  Since  deity  and  humanity  are  indissolubly  united  in 
Christ's  single  person,  we  cannot  regard  Christ's  human  soul  as  limited  to 
place  without  vacating  his  person  of  its  divinity.  But  we  cannot  conceive 
of  his  human  body  as  thus  omnipresent.  As  the  new  bodies  of  the  saints 
are  confined  to  place,  so,  it  would  seem,  must  be  the  body  of  their  Lord. 
But,  though  heaven  be  the  place  where  Christ  manifests  his  glory  through 
the  human  body  which  he  assumed  in  the  incarnation,  our  ruling  concep- 
tion of  heaven  must  be  something  higher  even  than  this,  namely,  that  of  a 
state  of  holy  communion  with  God. 

( b  )  Is  this  earth  to  be  the  heaven  of  the  saints  ?    We  answer : 

First, — that  the  earth  is  to  be  purified  by  fire,  and  perhaps  prepared  to 
be  the  abode  of  the  saints, — although  this  last  is  not  rendered  certain  by 
the  Scriptures. 

Secondly,  —  that  this  fitting-up  of  the  earth  for  man's  abode,  even  if  it 
were  declared  in  Scripture,  would  not  render  it  certain  that  the  saints  are 
to  be  confined  to  these  narrow  limits  (John  14  : 2  ).  It  seems  rather  to  be 
intimated  that  the  effect  of  Christ's  work  will  be  to  bring  the  redeemed  into 
union  and  intercourse  with  other  orders  of  intelligence,  from  communion 
with  whom  they  are  now  shut  out  by  sin  (  Eph.  1 : 20 ;  CoL  1 : 20 ). 

2.     Of  the  wicked. 

The  final  state  of  the  wicked  is  described  under  the  figures  of  eternal  fire 
(Mat.  25  : 41 ) ;  the  pit  of  the  abyss  (  Eev.  9:2,  11 );  outer  darkness  ( Mat. 
8  : 12  )  ;  torment  (  Eev.  14  : 10,  11 )  ;  eternal  punishment  (  Mat.  25  : 46)  ; 
wrath  of  God  (  Bom.  2:5);  second  death  ( Bev.  21:8)  ;  eternal  destruc- 
tion from  the  face  of  the  Lord  ( 2  Thess.  1:9);  eternal  sin  (  Mark  3  : 29  ). 

Summing  up  all,  we  may  say  that  it  is  the  loss  of  all  good,  whether 
physical  or  spiritual,  and  the  misery  of  an  evil  conscience  banished  from 
God  and  from  the  society  of  the  holy,  and  dwelling  under  God's  positive 
curse  forever.  Here  we  are  to  remember,  as  in  the  case  of  the  final  state  of 
the  righteous,  that  the  decisive  and  controlling  element  is  not  the  outward, 
but  the  inward.  If  hell  be  a  place,  it  is  only  that  the  outward  may  corres- 
pond to  the  inward.  If  there  be  outward  torments,  it  is  only  because  these 
will  be  fit,  though  subordinate,  accompaniments  of  the  inward  state  of  the 
soul. 

In  our  treatment  of  the  subject  of  eternal  punishment  we  must  remember 
that  false  doctrine  is  often  a  reaction  from  the  unscriptural  and  repulsive 
over-statements  of  Christian  apologists.  We  freely  concede  :  1.  that  future 


270        ESCHATOLOGY,   OE  THE   DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  THINGS. 

punishment  does  not  necessarily  consist  of  physical  torments,  —  it  may  be 
wholly  internal  and  spiritual ;  2.  that  the  pain  and  suffering  of  the  future 
are  not  necessarily  due  to  positive  inflictions  of  God, —  they  may  result 
entirely  from  the  soul's  sense  of  loss,  and  from  the  accusations  of  con- 
science ;  and  3.  that  eternal  punishment  does  not  necessarily  involve  end- 
less successions  of  suffering, —  as  God's  eternity  is  not  mere  endlessness,  so 
we  may  not  be  forever  subject  to  the  law  of  time. 

In  order,  however,  to  meet  opposing  views,  and  to  forestall  the  common 
objections,  we  proceed  to  state  the  doctrine  of  future  punishment  in  greater 
detail : 

A.  The  future  punishment  of  the  wicked  is  not  annihilation. — In  our 
discussion  of  Physical  Death,  we  have  shown  that,  by  virtue  of  its  original 
creation  in  the  image  of  God,  the  human  soul  is  naturally  immortal ;  that 
neither  for  the  righteous  nor  the  wicked  is  death  a  cessation  of  being  ;  that 
on  the  contrary,  the  wicked  enter  at  death  upon  a  state  of  conscious  suffer- 
ing which  the  resurrection  and  the  judgment  only  augment  and  render 
permanent.     It  is  plain,  moreover,  that  if  annihilation  took  place  at  death, 
there  could  be  no  degrees  in  future  punishment, — a  conclusion  itself  at 
variance  with  express  statements  of  Scripture. 

There  are  two  forms  of  the  annihilation  theory  which  are  more  plausible, 
and  which  in  recent  times  find  a  larger  number  of  advocates,  namely : 

(a)  That  the  powers  of  the  wicked   are  gradually  weakened,   as  the 
natural  result  of  sin,  so  that  they  finally  cease  to  be. — We  reply,  first,  that 
moral  evil  does  not,  in  this  present  life,  seem  to  be  incompatible  with  a 
constant  growth  of  the  intellectual  powers,  at  least  in  certain  directions,  and 
we  have  no  reason  to  believe  the  fact  to  be  different  in  the  world  to  come  ; 
secondly,  that  if  this  theory  were  true,  the  greater  the  sin,  the  speedier 
would  be  the  relief  from  punishment. 

( b )  That  there  is  for  the  wicked,  certainly  after  death,  and  possibly 
between  death  and  the  judgment,  a  positive  punishment  proportioned  to 
their  deeds,  but  that  this  punishment  issues  in,  or  is  followed  by,  annihila- 
tion.— We  reply  first,  that  upon  this  view,  as  upon  any  theory  of  annihila- 
tion, future  punishment  is  a  matter  of  grace  as  well  as  of  justice  —  a  notion 
for  which  Scripture  affords  no  warrant ;  secondly,  that  Scripture  not  only 
gives  no  hint  of  the  cessation  of  this  punishment,  but  declares  in  the 
strongest  terms  its  endlessness. 

Since  neither  one  of  these  two  forms  of  the  annihilation  theory  is 
Scriptural  or  rational,  we  avail  ourselves  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis  as 
throwing  light  upon  the  problem.  Death  is  not  degeneracy  ending  in 
extinction,  nor  punishment  ending  in  extinction, —  it  is  atavism  that  returns, 
or  tends  to  return,  to  the  animal  type.  As  moral  development  is  from  the 
brute  to  man,  so  abnormal  development  is  from  man  to  the  brute. 

B.  Punishment  after  death  excludes  new  probation  and  ultimate  restora- 
tion of  the  wicked. — Some  have  maintained  the  ultimate  restoration  of  all 
human  beings,  by  appeal  to  such  passages  as  the  following  :  Mat.  19  :  28  ; 
Acts3:21;  Eph.  1:9,  10. 


FINAL  STATES   OF  THE   RIGHTEOUS   AND   OF  THE   WICKED.    271 

( a )  These  passages,  as  obscure,  are  to  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of 
those  plainer  ones  which  we  have  already  cited.     Thus  interpreted,  they 
foretell  only  the  absolute  triumph  of  the  divine  kingdom,  and  the  subjec- 
tion of  all  evil  to  God. 

( b )  A  second  probation  is  not  needed  to  vindicate  the  justice  or  the  love 
of  God,  since  Christ,  the  immanent  God,  is  already  in  this  world  present 
with  every  human  soul,  quickening  the  conscience,  giving  to  each  man  his 
opportunity,  and  making  every  decision  between  right  and  wrong  a  true 
probation.  In  choosing  evil  against  their  better  judgment  even  the  heathen 
unconsciously  reject  Christ.  Infants  and  idiots,  as  they  have  not  consciously 
sinned,  are,  as  we  may  believe,  saved  at  death  by  having  Christ  revealed  to 
them  and  by  the  regenerating  influence  of  his  Spirit. 

(  c  )  The  advocates  of  universal  restoration  are  commonly  the  most  stren- 
uous defenders  of  the  inalienable  freedom  of  the  human  will  to  make  choices 
contrary  to  its  past  character  and  to  all  the  motives  which  are  or  can  be 
brought  to  bear  upon  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  find  in  this  world  that 
men  choose  sin  in  spite  of  infinite  motives  to  the  contrary.  Upon  the 
theory  of  human  freedom  just  mentioned,  no  motives  which  God  can  use 
will  certainly  accomplish  the  salvation  of  all  moral  creatures.  The  soul 
which  resists  Christ  here  may  resist  him  forever. 

(d)  Upon  the  more  correct  view  of  the  will  which  we  have  advocated, 
the  case  is  more  hopeless  still.  Upon  this  view,  the  sinful  soul,  in  its  very 
sinning,  gives  to  itself  a  sinful  bent  of  intellect,  affection,  and  will ;  in  other 
words,  makes  for  itself  a  character,  which,  though  it  does  not  render  neces- 
sary, yet  does  render  certain,  apart  from  divine  grace,  the  continuance  of 
sinful  action.  In  itself  it  finds  a  self -formed  motive  to  evil  strong  enough 
to  prevail  over  all  inducements  to  holiness  which  God  sees  it  wise  to  bring 
to  bear.  It  is  in  the  next  world,  indeed,  subjected  to  suffering.  But  suffer- 
ing has  in  itself  no  reforming  power.  Unless  accompanied  by  special 
renewing  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  it  only  hardens  and  embitters  the 
soul.  We  have  no  Scripture  evidence  that  such  influences  of  the  Spirit  are 
exerted,  after  death,  upon  the  still  impenitent ;  but  abundant  evidence,  on 
the  contrary,  that  the  moral  condition  in  which  death  finds  men  is  their 
condition  forever. 

(  e  )  The  declaration  as  to  Judas,  in  Mat.  26  : 24,  could  not  be  true  upon 
the  hypothesis  of  a  final  restoration.  If  at  any  time,  even  after  the  lapse  of 
ages,  Judas  be  redeemed,  his  subsequent  infinite  duration  of  blessedness 
must  outweigh  all  the  finite  suffering  through  which  he  has  passed.  The 
Scripture  statement  that  "good  were  it  for  that  man  if  he  had  not  been 
born  "  must  be  regarded  as  a  refutation  of  the  theory  of  universal  restora- 
tion. 

C.  Scripture  declares  this  future  punishment  of  the  wicked  to  be  eternal. 
It  does  this  by  its  use  of  the  terms  aluv,  aluvLoq, —  Some,  however,  maintain 
that  these  terms  do  not  necessarily  imply  eternal  duration.  We  reply  : 

(  a )  It  must  be  conceded  that  these  words  do  not  etymologically  neces- 
sitate the  idea  of  eternity  ;  and  that,  as  expressing  the  idea  of  "  age-long," 
they  are  sometimes  used  in  a  limited  or  rhetorical  sense. 


272       ESCHATOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   FINAL  THINGS. 

(  6  )  They  do,  however,  express  the  longest  possible  duration  of  which 
the  subject  to  which  they  are  attributed  is  capable  ;  so  that,  if  the  soul  is 
immortal,  its  punishment  must  be  without  end. 

(  c )  If,  when  used  to  describe  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  they 
do  not  declare  the  endlessness  of  that  punishment,  there  are  no  words  in 
the  Greek  language  which  could  express  that  meaning. 

( d)  In  the  great  majority  of  Scripture  passages  where  they  occur,  they 
have  unmistakably  the  signification  "  everlasting.'*  They  are  used  to 
express  the  eternal  duration  of  God,  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit 
( Rom.  16  : 26  ;  1  Tim.  1  : 17  ;  Heb.  9  :14  ;  Eev.  1 : 18 ) ;  the  abiding  pres- 
ence of  the  Holy  Spirit  with  all  true  believers  (  John  14 : 17 )  ;  and  the 
endlessness  of  the  future  happiness  of  the  saints  (  Mai  19  : 29  ;  John  6  : 54, 
58;  2  Cor.  9:9). 

(  e  )  The  fact  that  the  same  word  is  used  in  Mat.  25  : 46  to  describe  both 
the  sufferings  of  the  wicked  and  the  happiness  of  the  righteous  shows  that 
the  misery  of  the  lost  is  eternal,  in  the  same  sense  as  the  life  of  God  or  the 
blessedness  of  the  saved. 

(/)  Other  descriptions  of  the  condemnation  and  suffering  of  the  lost, 
excluding,  as  they  do,  all  hope  of  repentance  or  forgiveness,  render  it  cer- 
tain that  aiuv  and  aluvioc,  in  the  passages  referred  to,  describe  a  punish- 
ment that  is  without  end. 

(g)  While,  therefore,  we  grant  that  we  do  not  know  the  nature  of 
eternity,  or  its  relation  to  time,  we  maintain  that  the  Scripture  representa- 
tions of  future  punishment  forbid  both  the  hypothesis  of  annihilation,  and 
the  hypothesis  that  suffering  will  end  in  restoration.  Whatever  eternity 
may  be,  Scripture  renders  it  certain  that  after  death  there  is  no  forgive- 


D.  This  everlasting  punishment  of  the  wicked  is  not  inconsistent  with 
God's  justice,  but  is  rather  a  revelation  of  that  justice. 

(  a )  We  have  seen  in  our  discussion  of  Penalty  ( pages  652-656 )  that  its 
object  is  neither  reformatory  nor  deterrent,  but  simply  vindicatory ;  in 
other  words,  that  it  primarily  aims,  not  at  the  good  of  the  offender,  nor  at 
the  welfare  of  society,  but  at  the  vindication  of  law.  We  have  also  seen 
(  pages  269,  291 )  that  justice  is  not  a  form  of  benevolence,  but  is  the  expres- 
sion and  manifestation  of  God's  holiness.  Punishment,  therefore,  as  the 
inevitable  and  constant  reaction  of  that  holiness  against  its  moral  opposite, 
cannot  come  to  an  end  until  guilt  and  sin  come  to  an  end. 

(  b  )  But  guilt,  or  ill-desert,  is  endless.  However  long  the  sinner  may 
be  punished,  he  never  ceases  to  be  ill-deserving.  Justice,  therefore,  which 
gives  to  all  according  to  their  deserts,  cannot  cease  to  punish.  Since  the 
reason  for  punishment  is  endless,  the  punishment  itself  must  be  endless. 
Even  past  sins  involve  an  endless  guilt,  to  which  endless  punishment  is 
simply  the  inevitable  correlate. 

( c )  Not  only  eternal  guilt,  but  eternal  sin,  demands  eternal  punish- 
ment. So  long  as  moral  creatures  are  opposed  to  God,  they  deserve  pun- 


FINAL   STATES   OF   THE   RIGHTEOUS   ASTD   OF  THE  WICKED.      273 

isliment.  Since  we  cannot  measure  the  power  of  the  depraved  will  to  resist 
God,  we  cannot  deny  the  possibility  of  endless  sinning.  Sin  tends  ever- 
more to  reproduce  itself.  The  Scriptures  speak  of  an  "  eternal  sin  "  (  Mark 
3  :  29  ).  But  it  is  just  in  God  to  visit  endless  sinning  with  endless  punish- 
ment. Sin,  moreover,  is  not  only  an  act,  but  also  a  condition  or  state,  of 
the  soul ;  this  state  is  impure  and  abnormal,  involves  misery  ;  this  misery, 
as  appointed  by  God  to  vindicate  law  and  holiness,  is  punishment ;  this 
punishment  is  the  necessary  manifestation  of  God's  justice.  Not  the 
punishing,  but  the  not-punishing,  would  impugn  his  justice ;  for  if  it  is  just 
to  punish  sin  at  all,  it  is  just  to  punish  it  as  long  as  it  exists. 

( d  )  The  actual  facts  of  human  life  and  the  tendencies  of  modern  science 
show  that  this  principle  of  retributive  justice  is  inwrought  into  the  elements 
and  forces  of  the  physical  and  moral  universe.  On  the  one  hand,  habit 
begets  fixity  of  character,  and  in  the  spiritual  world  sinful  acts,  often 
repeated,  produce  a  permanent  state  of  sin,  which  the  soul,  unaided,  cannot 
change.  On  the  other  hand,  organism  and  environment  are  correlated  to 
each  other ;  and  in  the  spiritual  world,  the  selfish  and  impure  find  sur- 
roundings corresponding  to  their  nature,  while  the  surroundings  react 
upon  them  and  confirm  their  evil  character.  These  principles,  if  they  act 
in  the  next  life  as  they  do  in  this,  will  ensure  increasing  and  unending  pun- 
ishment. 

(e}  As  there  are  degrees  of  human  guilt,  so  future  punishment  may 
admit  of  degrees,  and  yet  in  all  those  degrees  be  infinite  in  duration.  The 
doctrine  of  everlasting  punishment  does  not  imply  that,  at  each  instant  of 
the  future  existence  of  the  lost,  there  is  infinite  pain.  A  line  is  infinite  in 
length,  but  it  is  far  from  being  infinite  in  breadth  or  thickness.  "An 
infinite  series  may  make  only  a  finite  sum ;  and  infinite  series  may  differ 
infinitely  in  their  total  amount."  The  Scriptures  recognize  such  degrees 
in  future  punishment,  while  at  the  same  time  they  declare  it  to  be  endless 
( Luke  12 :47,  48 ;  Bev.  20  : 12,  13  ). 

(/)  We  know  the  enormity  of  sin  only  by  God's  own  declarations  with 
regard  to  it,  and  by  the  sacrifice  which  he  has  made  to  redeem  us  from  it. 
As  committed  against  an  infinite  God,  and  as  having  in  itself  infinite  possi- 
bilities of  evil,  it  may  itself  be  infinite,  and  may  deserve  infinite  punish- 
ment. Hell,  as  well  as  the  Cross,  indicates  God's  estimate  of  sin. 

E.  This  everlasting  punishment  of  the  wicked  is  not  inconsistent  with 
God's  benevolence. — It  is  maintained,  however,  by  many  who  object  to 
eternal  retribution,  that  benevolence  requires  God  not  to  inflict  punish- 
ment upon  his  creatures  except  as  a  means  of  attaining  some  higher  good. 
We  reply : 

(a)  God  is  not  only  benevolent  but  holy,  and  ioliness  is  his  ruling 
attribute.  The  vindication  of  God's  holiness  is  the  primary  and  sufficient 
object  of  punishment.  This  constitutes  a  good  which  fully  justifies  the 
infliction. 

(  b )  In  this  life,  God's  justice  does  involve  certain  of  his  creatures  in 
sufferings  which  are  of  no  advantage  to  the  individuals  who  suffer ;  as  in 


ESCHATOLOGY,    OR  THE   DOCTRINE   OF  FINAL  THINGS. 

the  case  of  penalties  which  do  not  reform,  and  of  afflictions  which  only 
harden  and  embitter.  If  this  be  a  fact  here,  it  may  be  a  fact  hereafter. 

(c)  The  benevolence  of  God,  as  concerned  for  the  general  good  of  the 
universe,  requires  the  execution  of  the  full  penalty  of  the  law  upon  all  who 
reject  Christ's  salvation.  The  Scriptures  intimate  that  God's  treatment  of 
human  sin  is  matter  of  instruction  to  all  moral  beings.  The  self -chosen 
ruin  of  the  few  may  be  the  salvation  of  the  many. 

( d  )  The  present  existence  of  sin  and  punishment  is  commonly  admitted 
to  be  in  some  way  consistent  with  God's  benevolence,  in  that  it  is  made  the 
means  of  revealing  God's  justice  and  mercy.  If  the  temporary  existence  of 
sin  and  punishment  lead  to  good,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  their  eternal 
existence  may  lead  to  yet'greater  good. 

( e  )  As  benevolence  in  God  seems  in  the  beginning  to  have  permitted 
moral  evil,  not  because  sin  was  desirable  in  itself,  but  only  because  it  was 
incident  to  a  system  which  provided  for  the  highest  possible  freedom  and 
holiness  in  the  creature  ;  so  benevolence  in  God  may  to  the  end  permit  the 
existence  of  sin  and  may  continue  to  punish  the  sinner,  undesirable  as  these 
things  are  in  themselves,  because  they  are  incidents  of  a  system  which  pro- 
vides for  the  highest  possible  freedom  and  holiness  in  the  creature  through 
eternity. 

F.  The  proper  preaching  of  the  doctrine  of  everlasting  punishment  is 
not  a  hindrance  to  the  success  of  the  gospel,  but  is  one  of  its  chief  and 
indispensable  auxiliaries. — It  is  maintained  by  some,  however,  that,  because 
men  are  naturally  repelled  by  it,  it  cannot  be  a  part  of  the  preacher's 
message.  We  reply : 

(  a  )  If  the  doctrine  be  true,  and  clearly  taught  in  Scripture,  no  fear  of 
consequences  to  ourselves  or  to  others  can  absolve  us  from  the  duty  of 
preaching  it.  The  minister  of  Christ  is  under  obligation  to  preach  the 
whole  truth  of  God ;  if  he  does  this,  God  will  care  for  the  results. 

( b )  All  preaching  which  ignores  the  doctrine  of  eternal  punishment  just 
so  far  lowers  the  holiness  of  God,  of  which  eternal  punishment  is  an  expres- 
sion, and  degrades  the  work  of  Christ,  which  was  needful  to  save  us  from 
it.  The  success  of  such  preaching  can  be  but  temporary,  and  must  be  fol- 
lowed by  a  disastrous  reaction  toward  rationalism  and  immorality. 

( c  )  The  fear  of  future  punishment,  though  not  the  highest  motive,  is 
yet  a  proper  motive,  for  the  renunciation  of  sin  and  the  turning  to  Christ. 
It  must  therefore  be  appealed  to,  in  the  hope  that  the  seeking  of  salvation 
which  begins  in  fear  of  God's  anger  may  end  in  the  service  of  faith  and  love. 

( d  )  In  preaching  this  doctrine,  while  we  grant  that  the  material  images 
used  in  Scripture  to  set  forth  the  sufferings  of  the  lost  are  to  be  spiritually 
and  not  literally  interpreted,  we  should  still  insist  that  the  misery  of  the 
soul  which  eternally  hates  God  is  greater  than  the  physical  pains  which  are 
used  to  symbolize  it.  Although  a  hard  and  mechanical  statement  of  the 
truth  may  only  awaken  opposition,  a  solemn  and  feeling  presentation  of  ifc 
upon  proper  occasions,  and  in  its  due  relation  to  the  work  of  Christ  and  the 
offers  of  the  gospel,  cannot  fail  to  accomplish  God's  purpose  in  preaching, 
and  to  be  the  means  of  saving  some  who  hear. 

Z^S. 

OP  THE  X 

UNIVERSITY) 


CALIFOT?T 


14  DAY  USE 

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